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years that followed, he turned his attention away from medicine as his hold on power solidified. Each of these
episodes demonstrates that official claims that there was simply not enough money to improve health services
have almost always been abandoned during periods of political crisis. Still, these moments have been
infrequent; placidity, and not just poverty, helps account for Malawi's dismal medical infrastructure.
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ABSTRACT 
DIVIDENDS OF DISQUIET: POPULAR POLITICS AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN 
THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT MEDICAL SERVICES IN 
NYASALAND/MALAWI, 1914-1983 
Luke Messac 
Robert Aronowitz 
This dissertation is a history of medicine in development planning and popular politics in 
Malawi between the First World War and 1980. Using archival sources and oral histories, 
this dissertation seeks to explain when and why access to biomedical care became a 
central political concern and budgetary priority. During both the colonial and early post-
colonial eras, Malawi's governments increased spending on biomedical care to 
demonstrate beneficence, particularly when they faced popular reactions to widely hated 
policies. Government officials and international advisers persistently attributed Malawi's 
inadequate medical provision to the nation's poverty, but changes in health spending 
have not automatically followed shifts in GDP or government revenues. Instead, the 
construction of new hospitals and dispensaries, the purchase of new supplies and 
medicines, and the addition of medical staff have almost always come in the wake of 
social unrest (in particular, following world wars and internal protests). Only at these 
moments was the government compelled to devote more resources to health. Yet unrest 
did not automatically lead to increases in Medical Department spending. Increases in 
health expenditure often came only after influential officials argued that there was a link 
between medical spending and regime stability. The first attempts to bring “Western” 
medicine to Nyasaland’s African population came after the great disruptions caused by 
the First World War. The most rapid increase in public sector health spending came 
during the Federation era, when popular protests threatened the government. This rise in 
spending occurred even though influential modernization theorists counseled 
governments like Nyasaland’s to avoid spending on health care. In the months after 
independence in 1964, President HK Banda abandoned health fees during a moment of 
political crisis. In the years that followed, he turned his attention away from medicine as 
his hold on power solidified. Each of these episodes demonstrates that official claims that 
there was simply not enough money to improve health services have almost always been 
abandoned during periods of political crisis. Still, these moments have been infrequent; 
placidity, and not just poverty, helps account for Malawi's dismal medical infrastructure.
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Introduction 
 
I. The thrall of scarcity and the narrowing of the historical imagination  
 
This dissertation interrogates a notion with an air of common sense. It is an idea that 
seems, to many scholars, so patently obvious as to merit only a fleeting mention. It is an 
old idea, and it has had many critics, but it remains a common justification for 
maintaining the status quo in global health. Here it is: public sector health care for poor 
people in poor countries is fated to be poor in quality and quantity. Inadequate funding, 
poorly trained medical staff, outdated drugs and equipment, and inefficient management 
are, in this formulation, a necessary consequence of a low GDP. In his A History of 
Global Health, Randall Packard captures the essence of this idea (which he emphatically 
does not endorse) in the following question: “It’s Africa and India, what did you 
expect?”1 A corollary is the contention that increased funding for health and other forms 
of social protection must await a rise in national income. This idea has had remarkable 
staying power, and has long foreclosed more careful inquiry into the actual forces that 
have influenced levels of government health spending in colonial and postcolonial 
settings. 
 
The idea that economically impoverished regions must have poorly funded health 
services has been repeated by politicians, and accepted by scholars, for decades. In her 
1944 report titled Welfare in the British Colonies the social anthropologist Lucy Mair 
(who had worked extensively in Nyasaland) claimed that government efforts to stem the 
																																																								1	Randall	Packard,	A	History	of	Global	Health:	Interventions	into	the	Lives	of	Other	
Peoples	(Baltimore,	MD:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	2016).	
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spread of transmissible diseases had “been hampered by the lack of funds and personnel 
sufficient to carry it out.”2  She did not interrogate any further the reasons for the “lack of 
funds” for this work. A decade later, in her report on a year of travels through many of 
Britain’s African colonies, Labour Party activist Joan Wicken noted that each colony had 
a per-capita income much lower than the United Kingdom’s. “Given these figures,” she 
concluded, “it is hardly surprising that Government officials constantly commented that 
certain things were desirable but not possible.”3 In her analysis, Africa’s “basic poverty” 
was sufficient explanation for governments’ “difficulty in providing the most elementary 
public services.”4 
 
More recent historical scholarship has, at times, continued to accept at face value colonial 
officials’ claims that resources were too scarce for robust social services, including health 
care. In a 1985 paper, the historian John Iliffe recounted the response by the Chief 
Secretary of Nyasaland to a report submitted by the Colonial Secretary’s Advisor on 
Social Welfare in 1950: “The conclusions were to spend more money,” reported the 
Chief Secretary, “and we have no more to spend.”5 The reader assumes that Iliffe is 
demonstrating colonial stinginess here, but in another section of the paper, Iliffe himself 
seems to lend credence to official pleas of poverty. He recounts the Nyasaland Financial 
Secretary’s denial of a native council’s 1949 proposal to set aside a portion of each 
																																																								
2 Lucy Philip Mair, Welfare in the British Colonies (New York: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1944). Page 81. 
3 Joan E. Wicken, “African Contrasts,” Alice Horsman Travelling Fellow, 1956-57 (Submitted to 
Somerville College, Oxford, January 1958), MSS.Afr.s.1726, BLOU. Page 7. 
4 Ibid. Page 6. 
5 John Iliffe, “The Poor in the Modern History of Malawi,” in Malawi: An Alternative Pattern of 
Development (Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 1985). Page 267 
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African’s hut tax to assist orphans and disabled adults; this refusal, Iliffe asserts, was a 
product of “governmental poverty joined with official ideology.” Thus Iliffe himself 
gives at least some credence to the government’s claim that low revenues are sufficient to 
explain the paltriness of public services and social protection programs.6  
 
The examples of this equation between poverty and poor social services are legion. In his 
history of Malawi’s medical services, John Lwanda contends that Malawi’s early 
postcolonial government “did not have enough resources to run universal medical 
services.”7 In an otherwise careful study of taxation in British colonial Africa, Leigh 
Gardner does not elaborate on her claim that postwar plans for improved social services 
in Northern Rhodesia and Kenya were stymied by “resource constraints.” She does not 
say whether these resource constraints stemmed from the stinginess of officials or the 
absolute poverty of colonial treasuries.8 
 
Yet some of these same scholars admit, at other points in their writings, that such claims 
of scarcity are too facile. “It is true that social services can only be secured by an 
adequate economic base,” said Wicken. But, she continued, the people of Britain 
“indirectly benefit” from the poverty of their colonial territories.9 Wicken did not explain 
in this passage precisely how citizens in Britain benefited from African poverty, but the 																																																								
6 Ibid. Page 267. 
7 John Lloyd Chipembere Lwanda, Colour, Class and Culture: A Preliminary Communication 
into the Creation of Doctors in Malawi, 1st edition (Glasgow: Dudu Nsomba, 2008). Page 38. 
This is curious claim, because Malawi’s government did, in fact, offer medical services that were 
free at the point of care after a very brief experiment with fees in late 1964 (see Chapter 8). 
8 Leigh Gardner, Taxing Colonial Africa : The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1st ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Page 155-156. 
9 Wicken, “African Contrasts.” Page 70. 
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rest of her report pointed to the use of low-wage labor on plantations and in mines by 
British capitalists. She suggested that since such a large share of the wealth drawn from 
African labor had filled British bank accounts, the UK Treasury’s long-standing 
insistence that colonies had to fund their social services with local revenue was 
inequitable. The people of Britain, Wicken declared, were obliged to use “some of our 
economic resources to break the vicious circles which bind the peoples of Africa in the 
chains of poverty.”10  
 
In her study of colonial taxation, Gardner also complicated her acceptance of official 
claims of “resource constraints” when she detailed increases in spending on health and 
education just before independence in both Kenya and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia, after 
independence). The extension of the franchise to more Africans gave them “greater 
bargaining power…and allowed them to lobby for fiscal transfers, thus fundamentally 
altering the politics of taxation and government expenditure.”11 Thus, the most important 
change allowing for increased social services spending was neither an increase in gross 
domestic product nor the growth of public revenues, but a shifting balance of political 
power between European settlers and African colonial subjects. These effects of new 
political pressures during decolonization belied to the oft-repeated claims that there was 
just not enough money to increase spending on health and education.  
 
It is certainly true that colonial officials administered vast populations with finances that 
were—to most contemporary British observers—absurdly paltry. Yet this “governmental 																																																								
10 Ibid. Page 83. 
11 Gardner, Taxing Colonial Africa. Page 238. 
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poverty” must be put into context. First, little of the revenue that administrators collected 
(or, often, forcibly extracted) in the form of hut taxes, poll taxes, income taxes, sales 
taxes, and customs duties was spent on health, education and social welfare. Officials 
hoping to spend more on social services in Nyasaland were continually frustrated by the 
burden of the colony’s massive debts, accrued in loans of dubious merit through a 
process described in Chapter 3. In 1937, 44 percent of Nyasaland’s public expenditure 
went toward servicing the colony’s debts. An additional six percent of Nyasaland’s 
public expenditure in that year was devoted to pension allowances for British colonial 
officials. By comparison, eight percent of government spending went toward health 
care.12 
 
Second, there were obvious sources of additional revenue that could have funded social 
services that colonial administrators in British Africa did not tap. One such source was 
extractive industry. Northern Rhodesia’s copper industry provides a particularly stark 
example of the extent of foregone revenues. In her 1941 Plan for Africa, Rita Hinden—
who will be a significant figure in Chapter 5—explained: 
These few facts illumine the extraordinary distribution of the produce of the 
Northern Rhodesian copper industry. Three private companies, registered in Great 
Britain, own the richest copper-fields in the world. The value of their exports 
reaches £10 million a year. Half of this sum is taken directly out of the country 
and handed over to shareholders, directors, and others. About half a million is 
paid to a chartered company which apparently does nothing at all to further the 
production of copper; another half-million is paid over in taxes to the British 
Treasury. About one million pounds is paid to a few thousand European 
employees of the company in Northern Rhodesia. The Rhodesian government is 
itself given half a million in taxes, and the native workers in the mines, ten times 																																																								
12 Ewout Frankema, “Colonial Taxation and Government Spending in British Africa, 1880–1940: 
Maximizing Revenue or Minimizing Effort?,” Explorations in Economic History 48, no. 1 
(January 2011): 136–49. Also see Gardner, Taxing Colonial Africa. Appendix 1. 
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as numerous as the Europeans, receive about one-quarter of a million pounds a 
year—less than the royalties of the Chartered Company!13 
 
With so much of the territory’s mineral wealth destined for capitalists in Britain or 
European laborers on the mines, there was little left for the Northern Rhodesian 
administration to devote to social services for the general population. In fiscal year 1937-
1938, the Northern Rhodesian administration collected £1 million in revenue, and 
government expenditure on the medical department was approximately £70,000.14 Thus, 
expatriated profits of the territory’s three major copper companies amounted to more than 
70 times the Northern Rhodesian government health budget.15 
 
Even while shareholders in London prospered, the UK Treasury maintained a nearly 
impregnable stance against using its own funds for colonial projects. Even after the 
passage of the 1929 Colonial Development Act, the Treasury maintained its policy that 
grants for capital expenditures (on new hospitals, for example) would not oblige the UK 
Treasury to cover recurrent expenditures (such as the staffing and equipping of those 
																																																								
13 Rita Hinden, Plan for Africa: A Report Prepared for the Colonial Bureau of the Fabian Society 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1941). Pages 53-54. The “chartered company” referred to 
is the British South Africa Company (BSAC), which had administered Northern Rhodesia until 
1924. Even after the UK government took responsibility for the administration of the colony, the 
BSAC retained sole possession of Northern Rhodesia’s mineral rights. 
14 Ibid. Page 102.  
15 In 2011, only 2.4 percent of 10 billion in revenues from Zambia’s copper mines accrued to the 
government. By then, the relationship between the state and private companies was similar to that 
maintained during the colonial era (but different from early postcolonial era of nationalization). 
See Tom Burgis, The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the 
Theft of Africa’s Wealth, First edition (London: Public Affairs, 2015).  
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hospitals).16 This policy would only begin to change at the end of the Second World War, 
following developments that will be explained in Chapter 6. 
 
So those officials and observers who argued that there was simply not enough money to 
pay for social services for Africans had to: first, ignore the relatively low portions of 
colonial budgets spent on such services; second, obfuscate about flows of wealth from the 
colonies to the metropole, and; third, maintain a hard line against releasing funds from 
the imperial treasury for colonial social services.17 The claims of scarcity were a 
simulacrum, a distorted vision of reality carefully maintained to deflect criticism and 
defend against any welfarist claims on public and private finances.  
 
One more piece of evidence that this claim of scarcity was a convenient construction was 
evident in patterns of public sector spending. In metropolitan Britain, the share of total 
government spending devoted to health care and sanitation rose steadily throughout the 
twentieth century (with the exception of 1914-1933 and 1939-1949, when vast increases 
in expenditures on armaments depressed the share going toward health). Figure 0.1 
demonstrates this relationship. This secular increase in the share of government spending 
on health (both medical care and public health) supports the oft-repeated claims by 
colonial officials and mid-century modernization theorists that health spending claims  																																																								
16 Stephen Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940 (Totowa, 
N.J.: F. Cass, 1984). Page 181. 
17 Britain was not the only colonial power that was loath to open the metropolitan treasury for 
colonial development. Elise Huillery has calculated that between 1907 and 1957 the French 
metropolis provided only two percent of French West Africa’s public revenue, while salaries for 
colonial executives and district administrators claimed more than 13 percent of local public 
expenditures. See Elise Huillery, “The Black Man’s Burden--The Cost of Colonization of French 
West Africa,” Journal of Economic History 74, no. 1 (2013): 1–38. Page 6. 
	 8	
 
Figure 0.1: Health spending as a share of total (central and local) government spending 
in the United Kingdom, 1900-2013. Source: 
http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/government_expenditure.html 
 
larger shares of public budgets as nations grow richer. But the same graph looks quite 
different when we use Malawi’s data. As shown in Figure 0.2, recurrent health spending 
(again, including both medical care and public health) as a share of total expenditure on 
the Malawi revenue account shows nothing resembling Britain’s steady increase. The 
share fell during the Second World War, but it was already on the decline during the 
1930s. It rose during the 1950s, and fell again during the 1960s. I will argue that changes 
in public expenditure on health services in Nyasaland were driven as much by political 
events and official perceptions of regime legitimacy as they were by aggregate 
production or public revenues. 
 
II. Medicine’s presence and absence in African history 
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This dissertation chronicles government medical care in Nyasaland and Malawi between 
the First World War and the dawn of the AIDS epidemic. This is not a history of health 
outcomes and mortality rates. Malawi has never had compulsory universal vital 
registration, so it is extremely difficult to discern how patterns of healthcare and political 
economy have affected morbidity and mortality rates. Some studies have attempted to 
determine the impact of health care on health outcomes in Africa using survey data. 
Because the most extensive survey data is quite recent, these studies tend not to have 
great historical depth.18 The most careful historical investigation of health care on health 
outcomes may be Shane Doyle’s painstaking study of three districts in Tanzania and 
Uganda; among other sources, he mined decades of parish records of births and deaths.19 
But in this dissertation, the focus is on government health spending and health care 
provision. 
 
Nor is this the history of one disease or individual. Instead it is a political and social 
history of a government medical system. The main actors are officials (in 
Nyasaland/Malawi, the United Kingdom, the United States and elsewhere in Africa), 
healthcare providers (both African and European), and patients (mostly African, though 
																																																								
18 The most well-known coordinator of developing-country health and demographic survey data, 
the Demographic and Health Survey Program (funded by USAID, UNICEF, UNFPA, the WHO 
and UNAIDS), began only in 1984). 
19 Shane (Shane Declan) Doyle, Before HIV : Sexuality, Fertility and Mortality in East Africa, 
1900-1980, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). For an overview of the influence of 
health care on health outcomes, see Paul Farmer, Matthew Basilico, and Luke Messac, “After 
McKeown: The Changing Roles of Biomedicine, Public Health and Economic Growth in 
Mortality Declines,” in Therapeutic Revolutions: Pharmaceuticals and Social Change in the 
Twentieth Century, Eds. Jeremy Greene, Flurin Condrau, Elizabeth Watkins (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2016).” 
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European settlers and officials sometimes enter the narrative).20 While historians of 
medicine in Africa have chronicled disease-specific campaigns,21 or mission hospitals,22 
detailed histories of government medical administration and practice are still few.23 
 
																																																								
20 Though this dissertation explores the influence of a number of events happening outside 
Malawi’s borders on its health policy, there are of course some that are emphasized at the 
expense of others. In particular, this dissertation is focused on events in the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and the Rhodesias (today, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Particularly during the late 
colonial and early postcolonial moments (chapters 8-10), there were influences from elsewhere. 
The Mau Mau rebellion took place at the same time as anti-Federation protests, and Nyerere’s 
long rule (and interest in community health care) in Tanzania was largely coincident with HK 
Banda’s reign. These intra-African influences are only briefly mentioned in this dissertation, as 
they are slightly less direct than the other influences that are explored in more depth. 
21 Maryinez Lyons, The Colonial Disease : A Social History of Sleeping Sickness in Northern 
Zaire, 1900-1940 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); John Farley, Bilharzia : A 
History of Imperial Tropical Medicine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); The 
Making of a Tropical Disease: A Short History of Malaria, 1 edition (Baltimore, Md.: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2011). 
22 Markku Hokkanen, Medicine and Scottish Missionaries in the Northern Malawi Region 1875-
1930 : Quests for Health in a Colonial Society (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2007); Michael 
Jennings, “‘Healing of Bodies, Salvation of Souls’: Missionary Medicine in Colonial Tanganyika, 
1870s-1939,” Journal of Religion in Africa 38, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 27–56; Terence O. 
Ranger, “Godly Medicine: The Ambiguities of Medical Mission in Southeastern Tanzania, 1900–
1945,” The Social Basis of Health and Healing in Africa, no. 30 (1992): 256; The Steamer 
Parish: The Rise and Fall of Missionary Medicine on an African Frontier, 1 edition (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004); Nancy Rose Hunt, A Colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, 
Medicalization, and Mobility in the Congo (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999). 
23 Ralph Schram, A History of the Nigerian Health Services (Ibadan University Press, 1971); 
Michael Gelfand, Proud Record: An Account of the Health Services Provided for Africans in the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Printed by the Govt. Printer for the Federal Information 
Dept, 1960); Michael Gelfand, A Service to the Sick: A History of the Health Services for 
Africans in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1953 (Gwelo, Rhodesia: Mambo Press, 1976); Ann Beck, A 
History of the British Medical Administration of East Africa, 1900-1950. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1970); Ann Beck, Medicine, Tradition, and Development in Kenya and 
Tanzania. 1920-1970, First Edition (Waltham, Mass: African Studies Assn, 1981); RT Mossop, 
History of Western Medicine in Zimbabwe (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997). C Baker, 
“The Government Medical Service in Malawi: An Administrative History, 1891-1974.,” Medical 
History 20, no. 3 (July 1976): 296–311. 
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Figure 0.2. Recurrent government health spending as share of total government 
recurrent expenditure, Nyasaland/Malawi, 1920-1980. Sources: Annual Medical 
Department Reports (1920-1952), Hazelwood & Henderson (1960) and DT Jack (1959) 
(1953-63), and Reports of 1974, 1979 and 1983 World Bank Missions to Malawi (1964-
1982). 
 
Those that do exist tend to focus on government development plans—while tending to 
downplay the fact that few were ever brought to fruition24—or to take a teleological 
perspective in which progress toward a robust system of lifesaving care was stepwise and 
steady.25 Even those histories that highlight the use of biomedical rationales for 
segregationist and economically exploitative policies do not generally highlight the extent 
to which medical care was or was not a part of the daily life of the average African 
subject.26  
																																																								
24 Ann Beck, A History of the British Medical Administration of East Africa, 1900-1950. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Ann Beck, Medicine, Tradition, and Development 
in Kenya and Tanzania. 1920-1970, First edition (Waltham, Mass: African Studies Assn, 1981). 
25 Baker, “The Government Medical Service in Malawi.” 
26 Maynard W. Swanson, “The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in 
the Cape Colony, 1900-1909,” The Journal of African History 18, no. 3 (January 1, 1977): 387–
410; Curtin, “Medical Knowledge and Urban Planning in Tropical Africa”; Randall M. Packard, 
“The Invention of the ‘Tropical Worker’: Medical Research and the Quest for Central African 
00.02
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The result is a historiography that either tends to emphasize the presence of biomedicine 
over its absence (for the more celebratory narratives), or biopower and mass 
experimentation over neglect (in critical histories).27 In both sets of histories, the writings 
and exploits of a small number of white men (e.g. Albert Cook, David Livingstone) 
occupy much more of the narrative than African auxiliaries and lay caregivers.28 As 
Steven Feierman has argued, for the vast majority of people in southern, central and 
eastern Africa care in times of illness is given not by medical doctors nor by registered 
nurses, but by kin and neighbors.29 This was even more the case during the first half of 
the twentieth century, when Nyasaland’s health facilities—both mission and 
government—were always sparse and poorly-funded, even by the contemporary 
standards of British Africa.  
 
This dissertation is a biography of government provision of “Western” medicine and 
public health in Malawi. Though I recognize that this was but one part of a plural medical 																																																																																																																																																																					
Labor on the South African Gold Mines, 1903–36,” The Journal of African History 34, no. 02 
(1993): 271–92. 
27 For a sample of celebratory narratives, see Gelfand, A Service to the Sick: A History of the 
Health Services for Africans in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1953; Gelfand, Proud Record. For a 
sample of the critical narratives, see Wolfgang U. Eckart, “The Colony as Laboratory: German 
Sleeping Sickness Campaigns in German East Africa and in Togo, 1900-1914,” History and 
Philosophy of the Life Sciences 24, no. 1 (2002): 69–89; Paul S. Landau, “Explaining Surgical 
Evangelism in Colonial Southern Africa: Teeth, Pain and Faith,” The Journal of African History 
37, no. 2 (1996): 261–281.  
28 W. P. Livingstone, Laws of Livingstonia: A Narrative of Missionary Adventure and 
Achievement (University of Toronto Libraries, 2011). The Steamer Parish; Jennings, “‘Healing of 
Bodies, Salvation of Souls’”; Agnes Rennick, “Church and Medicine: The Role of Medical 
Missionaries in Malawi, 1875-1914” (PhD Dissertation, Department of History, University of 
Stirling, 2003). There are, of course, exceptions to this generalization. For histories that do focus 
on African biomedical practitioners, see Hunt, A Colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, 
Medicalization, and Mobility in the Congo; Iliffe, East African Doctors. 
29 Steve Feierman, The Illusion of Care (forthcoming). 
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system in Malawi, and remains so today, I will focus on this one element throughout. Of 
course other elements (including missionary medicine, millenarian Christianity and 
popular healers) will enter the narrative, as they had significant effects on the history of 
government medical care. But by recounting the history of government medical care over 
the course of the twentieth century, it will become apparent that something is missing 
from many micro studies and grand narratives of colonial and postcolonial medicine. The 
missing element is the key role of social unrest in determining the level of official 
attention paid to public sector health care. Malawi’s government health facilities often 
grew during periods of colonial labor agitation and after major global wars, while they 
languished in during periods of perceived quietus. The disquiet that impelled greater 
spending on health did not necessarily have to occur within Malawi—particularly during 
the interwar period, Nyasaland was the beneficiary of funding spurred by striking 
workers in the United Kingdom, the West Indies and other British African colonies. 
Colonial officials with a particular interest in social services in Nyasaland made creative 
use of crises elsewhere to direct resources to the impoverished backwater of the British 
Empire. The greatest increase (in terms of the share of government spending going 
toward health) occurred in the 1950s and early 1960s, when Nyasaland’s Africans proved 
unwilling participants in an incipient Federation system of government with Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia. During these turbulent years, health spending was a response to the 
unrest within Nyasaland. And shortly after Malawi secured independence in July 1964, a 
brief and abortive experiment with outpatient user fees in Malawi proved to be a cause of 
social unrest. 
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Arguing that unrest has positive social dividends may seem dangerously naïve, 
particularly in a region long plagued by terrific violence and bloody racial strife. 
Compared to other countries in southern, central and eastern Africa, Malawi’s relatively 
placid history seems an obvious benefit. Though I will argue in the following chapters 
that Malawi’s political history is often written in sepia tones that obscure bloody events, 
it is true that Malawians were, for the most part, spared the great brutalities visited upon 
other peoples in the region. Malawians were not pillaged to the same extent as the 
Congolese under both Belgium’s King Leopold or Mobutu. Malawians were not herded 
into concentration camps, as the Namibians were under German rule before the First 
World War, or as Kenyans were by the British during the Mau Mau revolt. They did not 
experience civil wars like those in Mozambique and Angola. They did not suffer the 
same degree of systematic and brutal racial segregation as blacks in Southern Rhodesia 
and South Africa. 
 
By comparison, Malawi’s political history seems calm, almost serene. Long described as 
simple peasants in a remote outpost of the British Empire, Africans in Nyasaland rarely 
made the front pages of newspapers in Europe or the United States. The famed Scottish 
missionary physician David Livingstone had railed against slave traders around Lake 
Malawi in the 1860s—when the territory was a source for thousands of slaves in the 
Indian Ocean slave trade—but by the twentieth century Nyasaland was, in British eyes, a 
paragon of primitive placidity.30 And so it would remain, save for an abortive revolt by a 
																																																								
30 David Livingstone, David Livingstone’s Shire Journal 1861-1864, ed. G. W. Clendennen 
(Aberdeen: Scottish Cultural Press, 1993); Edward A. Alpers, The East African Slave Trade, 
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fiery African minister in 1915 (Chapter 1) and a brief period in the years leading up to 
independence when a vibrant movement against the Federation government took hold 
(Chapter 8). Nyasaland rarely roused great concern in the Colonial Office, or in any other 
centers of imperial or commercial power. After independence in 1964 outside 
indifference continued, as Prime Minister Hastings Kamuzu Banda swiftly became Life 
President Banda and remained firmly in control of the nation’s politics and economy until 
the early 1990s (Chapters 9 and 10). The population and the economy grew, but in terms 
of per-capita GDP Malawi remained one of the poorest countries on the planet. Bereft of 
mineral resources and spared headline-grabbing violence, Malawi became the province of 
aid workers and missionaries, not international journalists or high-level diplomats.  
 
But even though Malawi has lacked easily recognizable drama or destruction in its 
colonial and postcolonial political history, there was throughout a silent violence being 
done to its poorest people. In her memoirs, English-born Margaret Fuller compared the 
experience of her early childhood years in Southern Rhodesia during the civil war in the 
1970s with her teenage years in a comparatively peaceful Malawi in the early 1980s: 
We feel more dangerously, teeteringly close to disease and death…than we did 
during the war in Rhodesia…In Malawi we frequently see children bent 
backward, as easily and rigidly as twisted paper clips, with cerebral malaria, from 
which, if they emerge alive, they will rarely recover completely.31 
 
Malawi’s governments—colonial and postcolonial—consistently denied the vast majority 
of its population access to healthcare services that were the standard of care in much of 																																																																																																																																																																					
Reprint edition (Historical Association Of Tanzania, 1972); Frank Debenham, Nyasaland: The 
Land of the Lake, First Edition (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1955). 
31 Alexandra Fuller, Don’t Let’s Go to the Dogs Tonight: An African Childhood (New York: 
Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2003). 
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the rest of the world. Without enough adequately trained medical providers, women 
perished from treatable complications of labor and delivery. Stringent rationing and 
frequent stock-outs of antibiotics left thousands to die of treatable infections (see 
Chapters 4 and 8). The absence of accessible health facilities doomed many to needless 
suffering and premature death in their homes. And for those patients who did manage to 
make it to hospitals and health centers, broken X-ray machines and laboratory equipment 
left medical providers unable to render accurate diagnoses (see Chapters 8, 9 and 10). 
While Malawians paid taxes and submitted to forced labor under both colonial and 
postcolonial governments, little of the wealth extracted from their toil came back to them. 
These, too, were acts of violence. The dearth of funds budgeted to the “staff, stuff, space 
and systems” necessary to deliver preventive and curative healthcare was, for many, as 
fatal as a shot from a gun or the slice of a machete.32  
 
But political inattention to health care was not total. The pervasive neglect was 
interrupted, at brief and irregular intervals, by additional funding. One question this 
dissertation seeks to answer is: why did those interruptions occur? The answer, most 
often, was unrest. Unrest came in many different forms, including non-violent 
demonstrations and global wars, general strikes and subversive rumors. Colonial 
subjugation and post-colonial dictatorship proved to be political arrangements most 
responsive to these kinds of threats to legitimacy. Government spending on medical care 
was a favored palliative during times of unrest. In contrast to “native” education, which 
officials feared would stoke rebellion (particularly after the 1915 Chilembwe Rising), 																																																								
32 Paul Farmer, “Who Lives and Who Dies,” London Review of Books, February 5, 2015. 
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health spending (and, in particular, curative health spending) was seen as a way to quiet 
restive publics.33 This contrast in the perceived political consequences of health and 
education spending helps explain why networks of government-run district hospitals and 
clinics were constructed throughout Nyasaland during the 1920s and 1930s, while the 
colony’s first government-run secondary school for Africans did not open until after the 
Second World War. 
 
Unrest did not have to happen within Nyasaland’s borders to impact its health budgets. 
Savvy officials in the UK and Nyasaland with an interest in this oft-forgotten land’s 
health sector drew persuasive—if roundabout—connections between the need to quell 
unrest elsewhere and the imperative to spend more on health care in Malawi. Such 
connections by well-placed moral entrepreneurs were key to securing drugs and doctors 
for a colony (and later, a country) that so woefully lacked them. Popular social unrest, 
including a number of episodes linked to Malawi only by the most tenuous of 
connections, was a precursor to every significant increase in public sector health 
spending. Given the crucial importance of the monopoly on violence to any regime’s 
legitimacy, it is understandable that Malawi’s colonial and postcolonial governments 
would seek to keep potentially violent forms of political agitation from seeping into the 																																																								
33 John Chilembwe, who led the 1915 revolt, had been educated at a Church of Scotland Mission, 
and had been a house servant of the Baptist missionary Joseph Booth. Booth had taken 
Chilembwe to the United States in 1897, where he continued his studies at the Virginia 
Theological Seminary. In the years after his return to Nyasaland in 1900, Chilembwe became 
more and more vocal in his criticism of the treatment of Africans, particularly those who labored 
on estates. After his rebellion had been put down and Chilembwe executed, a Commission of 
inquiry questioned Protestant missionaries about the political influence of African education at 
the missions. See “The Effects of Mission Teaching on the Native Mind,” in Voices from the 
Chilembwe Rising: witness testimonies made to the Nyasaland Rising Commission of Inquiry, 
1915, ed. John McCracken (London: Oxford University Press, 2015). Pages 359-463. 
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thinly governed land.34 Yet the fact that official attempts to palliate the populace could so 
often involve health spending is barely recognized by political scientists, sociologists or 
historians.35 
 
Perhaps part of the reason why this pattern has gone relatively unnoticed is the fact that 
not all wars and strikes proved boons to health spending. The relationship between unrest 
and outlays for health was not an automatic cause-and-effect of the kind readily 
discernable in regression analyses. Labor unrest and unemployment in the 1920s in 
Britain set in motion events that would lead to the construction of district hospitals across 
Nyasaland during the early 1930s (Chapter 3). Yet within Nyasaland the share of 
government expenditure going toward health care declined markedly during the mid-
1930s, a slide that continued after a massive anti-witchcraft movement known as mchape 
swept across the countryside. It persisted even after the return of the infamously 
																																																								
34 I refer here to Max Weber’s argument that a state is only a state if its staff can successfully 
maintain a claim to a “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its 
order.” See Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77–128.  
35 The political scientists Zeynep Taydas and Dursun Peksen have noted a negative association 
between social spending and the frequency of outbreaks of political violence. This literature 
posits that increasing social spending might lead to greater political legitimacy and, therefore, a 
decrease in coup attempts and civil wars. But in this dissertation the cause and effect are reversed. 
In my account, official concern that there is a threat to legitimacy (and the threat need not be 
domestic) spurs an increase in social spending. See Zeynep Taydas and Dursun Peksen, “Can 
States Buy Peace? Social Welfare Spending and Civil Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research 49, 
no. 2 (2012): 273–87.  Political scientist James C. Scott notes this absence of scholarship on the 
role of seemingly disorganized forms of unrest from below on policy. “And yet,” he explains, 
“the accumulation of thousands or even millions of such petty acts can have massive effects on 
warfare, land rights, taxes, and property relations. The large-mesh net political scientists and most 
historians use to troll for political activity utterly misses the fact that most subordinate classes 
have historically not had the luxury of open political organization.” James C. Scott, Two Cheers 
for Anarchism: Six Easy Pieces on Autonomy, Dignity, and Meaningful Work and Play 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012)., xx. 
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disruptive millenarian preacher Elliot Kamwana from his forced exile in 1937 (Chapter 
4). The connection between unrest and health spending had to be forged deliberately, 
often using finely tuned arguments delivered by officials with influence in the budget-
making process.  
 
Of course, the unrest-driven increases in public spending on health were not sufficient to 
spare Malawi its dismal health indices, currently some of the world’s worst. But that fact 
does not refute, but rather strengthens, my thesis. Interruptions to the prevailing neglect 
of the health of Malawi’s people were too seldom and brief precisely because of its 
people’s reputation for placidity. 
 
III. The role of economic thought: the eternal health-is-wealth debate 
 
Before a crowded Harvard lecture hall one brisk November afternoon in 2014, Paul 
Farmer chuckled. He had paused in the midst of discussing an article by the Nobel Prize-
winning economist Amartya Sen, with whom he was teaching a graduate seminar. He 
laughed because he thought Sen had penned a hilariously tongue-in-cheek passage. In the 
1998 article, Sen offered a number of reasons economists should concern themselves 
with indicators of mortality (and not only with measures of income). To Farmer, a 
number of the arguments were so blatantly obvious as to go without saying. Why, Farmer 
wondered, would Sen need to remind anyone of “the intrinsic importance we attach—and 
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have reason to attach—to living,” or—in an even more amusing turn of phrase—of “the 
fact that many other capabilities that we value are contingent on our being alive”?36 
 
Yet for Sen, who had long encouraged development economists to broaden their scope of 
inquiry beyond per-capita GDP statistics, these remained necessary arguments. The 
relevance of human health and even human survival to economics remains a subject of 
debate in the field’s top-tier peer-reviewed journals. In 2005, the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics published “The gift of the dying,” in which Alwyn Young argued: “The AIDS 
epidemic enhances the future per capita consumption possibilities of the South African 
economy, in effect endowing it with additional resources.”37 Resting this argument 
largely on the (disputed) assumption that high rates of AIDS mortality would lead to 
decreased fertility rates (thereby leaving more resources for those who survived), Young 
chided advocates who called AIDS an economic problem. “One cannot endlessly lament 
the scourge of high population growth in the developing world and then conclude that a 
reversal of such processes is an equal economic disaster. The AIDS epidemic is a 
humanitarian disaster of millennial proportions, one that cries for assistance. It is not, 
however, an economic disaster.”38 Given the prominent place given to such arguments in 
a major economic journal, Sen did have ample reason to worry about the consequences of 
understanding poverty only through “the cold and often inarticulate statistics of low 
																																																								
36 Amartya Sen, “Mortality as an Indicator of Economic Success and Failure,” The Economic 
Journal 108, no. 446 (January 1, 1998): 1–25. Page 5. 
37 Alwyn Young, “The Gift of the Dying: The Tragedy of AIDS and the Welfare of Future 
African Generations,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, no. 2 (2005): 423–66. Page 425. 
38 Ibid. Page 460. 
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incomes,” rather than “the directly relevant and immediately gripping facts of diminished 
lives, agonized existence, and untimely deaths.”39 
 
These articles added to a storied, and complex, literature in economics. Sen’s arguments 
about the intrinsic value of “being alive” might seem bemusing and obvious at first 
glance, but they are a deliberate corrective to a long-standing discourse about the 
instrumental uses of health for economic ends. For over a century, a number of 
economists and policymakers arguing for increased public expenditure on medicine and 
public health have often framed health as in instrument for aggregate economic growth. 
Their tracts did not dwell, as Sen’s often do, on the value of health as an end in itself or 
as a precondition for a meaningful life. Seeking to appeal to the cold calculus of 
treasuries and taxpayers, advocates for increased health spending have often framed 
health as a useful “investment” in the pursuit of economic growth. One prominent and 
fairly recent example is the World Health Organization’s Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health, chaired by economist Jeffrey Sachs, which published a 
report in 2001 claiming that “good population health is a critical input to poverty 
reduction, economic growth, and long-term economic development at the scale of whole 
societies.”40  
 																																																								
39 Sen, “Mortality as an Indicator of Economic Success and Failure.” Page 2 
40  The report also made the following claim: “The economic costs of avoidable disease, when 
taken together, are staggeringly high. Disease reduces annual incomes of society, the lifetime 
incomes of individuals, and prospects for economic growth. The losses are dozens of percent of 
GNP of the poorest countries each year, which translates into hundreds of billions of US dollars.”  
Jeffrey Sachs, Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health and Economic Development, 
Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (Geneva: World Health Organization, 
2001), 22. 
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Yet such arguments have often proven ineffective in convincing skeptics. In this 
dissertation I will demonstrate that presenting human health as an instrument for 
growth—rather than an end in itself—has sometimes helped to pry open government 
purses. But I will also argue that the argument has often fallen on deaf ears, or even 
invited contrary claims, along the line of Alwyn Young’s, that saving the lives of the 
poor through health spending might decrease per-capita incomes.41 This pattern is clear 
in the response to a 2001 article co-authored by John Luke Gallup and Jeffrey Sachs. 
Using data from 1965 to 1990 and controlling for a number of variables, the authors 
concluded from a cross-country regression that a 10 percent reduction in their “index of 
malaria” was associated with an annual boost of 0.3 percent to per-capita GDP.42 Five 
years later, economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson countered this finding in 
their own regression analysis. Using a range of data sources on life expectancy starting in 
1940, the authors concluded: “There is no evidence that the large exogenous increase in 
life expectancy [effected, in their account, by chemotherapeutic agents] led to a 
																																																								
41 The idea that mass death might be beneficial to African peoples is not new. In a 1988 article on 
population control and conservation, former colonial agricultural advisor Richard Kettlewell, who 
figures prominently in the history that follows (see Chapters 2 and 8), argued, “The widespread 
existence and threat of AIDS in Africa may be a blessing in disguise. Of course the disease might 
itself have some cruel limiting effect on population, but it may influence some counties towards 
the public advocacy of less promiscuity and the extensive use of contraceptives. This could 
perhaps help a campaign to reduce the still greater menace of mass starvation in the future—
provided the opportunity is grasped before a cure for AIDS is discovered and anxiety on that 
account abated.” Richard Kettlewell, “Personal Thoughts on the Future of Africa,” LSHTM 
Nut/05/04, Page 17. This argument is not going out of fashion. In 2014, Young’s paper was 
taught in graduate economics seminars as an example of the economic benefits of pandemic 
disease, rather than an object lesson in questionable assumptions and the morally callous 
extremes of a certain kind of economic logic.  
42 John Luke Gallup and Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The Economic Burden of Malaria,” American Journal 
of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 64, no. (1,2)S (2001): 85–96. In this article, each nation’s 
index of malaria intensity was “the fraction of the population at risk of malaria multiplied by the 
fraction of cases of malaria that are falciparum malaria.” See page 85. 
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significant increase in per-capital economic growth.”43 Advocates of the claim that health 
spending increases economic growth can point to empirical evidence to support their 
claims, but so can the argument’s detractors. As I will demonstrate, the claim has a less 
illustrious record in actually increasing public sector health budgets than its advocates 
might assume.44 Multiple chapters (2, 7, 8 and 10) examine the influence—or, more 
often, the lack thereof—of arguments claiming that public sector health spending is an 
effective instrument for increasing economic growth (an argument that I will refer to as 
the “health is wealth” argument) in colonial Nyasaland and post-colonial Malawi.  
 
The inability of changing fashions in development economics to explain actual outlays on 
health is evident from Malawi’s twentieth-century government budgets. Figure 0.2 
(shown above) tracked the share of Malawi’s recurrent expenditure devoted to the 
Medical Department (or, after independence in 1964, the Ministry of Health) between 
1920 and 1980.  The graph revealed that health accounted for more than 8 percent of 
recurrent government expenditure in only two periods: first, in the years between 1920 																																																								
43 Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, “Disease and Development: The Effect of Life 
Expectancy on Economic Growth” (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 
12269, Cambridge, MA, May 2006). 
44 Numerous empirical studies and theoretical models have supported a causal relationship 
between health spending and economic growth, and many will be cited in the coming chapters. 
Some of the most prominent and frequently cited include: Mushkin, Selma J, “Health as an 
investment,” Journal of Political Economy 70, no 2, suppl (October 1962): 129-57; Gary Becker, 
Human Capital, New York: Columbia University Press (for NBER), 1964], pp. 33-36; Victor R 
Fuchs, “The contribution of health services to the American Economy,” Milbank Memorial Fund 
Q.44 (1 October 1966): 65-102; Michael Grossman (1972) “On the concept of health capital and 
the demand for health, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 80, No 2, pp. 223-255; TW Schultz, 
Prize Lecture, Lecture to the Memory of Alfred Nobel. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic 
Sciences in the Memory of Alfred Nobel 1979; Dreze and Sen, India: Development and 
Participation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. A more recent addition to this literature is 
Adrienne Lucas, “Essays on Disease, Human Capital, and Economic Growth” (PhD Dissertation, 
Department of Economics, Brown University, 2006). 
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and 1930, and; second, between the mid-1950s and the early 1960s. The first such period 
(the 1920s) will be discussed in Chapter 1. This decade is less pertinent to this argument, 
as public sector health spending in Nyasaland during this period was still largely focused 
on the care of European officials. However, in comparing the rest of the graph with the 
history of thought in development economics, a counterintuitive becomes apparent. 
Health secured its highest shares of government spending precisely when the “health is 
wealth” argument was given the least credence by leading development economists. 
 
In later chapters I will describe in detail the dominant trends in development economics 
during three major eras. Here, though, I will provide only the most cursory of summaries.  
In the first era, lasting from the 1930s to the early 1950s, the “health is wealth” argument 
was an important facet of British thought about how to develop colonial holdings. 
Spurred by research nutrition, entomology, and tropical medicine, officials in both the 
UK Colonial Office and in the colonies spoke ever more forcefully about the futility of 
efforts to increase output from the colonies without concomitant efforts to improve 
nutrition and eliminate widespread parasitic infections. Still, the UK Treasury remained 
doubtful of the impact of health spending on revenues throughout this era, and the need 
for “economies” in social services such as health limited the reach of health campaigns. 
With the arrival of the Second World War, even frugal plans for health were shelved in 
Nyasaland and elsewhere in British Africa.  
 
Though health was mentioned in early postwar economic planning, by the late 1950s the 
focus had shifted. In this era, university economists from the US and the UK argued for 
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modernization, a strategy for rapid industrialization that called for focusing public 
expenditure on the building blocks of capital-intensive industrial production rather than 
the health of the broader populace. Yet despite the fact that colonial economists and even 
African nationalists in Nyasaland corresponded with leading theorists of modernization, 
it was during the 1950s and 1960s that Nyasaland (known after its independence in 1964 
as Malawi) experienced its most rapid rise in government health spending. This spending 
was, in large part, a response to a crisis of political legitmacy that led political authorities 
to discard some prescriptions of modernization in favor of overt and widely-publicized 
demonstations of beneficence made possible by health spending.  
 
Finally, in the 1970s (the third era in economic thought covered in this dissertation) 
international development discourse rediscovered nutrition and health. A burgeoning 
literature on “human capital” and a focus within the World Bank on Basic Needs 
prompted increased attention to and financing for health projects. For the first time since 
independence, Malawi could obtain more substantial assistance from bilateral and 
multilateral donors for health projects. But once again, there was discordance during this 
era between health spending and trends in economic thought. Health spending remained 
limited, as Britain no longer felt it necessary to spend its resources on an independent 
Malawi and President Banda no longer perceived internal threats to his own political 
legitimacy. 
 
Again, aside from the 1920s, the share of public sector recurrent expenditure devoted to 
health was greatest during the 1950s to the early 1960s. The coincidence of increased 
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health spending (in both absolute and relative terms) with the era in which modernization 
theorists dismissed the “health is wealth” argument motivates this historical analysis of 
the relationship between economic theory and economic policy. Academic economists 
have long repeated John Maynard Keynes’ observation that “practical men, who believe 
themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of 
some defunct economist.”45 The argument that economic ideas hold great sway over 
health budgets is prevalent in accounts of international health since the dawn of the 
neoliberal era in the 1980s; in these histories of the recent past, International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank officials compelled the governments of poor nations to enter into 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that gutted health sector budgets in the name of 
debt repayment.46 The policy prescriptions of World Bank and IMF officials were, as 
these histories demonstrate, inspired by the ideas of “neoliberal” economists such as 
Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek.47 
 
These histories reveal deep and disquieting truths about the relationship between 
armchair elite theorizing and the “immiseration” of health care systems for poor people in 
poor countries.48 But in this dissertation I am concerned with an earlier era, before the 
																																																								
45 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory Of Employment, Interest, And Money (Palgrave 
MacMillan, 1936).  
46 Unhealthy Health Policy: A Critical Anthropological Examination, Edited by Arachu Castro 
and Merrill Singer (Lanham, Md: Altamira Press, 2004); Salmaan Keshavjee, Blind Spot: How 
Neoliberalism Infiltrated Global Health (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 
2014); Paul Farmer, Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). 
47 Keshavjee, Blind Spot, pages 88-96; David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford; 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
48 James Pfeiffer and Rachel Chapman, “Anthropological Perspectives on Structural Adjustment 
and Public Health,” Annual Review of Anthropology 39 (2010): 149-65.  
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much-discussed age of structural adjustment.49 By chronicling the history of a public 
sector health system prior to the neoliberal age, I intend to demonstrate the profound 
influence not of elite theory, but of popular politics. Mine is not a history in which 
regnant economic theory is the most important determinant of health policy. Instead, the 
story follows closer to the lament of Peter Ruderman, an economist who had worked in 
development policy. “Decisions as to public spending on health,” Ruderman explained, 
“are often taken in response to…political pressures.”50 I ultimately conclude that 
economic thought can provide a hospitable (or inhospitable) international milieu for the 
officials and politicians holding the purse strings of government spending. Yet the 
credence (or lack thereof) given to the “health is wealth” argument does not explain the 
major changes in health spending in Malawi during the colonial and early post-colonial 
eras. Intellectual histories of Western economic thought are unable to explain patterns of 
health spending. Claims about the economic value of health spending have a long and 
contentious history, yet shifts in economic thought have not been the primary influence 
on levels of government spending on medicine and public health.  
 
For the key influences, the historian must look to popular politics and the ideological 
commitments of key political officials. Ferguson was correct in noting that the poorer 
nations of southern Africa were under the thrall of an “anti-politics machine” by the 																																																								
49 For an overview of Malawi’s health sector during the era of structural adjustment (early 1980s 
to early 2000s), see Ezekiel Kalipeni, “Structural adjustment and the health care crisis in 
Malawi,” Proteus 21 (2004); 1: 23-30. Also see Elias Banda and Gill Walt. “The Private Health 
Sector in Malawi: Opening Pandora’s Box?” Journal of International Development 7 (1995): 
403. 
50 A. Peter Ruderman, “General Economic Considerations,” in Health Planning: Qualitative 
Aspects and Quantitative Techniques (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University School of 
Hygiene and Public Health, Department of International Health, 1972). Page 109 
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1980s, but it was not always thus.51 Patterns of growth and retrenchment of the Malawian 
health sector can only be explained with reference to broader African, European and 
American political histories. Health spending was long seen as a political weapon, an 
instrument intended to quell restive publics. It was popular politics, and not the writings 
of the elite academics, that determined whether or not the rulers of one of the world’s 
poorest peoples cared about matters of health and sickness, life and death. 
 
IV. Outline: political crises and health spending in Malawian history 
The chapters ahead chronicle the role of medicine in development planning and popular 
politics in Malawi between 1914 and 1983. This time span is bookended by two 
calamities that fundamentally changed the nature of health care in Malawi. The period 
begins with the First World War, a war in which hundreds of thousands of Nyasaland’s 
Africans encountered both European forced labor and European medical provision for the 
first time. Before the First World War, government health programs for Africans were so 
sparse that, aside from mass campaigns to vaccinate against smallpox and monitor for 
sleeping sickness, they rarely touched the lives of most Africans in Nyasaland (Chapter 
1). This dissertation ends (save for a conclusion and ethnographic interludes) with the 
start of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s. This was a massive conflagration that would, by 
2004, grow to claim the lives of 80,000 Malawians every year (out of a population of 
12.5 million) before mortality began to fall with the free provision of antiretroviral 
																																																								
51 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine : “development,” depoliticization, and 
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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therapy.52 This epidemic was so traumatic that it profoundly colored, and even erased, 
earlier memories of government health provision (see conclusion). The AIDS crisis also 
helped usher in a new era of health financing in Malawi (as elsewhere in southern 
Africa), an era in which significant external resources would change the relationship 
between crisis politics and health spending.53 
 
In the seventy years between these two disasters, I ask, when and why did access to 
biomedical care become a central political concern and budgetary priority? During both 
the colonial and early post-colonial eras, Malawi's governments increased spending on 
biomedical care to demonstrate beneficence, particularly when they faced threats to 
legitimacy. These threats could come from within Malawi, but they could also arise from 
seemingly unrelated and far-flung events. Officials and international advisers persistently 
attributed Malawi's inadequate medical provision to the nation's poverty, but changes in 
health spending have not automatically followed shifts in GDP or government revenues. 
Instead, the construction of new hospitals and dispensaries, the purchase of new supplies 
and medicines, and the addition of medical staff have almost always come in the wake of 
social unrest, such as world wars, international waves of labor action, and domestic 
protests. Only at these moments were the government and its international partners 
compelled to devote more resources to health. Oft-repeated official claims that there was 
simply not enough money available to improve government health services have almost 																																																								
52 Andreas Jahn, Sian Floyd, and Amelia C Crampin, “Population-Level Effect of HIV on Adult 
Mortality and Early Evidence of Reversal after Introduction of Antiretroviral Therapy in 
Malawi,” Lancet 371 (2008): 1603–11. 
53 Luke Messac and Prabhu Prabhu, “Redefining the Possible: The Global AIDS Response,” in 
Reimagining Global Health: An Introduction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). 
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always been abandoned during periods of political crisis. Yet these periods have been 
infrequent; placidity, and not just poverty, may account for Malawi's dismal medical 
infrastructure. 
 
Health services in Malawi have been a product of strife, not quietus. War and unrest, 
often in far-flung locales, brought spending on healthcare provision, while periods of 
perceived calm have spurred retrenchment. Because the idea that government spending 
on health has been as much a function of international political instability as national 
prosperity is so counterintuitive, it will be proven not with one example, but with many, 
spanning seventy years and involving actors and events many countries. The history is 
drawn from numerous archives in Malawi, the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Botswana. Written sources include official reports, memoirs and correspondence of civil 
servants in both the colonial and postcolonial administrations. Oral sources include 
interviews conducted with dozens of Malawians and expatriates between 2011 and 2015. 
Fieldwork in two Malawian villages (one in Neno District, and another in Mangochi 
District) provides additional data. 
 
The chapters ahead are organized in roughly chronological fashion, but each relates a 
different episode to compare the influence of social unrest and economic thought on the 
attention given to health care in public sector budgets in colonial Nyasaland and post-
colonial Malawi. Each chapter is preceded by a “prelude.” Most of these preludes are 
vignettes from my fieldwork in Mangochi and Neno Districts. The questions and issues 
raised in each prelude are similar, though not identical, to those explored in the 
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corresponding (historical) chapters. The preludes, then, are intended to show resonances 
and dissonances, to trace the lineaments of history in an emergent present. I have changed 
the names of people (except for public figures) and village names (but not district or 
hospital names) in the preludes (except for 2, 4, 8 and 9), in order to protect the identities 
of my interlocutors. 
 
The first five chapters focus on the period spanning the two world wars (1914-1945). 
Chapter 1 draws a link between the conscription of hundreds of thousands of Nyasaland 
Africans into the Allied carrier service during the First World War and the first deliberate 
efforts to provide some measure of health care to rural subjects in Nyasaland during the 
1920s. Many conscripted carriers and soldiers had their first contact with hospitals during 
the Great War, though these facilities were far more impressive in official records than in 
reality. During the early 1920s—not a particularly hospitable time for health spending in 
the British Empire—persistent advocacy by the Director of Medical Services and chief’s 
demands to resuscitate health facilities shut down after the war helped prompt the 
administration to fund the construction of more than sixty rural dispensaries around the 
colony. 
 
Chapter 2 turns to the interwar era of investigations into the health of Africans in the 
British Empire. These investigations were conducted by experts in diverse array of 
scientific fields, including nutrition, entomology, agriculture and anthropology. During 
the interwar era, these fields were high on the British imperial research agenda. 
Physicians and administrators echoed the academic findings that hardy, productive bodies 
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could only be sustained with diets containing enough vitamins, minerals and calories and 
living environments sufficiently free of parasites. Multi-disciplinary investigations, such 
as the Nyasaland Nutrition Survey (1938-1940) buttressed officials’ claims that increased 
production from colonial subjects depended on increased investment in the health of 
colonized Africans. Commonly proposed investments included agricultural extension 
services and vector control campaigns, but also improved health care facilities.  
 
But, as chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate, these visions for colonial social medicine were not 
the principal determinants of spending on health during the interwar years. Chapter 3 
recounts the passage of the UK Colonial Development Act of 1929, and the effect of this 
law on Nyasaland’s health sector. Odd as it may seem, health spending in Nyasaland in 
the early 1930s was a piece of the government’s response to the 1926 General Strike in 
the United Kingdom. In the years following this strike, British officials with experience 
in both domestic labor relations and colonial administration argued that colonial 
development spending could both alleviate a worsening unemployment crisis and calm 
labor militancy within the UK. Other officials in the Colonial Office in London and the 
Colonial Medical Service then drew special attention to Nyasaland, a poor colony which 
held little promise as a market for British goods but which—according to these 
advocates—languished in such a state of neglect as to threaten to bring “grave public 
discredit” upon the Crown. As a result of this lobbying, Nyasaland’s health sector 
became a major beneficiary of 1929 Colonial Development Act. Many of the colony’s 
district hospitals were built with funds made available by this legislation. Thus, moral 
entrepreneurs in the British administration were able to subvert the law’s original intent 
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(to increase employment in the UK through the purchases of manufactured goods for the 
colonies) in order to improve a health system in Nyasaland they had long lamented. 
 
Chapter 4 demonstrates the other side of the link between unrest and health spending. 
Once the well-connected moral entrepreneurs with a concern for Nyasaland departed 
from their posts, the colony’s health sector languished. The late 1930s and early 1940s 
were a period of profound disquiet in the British Empire; waves of riots and strikes roiled 
the oil fields and ports of the British West Indies, the mines of Northern Rhodesia’s 
Copperbelt, and cocoa farms in West Africa. Secretary of State for the Colonies Malcolm 
MacDonald used these crises of colonial legitimacy to usher the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act of 1940 to passage. But most of the initial funding made possible by this 
law went to the perceived centers of unrest, such as the West Indies, and not to a 
seemingly docile Nyasaland. Medical administrators in Nyasaland complained bitterly to 
their superiors, but to no avail; even as the metropolitan government touted the new 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act, proposals to improve nutrition and medical 
training in Nyasaland were shelved. 
 
Yet developments in Britain during and immediately after the Second World War 
changed political discourse about social services in British Africa. Chapter 5 focuses on 
changing metropolitan thought about colonial development during and immediately after 
the Second World War. During the late 1930s and early 1940s, powerful voices in 
Britain’s Labour Party challenged the persistent claim that there just was not any money 
available to improve health services for Africans in Britain’s colonies. At the same time, 
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a new consensus emerged in British society about the government’s responsibility to 
ensure the health of the British people. This consensus was in evidence both in the 
popular reception to the 1942 Beveridge Report, and in the 1946 enactment of the UK 
National Health Service. For many, including William Beveridge and prominent 
members of Britain’s Labour Party, the social and economic rights embodied in the 
Beveridge report seemed applicable not only to Britain, but also to its colonies. In the 
years following the publication of the report, officials throughout the British Empire and 
Commonwealth contemplated their own plans for social protection. 
 
But once again, Nyasaland’s reputation as a land of quietus helped officials in Whitehall 
exclude the colony from discussions about more robust social services in Africa. The 
causes and consequences of this relative neglect in the immediate postwar period are the 
focus of Chapter 6. Instead of enacting the old-age and disability pensions and health-
care provisions that were the backbone of the consolidated British welfare state, officials 
in London and Zomba argued that rural Africans in Nyasaland were already protected 
against ruin by traditional village mechanisms of social security. The idealized image of 
egalitarian social solidarity among rural Africans amounted to a historically dubious and 
politically interested argument for inaction. So when a postwar wave of labor unrest 
spread across much of British Africa, Nyasaland was dismissed as a haven of political 
quietus, and its health sector saw relatively little of the newly available development 
financing. 
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Despite the dearth of official attention given to Nyasaland’s dismal health centers and 
hospitals, African subjects in the colony showed increasing interests in health facilities in 
the decades following the Second World War. In Chapter 7, I chart the rapid rise in 
attendance at government health facilities in the postwar decades, and argue that the 
(slow and halting) arrival of new drugs and equipment during the postwar years were key 
to attracting patients to government facilities. The increased popularity of government 
health care among the general population had profound effects on the politics of medicine 
in the postwar era. Health care itself became an even more important response to social 
unrest, and health care became a major subject of late-colonial and post-colonial political 
demands. 
 
Even as more patients began to present for care, prominent development economists in 
the United States and the UK argued ever more forcefully that government spending on 
healthcare was “consumption” rather than investment, and that such spending was an 
imprudent use of public resources in poor countries. Yet in Chapter 8, I explain how it 
was that precisely during the period when modernization theorists seemed most 
influential in economics, recurrent government health spending in Nyasaland rose 
dramatically, from £273,000 pounds in 1953 to £1.48 million pounds in 1969. The 
prevailing development discourse of the moment cannot explain this pattern of spending. 
Instead, we must look again to political crises. Officials in the government of the 
controversial and short-lived Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963) 
publicized financial commitments to health in an attempt to quiet growing protests within 
Nyasaland and critics in the UK. Government health care even became a focal point of 
	 36	
political contests, as pro-Federation commentators accused anti-Federation nationalists 
had sabotaged a smallpox vaccination campaign, while anti-Federation voices countered 
that the Federation government had neglected health care for Africans. 
 
Shortly after Malawi gained independence in 1964, another political crisis prompted 
Malawi’s new government to turn its attention to health care. Chapter 9 chronicles a 
short-lived rebellion by Malawi’s cabinet ministers, which prompted the embattled Prime 
Minister Hastings Kamuzu Banda to abandon the outpatient user fees he had enacted only 
a few months earlier. His attempts to establish legitimacy in the eyes of Malawi’s 
citizenry included well-publicized visits to government hospitals. Yet throughout the 
1960s he could find scarce support for health care from other governments and 
international agencies. This was the heyday of population control in international health, 
so aid for health was focused almost entirely on contraception. Yet Banda refused to 
contradict his regime’s own carefully constructed ideology of abundance by promoting 
contraception at government health facilities. 
 
Chapter 10 documents Banda’s turn away from healthcare as a major priority during the 
1970s. Not coincidentally, this shift in focus coincided with greater regime stability. 
Without any mortal threats to his rule, Banda could turn his attention to estate agriculture 
and a new capital city, even as the rise of human capital arguments in development 
discourse led to increased interest in health among bilateral and multilateral aid donors. 
Banda came to rely on external donors, particularly governments that were facing 
international crises of legitimacy, for health financing, rather than drawing upon 
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Malawi’s own domestic revenues. As in prior decades, Malawi’s public sector health 
expenditures and policies were the opposite of what the cosmopolitan advisors and august 
professors advised. Here, once more, the shifting tides of economic theory are unable to 
explain patterns of outlays for health. 
 
In the conclusion, I consider how this pattern of crisis-driven health spending has 
changed during Malawi’s crisis-riddled recent past. In the three decades since the mid-
1980s, a period marked by AIDS, famine and periodic suspensions of donor aid, 
Malawi’s governments have come to hold little legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry. 
Still, public officials continue to try to regain the public’s trust through displays of 
solicitude. But political leaders have devoted relatively little in the way of domestic 
revenues to health, instead seeking to claim personal credit for international aid coming 
into Malawi. 
 
Over the last few years I have been asked a question. It recurs in libraries and archives 
and district hospitals and government offices and cafes, in the United States and Europe 
and Africa. The question is innocent enough: “What are you researching?” Among the 
many expatriate aid workers and volunteers that I meet, the most frequent response to my 
explanation (“I’m studying the history of the government health service in Malawi”) is 
something akin to “Oh, I can’t imagine there is much to study there.”  They are correct 
that there is not much in the way of government medical care in Malawi, nor has there 
ever been. But just as action has a history, so, too, does inaction. Just as acts of care and 
attention can be chronicled and explained, so can records of neglect. The dreadful 
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disrepair of Malawi’s public hospitals and the empty shelves in public dispensaries are 
just as much a product of history as Britain’s well-equipped clinics and socialized health 
insurance. In fact, they are a part of the same history. Who has the government cared for? 
Who has been left to die? And why? These questions can only be answered with a global, 
contingent, and often ironic history of crisis politics. It is a history in which perceptions 
of peace can bring untimely death. It is also a history in which, as the next chapter will 
show, brutal and deadly war brings expectations of health. 
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Chapter 1 
Drugs for the tengatenga: the beginnings of government medicine in Nyasaland in 
an era of war, 1914-1929 
 
Abstract 
 
As unpaid forced labor on settler farms, as carriers supplying the British in the East 
African theatre during the First World War, and as transporters of European officials, 
Africans were made to carry loads throughout the colonial era. Less remembered by 
historians of Malawi (and, as it was known under British rule, Nyasaland), though, is that 
the colonial administration’s reliance on African subjects as beasts of burden impelled its 
initial expenditures on medical care. Whereas before the First World War the only source 
of biomedical care in Nyasaland were the scattered mission hospitals, the intense 
demands for African labor during the war spurred the construction of government-run 
hospitals and dispensaries. These ill-equipped facilities were tasked with the care of the 
hundreds of thousands of “carriers” forced to carry munitions, rations and other supplies 
to troops fighting near the border of Nyasaland and German Tanganyika. 
 
In the aftermath of war, experience with biomedicine at these hospitals led native 
authorities and colonial medical officers to call for the construction of additional health 
facilities. By 1923, Nyasaland had a system of 70 rural dispensaries. These facilities were 
staffed by poorly trained African auxiliaries and operated under extreme economies, and 
according to colonial officials they had not secured the confidence of most Africans. But 
the hospitals and dispensaries owed their very existence to the even more threadbare 
carrier hospitals that inaugurated the era of biomedical care for Africans in Nyasaland.  
 
Using archival records and oral histories from Malawi and the United Kingdom, this 
chapter seeks to explain the beginnings of government medicine for Africans in colonial 
Nyasaland. The need of massive human labor supplies during the Great War, and the 
perceived need to demonstrate imperial concern for sick subjects in the years that 
followed impelled a pennywise Treasury to begin spending on health services.  
 
Prelude: Memories of carrying 
 
“They were always carrying the colonists,” remembered “Francis,” a 48-year-old farmer 
in Nyanza, a lakeshore village near the town of Monkey Bay in southern Malawi. Taking 
a brief respite from his daily labors to drink tea in the living room of his home one hot 
morning in March 2015, Francis recounted stories of the colonial era told by his parents 
and grandparents. He had heard from them that whenever a district commissioner would 
travel through the village on ulendo (tour) to meet with local leaders or collect taxes, 
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villagers would have to carry his machila  (hammock-stretcher) on their shoulders. “The 
people complained about it, a lot, (anadandaula kwambiri)” he said. 
 
Memories of carrying have even been etched into the names Malawians have given to the 
landscape. In the southwestern province of Neno, the poorest district in the world’s 
poorest country, a schoolteacher explained the meaning of the name of a hill called 
Caliwoni near his home. It was not, he said, a Chichewa word. Rather, Caliwoni 
harkened back to a command uttered often in that place by a British official whenever he 
visited on tour. Villagers carrying the machila on which he rode would inevitably slow 
when they reached the long, steep hill. “Carry on! Carry on!” the official would 
command. The villagers so associated that hill with this command that they Chewa-ized 
the command and named the hill Caliwoni.1 
 
All kinds of forced labor remain vivid in Malawian memories of colonization. Still 
sipping his tea, Francis reminisced about the demands of thangata labor. Thangata was a 
system by which, in return for the privilege of living as squatters on the massive estates 
granted to European settlers by the colonial government, Africans were made to perform 
at least one month of unpaid labor for the settlers each year as “rent.”2 In colonial days 
(ku nthawi atsamunda), Francis remembered, people were beaten for refusing to perform 
																																																								
1 The suffix –ni  in Chichewa, the most commonly spoken language in Malawi, is used to denote 
a command. 
2 George Shepperson, Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins, Setting and 
Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915, 1969, Page 179; John McCracken, A 
History of Malawi : 1859-1966. (Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey, 2012). Page 80. 
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thangata labor. They were sometimes beaten just because a settler found their work too 
slow for his liking.3 
 
As bearers of European officials’ machilas, as thangata laborers on European estates, 
and—as this chapter will detail—as carriers supplying troops in the East African theater 
during the First World War, African men and women were put to work against their will 
throughout the colonial era. The personal memoirs of former British officials and 
commentators tend to portray all this labor as ennobling, even enjoyable. The Cambridge 
Professor of Geography Frank Debenham claimed the first Nyasaland administrators had 
devised the hut tax for the purposes “of paying for benefits conferred and of keeping the 
men occupied.”4 WTC Berry, a medical officer in Nyasaland between 1936 and 1943, 
described the invariably jovial disposition of the men who were his means of transport: 
In the remoter parts of the Protectorate the Boma [government] also kept a team 
of four ‘machila men’ for the doctor’s use if he had to visit a village some miles 
away, off the beaten track where a car could not go. A machila was a wheeled 
chair with shafts at each end. One man pulled between the shafts in front, another 
pushed at the back and the other two ran alongside to take over at intervals. Even 
in the fiercest heat they would not slack off their running and sang, whooped, and 
turned somersaults as they went…They showed extraordinary powers of 
endurance and arrived at their destination up to eight or ten miles away quite fit 
and well able to quip along the way with any villagers they might encounter.5 
 
These men may or may not have been paid, and the labor may or may not have been 
forced; Berry did not say. The point here is merely the merry, unburdened attitudes that 
he attributed to them. Yet for Nyasaland’s Africans, laboring for Europeans—particularly 
forced labor—was the stuff of bitter memories. Lewis Bandawe, a Lomwe immigrant 																																																								
3 Personal interview with Francis in Nyanza Village, Mangochi District, Malawi, March 20, 2015. 
4 Debenham, Nyasaland. Page 165. 
5 W. T. C. Berry, Before the Wind of Change (Suffolk, England: Halesworth Press, 1984). Page 
17. 
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from Portuguese Mozambique who would go on to serve as head clerk and interpreter in 
Nyasaland’s High Court from 1934 from 1960, wrote in his memoirs that the British 
colonial government “was a terror to all people.” To Bandawe, the iron collars used on 
prisoners (most often guilty of nothing more than defaulting on hut taxes) looked just like 
the ones he had seen on slaves in neighboring Mozambique.6 Bandawe claimed (with, 
perhaps, some exaggeration) that “every European, with the exception of the 
missionaries, had a chikoti—a whip made of hippo’s hide—which he used on his 
domestic servants and labourers.”7 Ending such practices was an animating force of 
anticolonial politics. For Francis, the most inspiring promise in the early speeches of 
Hastings Kamuzu Banda (Malawi’s nationalist leader and first president) was his promise 
to end thangata.8 
 
Today’s rural Malawians relish the absence of such overt systems of forced labor. But 
even without demands for unfree labor there remains, of course, plenty of work to do. 
The annual hungry season (December-March), when food from the previous harvest runs 
short but the work of tending to the next is hardest, is the busiest time. I lived with 
Francis and his family during this period, and noted the daily routine. Five people (not 
including me) slept in Francis’s home on most nights. Francis and his wife, Edith, slept in 
one room on a mat of woven banana leaves. Lucia, the couple’s eight-year-old daughter, 
and Monica, their three-year-old niece, slept in another room. Samuel, the 17-year-old 
																																																								
6 Lewis Mataka Bandawe, Memoirs of a Malawian: The Life and Reminiscences of Lewis Mataka 
Bandawe (Claim, 1971). Also see Edward Paice, Tip and Run : The Untold Tragedy of the Great 
War in Africa (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007). Pages 162-163. 
7 Bandawe, Memoirs of a Malawian, 70-73; Paice, Tip and Run.,162. 
8 Personal interview with Francis in Nyanza Village, Mangochi District, Malawi, March 20, 2015. 
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son of Francis’s late sister, sleeps in the hut adjacent to the house that doubles as Edith’s 
kitchen. 
 
Every morning before daybreak, Francis’s wife Edith swept the house and the back yard 
with a broom made of twigs. She then walked 100 meters to the nearest borehole, where 
she filled a 50-liter basin. With apparently little difficulty, the slight yet strong Edith 
lifted the basin and placed it on her head for the walk home. Walking into the dimly lit 
kitchen, a hut with no ventilation that will soon be filled with smoke, she packed twigs 
and branches into an earthen cook-stove and started a fire to heat the water. Some of the 
water would be used to cook nsima, the maize porridge that is the staple of the Malawian 
diet. Much of the rest of the water will be used for bathing. She helped Lucia prepare for 
school, then tied Monica to her back with a chitenje cloth and departed to collect more 
firewood or to help Francis’s disabled parents, who lived next door, with their chores. On 
many other days helped Francis and Samuel in the fields. Every evening she spent two 
hours preparing dinner.  
 
Francis also rose before dawn, and during most days in the hungry season he walked two 
kilometers to the two-hectare field where he grew maize and groundnuts. There he 
carefully tended to what would be the major source of his family’s sustenance for the 
coming year. Francis was often joined in the field by his late sister’s son, Samuel, a 17-
year-old who was orphaned three years prior and who slept in the hut that doubled as 
Edith’s kitchen. My rent helped Francis purchase a 50-kilogram bag of fertilizer; this cost 
16,500 kwacha (about US$40) at the nearest agricultural marketing board depot. Though 
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fertilizer can increase yields by as much as three-fold it also added to Francis’s workload. 
In addition to planting the crops and weeding the fields, he now had to apply fertilizer in 
a painstaking process two times during the growing season. To me, Francis and Edith’s 
exertions appeared unbelievable, especially because they lived on such a meager diet. 
Their daily nsima satiated hunger, but furnished few calories. 
 
For Francis and Edith, work abounds. The harvest rarely provides much more than 
subsistence. Still Francis says he enjoys farming. He is one of the few men in the village 
who does not spend every night in a canoe on the lake, fishing for kampango (catfish) or 
usipa (sardine-like fish) by lanterns and moonlight. The family has proved successful 
enough at farming to live a more comfortable life than others in their village. Their house 
is made not of wattle and daub (as are many others in the village), but of cement. Their 
floor is also cement, as opposed to the packed dirt many others have. The roof of their 
three-roomed domicile is made of corrugated iron, not straw. Francis’s family has even 
amassed wealth, in the form of 10 chickens, four goats and one pig. 
 
If the annual rains do not fall at the right time and in the right amount all their exertions 
can come to naught. Their home, like the rest in their village, has neither electricity nor 
running water. Francis once had a working cell phone, but it has been broken for months. 
The couple derives great satisfaction from the fact that they labor on their own terms. 
Unlike their grandparents and great-grandparents, they are not colonial subjects. They are 
no one’s beasts of burden. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Malawian government health care was born of a war in which Africans died in droves. 
The colonial administration’s reliance on African subjects as beasts of burden impelled 
its initial expenditures on medical care. In the aftermath of war, medical officers began to 
focus not only on the health of Europeans and research, but also on the wellbeing of 
Africans. Whereas before the First World War the only sources of biomedical care for 
Africans in Nyasaland were the few scattered mission hospitals, the intense labor 
demands during the war spurred the construction of government-run hospitals. In the 
aftermath of the war, experience with biomedicine led native authorities, and the medical 
officers who interacted with them, to call for the construction of dispensaries around the 
country.  
 
The 1920s were the start of a period—which in many ways, never ended—when Medical 
Department officials and native authorities consistently demanded additional funds from 
the territorial and imperial Treasuries for medical care for Nyasaland’s Africans. As the 
colonial employees with the most frequent contact with rural African smallholders, 
doctors saw each day how the UK’s claims that it brought bring health, peace and 
prosperity to the colonial populace were belied by quotidian realities. Africans, they 
argued, must be able to expect something in exchange for onerous taxation, forced labor 
and alien rule. Colonized Africans in Nyasaland received very little government medical 
care until the era of the Central African Federation (1953-1963, see Chapter 8), but public 
sector health care was born earlier, after a Great War that took the lives of thousands of 
the colony’s inhabitants. 
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II. The mirage of hospitals during the Great War 
a) Reviewing missionary and government services in Nyasaland before the Great 
War 
Before the Great War, medical care for Africans in Nyasaland was sparse and almost 
wholly provided by missions. Mission hospitals had been established at Cape Maclear in 
1875, Bandawe in 1881, Livingstonia in 1894, and Zomba in 1896. They were important 
not only for the care they provided, but also because they trained African medical 
auxiliaries for both mission and government facilities.9  
 
Before the First World War, the government medical service was devoted almost entirely 
to the care of European officials (and, to a lesser extent, non-officials) and scientific 
research.10 Nyasaland, like many other colonial regimes in Southern and Central Africa 
(e.g. Northern and Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Mozambique, Congo), was 
originally a for-profit private enterprise. Established in 1891, the British Central African 
Protectorate was originally a public-private venture funded by Cecil Rhodes’ British 
South Africa Company (BSAC). Rhodes did not think the territory very profitable, and 
paid His Majesty’s Government to administer it on a shoestring budget of £10,000 per 
year. He agreed to fund the establishment of the “Protectorate” in part to advance his 
dream of British rule “from the Cape to Cairo,” and in part because the British 
government had agreed that in return for its funding the BSAC would secure the sole 																																																								
9 Michael King and Elspeth King, The Story of Medicine and Disease in Malawi: The 150 Years 
Since Livingstone (Malawi: Arco Books, 1992); Austin C. Mkandawire, Living My Destiny : A 
Medical and Historical Narrative (Limbe, Malawi: Popular Publications, 1998). 
10 African soldiers and prisoners were two exceptions; in early colonial British Africa, they did 
receive medical attention from the government. 
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rights to the gold fields in Mashonaland (in present-day Zimbabwe).11 The interest from 
the start in Nyasaland (so renamed in 1907) was to spend as little as possible, while 
maintaining a modicum of order and aiding European planters to profitably run estates. 
The spirit of extreme economy continued even all of the Nyasaland administration’s 
political ties to the BSAC were severed in 1911.12 
 
In this era British medical officers came to Africa to build reputations as researchers, to 
discover new pathogens and disease mechanisms and enter the bacteriological pantheon 
of Koch and Pasteur, rather than to provide medical care. Michael Worboys and Megan 
Vaughan have argued that late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century practitioners of 
tropical medicine were more interested in biological investigation than public health or 
clinical medicine.13 Such was the case for Dr. Hugh Stannus, stationed at Fort Johnston 
as a medical officer to the King’s African Rifles [Nyasaland’s military force] from 1905 
to 1910. Stannus built a pathology laboratory, started a medical library, and authored 
scientific publications on sleeping sickness (in humans and animals) yaws, black-water 
fever, albinism, and ethnological works on African peoples.14  
 
																																																								
11  John Reader, Africa: A Biography of the Continent (New York: Vintage, 1999). Page 579. A 
“Protectorate” was a designation of a British imperial holding technically distinct from that of a 
colony; the pretense was that sovereign chiefs had willingly signed treaties putting themselves 
under the protection of the British Crown). For the sake of simplicity, and because these treaties 
were often far from equal exchanges of willing parties, throughout this dissertation I will refer to 
Nyasaland as a British “colony.” 
12 Griffith Bevan Jones, Britain and Nyasaland (London: Allen & Unwin, 1964). Page 53. 
13  And Michael Worboys, ‘Manson, Ross and Colonial Medical Policy: Tropical medicine in 
London and Liverbool, 1899-1914,” in Macleod and Lewis, eds, (1988), pp 21-38. 
14Megan Vaughan, Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness (Stanford, Calif: 
Stanford University Press, 1991). pp 30-32. 
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From the perspective of the metropolitan government, the role of medical officers in 
Nyasaland before the First World War was to protect the few Africans, Indians, and 
Europeans involved in the threadbare administration of the new territory. The contract of 
the Indian surgeon Dr. Sorabji Boyce, the colony’s first medical officer (who 
accompanied Sir Harry Johnston to the new British holding in 1891 and died only six 
months later), explained his primary duty was to care for government officials.15 Almost 
a quarter-century later, in 1913, Nyasaland’s Medical Department had twelve medical 
officers and five nurses.16 In 1914, there were only a few small government hospitals 
providing care for Africans at Port Herald (4 beds), Zomba (46 beds), Fort Johnston (5 
beds), and Karonga (2 beds).17  
 
Public health ordinances passed during the early years of the twentieth century were 
martial in nature and ill-suited to securing the trust of peoples so recently conquered, 
often by force of arms. A July 1903 ordinance aimed at limiting sleeping sickness 
(human trypanosomiasis) required all Africans seeking to cross the border of a district to 
enter only at specified government stations, where they would be made to submit to a 
medical examination. These exams focused on palpation of the cervical glands (in the 
neck). If the glands were not enlarged, the traveler would be issued a pass. If the 
																																																								
15 Owen J. M. Kalinga, Historical Dictionary of Malawi, Fourth Edition (Lanham, Md: 
Scarecrow Press, 2011); Lwanda, Colour, Class and Culture. 
16 WH Mercer, “The Colonial Office List for 1913: Comprising Historical and Statistical 
Information Respecting the Colonial Dependencies of Great Britain” (London: Waterlow & Sons 
Ltd, 1913). p 274. 
17 Lwanda, Colour, Class and Culture. Pages 47. Control of the country’s largest hospital, at 
Zomba, had been transferred from the UMCA Mission to the Nyasaland colonial administration 
in 1908. Rennick, “Church and Medicine: The Role of Medical Missionaries in Malawi, 1875-
1914.” Page 125. 
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travelers’ glands were enlarged, the traveler could be quarantined in a “segregation 
settlement.”18 Suspected sleeping sickness cases sometimes had their cervical glands 
punctured for diagnosis, though widespread opposition to this procedure limited its use.19 
 
If, in the course of sleeping sickness investigations in villages, officials suspected 
infection or if the residences were believed to lie within the range of the tsetse fly (the 
carrier of trypanosomiasis), District Residents could evict Africans from their huts or 
even order the abandonment of entire villages.20 The consequences of disobedience were 
harsh: “In case of disobedience to such an order the District Resident may, after due 
warning, destroy such hut, settlement or village and remove the inhabitants thereof in 
custody.”21 
 
Smallpox vaccination campaigns involved similarly harsh measures. In 1896, Dr. Neil 
Macvicar of the Church of Scotland Blantyre Mission had begun training African medical 
																																																								
18 Charles J Griffin and Walter E Demuth, “No. 4 of 1903, Epidemic and Contagious Diseases, 
Rules, 117/1911, 21st July 1903, Sleeping Sickness,” in Proclamations, Rules and Notices 
Relating to the Nyasaland Protectorate in Force on the 31st December 1914 (Zomba, Nyasaland: 
Government Printer, 1915), 40–43. 
19 “Church and Medicine,” pages 308-310. Also see “The diagnosis of human trypanosomiasis,”  
Sleeping Sickness Bureau Bulletin 2 (1910); 14: 55-60. 
20 Markku Hokkanen, “The Government Medical Service and British Missions in Colonial 
Malawi, c.1891-1940: Crucial Collaboration, Hidden Conflicts,” in Beyond the State: The 
Colonial Medical Service in British Africa (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 39–
63. Pages 47-48. 
21 Charles J Griffin and Walter E Demuth, “No. 4 of 1903, Epidemic and Contagious Diseases, 
Rules, 117/1911, 21st July 1903, Sleeping Sickness,” in Proclamations, Rules and Notices 
Relating to the Nyasaland Protectorate in Force on the 31st December, 1914 (Zomba, 
Nyasaland: Government Printer, 1915), 40–43. 
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assistants to vaccinate against smallpox using scalpels and lymph.22 These assistants 
entered the field in time to respond to a fairly short-lived epidemic in 1899-1900—the 
brevity of this outbreak seemed to confirm to the administration the utility of native 
vaccinators.23 The colonial administration began to pay the wages of the native 
vaccinators and to purchase the supplies of calf lymph.24 As Agnes Rennick argued in her 
dissertation on missionary medicine in Malawi, both the missionaries and the 
administration sought to draw additional settlers from Britain by demonstrating that both 
European planters and African laborers could live healthy lives in the Protectorate.25 
 
Nearly a decade without a serious smallpox epidemic in Nyasaland bred confidence 
among both missionary doctors and colony’s chief medical administrator that their 
vaccination program was effective. In 1907, Principal Medical Officer Henry Hearsey 
confidently declared that “epidemics of smallpox, such as were common in the 
protectorate some years ago, do not now occur.”26 But when large outbreaks struck 
Nyasaland the very next year, the colonial administration issued the Vaccine Ordinance 																																																								
22 A 1900 letter by a coffee planter to the Blantyre Mission indicate that smallpox vaccination 
lymph was administered person-to-person, rather than from tubes. See Rennick, “Church and 
Medicine: The Role of Medical Missionaries in Malawi, 1875-1914.” Page 205. 
22 Ibid. Page 299. 
23 Rennick, “Church and Medicine: The Role of Medical Missionaries in Malawi, 1875-1914.” 
Page 299. 
24 These payments from the colonial administration began in 1904. In 1913, Hearsey reported that 
the government paid “about £200 per annum for the wages of Native Vaccinators, and an 
additional £100 for the purchase of lymph.” Ibid. Page 301. Also see Megan Vaughan, “Health 
and Hegemony: Representation of Disease and the Creation of the Colonial Subject in 
Nyasaland,” in Contesting Colonial Hegemony: State and Society in African and India (London: 
British Academic Press, 1994), 173–201. By 1921, the government spent £400 per annum on calf 
lymph. See Approved Estimates, Nyasaland Protectorate, 1921-22 (Zomba: Government Printer, 
1921), 27, in T161/91, UKNA. 
25 Rennick, “Church and Medicine: The Role of Medical Missionaries in Malawi, 1875-1914.” 
Page 298. 
26 Ibid. Page 300. 
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of 1908, which made vaccination compulsory. By 1913, the Government reported that the 
African assistants had administered 143,502 vaccinations in that year alone.27 
 
Yet Rennick provides ample evidence that these vaccination campaigns may have been 
less effective than advertised. Even Hearsey doubted the accuracy of the vaccinators’ 
returns. The few medical officers in the employ of the government did little to verify 
them. Doctors also recognized that their lymph was often stored so long that it lost its 
capacity to stimulate immunity. At times some of the vaccinators’ efforts seemed worse 
than useless.  In 1909, a District Resident reported that the high frequency of severe 
ulcers on the arms of the recently vaccinated might have something to do with a local 
vaccinator’s wont to use a blood-soaked, dirt-stained scalpel to carve gaping wounds into 
patients’ arms.28 
 
On the other hand, these campaigns were definitely effective at demonstrating to African 
subjects the similarities between public health and the recent wars of colonial conquest. 
The Central African Times reported in 1899 on the government’s response to a smallpox 
outbreak in the Ntcheu District village of Ntonda: “Every house in which a case was 
found was burned and the natives compensated. A cordon of askari [African soldiers in 
the employ of the colonial administration] is on duty day and night.” Even missionaries 
joined in the arson. Dr. Walter Elmslie of Universities’ Mission for Central Africa 
Livingstonia Mission reported that after unsuccessfully “hunting for a case of small pox 
																																																								
27 Ibid. Page 301. 
28 Ibid. Page 305. 
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which is being hid away by the people,” he “burnt down several houses where we knew 
he had been, so the stupid people may begin to see their own interests and help us.”29 
 
Such tactics would do little to secure the trust of Africans that vaccination campaigns 
were, in fact, helping them. As early as the 1908 epidemic, a movement emerged that 
appeared dangerously subversive to colonial officials. The moment seemed to augur 
upheaval. In addition to smallpox, the years 1907-1908 brought other unusual occurrence. 
Nyasaland’s: minor earthquakes shook the earth, a comet appeared in the sky, and cattle 
were felled in large numbers by an epidemic.  
 
Into this tumult stepped Elliot Kamwana, a mission-educated 26-year-old from Nkata 
Bay. In 1908 Kamwana returned home from his studies to baptize his neighbors into the 
Watch Tower Church. His sermons proclaimed, “Kwacha, Africa yuka” (“It is dawn, 
Africa rise.”). Kamwana spoke of a future where “all Kings, Kingdoms and Governments 
would cease.” Within six months of beginning his ministry, he had already baptized over 
9,000 people. Seeing in his message a political challenge “under the cloak of religion,” 
Nyasaland’s authorities arrested Kamwana. In 1909 he was deported to the Seychelles.30  
 
Decades later, colonial measures against smallpox would continue to engender 
opposition. The frequent recurrence of smallpox in the coming decades, and the often-																																																								
29 Ibid. Page 304. 
30 Even in exile, Kamwana continued to cause trouble for authorities. In 1914, pamphlets 
predicting the apocalypse and bearing his name appeared in Nyasaland. Henry Donati, “‘A very 
antagonistic spirit: Elliot Kamwana: Christianity and the World in Nyasaland, The Society of 
Malawi Journal, 64 (2011);1: 13-33. 
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unexplained brutality of the measures taken in the name of disease control, would spur a 
backlash against vaccination campaigns. Vaccinators lamented villagers’ refusal to 
cooperate during a 1936 outbreak.31 Resistance would take on special importance in the 
late 1950s, when the Federation Government claimed that the leadership of the Malawi 
Congress Party had frightened the people into rejecting vaccinations  (Chapter 8).  
 
Coercive public health measures, and not curative medicine, were the only introduction 
most Africans received to government medicine before the Great War. Removals from 
villages by armed police in the name of sleeping sickness prevention resembled nothing 
so much as the battles only recently fought by some of Nyasaland’s peoples against 
British and BSAC troops during the 1890s before they submitted to “protection.”32 The 
most profound impact of Europeans in most African lives was in the hut taxes they were 
made to pay each year, which compelled thousands of men to leave their villages to in 
search of waged labor on plantations and in mines. Curative health care was not a 
meaningful part of this experience of being governed. Unless they lived near a religious 
mission, most Africans never saw a doctor or nurse.  
 
b) “Invited to die for a cause which is not theirs”: Nyasaland Africans in the Great 
War  
																																																								
31 Vaughan, “Health and Hegemony: Representation of Disease and the Creation of the Colonial 
Subject in Nyasaland.” Pages 185-186. 
32 For a brief account of the wars of conquest led by Harry Johnston between 1891 and 1894 
while in the employ of both the British government and the BSAC, see McCracken, A History of 
Malawi. Pages 57-67. 
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It was not until the Great War reached Nyasaland that many Africans had contact with 
government-employed British or Indian medical providers or African auxiliaries. For the 
Africans patients, this introduction to European medicine came during a period of 
profound upheaval. The nkhani chiwaya (war of the big gun) has long been remembered 
as a time of excruciating forced labor and mass death. WTC Berry, a medical officer in 
Nyasaland during the 1930s, recalled an aphorism coined by “an observant Bantu chief,” 
summing up the chronicity of European presence in Africa: “First the missionary, then 
the trader, then the gunboat.”33 Indeed, it was a gunboat that heralded the start of 
hostilities between the UK and Germany in East Africa. On August 8, 1914—four days 
after Germany invaded neutral Belgium prompting the British to declare war on 
Germany—British warships fired on a wireless installation and railway station at the 
German East Africa capital, Dar es Salaam. On August 13, the war reached Nyasaland; 
sitting in dry dock in the German port of Sphinx Hafen on the northeastern shores of 
Lake Nyasa, the German ship Hermann von Wissmann was demobilized by a shot from 
the British gunboat Guendolen. This was no great battle, as the German captain had not 
even been alerted to the outbreak of war.34 From then on, a long war would be fought in 
each of Nyasaland’s neighbors: German East Africa (today’s Tanzania), Portuguese East 
Africa (today’s Mozambique), and Northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia).35 
 
																																																								
33 Berry, Before the Wind of Change. Foreword. 
34 McCracken, A History of Malawi. 148 
35 Paice, Tip and Run. 13-15 East Africa was, in many ways, an unlikely theatre of war. The 1885 
Berlin Act excluded the colonies of the Congo Basin from any universal war, and the few troops 
stationed in German and British colonies were there for internal security. The borders were 
porous, and prior to the war there was no great appetite on either the British or German side for 
the East African territory held either by the other side.  
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Africans in Nyasaland did not immediately feel the most terrible exactions of war, but in 
time they would toil, and die, in droves. Opposition to the war surfaced early. In an 
unpublished letter he sent to the Nyasaland Times shortly before he led an armed uprising 
in January 15, the preacher John Chilembwe decried the lot of Africans in “this present 
world.” They were, he declared, “invited to die for a cause which is not theirs.”36 This 
was, of course, a dramatic understatement, for Africans were not so much invited as 
forced to join the war. But after leading a short-lived rebellion, Chilembwe would be shot 
dead by a police patrol in February 1915, so he would not live to see the worst of the 
wartime conscription. 
 
In the aftermath of Chilembwe’s bloody but abortive uprising, British officials were 
reticent to arm the newly restive African population. This would change later in the war, 
when the demand for reinforcements led to the conscription of many African soldiers 
(askari)). But in early 1916, British commanders were far more desperate for human 
carriers than armed troops. In February 1916 Brigadier-General Edward Northey arrived 
as commander of the Nyasaland-Rhodesian forces to find his troops desperately short of 
food. Askari and carriers were receiving “starvation rations” of 1.25 pounds of maize 
each day, as supplies ran short near the front lines.37 Food, munitions, medicines, mail 
and even whiskey were supplied via a route that demanded vast quantities of human 
labour.38 Ocean, river and rail transport from South Africa only reached as far as 																																																								
36 Shepperson, Independent African. 
37 McCracken, A History of Malawi. 149 
38 Paice, Tip and Run. 265 The main British supply line to the East African theatre began at 
Durban, South Africa, where supplies were shipped to the port of Beira in Portuguese East Africa. 
There they were put aboard smaller steamers to a British concession at Chinde, where the 
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Blantyre (along the main supply line) and Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia (on a 
subsidiary route). Pack animals could not survive in the tsetse-infested regions, as they 
were quickly killed off by trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness).39 So all along the 120 
miles from Blantyre to Fort Johnston, and along a 700-mile route from Livingstone to 
Fife in Northern Rhodesia, and up mountains and through the dense brush of German 
East Africa, African carriers were the British army’s beasts of burden. Among Africans 
the carrier service was known as tengatenga; kutenga means “to take” in Chichewa; 
tengatenga translates, roughly “to take very far.” 
 
Northey made constant demands for additional carriers from Nyasaland Governor George 
Smith. Smith set quotas for each of the chiefs; some who failed to supply the allotted 
numbers of carriers were put to the lash.40 Police who failed to conscript sufficient 
carriers would have their pay withheld. The pay for carrier service was not sufficient to 
draw Africans into the service; carriers were paid six shillings per month, the same 
amount white settler volunteers earned in a single day. Turning to coercion, the 
administration first went after Africans who had defaulted on the hut tax (then six 
shillings per year per hut) were the first to be forced into service.41 When defaulters went 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Zambesi River flows into the Indian Ocean. There supplies were they were sent aboard riverboats 
up the Zambesi and Shire Rivers to Chiromo, at the southern tip of landlocked Nyasaland. 
Transport from Chiromo to Blantyre was aboard a railway. 
39 Daniel R. Headrick, “Sleeping Sickness Epidemics and Colonial Responses in East and Central 
Africa, 1900–1940,” PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases 8, no. 4 (April 24, 2014). See also Paice, 
Tip and Run, “As the availability of livestock for transport proved incapable by mid-1916 of 
matching the depradations of disease, the onus fell on the only alternative—human porterage.” 
40 Melvin E. Page, The Chiwaya War: Malawians In The First World War, First edition 
(Westview Press, 2000). Pages 46-47. 
41 Even with so many Nyasaland Africans compelled into war service, the Nyasaland government 
continued to rely heavily on the hut tax for its revenues. During fiscal year 1917-18, the native 
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into hiding, police kidnapped their wives until they surrendered. But these conscripts 
were not sufficient to supply the war effort. Facing demands for additional carriers, 
police conducted night raids in villages to kidnap any able-bodied men they could find.42  
 
Estimates of the number of Nyasaland Africans in the carrier service during the war vary 
widely; the historian Melvin Page’s figure of 200,000 is neither the lowest nor the 
highest. Population figures for this period were based not on careful census data but 
rather on administrative conjecture. Nevertheless, using the official estimate of 
Nyasaland’s African population in 1918 (1.218 million), we can estimate that 16 percent 
of Nyasaland’s African population worked in the carrier service during the war.43 But 
even this figure does not adequately convey the scale of disruption that the carrier service 
brought to some parts of the colony, particularly those along the major transport routes. 
An administrative census of military labor in 1918 found that the number of people 
engaged in military labor in South Nyasa district (18,615) was equal to 54.7 percent of 
the adult male population of the district.44 This district, on the southern shore of Lake 
Malawi, includes the village where Francis lived in 2015—small wonder, then, that a 
century after the Great War, collective memories of carrying remained pervasive. 																																																																																																																																																																					
hut tax accounted for over half of the revenues of the Protectorate government (£75,448 out of a 
total of £144,239). Nyasaland Blue Book, 1917-1918, CO 525/82/50, UKNA. 
42 Ibid. Pages 45-46, 52. Melvin Page sought out records about carriers during the First World 
War from a wide range of sources to reconstruct the historical narrative during this period, but 
some of the lengths to which Governor Smith and police went to conscript carriers are difficult to 
establish, as are many features of colonial governance in Nyasaland before the end of the First 
World War. This is because a large fire consumed government buildings in Zomba in 1919, 
destroying many of the archives. Medical officer WL Gopsill even recounted clerks throwing 
papers into the fire to relieve themselves of paperwork. WL Gopsill, “A Few Notes on My Life in 
Zanzibar and Nyasaland from 1926 to 1945” MSS.Afr.s.883, BLOU. Page 11. 
43 Baker, “The Government Medical Service in Malawi.” 106 
44 Page, The Chiwaya War, 52-54. Some of these laborers were women and children, not adult 
males.  
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Tengatenga brought extreme privations. Even the pro-British Nyasaland Times reported 
that maize was “ground up, husks and all, and then issued as rations.”45 Men (and 
sometimes women and children) were made to carry loads through swamps and up 9,000-
foot peaks. Conductors, including missionary priests, beat carriers with whips, and often 
left them to die of exposure and exhaustion along these seemingly interminable supply 
routes.46 Dysentery and pneumonia were rampant, and there were documented outbreaks 
of smallpox and plague.47 Many of the sick and exhausted were abandoned along the 
road to die.48 FC Baily, a convoy officer in German East Africa during the war, 
remembered carriers thus: 
A carrier is one of the lowest forms of life (except a machine gun carrier, who is a 
picked man) and he is always more or less in a state of misery, as well he may be, 
for his job is to carry forty pounds’ weight on his head, and as he takes no interest 
whatever in the war, he does not find this very amusing. The mortality among 
carriers was extremely high, because, contrary to the popular idea, the native is no 
more immune to local diseases than anybody else, and goes down with malaria, 
dysentery and diarrhea very much the same as a white man.49 
 
 Even Governor Smith, who had orchestrated the brutal recruitment campaign of carrier 
labor, estimated a mortality rate for carriers of 4-5 percent during 1917-1918, when 
conditions were worst.50  
 
																																																								
45 Page, The Chiwaya War. 110-111 
46 Ibid. Page 112-113. 
47 Ibid. 110-111 
48 Paice, Tip and Run. Page 346. 
49 Francis Evans Baily, Twenty-Nine Years’ Hard Labour (London: Hutchinson & co., ltd., 
1934),. 95-96. 
50 Page, The Chiwaya War. 113-114. 
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In a final stroke of suffering, survivors of carrier service returned home to two more 
scourges: epidemic and famine. Thousands who had survived carrier service died on the 
walk home at the end of the war in the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic.51 Then, by April 
1919, villages across the Protectorate found themselves without food. According to 
Nyasaland Governor Hector Duff, the famine was due in part to the failure of the early 
grain harvest, but he admitted the cause was “chiefly the fact that immense quantities of 
stored native grain had been requisitioned for the use of the troops and that scores of 
thousands of able bodied natives had been withdrawn from their homes to serve as 
military porters…leaving few but old men, women and children to attend to the 
cultivation of the land.” Thus, the effects of the war on health rippled far beyond even the 
hundreds of thousands compelled into years of forced labor.52 
c) Carrier hospitals in the East African theater 
In an attempt to maintain supply lines, the British military set up “carrier hospitals” near 
the front lines in German East Africa. In some accounts these medical facilities appear 
quite impressive. The official history of the First World War, commissioned by the UK 
Government, claims “the supply of medical stores and drugs, ordnance stores and 
comforts was…sufficient for the needs of the force.” According to this chronicle, medical 
care for carriers was provided at  “twenty-eight mixed rest stations, five casualty clearing 
hospitals, and seven carrier hospitals.”53 In August 1917 these facilities were staffed by 
“80 medical officers, 3 sub-assistant surgeons, 14 Roman Catholic priests, 23 nursing 
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53 Medical History of the War, Vol IV, 477-8. 
	 60	
sisters, 24 dispensers, and 123 British other ranks.”54 The history notes the “excessive 
death-rate” of the carriers, but attributes this primarily to “the poor physique of the 
African native.”55  
 
But recent historians do not paint the same portrait of a robust carrier medical service. In 
his Chiwaya War, Melvin Page explains, “Government authorities published impressive 
lists of hospitals, personnel ‘available,’ and lists of medical supplies. Most of these were 
only last minute and meager efforts and even then did not often operate as the 
organizational plans projected.” A missionary without any medical training who treated 
many of the carriers on the routes in southwest Tanganyika, remembered most of his 
medicines came from “a fine assortment” looted from a German mission, “but nearly all 
with German titles” he did not understand. He mostly gave sick patients “salts, 
Livingstone’s rouser pills [an antimalarial pill containing quinine and a mixture of 
purgatives, marketed by Burroughs Wellcome], quinine, boric powder and dressings and 
bandages.” Even hospitals with trained nurses were overwhelmed by sick carriers. “Our 
hospital is so crammed that patients sleep on top of one another,” remembered a Catholic 
nun posted at one of the carrier hospitals. At another hospital in Mwenzo the facilities 
were so small, and the sick so numerous, that many cases were turned away.56 
 
Within Nyasaland the war left medical services even more depleted than before. Seven of 
the twelve doctors employed by the government were called up to serve on the front in 																																																								
54 Medical History of the War, Vol IV, 492. 
55 Medical History of the War, Vol IV, 490. 
56 Page, The Chiwaya War. 113 
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German East Africa.57 “Owing to the extreme shortage of staff it was not possible to keep 
open more than three civil stations, namely, Port Herald, Blantyre and Zomba.”58 
Another hospital remained in operation at Fort Johnston, but was under military control. 
Even obtaining medical staff for Nyasaland’s troops proved extremely difficult. On 
January 4, 1917, Governor Smith sent a telegram to the UK’s Secretary of State for the 
Colonies requesting five Indian sub-assistant surgeons immediately.59 Robert Hollowell 
Headley, an official in the Military Department of the India Office in London, explained, 
“In view of the shortage of this class of medical personnel in India it is very doubtful 
whether the men can be supplied.”60 Two months later a British General in Dar-es-
Salaam cabled the Secretary of State for the Colonies, lamenting the sub-assistant 
surgeons were an “urgent need” yet were still “not received.”61 The records do not 
indicate whether the sub-Assistant surgeons ever arrived. 
 
Yet despite the shortcomings of medical care for carriers and askari, more of Nyasaland’s 
Africans came into contact with government-run British medical facilities during the war 
than at any time previously. “For the first time,” claims the historian Colin Baker, 
“hundreds of thousands of Nyasaland Africans had access to Government medical 
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services.”62 This might be an overstatement, depending on one’s definition of “access” 
and “medical services.” But Baker is correct when he argues “this was bound to lead to 
pressure—whether voiced or not—to extend medical facilities after the war.” Though 
Baker does not explain how this “pressure” manifested, the next section of this chapter 
will do so. The popular memory of carrier hospitals and clinics, and officers’ desire to 
maintain some semblance of attention to Africans, impelled the construction of dozens of 
dispensaries throughout Nyasaland in the early 1920s. 
 
III. Bringing medicine back from the war: government dispensaries and auxiliary 
training in the 1920s 
a) Rural government dispensaries: a postwar demand of Nyasaland chiefs 
In 1921, three years after the war’s end, Nyasaland’s Principal Medical Officer, Dr. 
Henry Hearsey, drafted a Circular and sent it to the Chief Secretary in Zomba for 
comment. Hearsey, who had occupied his position as Principal Medical Officer since 
1902, wrote: “A not unimportant part of the scheme for providing medical aid to the 
native population is the provision of Rural Dispensaries in areas distant from stations 
where Medical Officers and Sub-Assistant Surgeons are posted.” Such provision of 
medical care in rural areas had not previously been a part of government medical 
policy—certainly not an important one—so Hearsey explained his inspiration. “That 
there is an urgent need for such Dispensaries was forced on my mind when I closed down 
those which had been erected on Lines of Communication during the late War. Various 
Headmen and others enquired of me what they were now to do with their sick who 																																																								
62 Baker, “The Government Medical Service in Malawi.” 301 
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needed treatment.” Even though the health facilities for African carriers maintained 
during the war were sparse, poorly equipped and staffed with minimally trained 
personnel, Africans remembered them as one of the few parts of the war effort worth 
keeping. In response to the enquiries of native authorities, Hearsey announced his plans: 
It is my intention to indent this coming year for a quantity of concentrated stock 
mixtures for easy dispensing, which together with simple dressings, etc., would be 
supplied to these dispensaries. They would be placed in charge of intelligent 
native Hospital and Dispensary Attendants who had received some training and 
experience in our native hospitals.63 
 
Hearsey’s circular asked each of Nyasaland’s “Residents” (British officials in charge of 
administering each district) to send him a number of locations that would be appropriate 
for these new dispensaries. The criteria for selection of sites should, he explained, be the 
density of the population in that area, and the distance from a Mission health facility for 
natives. Hearsey sought, then, not to situate the rural dispensaries only in areas of 
commercial activity or military importance, but rather to reach the largest native 
population possible. 
 
Two weeks later, when the Chief Secretary sent a copy of the circular to district officials, 
he changed both its content and tone. No longer did the circular open with a declaration 
of the importance of medical care for Africans. The Chief Secretary’s language was less 
enthusiastic, lacking any indication he thought Hearsey’s plan important: “I am directed 
to inform you that a proposal has been put forward by the Principal Medical Officer for 
the establishment of dispensaries in rural areas.” The Chief Secretary’s revised circular 
also added a criterion for the site of rural dispensaries, namely that “accessibility to the 																																																								
63 H Hearsey, “Medical Treatment of Natives. Rural Dispensaries, by Office of the Principal 
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medical headquarters of the District should also be taken into consideration.” Ready 
access to administrative centers, then, compromised the ideal of serving the most people 
in areas remote from extant health services. The Chief Secretary also added “not more 
than four sites in your district should be reported upon.”64  
 
Similar stipulations would become a recurring theme in Nyasaland’s medical service—
central administrators constantly stressed cost containment. When the Principal Medical 
Officer stressed the need for greater provision of medical services to Africans, the Chief 
Secretary revised his circular to ensure limits on transport costs and in the number of sites 
chosen. When the District Residents responded with their potential sites some, including 
the Resident of South Nyasa (later known as Fort Johnston District) proposed only three 
dispensary sites rather than the Chief Secretary’s limit of four. Seeking to maximize the 
number of dispensaries overall, Hearsey and the Medical Officer at Fort Johnston argued 
for the addition of a fourth site.65 As will be evident in the coming chapters, directors of 
medical services and medical officers, were almost always encouraging more health 
facilities, more rapid expansion, more spending, while administrators holding the purse 
strings in Zomba and London tried to quell these demands. 
 
When Hearsey sent his proposal to the Chief Secretary in 1921, there were already plans 
afoot, and funds indented in the budget, to build seven health facilities for Africans to be 
staffed with sub-assistant surgeons. Recognizing the extreme economies under which the 																																																								
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colonial budget operated at the time, Hearsey admitted that his plan might have to wait. 
Still, he believed that with the information provided by the districts, he would be able to 
gradually expand the dispensary system “as opportunities occur,” eventually building 64 
new dispensaries (four in each of Nyasaland’s sixteen districts).66 
 
Initially, prospects for Hearsey’s proposal did not appear to be very good. The Treasury 
Department in London demanded that Nyasaland cut its proposed 1922-23 budget in 
order to attain an operating surplus of £80,000. This surplus would permit Nyasaland’s 
government to cover expected losses on the privately owned Trans-Zambesi Railway, 
whose profits Nyasaland had been compelled by officials in Whitehall to guarantee in 
1919 (see Chapter 3). In order to meet these demands for austerity, Acting Governor 
Richard Rankine cut £39,000 from his 1922-23 budget, including £500 he had originally 
allocated for construction of the new dispensaries.67 Upset at being forced to make these 
revisions, Rankine lodged a protest with Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. He explained that although “it has not been possible in the past to provide to 
any extent for medical attendance of natives,” there remained “a great need for this,” 
particularly “if we are to prevent the large waste of human life and energy which goes 
unchecked at present among the natives.”68  
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In February 1922, Undersecretary of State for the Colonies Gilbert Grindle passed this 
plea to the true arbiter of budgetary matters, Chancellor of the Exchequer Robert Home. 
Grindle added that “information obtained in connection with the recent census and the 
latest annual medical report of Nyasaland emphasize the urgent need for increased 
medical attention to the native population.”69 Eventually the Treasury relented, if only 
slightly, in its demand for economies. Their justification here seems to have been a 
forecast by a Treasury official, who predicted that Nyasaland’s tariff and income tax 
revenues in 1922/23 would be higher than originally estimated, thereby reducing the 
scale of budget cuts needed.70 In March, Controller of Supply Services George Barstow 
informed Grindle that the Treasury was prepared to allow the reinsertion of £12,500 of 
Rankine’s proposed cuts.71 Ultimately, Nyasaland’s 1922-23 budget did include £768 for 
dispensary attendants’ salaries, £580 for supplies for both hospitals and dispensaries, and 
£500 for dispensary construction.72 An enthused Hearsey requested the expeditious 
construction of the new dispensaries, and reported he had already begun recruiting 
attendants.73  
 
The significance of these new dispensaries, for the health of the populace or for the 
colonial coffers, should not be overstated. The first year’s indent for the new attendants’ 
salaries (£768) represented less than one percent of the £100,000 collected from the 																																																								
69 “Undersecretary of State Gilbert Grindle to Chancellor of the Exchequer Robert Home,” 8 
February 1922, T 161/156, UKNA. 
70 Untitled Treasury Department Analysis, February 21, 1922, T 151/156, UKNA. 
71 “GL Barstow to Undersecretary of State for the Colonies Gilbert Grindle,” 9 March 1922, T 
161/156, UKNA. 
72 “Richard Rankine to Principal Medical Officer H Hearsey,” April 12, 1922, S40/1/3/2, MNA. 
73 “Principal Medical Officer H Hearsey to Acting Chief Secretary,” April 18, 1922, S40/1/3/2, 
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annual hut tax.74 Even in the Principal Medical Officer’s initial plans, the dispensaries 
were to be austere and inexpensive. Each facility, he explained, would consist of two huts 
of wattle and daub, one for the dispensary and another for the living quarters of the 
dispensary attendant.  The inside walls of the dispensary hut would be equipped with 
shelving made of reeds or split bamboo.75 Together, he estimated the two huts could be 
built for £10. The only other cost would be the wages of the dispensary attendant; he 
thought these should begin at £20 per month, rising each year by £2 and 6 shillings to 
reach a maximum of £30 per month.76 
 
Beyond the lingering memory of carrier hospitals, there were other forces impelling the 
British administration to pay greater attention to the health of natives. Historians Richard 
Rotberg and Colin Baker both note that British missionaries complained often to 
government officials about the inadequacies of medical care for Africans, while European 
landowners began to see the potential for greater output from healthier laborers.77 There 
was also a newfound focus on social service provision in the major treatises and 
justificatory doctrines of the British Empire. Former Governor-General of Nigeria Lord 
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Frederick Lugard, architect of the principle of indirect rule that became official policy 
throughout British Africa, published The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa in 
1922. Lugard explained, “The white man was at first engaged in consolidating his own 
position, and making the tropics healthier for Europeans engaged in their own 
development. He has now accepted the principle that they must be made more healthy for 
the native population.”78 As evidence, Lugard cited the testimony of then-Undersecretary 
of State for the Colonies L.S. Amery from a debate in the House of Commons on the 
Colonial Office Vote in August 1919. Because his was one of the earliest official 
articulations of imperial responsibility for native health, Amery’s words are worth 
quoting at some length: 
The whole problem of the development of the tropics is in fact largely a problem 
of coping with disease. Remember that the deadliness of the tropics is not merely 
the deadliness to the white man. If he suffers it is entirely, or almost entirely, 
because he catches diseases with which the native community around him is 
already infected, and which lowers his vitality. Our problem is not merely to 
make East Africa and West Africa healthy to the white man, but to make them 
healthy to the whole population, to undertake out there, as here at home, a 
campaign for dealing with the diseases of those countries in a much more 
comprehensive and bolder spirit than we have ever undertaken before.79 
 
Amery’s speech drew upon the concerns with contagion that had spurred segregationist 
city planning in the name of sanitation.80 But in his case, the possibility that African 
sickness could lead to European illness was a reason to improve native health, not 
separate their dwellings.  
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b) The realities of government medicine for Africans, 1921-1930 
Unsurprisingly, the visions of healthy, well-served native populations evoked by this 
rhetoric remained far from the daily experience of colonial medicine.  At the few native 
hospitals in Nyasaland during the early 1920s, medical officers wrote scathingly about 
the conditions in which they were made to practice. A 1921 annual report authored by Dr. 
Raymond Busy, the Senior Medical Officer in Blantyre, explained: 
The present position of the Native Hospital is unsatisfactory from all points of 
view. It is situated right on the road side…There is only one ward, which has to 
be used for all classes of cases…Government should build a proper new Native 
Hospital…with separate wards for medical, surgical and female patients and with 
good rooms for outpatients and for operations…Failing this it would be better to 
give a large government grant to the large, well-established and well-staffed 
hospital at the Church of Scotland Mission for the treatment of Natives and send 
all cases to that institution.81 
 
Busy’s proposal was not approved. Three years later, in his new post as Nyasaland’s 
Principal Medical Officer, Busy forwarded the Chief Secretary another complaint about 
Blantyre’s native hospital, this one written by A.G. Eldred, his successor as Blantyre’s 
Senior Medical Officer. Eldred’s report was even more vivid, describing the hospital’s 
“one large ward, in which all patients, prisoners, and the general native public have to be 
herded.” Lacking even a room to treat outpatients, “the dressing of wounds and ulcers is 
at present performed practically in the main road.” 82 In his own minute, the Director of 
Public Works added his opinion that the present Native Hospital was “in a very 
unsanitary condition…and, if retained, would involve such expenditure on improvement 
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as, in my opinion, is unjustifiable.”83 In 1925, citing the hospital’s “disrepair,” FE 
Whitehead, Nyasaland’s new Director of Medical and Sanitary Services, simply shuttered 
the building and paid the Blantyre Mission Hospital to treat African inpatients referred 
from government dispensaries.84 
 
Nyasaland was not the only colony in British Africa where the medical administration 
sought increased facilities for natives in the years after the First World War. In 1922, Dr. 
John Gilks, Kenya’s Principal Medical Officer, wrote of his Department that it was “no 
longer considered merely as an organization maintained by Government to facilitate 
administration by maintaining the personnel of the executive in health, but as a 
Department of Government responsible for the carrying out of the most important 
function for which Government itself is established, namely the maintenance in health of 
the general population of the country and the improvement of the conditions under which 
that population lives.”85 In Tanganyika (most of what was formerly German East Africa), 
the British administration began rural dispensary construction in 1926 in response to what 
historian Ann Beck described only as “popular demand and political pressure.”86  
 
In Nyasaland, Government dispensers were recruited from the small cadre of young 
African males who had received some education at mission schools; these recruits were 																																																								
83 “Minute by Director of Public Works to Nyasaland Chief Secretary, SMP 1268/1924,” July 31, 
1924, 1728/27, MNA. Eldred proposed that the medical department should be given permission 
to repurpose the abandoned Blantyre Sports Club Pavilion for use as a Native Hospital. 
84 F.E. Whitehead, “Annual Medical Report on the Health and Sanitary Condition of the 
Nyasaland Protectorate for the Year Ended 31st December, 1925” (Zomba, Nyasaland: 
Government Printer, June 11, 1926). Page 13. 
85 Beck, Medicine, Tradition, and Development in Kenya and Tanzania. 1920-1970. Pages 15-16 
86 Ibid. pages 15-16  
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trained at native hospital in Zomba, where they apprenticed for a few months under 
African dressers and dispensers before being sent out. Though a few African auxiliaries 
in the government service had received months or even years of medical training at 
mission hospitals, there was no formal didactic instruction for the new dispensers training 
in Zomba in the 1920s87. When they reached their rural outposts, the new dispensers did 
not draw in droves of sick patients. Attendance figures belied the Medical Department’s 
claim that dispensers were “giving the natives confidence in European medicine.”88 In 
1927, the average number of new cases presenting daily at each of the 78 rural 
dispensaries was only 3 to 4.89 
 
Though dispensaries and African hospitals made some bare minimum of care available to 
the general African population in Nyasaland, members of the colonial administration did 
not take great pride in them. In 1925 the government claimed to provide 14 “hospitals” 
for natives, though it counted the Blantyre Mission as one such hospital, and only seven 
of the 14 had a medical officer. The other seven each had a sub-assistant surgeon, though 
at two of these the sub-assistant surgeon was present only two or three months each 
year.90 As Nyasaland Governor Shenton Thomas lamented in a dispatch to the Colonial 
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Office in 1930, native hospitals were so poorly maintained that “Africans of the better 
type flatly refused to enter.”91  
 
There were few diseases for which European medicine was thought, among the general 
African population, to be effective. During the early 1920s, the new native dispensaries 
joined mission hospitals in attempting to cure yaws, a treponemal infection closely 
related to syphilis, though spread via non-sexual contact.92 Yaws was not a fatal 
infection, but it caused disfiguring and often debilitating ulcers that could erode skin, 
tissue and even bone. The dispensaries and hospitals initially used “Castellani’s mixture,” 
a combination of tartar emetic, sodium salicylate, and potassium iodide that had been 
used by David Livingstone in the 1860s. But the treatment was “disappointing,” as 
relapses were common and advanced cases were rarely cured.93 
 
In 1925, medical officers in the districts of Karonga and Dedza introduced an 
intramuscular injection of sodium bismuth tartrate that seemed, at least initially, more 
effective. “The natives, once they realized the value of the new treatment, flocked to the 
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dispensaries,” wrote medical officer HB Follit.94  Various preparations of bismuth had 
been used to treat syphilis and yaws in other British colonies since 1922. It eventually 
appeared to demonstrate some efficacy as a treatment for yaws; six injections over three 
weeks suppressed the disfiguring and painful ulcers (though, unbeknownst to the 
investigators of the 1920s, this suppression would usually not be permanent).95 The 
injections were intramuscular (not intravenous, as were other treatments such as 
salvarsan), so some of the dressers staffing native dispensaries were permitted to 
administer them by themselves.96 But the injections were not without side effects. The 
most common was stomatitis, a painful an inflammation of tissue in the mouth. This side 
effect was more commonly seen with the higher doses administered to patients with 
syphilis. For yaws patients, for whom side effects were less frequent, the injections 
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proved quite popular. Outpatient attendances for yaws climbed from 479 in 1925 to 2227 
in 1928.97   
 
 
 
 
 
Few Nyasaland Africans had access to what was generally believed to be the safest, most 
effective yaws treatment available. Yaws symptoms could be even more quickly 
suppressed by injections of neosalvarsan. Discovered in the laboratory of German 
physician Paul Ehrlich in 1912 (and an improvement on salvarsan, which his laboratory 
had discovered in 1909), neosalvarsan was first used in Europe as a treatment for 
venereal syphilis.98 A few missions and native hospitals in Nyasaland began using this 
injection in 1920s for both syphilis and yaws. The drug proved fairly painless, and within 
weeks after completing the course of two injections, administered one a week apart, most 
patients’ outward manifestations of yaws had disappeared. But the Medical Department 
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deemed neosalvarsan too expensive for “general use.”99 In 1921, a missionary in 
Tanganyika reported that neosalvarsan cost him 10 shillings per dose.100 Five years later, 
writing in the pages of the Lancet, John Owen Shircore (then Tanganyika’s Director of 
Medical Services), reported that for 10 shillings he could prepare over 300 doses of his 
favored bismuth injection.101 In addition, because neosalvarsan had to be administered 
intravenously, it was used only at stations staffed by medical officers.102  
 
Despite the popularity of yaws treatment, most Africans did not begin to seek care at 
government or mission facilities for every kind of serious illness. As Terence Ranger 
explained, “there was remarkably little of the predicted carry-over effect. Readiness to 
come for yaws treatment did not break down a more general ‘mistrust of European 
methods.’”103 I will argue in Chapter 7 that Nyasaland Africans were skeptical 
empiricists in their therapy-seeking behavior. This is anything but a novel argument—
though, as I will argue, its veracity and import have not yet been fully appreciated. Dr. JB 
Christopherson, a missionary physician working in Tanzania, made the same case in the 
UMCA’s journal in 1921 when he declared: “the native only judges by results.”104 In the 
late 1920s European medicine seemed effective at treating yaws, though the popularity of 
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these injections would abate as the disfiguring lesions reappeared in previously treated 
patients. This was due to at least three factors: the inefficacy of the treatments themselves 
(truly effective therapy would come only with the arrival of penicillin); the difficulty in 
completing full treatment courses, which required multiple visits by patients in whom 
lesions had already begun to resolve; and the lack of a focus on treating latent cases, in 
addition to patients with clinically manifest disease.105  
 
Beyond the deficiencies in yaws campaigns, an even more important reason for the dearth 
of African attendance at medical facilities was that European medicine had not yet 
demonstrated any efficacy at treating many other common illnesses, from tropical ulcer 
to tuberculosis. The total number of African and Asian outpatient attendances did rise 
during the 1920s, markedly after the construction of dispensaries, from 19,089 in 1921 to 
96,088 in 1923, then more slowly, to 168,181 in 1928. By 1928, there was still barely one 
outpatient admission per year for every ten Africans in Nyasaland.106 Christopherson 
may have been right when he claimed that “every case cured is placed in the native mind 
to the credit of the government”—as we will see in later chapters, this was the 
assumption underlying investments in health care throughout the British Empire during 
periods of tumult—but in the 1920s such cases remained relatively few and far 
between.107 
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In any case, government medicine was not the most pervasive fact of colonial rule for 
African subjects in Nyasaland during the first interwar decade. During the early 1920s, a 
flat hut tax of 6 shillings was due from inhabitants of each hut every October 1. Default 
on this tax carried penalties including a prison term of six months, the demolition of 
one’s hut, and even the seizing of the defaulter’s wife as a hostage until payment (a tactic 
born in the impressment of carrier labor during the Great War).108 As late as the mid-
1930s, tax-defaulters held as prisoners in Mlanje were even made to perform the daily 
task of removing buckets of feces and urine from the latrines in the homes of 
Europeans.109  
 
Beyond the conscription of wartime carriers and punishments for tax defaulters, the 
government was known among Africans for its neglect during times of want. During a 
terrible famine in 1922-1923, British administrators set the price of imported maize at 
more than two times the rate the government had ever paid to peasant producers, and 
refused to release stored maize from granaries.110  
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The Nyasaland government was also known for its seemingly endless preferences for 
European settlers. In 1928, when a 20-year old European man named D’Arcy shot and 
killed an African boy, D’Arcy claimed he had merely intended to show off the gun but it 
had accidentally gone off. Nyasaland’s High Court ruled that this act was “that of a youth 
who considers it grand and manly to be seen carrying a firearm” and, though finding the 
defendant guilty of manslaughter, Judge Haythorne Reed felt he could “pass on…only a 
sentence of a fine” of forty pounds. “I hope,” the judge advised D’Arcy, “you will shew 
that this is justified by becoming a useful member of society, and by living up to the 
highest ideals of our race.”111 Contrast this to the sentence imposed upon an native cook, 
who was convicted of disobedience to his master’s orders when, instead of drowning 
“two sick puppies” as ordered, he gave them away as a present. A lower court sentenced 
the cook to three months imprisonment with hard labor; on appeal, the High Court 
showed the extent of his forbearance for natives by lowering the cook’s sentence to 2 ½ 
months.112 So while the Principal Medical Officer succeeded in garnering some funds to 
make government medicine for Africans more widely available, this was a small and, in 
many ways, anomalous departure from colonial policy of the era.  
IV. Conclusion 
 
Whereas before the First World War the only source of biomedical care in Nyasaland 
were the scattered mission hospitals, the intense demands for African labor during the 
war spurred the construction of government-run hospitals and dispensaries. These ill-																																																								
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equipped facilities were tasked with the care of the hundreds of thousands of “carriers” 
forced to carry munitions, rations and other supplies to troops fighting near the border of 
Nyasaland and German East Africa. Many conscripted carriers and soldiers had their first 
contact with hospitals during the Great War, though these facilities were far more 
impressive in official records than in reality. 
 
In the aftermath of war, experience with biomedicine at these hospitals led native 
authorities and colonial medical officers to call for the construction of additional health 
facilities. These facilities were staffed by poorly trained African auxiliaries and operated 
under extreme economies. According to colonial officials of the 1920s, these healthcare 
facilities had not secured the confidence of most Africans. But the hospitals and 
dispensaries owed their very existence to the even more threadbare carrier hospitals that 
inaugurated the era of biomedical care for Africans in Nyasaland. During the early 1920s, 
persistent advocacy by the Director of Medical Services, who invoked the recent war, 
helped prompt the construction of rural dispensaries around the colony. 
 
The next chapter will show that in the decades that followed the Great War, healthcare 
for Africans would continue to be dictated by colonists’ labor demands, in particular the 
need for healthy laborers on European-owned agricultural estates. For most other 
Africans in Nyasaland, health remained a small part of the experience of being colonized. 
Still, the feverish demand for labor during the Great War, the colonial government’s first 
great crisis, had helped spur medical provision that reached Africans even in some rural 
areas. 
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Chapter 2 
Legacies of interwar nutrition research: from veterinary medicine to economic 
growth in Nyasaland, 1920-1953 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter chronicles the efflorescence, decline and enduring effects of interwar-era 
nutrition research in British colonial Africa. During the interwar era, experts in a diverse 
array of scientific fields, including nutrition, entomology, agriculture, and anthropology 
investigated the health of Africans in British holdings in eastern and southern Africa. 
These studies were inspired by—and in some cases led by—veterinarians who had 
previously conducted animal studies in Africa. In both the veterinary and human studies, 
investigators were interested in growing and maintaining productive bodies. Such bodies, 
they found, could only be forged with diets consisting of sufficient quantities of vitamins, 
minerals and calories. The researchers were also concerned about parasites’ ability to sap 
productivity. One of the most ambitious such investigations was the Nyasaland Nutrition 
Survey (1938-1940), which buttressed officials’ claims that improving productivity 
among colonized subjects demanded increased spending on health services and 
agricultural extension. During the interwar years this research showed little immediate 
impact on colonial expenditures for either health or agriculture. But later, in the postwar 
dawn, economic researchers would use the Nyasaland Survey data to calculate colonial 
national incomes. After the Second World War, the Survey’s agriculturalist advocated 
radical changes to agricultural policy. Ultimately, a research agenda originally aiming to 
help transform Africans into more effective laborers was repurposed to try to make them 
into more ambitious capitalists. 
 
Prelude: Flood, drought, and living in uncertainty 
 
 “If you could leave this place, you would,” explained an elderly man waiting in line to 
see a nurse operating a mobile clinic out of the back of a Toyota Landcruiser. The man 
(who declined to give his name because he had just cobbled together a shoddy grass hut 
outside the camp and did not want to be disqualified from relief offered in the camp) was 
one of thousands in the area who had lost homes and livelihoods in recent floods. But for 
the many who continued to sleep in Red Cross tents or church pews or hastily converted 
schoolrooms, the danger that roused the greatest fear was not continued homelessness, 
but famine. 
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In early January 2015 large swaths of the southern African nations of Malawi and 
Mozambique suffered the region’s worst flood in at least a half-century. The United 
Nations estimated 170,00 people were displaced, while at least 150 people died. Budding 
crops on an estimated 89,000 hectares of cultivated fields were washed away, while 
195,000 livestock were drowned. One week after the rains ended, some areas were still 
only accessible by helicopter. Thousands sought shelter from the waters in hastily 
constructed camps. Camp residents complained they had little food, and nurses operating 
out of Red Cross ambulances reported seeing cases of scabies, diarrhea, malaria, and 
scores of women complaining of non-specific and diffuse body pain. 
 
The annual rains are usually a welcome sight and, initially, their arrival was a relief. After 
applying fertilizer and planting crops in November 2014 farmers waited anxiously for the 
rains, which usually start by mid-November but only started this year in mid-December. 
But over the holidays the rains did not relent. By the second week of January, the Shire 
River had flooded its banks and began to fill the surrounding valley. Refugees in Nchalo, 
a town in Malawi’s southern district of Chikwawa, recounted waters that rose to the 
necks of full-grown men. Clothing, pots, and livestock were washed away. Malawians 
described the scene with a refrain repeated so often that one wondered if everyone had 
read Coleridge: “Water, water everywhere.” 
 
By February 2015 in Nchalo a shifting cast of NGOs provided ad hoc relief to the 
thousands housed in two contiguous camps with a combined 3,000 people. The tents had 
been cobbled together from UNICEF, the Red Cross and the Malawi Army, but many 
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leaked in the heavy rains. The World Food Programme and World Vision distributed soy, 
beans and cooking oil. Médecins Sans Frontières built latrines and began offering a daily 
mobile clinic. Illovo, a sugar company with a plantation nearby, parked a tank of potable 
water at the side of the road and offered to treat more medical cases referred to the 
company clinic free of charge. One afternoon, without any notice, shopkeepers in a local 
Muslim charitable society unloaded a truck full of groceries right in front of the camp. 
Realizing immediately that this donation was unlikely to be repeated, hungry men and 
women jostled for the sudden windfall. Government officials conducted head counts of 
camp residents. Sundry NGO administrators visited every day to assess the situation and 
deliver sundry supplies. But aside from the higher-level meetings in the country’s capital, 
there seemed to be little coordination; NGO employees interviewed in the camps had not 
met with other groups working there. 
 
A week after the waters began to subside, more and more refugees tried to return to their 
homes. The tents in the camps were too crowded with unwashed, unfed bodies, and the 
site itself was miserable. Located in the middle of barren soccer field without trees for 
shade, the tents became ovens in the hot midday sun.  
 
Neatly clad in a brown dress, a young girl in a camp alongside thousands displaced by 
recent floods repeated a daily chore seen often in nearby villages. Bent at the hip, her 
body folded in two, she used a small broom of bundled twigs to sweep away the dirt 
outside her tent. But this was a Sisyphean task. The tent was surrounded only by a barren 
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expanse of dust. It seemed a quiet attempt to recover some sense of normalcy in the midst 
of an unfolding disaster. 
 
There was relative comfort nearby. Across the tarmac road from the camp was an outdoor 
market where brightly colored clothing was sold. A half-mile away, a quaint lodge 
offered ample shade and breakfast to NGO administrators with per diems and SUVs. The 
camp residents lived in a squalor surrounded by normalcy.  
 
Outside the official disaster area, further north along the Shire River in the village of 
Matope, the flood inflicted similar damage. Matope means “mud” in Chichewa, a nod to 
its low-lying locale. A smallholder farmer named John Lucia returned to his brick house 
after the water receded to find a wall collapsed. After his neighbor found his home 
destroyed as well, both of their families (comprising 11 people) moved into a single 
wattle-and-daub hut nearby. They were the lucky ones; families without recourse to spare 
huts slept on church pews and on schoolroom floors. 
 
While the destruction of housing was a disaster, the most fearful sight came when the 
waters subsided and people surveyed their fields. The entire valley was usually lush with 
maize, cotton and rice by late January. But they saw only a thick layer of silt and sand 
that promised to suffocate their crops. Though the region’s semi-subsistence farmers 
were accustomed a precarious existence and seasonal hunger, this was an unbearable 
shock. Most families had already run out of food stored up from the May 2014 harvest. 
The months from January through April are commonly known in Malawi as nyengo njala 
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(the hungry season). Dedicated malnutrition wards in district hospitals fill with infants on 
the verge of death, children with crispy orange hair, distended bellies, edematous feet and 
twig-like arms. So concentrated is the suffering here that the hungry season draws an 
annual pilgrimage of medical researchers, studying either the effect of acute-on-chronic 
malnutrition, or devising biomedical interventions to address it.1 
 
During these months, people toil on empty stomachs to produce the next harvest. “We are 
poor people,” explained Ruthina Medisani, an elderly woman in Matope whose home had 
been felled and fields laid waste by the flood. “We must rely only on what we can grow.” 
 
Those able-bodied poor who cannot grow enough for themselves must begin the sojourn 
for ganyu (piecework labor) in the fields of wealthier farmers. But in the floods of early 
2015, even this work had disappeared. Crops had been destroyed across the valley. The 
quest for meager pay now forced many to make the long walk into the highlands where 
some farms have been spared. A well-built young man named Denies Bonongwe, who 
had lost his house and was living with friends, says these sojourns for ganyu earned him 
no more than 200 kwacha (US$0.43) per day. 
 
Although no Malawians I interviewed could remember floods of this magnitude, they did 
point to recent history for predictions of what could come next. In 2002 the country had 																																																								
1 This research includes a 2013 study that found that antibiotic treatment in severely 
malnourished children could, alongside standard-of-care protein-based “therapeutic food,” 
decrease the risk of death. This finding was published in the New England Journal of Medicine. 
Indi Trehan et al., “Antibiotics as Part of the Management of Severe Acute Malnutrition,” New 
England Journal of Medicine 368, no. 5 (January 31, 2013): 425–35. 
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endured a deadly famine after a poor harvest (spurred, in part, by cuts to a government 
program that provided free agricultural inputs). The famine was worsened by the bungled 
response. The recently privatized agricultural marketing board (ADMARC) had sold off 
the government’s reserves of grain, the president was late to declare a state of emergency, 
and disaster relief from outside the country was late and insufficient. Many baby boys 
born during this period were given the name Mavuto (translated literally, “misfortune”). 
Patrick Mwale, an elected ward councilor representing the area around Matope, 
remembers 2002 as the year “nobody came to help.” He hoped that his year his 
constituents’ cries were heard, both by the Malawi government and by outside donors. 
 
For their part, Malawians affected by the floods were quick to list exactly what they 
needed. Mwale reported that his constituents’ demands were varied, but amounted to a 
comprehensive program of relief and rehabilitation. In the immediate term, they called 
for emergency food relief and expanded public works programs to keep families fed. 
They also demanded a rapid distribution of seed and fertilizer to allow them to make one 
last-ditch attempt to replant their crops before the rains stopped for the year. They called 
for tarpaulins to cover their collapsed roofs, and assistance rebuilding their homes. Most 
of the displaced dreaded the prospect of sitting idle in sweltering camps or church floors, 
subject to the whims of whatever NGO decided to visit. But most of this relief did not 
come. As the window for replanting crops closed rapidly, many Malawians had nothing 
left to their names but ruined fields and collapsed homes. 
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Two months later the scale of devastation looked worse than ever. Parts of the country 
spared the torrential rains were struck by drought. Francis’s village was one such place. 
On the morning of February 21, Francis looked relieved by rains overnight. His smiled 
more than he had during the past three weeks. His nascent maize crop was about to enter 
a crucial phase. Without sufficient moisture in the soil over the coming weeks, the silken 
tassels that signaled a healthy crop would not emerge on time. “I was worried,” Francis 
admitted. He hoped the rains would continue. 
 
But his hopes would soon be dashed. Over the coming weeks, unrelenting sunshine 
parched the soil and scorched the stalks. Tassels, those hoped-for harbingers of full 
stomachs, sprouted late or not at all. By mid-March Francis was worried once more that 
even if rain fell again, the year’s harvest would still be paltry.  
 
Sure enough, the joyful spirits that accompany a strong harvest season came to few 
Malawians in 2015. Smaller crops of pumpkins proved hardy in the face of continued 
drought, but Malawians’ reliance on high-risk, high-reward maize—a crop that can yield 
bounteous harvests but is dangerously susceptible to drought—did not pay off that year. 
After a record 2014 harvest of 3.93 million tons, the floods and droughts during the 2015 
growing season depressed the annual harvest to only 2.88 million tons. The market price 
of maize barely dipped after the harvest; by December 2015 short supplies and a 
depreciating currency had pushed the maize prices to record levels.2 Even fishermen 
																																																								
2 “Malawi: GIEWS Country Breifs” (United Nations Food & Agriculture Organization, January 
14, 2016), http://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=MWI. 
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shared in the misery, as unusually strong winds on the lake kept fish outside the reach of 
their nets. 
 
These disasters revealed the nature of wealth in rural Malawi. Malawians determined 
their neighbor’s wealth not by their conspicuous consumption of superfluous luxuries 
(few had any), but rather the number of misfortunes (sickness, flood, drought, changes in 
government programs) they could withstand before tumbling into utter penury. When, for 
instance, Francis’s neighbor Bamusa developed cataracts so advanced he could scarcely 
see, he was able to afford surgery at Zomba’s Central Hospital. Both the surgery and food 
for inpatients were free (as are almost all services at government hospitals). Bamusa also 
had livestock he could sell to pay for transport and other ancillary expenses. When 
Francis’s nephew William could no longer afford school fees following the death of both 
his parents, he could turn to Francis to pay them. Wealth, in this village, entailed 
networks of support that allowed individuals to deal with tragedy and disaster. Francis 
and his family had the means to shield themselves against the coming onslaught of 
hunger, but without public action to ensure access to food, many Malawians did not. 
 
I. Health as wealth from the 1920s to the 1940s: entomology, nutrition, and labor 
productivity 
 
The first iteration of academic concern for the health of the general population of African 
subjects in the British Empire was driven by a diverse array of scientific fields, including 
nutrition, entomology, agriculture and anthropology. Improvements in health were 
understood to stem from a diet containing enough vitamins, minerals and calories and a 
living environment sufficiently free of parasites to build and maintain hardy, productive 
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bodies. Together these investigations buttressed the claim that increased production from 
colonial subjects—a boon for colonial exports of primary materials and purchases of 
industrial products from the metropole—depended on increased investment in the health 
of colonized Africans. These proposed investments included agricultural extension 
services and vector control campaigns, but also improved health care facilities. 
 
One of the most significant scientific investigations of the connection between health and 
productivity was the Nyasaland Nutrition Survey, begun in 1938. For a brief moment, 
Nyasaland was the center of imperial expectations for cutting-edge research and novel 
interventions in the effort to make colonized labor healthier and, consequently, more 
productive. Proposals for dramatic expansions in colonial interventions in the health of 
natives arose from this survey, interventions which at full scale would have impelled 
significant increases in health and agriculture department budgets and a wholesale 
imperial commitment the “health is wealth” argument. But this moment faded quickly; 
the exigencies of wartime—including the secondment of doctors and agricultural experts 
from Nyasaland and other African colonies to military service elsewhere—halted efforts 
in Nyasaland and elsewhere. When imperial concern for colonial development reemerged 
in the postwar era, it had far more resources but a waning belief in the connection 
between health and economic growth. 
 
This chapter draws upon archival research in Malawi and the United Kingdom to 
demonstrate both the efflorescence—and enduring effects—of interwar-era nutrition 
research in British colonial Africa. During the interwar era, experts in a diverse array of 
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scientific fields, including nutrition, entomology, agriculture, and anthropology 
investigated the health of Africans in British holdings in eastern and southern Africa. 
These studies were inspired by—and in some cases led by—veterinarians who had 
previously conducted research in Africa. In both the veterinary and human studies, 
investigators were interested in growing and maintaining productive bodies. Such bodies, 
they found, could only be forged with diets consisting of sufficient quantities of vitamins, 
minerals and calories. The researchers were also concerned with the role of parasites in 
sapping productivity. One of the most ambitious such investigations was the Nyasaland 
Nutrition Survey (1938-1940), which buttressed officials’ claims that improving 
productivity among colonized subjects demanded increased spending on health services 
and agricultural extension. During the interwar years this research showed immediate 
impact on colonial expenditures on either health or agriculture. But later, in the postwar 
dawn, economic researchers would recycle this research in calculating colonial national 
incomes. Agricultural experts, for their part, revived the research to advocate for radical 
changes in colonial land tenure and agricultural policy. Ultimately, a research agenda 
originally aiming to help transform Africans into more effective laborers was repurposed 
to try to make them into more ambitious capitalists. 
 
a) From livestock to natives: nutrition science in British Africa, 1925-1928 
Much of the knowledge of how to produce a more productive African laborer drew from 
the veterinary sciences. One of the first to propose that disease could result from 
deficiencies in micronutrient deficiencies (or, to use the early-twentieth-century category, 
“accessory factors”) was the University of Cambridge biochemist Frederick Gowland 
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Hopkins, who in a 1912 paper demonstrated that young rats fed diets lacking specific 
vitamins grew only slowly, while others fed diets lacking the amino acids tryptophan died 
within 14 days.3 In 1919, Hopkins chaired a Committee on Accessory Food Factors, 
which produced a report for the UK Medical Research Committee (itself chaired by 
Member of Parliament and dairy farmer Waldorf Astor). The report claimed that 
deficiencies of accessory factors produced similar manifestations in humans and animals. 
Among other examples, the report pointed to the visual impairments caused by the lack 
of Vitamin A in both animals and humans.4 
 
When, in time, British nutrition researchers sought to study human diseases more 
directly, colonized subjects seemed ready human subjects. The transition from animals to 
Africans was apt, given the uses to which Africans had been put in the recent war. During 
the First World War, hundreds of thousands were forced to work as “beasts of burden” in 
the East African theater (see Chapter 1).5 Many veterinary researchers quickly 
transitioned to African subjects in nutritional studies. One such researcher was John Boyd 
Orr, the head of a veterinary research institute in Aberdeen, Scotland. In 1925 while on 
assignment for the Colonial Office in Kenya, he worked with John Gilks, the director of 
																																																								
3 This research helped win Hopkins the Nobel Prize in Physiology for Medicine in 1929. F 
Gowland Hopkins, “Feeding Experiments Illustrating the Importance of Accessory Factors in 
Normal Dietaries,” The Journal of Physiology 44, no. 5–6 (July 15, 1912): 425–60; Celia Petty, 
“The Impact of the Newer Knowledge of Nutrition: Nutrition Science and Nutrition Policy, 1900-
1939.” (PhD Dissertation, Department of Human Nutrition, LSHTM, 1987). Pages 54-55. 
4 “Medical Research Committee Report on the Present State of Knowledge Concerning 
Accessory Food Factors (Vitamines),” Special Report Series (London: His Majesty’s Stationary 
Office, 1919), 
https://ia802607.us.archive.org/28/items/reportonpresents00commrich/reportonpresents00commri
ch.pdf. 
5 Paice, Tip and Run; Page, The Chiwaya War. 
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the Medical Department, on a survey of the diet and health of the Maasai and the Kikuyu. 
Their findings, published in the Lancet in 1927, stressed the poor nutritional status of 
both groups (though the meat-consuming Maasai were thought to have better nutrition) 
and the investigators’ confidence that greater efforts to improve African diets would 
improve the value of “the native as an economic factor.” 6 
 
In Nyasaland, medical officers echoed this concern with diet, while pointing as well to 
parasitic infections as another major cause of native “indolence.” In the 1925 Medical 
Department Annual Report, medical officer W. Milne-Tough contended poor diet was 
partly responsible for Africans’ deficient labor on European-owned agricultural estates, 
but he also blamed the high prevalence of ankylostomiasis [hookworm].7 Among the 
appendices included in Milne-Tough’s report was a study from Mlanje—a southern 
district filled with European-owned tea estates—in which medical officer HG Wiltshire 
found that even among (presumably better-fed) Africans employed as police and hospital 
attendants the prevalence of Ankylostoma duodenale in feces was 23.3 percent, while the 
prevalence of the ova of Ascaris lumbricoides was 43.3 percent.8 Milne-Tough allowed 
that some part of the problems with African labor productivity could be attributed to the 
“natural indolence” of natives (they were, he said, “content with a hand-to-mouth 
existence”), parasitic infections and diet were major contributors. “The first step towards 																																																								
6 JL Gilks and John Boyd Orr, “The Nutritional Condition of the East African Native,” Lancet 12 
(n.d.): 560–63; Michael Worboys, “The ‘Discovery’ of Colonial Malnutrition,” Society for the 
Social History of Medicine Bulletin 40 (June 1987): 23–26. Also see Osaak A. Olumwullah, Dis-
Ease in the Colonial State: Medicine, Society and Social Change among the AbaNyole of Western 
Kenya (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002). Page 229, footnote 56. 
7 Whitehead, “Annual Medical Report on the Health and Sanitary Condition of He Nyasaland 
Protectorate for the Year Ended 31st December, 1925.”, pages 8-11.  
8 “Appendix II: Some observations of intestinal parasites of natives at Mlanje,” in Ibid. 
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an improvement in the existing state of affairs,” he insisted, “must be taken by the 
employers of labour.”9 
 
Three years later, in his 1928 annual report, Director of Medical and Sanitary Services FE 
Whitehead made these same links between labor productivity, diet, and hookworm 
infection. He remarked that native labourers were given “physiologically insufficient, 
monotonous, and ill-balanced” rations of maize, beans and salt. The main element 
missing from this diet, Whitehead believed, was meat. Boyd Orr and Gilks had made the 
same claim with regard to the agricultural Kikuyu people while contrasting them with the 
pastoralist Maasai. But in his report, Whitehead admitted that “the Government rightly 
hesitates to enforce an adequate scale of diet,” as employers might not be able to afford to 
provide a regular ration of meat to African laborers.10 
 
In addition to such rationalizations, this medical discourse also served to de-politicize (at 
least in official discourse) the problem of labor productivity, and to ignore the possibility 
that African laborers might be working slowly in part because they resented the 
conditions under which they toiled. William Cecil Botttomley, a clerk in the Colonial 
Office, wrote in 1912 that the prevailing wage rate for African laborers on Nyasaland 
estates (four to five shillings per month, without food) was “a record for any settled part 
of Africa.” Hungry for labor to work their fields, many planters turned to the thangata 
system devised by Nyasaland Governor Alfred Sharpe in 1902.11 Under this system 																																																								
9 Ibid. Page 11. 
10 Whitehead, “Annual Medical Report for the Year Ended 31st December, 1928.” 
11 McCracken, A History of Malawi. Page 80. 
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African “tenants” on land alienated to Europeans were required to work for at least one 
month on Europeans’ crops in lieu of rent, and another month in order to meet hut tax 
obligations. The historian John McCracken has argued that African tenants often had to 
spend even longer on landlords’ fields, as landlords were wont to abrogate verbal 
agreements “by the simple expedient of refusing to provide workers with the vouchers 
required to demonstrate to the government that they had met their obligations.”12 While 
parasites and diet were much-studied causes of low productivity of African labor on 
European-owned estates, the problem could also have been a result of foot-dragging. In 
the absence of any real incentives to work harder, these African laborers (like many 
subject peoples) might have seen little reason to strain every fiber.13 But the colonial 
medical officials did not raise this possibility, perhaps because acknowledging it might 
detract from their ongoing efforts to prove to potential European settlers that they could 
turn an easy profit using low-paid or unpaid African labor. 
 
b) Anti-hookworm campaigns: medical popularity and danger, 1928-1931 
 
While solutions to problems with the native laborer’s diet appeared expensive, the 
Nyasaland government helped planters attempt a more frugal biomedical remedy for 
parasitic infections. Whitehead observed in 1928 that hookworm did “not appear to cause 
severe symptoms, and beyond a feeling of lassitude and discomfort suggestive of 
dyspepsia there is little to make the patient suspect his trouble. These slight symptoms are 
																																																								
12 Ibid. Page 130. 
13 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, Reprint edition 
(Princeton, N.J.: Yale University Press, 1987). 
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sufficient, however, to interfere with his output of work.”14 The Nyasaland Medical 
Department responded to this problem by providing carbon tetrachloride free of charge to 
European employers of native labor. The use of this drug marked another repurposing of 
veterinary medicine. Just as veterinary researchers like Boyd Orr had helped spark 
concern with African diets, they had also helped devise a cure for native lassitude caused 
by parasites. Carbon tetrachloride had first been tested for use as an antihelminthic on 
dogs by American pharmacologist Maurice Hall in 1921.15 
 
Such government aid for estates marked one of the Nyasaland government’s first 
interventions into the health of natives. Outside the sparsely placed mission hospitals, 
which tended to charge fees for care, Africans in the protectorate had few options for 
government healthcare, other than the few poorly equipped native hospitals in major 
towns and the recently established rural dispensaries constructed from wattle-and-daub 
and staffed by attendants with very limited diagnostic skills (see Chapter 1). Though 
Whitehead claimed in 1928 that hookworm was “nearly universal amongst the natives of 
the country,” he confessed he had not yet begun mass campaign against it ”owing to a 
lack of staff.”16 The government did undertake such a campaign following an increase in 
imperial grants for native health the early 1930s (Chapter 3), but in the 1920s the 																																																								
14 Whitehead, “Annual Medical Report for the Year Ended 31st December, 1928.” 
15 Maurice Crowther Hall, “The Use of Carbon Tetrachloride for the Removal of Hookworms,” 
Journal of the American Medical Association 77 (1921): 1641–43. Drugs originally used in 
veterinary medicine continue to be an important source of drugs for “tropical diseases,” for which 
there is generally little focused research and development. Praziquantel, ivermectin, and 
albendazole were originally developed for animals, and later repurposed for humans. Piero L 
Olliaro, Annette C Kuesel, and John C Reeder, “A Changing Model for Developing Health 
Products for Poverty-Related Infectious Diseases,” PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases 9, no. 1 
(January 8, 2015): e3379. 
16 Whitehead, “Annual Medical Report for the Year Ended 31st December, 1928.”, pages 12, 15. 
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government focused its limited medical budget on improving the health of laborers on 
Native estates.  
c) Pharmacies versus estates: elite battles over labor productivity and profits, 1928-
1932 
Early in the colonial era, concern for maintaining productive labor led some European 
planters to pay for health services for their African laborers. In 1901, the Church of 
Scotland mission hospital in Blantyre began to supply health services to employers of 
African labor—including planters, traders, and transport agents—in the Shire Highlands. 
African hospital assistants examined sick patients on an outpatient basis, and referred 
serious cases to the mission’s hospital.17 
 
By the 1920s, the government Medical Department had supplanted missionaries as the 
major supplier of medicines to European employers. In addition to supplying carbon 
tetrachloride to estates free of charge, the Nyasaland Government sold estates other 
medicines at their “landed cost” (at the cost of importing drugs); these prices were far 
below those prevailing at privately owned pharmacies in the territory. In a February 1928 
letter to the Chief Secretary in Zomba, Percy Skerett of the Nyasaland Merchants’ 
Association objected to this policy. He noted that the Government enjoyed much lower 
transport costs than private importers; government paid railway transport rates one-third 
lower than the private sector, and did not pay any wharfage fees at ports. “The Trader is 
therefore handicapped,” Skerett argued, “at once by the difference between the 
Government and his landed costs to the extent that he cannot compete at a price to get his 																																																								
17 Rennick, “Church and Medicine: The Role of Medical Missionaries in Malawi, 1875-1914.” 
Page 124. 
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actual outlay back.”18 Three months later, the Nyasaland Planters’ Association responded 
with its own letter, in which it contended “the scheme…is working well—to the benefit 
of the native who gets the proper medicine when he is sick and to the benefit of the 
Planter who thus manages to keep his workers in better health.”19  
 
The Government sided with the planters, and continued the policy—over the 
pharmacists’ objections—for years. Skerrett persisted in protesting the government’s sale 
of drugs to estates. He even penned a June 1932 letter to the editor of East Africa, a 
newspaper published in Kenya, decrying the policy as “most unfair competition” and a 
burden on the taxpayer. Repeal would, he said, “relieve the Government from their 
present invidious position, whereby they charge a license to those who deal in drugs and 
medicines and then, by supplying those stores themselves, deprive them of such business 
as would accrue.”20 But the government had already reaffirmed its position; in an April 
1932 memo to the Chief Secretary, Whitehead wearily explained that “this matter has 
been fully dealt with in previous minutes…I know that there is a very strong desire 
amongst planters to continue this arrangement.” The political power of estates—the main 
source of export revenue for Nyasaland—gave the cash-strapped government an interest 
in their prosperity—and support for medical provision on the estates was thought to be a 
cost-efficient way to improve their output. 																																																								
18 “Percy Skerett to Chief Secretary,” February 1, 1928, “Supply of medicines and drugs by 
government to agricultural companies and individuals at prices lower than those at which traders 
can import them,” 1728/27, MNA. 
19 “Nyasaland Planters’ Association to Chief Secretary,” May 21, 1928, “Supply of medicines and 
drugs by government to agricultural companies and individuals at prices lower than those at 
which traders can import them,” 1728/27, MNA. 
20 Percy Skerrett, “Government Supply of Medicines to Estates in Nyasaland,” Letter to the 
Editor of “East Africa,” (June 23, 1932), 1728/27, MNA. 
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d) Building “human material”: nutrition in British development thought, 1932-1938 
By the mid-1930s, though, both the myopic focus on chemotherapeutics for estate labor 
seemed, to a number of colonial researchers and officials, inadequate. In 1932, the British 
social anthropologist Audrey Richards’ published a revised version of her PhD a study of 
food and nutrition titled Hunger and work in a savage tribe: a functional study of 
nutrition among the southern Bantu. In the book, drawn from material presented in other 
ethnographic studies as well as her own fieldwork, she argued that malnutrition in British 
Africa was not solely a biochemical deficiency remediable with supplements, but the 
result of social processes legible only upon deeper examination of kinship groups and 
clans.21 But Richards was not averse to biochemical studies of nutrition; in her work 
among the Bemba in Northern Rhodesia during the mid-1930s she collaborated with Dr. 
Elsie Widdowson, a biochemist at Kings’ College Hospital in London.22 Richards and 
Widdowson published their findings in Africa, the journal of the London-based 
International Institute of African Languages and Cultures (IIALC). This institute had, in 
																																																								
21 Audrey Isabel Richards, Hunger and Work in a Savage Tribe: A Functional Study of Nutrition 
Among the Southern Bantu (Psychology Press, 1932). 
22 A. I. Richards and E. M. Widdowson, “A Dietary Study in North-Eastern Rhodesia,” Africa: 
Journal of the International African Institute 9, no. 2 (April 1, 1936): 166–96. Richardson and 
Widdowson explained “the biochemist and anthropologist look at native food problems from very 
different points of view, but it seems clear that research on African diets will be of scientific 
value only if there is cooperation between the two. Without chemical analysis it is impossible to 
know the composition of any particular native diet. Without a knowledge of customs and 
language of any tribal area the necessary facts cannot be collected.” Also see Brantley, Feeding 
families, 3-4. 
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1934, established a diet committee, which sought to support investigations of nutrition in 
British Africa by combining the insights of social anthropology and biochemistry.23 
 
But the increased interest in the economic underpinnings, and economic consequences, of 
nutrition during the 1930s was not unique to Britain’s holdings in colonial Africa. Studies 
published in the League of Nations Health Organization’s Bulletin in 1935 contended that 
poor nutrition was a truly global problem. Even in wealthy nations, such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States, the relatively poor continued to go hungry.24 In poor 
nations and dependencies, the report contended, the problem was an absolute shortage of 
food. Remedies, the report concluded, demanded the collaborative efforts of experts in 
health and agriculture.25 
 
The Colonial Office took up this call for combining experts in health and agriculture as 
part of an overall vision of colonial development. After a 1937 visit to East Africa, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Herbrand Sackville, the Earl de 
la Warr, declared that “the real ‘development’ needed in Africa is not in the investment of 
large sums of capital, but the improvement of the human material. The limiting factor is 
																																																								
23 Cynthia Brantley, Feeding Families : African Realities and British Ideas of Nutrition and 
Development in Early Colonial Africa (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002). Pages 3-4. 
24 ET Burnet and WR Akroyd, Nutrition and public health, offprint no.2 from Quarterly bulletin 
of the health organization of the league of nations, 4;2 (June 1935), also see Mark Gibson, The 
Feeding of Nations: Redefining Food Security for the 21st Century (CRC Press, 2012). Pages 
179-180. 
25 In 1936, researchers commissioned by the League of Nations published a globally applicable 
table of calorie and protein requirements that assumed only age and sex (not nationality, race, or 
location) were relevant determinants of nutritional requirements. See “Final Report of the Mixed 
Committee of the League of Nations on the Relation of Nutrition to Health, Agriculture and 
Economic Policy” (Geneva: League of Nations, 1937). 
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the low standard of health and intelligence of the average native.”26 To build Africa’s 
“human material,” improvements in agriculture, health and education would have to be 
pursued in tandem. Malnutrition—a product, according to a 1939 Colonial Office report, 
of poverty and ignorance, and a cause of disease and lassitude—was a problem that dealt 
with all three facets of this notion of development.27 
 
II. The rise and fall of nutrition research in Nyasaland: the Nyasaland Nutrition 
Survey 
 
a) Conducting the survey, 1938-1940 
 
In the year before the Second World War, Nyasaland was the site of an ambitious study 
meant to inform future interventions. Leading officials in Nyasaland at the time were 
eager to obtain additional funding for the medical department emphasizing the link 
between health and productivity. A March 1936 memorandum penned by ADJB 
Williams, Nyasaland’s Director of Medical Services and forwarded by Governor 
Kittermaster to the Colonial Office, stated that “the efficiency and therefore the material 
prosperity of a people depends to a very large extent on the healthiness of the people.”28 
Their timing was auspicious. In 1937, the UK Economic Advisory Council established a 
Committee on Nutrition to review responses from a questionnaire on nutrition that had 
been sent to every British dependency by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1936. 
Drawing upon funding from the IIALC, the Colonial Development Fund, the British 
																																																								
26 David John Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development: The Origins of British Aid 
Policy, 1924-1945 (Humanities Press, 1980).Page 59. 
27 Nutrition in the Colonial Empire, Economic Advisory Council, 1939. 
28 ADJ Bedward Williams, “Memorandum A: A Memorandum on the Health Policy in 
Nyasaland, From the Director of Medical Services to the Governor, the Colonial Office, and the 
Colonial Advisory Medical Committee” (Nyasaland Medical Department, March 23, 1936), 
No.138/1936: Nutrition and its Relation to Public Health, MNA. 
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Medical Research Council, and the Colonial Office, the Committee on Nutrition planned 
to support a series of multi-disciplinary nutritional surveys in colonial holdings 
throughout the empire.29 Kittermaster made it known that he was eager to have a study 
conducted among his subjects, and in March 1937 the governors of the East African 
territories—who had been tasked with selecting the site for the first study—granted his 
wish.30 
 
The Nyasaland Nutritional Survey began in three villages in Nkhotakota District in 
September 1938, under the leadership of Benjamin Stanley Platt. Though only in his mid-
thirties, Platt was already physician and biochemist of considerable repute. He had spent 
the previous six years in Shanghai, where he had conducted controlled trials and 
published findings the links between thiamine (Vitamin B1) deficiency, rice preparation, 
and the symptoms of beriberi.31 The survey team included another doctor, HG 
Fitzmaurice, who had been the medical officer stationed in Nkhotakota for two years the 
survey began. He was tasked with continuing his regular clinical work throughout the 
district while in the three survey villages he was to examine all the adults (using Platt’s 
own 10-page-long form for each exam) and to weigh the infants and young children.32 
For the team’s nutritionist, Platt chose Jessie Barker, another young researcher who had 
worked as a recorder on John Boyd Orr’s urban surveys in the UK. In Nyasaland 
Barker’s job was to record the weight of all food before cooking and as consumed, and to 																																																								
29 Berry, Before the Wind of Change. page 39-40. 
30 Brantley, Feeding Families., 4-5. 
31 Kenneth J. Carpenter, Beriberi, White Rice, and Vitamin B: A Disease, a Cause, and a Cure 
(University of California Press, 2000). 
32 Brantley, Feeding Families., 7-9 
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pack samples to be sent to Boyd Orr’s laboratory in Aberdeen for biochemical analysis. 
Her nickname in the villages became Mwadya chiyani (Chichewa for “what have you 
eaten”) due to the frequency with which she asked the question.33 Governor Kittermaster 
had chosen the anthropologist, Margaret Read, who had been conducting fieldwork in 
central and northern Nyasaland among the Ngoni people as a research fellow of the 
IIALC.34 Richard Kettlewell, an official in Nyasaland’s Department of Agriculture—and 
a man with a dismal view of extant African agricultural practices—was the team’s 
agriculturalist. The final expert on the survey team was the botanist, a role filled during 
most of the study by Dr. Geoffrey Herklots, an economic biologist whom Platt had met at 
the University of Hong Kong.35  The other actors in this drama—the Africans in the three 
villages that were to be the focus of the study—had been promised exemption from the 
hut tax for the duration of the study.36 
 
Early survey results soon revealed the complexity of nutritional problems in Nyasaland. 
In Shanghai, Platt’s studies of beriberi had shown that simple nutritional supplements, or 
slight alterations in the preparation of rice, could ameliorate biochemical deficiencies. 
But to Platt’s surprise, medical examinations of in the three villages revealed not a single 
clear case of any deficiency disease—no beriberi, no scurvy, no pellagra—known to be 
amenable to cure with a specific vitamin or mineral.37 Platt’s dreams of another a silver-																																																								
33 Ibid., 9. 
34 Ibid., 4-5. 
35 Ibid., 10. 
36 Veronica Berry and Celia Petty, The Nyasaland Survey Papers 1938-1943, Agriculture, Food 
and Health (Academy, 1992). Page 98. 
37 “There were no cases seen of any of the fully developed classical cases of deficiency diseases, 
such as beri beri, scurvy or pellagra. There were, however, physical signs of malnutrition, some 
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bullet nutritional cure—along the lines of the thiamine supplementation for beriberi he 
helped develop in Shanghai—would go unrealized. 
 
But Platt still believed the subjects in the surveyed villages were anything but hardy. 
Though they did not exhibit florid deficiencies of any particular micronutrient, many 
suffered from what William Thomas Charles (WTC) Berry—a medical officer who 
succeeded Fitzmaurice as the physician on the team—called “seasonal semi-starvation.” 
Using data from studies of Europeans, Platt assumed a basal metabolic rate (the rate of 
calorie usage during sleeping), as well as metabolic rates associated with a number of 
activities (harvesting maize, weeding, etc.) for both men and women.38 Drawing upon the 
team’s fieldwork studies of time devoted by their subjects to specific types of labor, Platt 
was able to estimate a number of calories required to meet energetic needs. To calculate 
the number of calories consumed, the report took Barker’s records of the amounts and 
kinds of food eaten in a number of the survey households as representative samples, and 
multiplied these tallies by the per-unit calorie figures for each kind of food that she had 
sent for biochemical analysis in Scotland. Though the original data collection was 
disaggregated by age, sex and other categories, in this table Platt used weighted averages 
																																																																																																																																																																					
of which might be considered as being sub-clinical manifestations of insufficiency of some 
dietary factors.” London School of Tropical Hygiene and Medicine, GB 0809 Nut/01/01/12, page 
22. Also see Brantley, Feeding Families. Page 107. Some of the clinical survey data was lost 
when, while Platt was driving to Zomba with survey papers in 1940, the door of his car burst 
open and scattered onto the muddy road and in the bushes. Berry and Petty, The Nyasaland 
Survey Papers 1938-1943, Agriculture, Food and Health. Page 13. 
38 Brantley, Feeding Families.100. More evidence that Platt was not prepared to study seasonal 
food shortages is made evident by the timing of medical exams, which were completed before the 
rainy season (aka the ‘hungry season’ when maize-growing areas experienced the greatest 
hunger, as the previous year’s crop ran out and the labor in the fields was hardest).  
	 103	
to offer a single figure comparing calorie requirements to calorie consumption for each 
village in each month between December 1938 and September 1939 (Figure 2.1).39  
 
In her book on the history of British colonial nutrition research, Cynthia Brantley focuses 
on the reductionism that went into crafting this table, noting that it does not disaggregate 
on the basis of age or sex. But Platt’s survey does often disaggregate on the basis of age, 
sex, and types of labor in many other tables. This is evident in a graph charting the 
average numbers of hours that men and women devoted to work throughout the survey in 
each village (see Figure 2.2). This graph focused on agricultural labor, and did not count 
many kinds of “women’s work,” such as cooking, grinding corn and sweeping the home. 
It also gave a somewhat unrepresentative picture of the male contribution to the family  
farm, as the exemption from the hut tax for the study villages meant that fewer men left 
the village in search of waged labor to pay the tax. Despite these shortcomings, Platt and 
his team used far less aggregation, than GDP per capita, an estimate of welfare that 
became globally popular in the decades following his survey (see Chapter 7). 
 
The survey data revealed that in each village there were months in which consumption 
did not meet requirements; in one village this happened in two months, in another it 
happened in seven months, and in a third it happened in nine of the months. The “energy 
deficit” could be astounding; in the maize-growing village of Jere in January 1939, a 
period during the growing season that demanded long days pulling weeds even as 
granaries containing the 1938 harvest began to run short, calorie intake was 28.5% below  																																																								
39 Ibid., 71-73. 
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AVERAGE CALORIE INTAKE PER DAY PER INDIVIDUAL FOR 
DIFFERENT MONTHS 
HILL VILLAGE 
Month Calorie Requirements Calorie Intake Percent Surplus 
December 2245 2130 -5.1 
January 2208 1580 -28.5 
February 2022 2006 -0.8 
March 2115 1721 -18.6 
April 1967 1722 -12.4 
May 1573 1401 -11 
June 1895 1786 -5.8 
July 1966 2304 +17.2 
August 1620 1617 -0.2 
September 1843 1691 -8.2 
Average 1942 1784 -8.2 
FOOTHILL VILLAGE 
December 1899 1537 -19.0 
January 2051 2108 +2.8 
February 1823 2354 +29.2 
March 1980 2229 +12.6 
April 1760 2004 +13.9 
May 1733 1485 -14.3 
June 1610 1947 +21.0 
July 1771 2958 +67.0 
August 1646 2308 +40.0 
September 1726 2033 17.8 
Average 1784 2050 +14.8 
LAKE SHORE VILLAGE 
December 1773 1907 +7.5 
January 2001 1895 -5.3 
February 1862 1567 -15.9 
March 1940 2099 +8.2 
April 1812 2154 +18.9 
May 1753 1429 -18.5 
June 1824 1234 -32.3 
July 1729 1460 -15.5 
August 1787 1393 -22.1 
September 2053 1803 -12.2 
Average 1852 1733 -6.4 
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Figure 2.1: Average calorie intake per day per individual for different months of the year 
by village. Source: The Nyasaland Survey Papers, 1938-1943: agriculture, food and 
health. Eds. Veronica Berry and Celia Petty. London: Academy Press, 1992. Page 138. 
 
calorie requirements. This table demonstrated both a chronic absolute deficiency and 
acute seasonal shortages in the number of calories available to villagers. The main 
problem, then, was that Africans simply did not grow enough food.40 
 
b) Nutrition Development Units, 1940-1943 
Platt used early results of this caloric budgeting to support his proposed solution, laid out 
in an April 1939 memo. There he called for the establishment of a pilot “Nutrition 
Development Unit” (NDU), a multi-disciplinary center that would seek to abolish the 
energy deficit throughout Nkotakota District by pursuing continued research and 
interventions in agricultural diversification, fishery, forestry, animal husbandry, 
healthcare (especially maternity and child welfare centers), sanitation, and handicrafts.41 
Platt believed that the NDU would be a model for the colony and even the rest of British 
Africa. In fact, there was great enthusiasm about the survey among many administrative 
and technical officers in Nyasaland. In his autobiography, WTC Berry remembered that 
upon his appointment to Nkotakota in January 1940, he was grateful to be “presented 
with a great opportunity.”42 
 																																																								
40 A 1939 Colonial Office report, entitled Nutrition in the Colonies and authored, in large part, by 
Platt, concluded that the deficiencies in agricultural production led not only to known dietary 
deficiencies (e.g. beriberi and pellagra) but also “deficiency states which while not resulting in 
manifest disease prevent the full enjoyment of health.” Writing in 1944, social anthropologist 
Lucy Mair noted that recent expert opinion blamed such deficiency states for exacerbating many 
diseases (including ulcers, leprosy, tuberculosis, hookworm disease, malaria), and for increasing 
rates of maternal and infant mortality. See Mair, Welfare in the British Colonies. Pages 95-96. 
41 Berry, Before the Wind of Change. 81; Brantley, Feeding Families., 140 
42 Berry, Before the Wind of Change., 50 
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Figure 2.2: Average number of hours of work per individual per working day. Source: 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Archives, GB 0809--Nut 02/04/11. 
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Yet soon, Berry would come to see his time in Nkotakota as an ignis fatuus—that is, a 
‘will o’ the wisp,’ a deceptive vision pursued in vain.43 The problem, as ever, was 
funding, though by 1940 the UK Treasury had a new reason to hoard its money. Berry 
knew of the September 1939 declaration of war against Germany when he began his 
tenure in Nkotakota, but he still believed then that the war would amount to no more than 
“an affair of leaflet raids over Germany.”44 When the Provincial Commissioner of 
Nyasaland’s Northern Province submitted his initial proposal for the NDU to the Colonial 
Office and Medical Research Council in 1939, he had requested £10,000 per year for 
three years.45 But after the British rout at Dunkirk and the fall of France to the Nazis, 
officials in London drastically curtailed the budget, to £1,025 per year for three years.46 
Kettlewell and a new agricultural officer named Dawkins were both seconded abroad for 
military service, as was the Assistant District Officer, Rangeley—who was supposed to 
run the NDU. Barker’s role became unclear, as she was supposed to teach women how to 
cook new crops that the agricultural officer taught men to plant, and to teach crafts such 
as spinning, weaving, knitting and pottery to women referred by the assistant district 
officer. Instead, she ended up pursuing research on the pediatric growth and development 
(continuing the dataset begun by Fitzmaurice) and completed a list of native plants and 
cooking methods. For his part Berry—disappointed both by the obsolescence of the 
development unit and his own distance from patriotic battle, tested a number of 
nutritional remedies for two common medical problems: sores on the lower leg known as 
“tropical ulcer,” and a painful bleeding of the gums in children known to Africans as 																																																								
43 Ibid., Foreword. 
44 Ibid., 50. 
45 Brantley, Feeding Families., 130 
46 Berry, Before the Wind of Change., 57 
	 108	
chiseye and to the British medical officers as Vincent’s angina. To his chagrin, neither 
proved susceptible to Vitamin C or the addition of hippopotamus meat to the diet.47 
 
As the war continued, and resources grew scarcer, officials in the Colonial Office and 
new leadership in Nyasaland made clear that there was no more room for heady ideas to 
improve productivity through nutritional improvements. Nyasaland’s Director of Medical 
Services at the war’s outset, H.S. de Boer, had been a fervent supporter of the survey, and 
had asked Barker to help recommend changes to African diets in government hospitals 
and prisons and on private tea estates. But by June 1942 the prime advocates of 
nutritional work in Nyasaland, de Boer and Kittermaster, had left Nyasaland, and 
Barker’s funding was not renewed.48 Berry continued his work, though he grew 
frustrated both by frequent drug shortages (which he attributed to the sinking of ships by 
German submarines) and by what he perceived as the obstinacy of the villagers to the 
unit’s schemes. The latter he blamed on the inherent limits to social engineering imposed 
by the system of indirect rule, where African chiefs retained significant authority over 
land issues. When the NDU’s three-year budget ran out in 1943 it, too, was terminated, 
its staff scattered to other duties.49 
 
The war also led Platt to delay, and ultimately abandon, his plans to produce a final report 
on the Nyasaland Survey. Upon his return to England in late 1939 to aid in plans to 
ensure troops had adequate nutrition, Platt had compiled the survey’s raw data but had 																																																								
47 Brantley, Feeding Families., 135-136. 
48 Ibid.134-135. 
49 Ibid., 63. 
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yet to write a conclusion or even to analyze the final results. He deposited the papers in 
the archives of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine’s (LSHTM’s) 
Department of Human Nutrition. These survey papers were not published in any form for 
a half-century, until Veronica Berry (widow of the late WTC Berry, who had died in 
1983) and a recent graduate of the Department of Human Nutrition named Celia Petty 
edited them into a book in 1992.50 
c) Government healthcare becomes a “lavish” expense 
This whimper of a denouement to the nutrition survey was, in part, a product a slow 
waning of interest among London-based officials in funding efforts to remedy parasitic 
infections and nutritional deficiencies in Nyasaland. As early as 1936, Thomas Stanton, 
Chief Medical Adviser to the Colonial Office opined that after Nyasaland’s medical 
entomologist, Dr. William Lamborn, retired, the post should be abolished in order to save 
money.51 Lamborn had authored of dozens of studies of insect- and rodent-borne diseases 
(including sleeping sickness, plague, and leprosy) in Nyasaland. But the scientific merits 
of the position were not enough to save it; after Lamborn’s retirement in 1941, 
Nyasaland’s Medical Department abolished the position.52 																																																								
50 Berry and Petty, The Nyasaland Survey Papers 1938-1943, Agriculture, Food and Health. 
51 S. Stanton, 24/11/1936, minute in Medical Services Organisation and Administration, CO 
525/161/4, “Extract from dispatch from Governor’s Deputy, No 379 of the 22nd October 1935, on 
the estimates for 1936,” M.A. Greenhill, 19.12.35, MNA In his 1939 report, De Boer agreed that 
the remaining entomologist employed by the Agricultural Department could continue Lamborn’s 
locally relevant studies, but he did not come up with this idea himself. It is clear from 
correspondence between Zomba and London that the impending abolition of this post was, by 
1939, a fait accompli. H.S. De Boer, “Medical and Health Services,” June 17, 1939, CO 
525/178/1, UKNA. 
52 Medical Department Annual reports, and John Kemp, “Dr W A Lamborn: A Medical 
Entomologist in Nyasaland,” Society of Malawi Journal 67, no. 1 (2014): 57–63. Though not 
directly employed by the Nyasaland government, a number of colonial entomologists did work in 
East and Central African research stations after the Second World War. These entomologists 
continued to conduct research in Nyasaland after Lamborn’s retirement. See Sabine Clarke, “The 
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More evidence that London remained chary of increasing healthcare spending came 
while Platt’s team was in the midst of its survey. In June 1939 de Boer sent a report to the 
Colonial Office detailing deficiencies in the Protectorate’s hospitals and dispensaries, and 
calling for greater investment in health services. Nyasaland Governor Donald Mackenzie-
Kennedy, Kittermaster’s successor, added a supportive letter in which he contended 
“health and allied services, directed to the development of a physically fit population, 
should be extended slightly in advance of schemes for the promotion of education and 
economic prosperity.”53 But officials in the Colonial Office and Treasury responded with 
skepticism, calling his proposals “prohibitively expensive.” One Colonial Office official 
even derided the free provision of food to hospitalized Africans as an unduly “lavish” 
expense (see Chapter 4).54 
 
When development grants restarted after the Second World War, the rhetoric supported 
the “health is wealth” argument, but linking healthcare to agricultural policy no longer 
seemed as potent in mobilizing financial resources for the government medical services. 
A 1944 report produced by Nyasaland’s Postwar Development Committee argued that 
production would not rise so long as “a large proportion of the Native population suffers 
from the debilitating effects of malaria, hookworm, bilharzia and other parasites” and 
while “malnutrition exists to a certain degree.” The authors declared: “We do not 																																																																																																																																																																					
Research Council System and the Politics of Medical and Agricultural Research for the British 
Colonial Empire, 1940-52,” Medical History 57 (2013); 3: 338-358. 
53 “Memo from Governor DM Kennedy to Chief Secretary, Zomba, Re: Dispatch to Be Sent to 
Colonial Office Concerning De Boer Report,” May 8, 1939, S40/1/8/1, Document No 204, MNA. 
54 “Minute by Gerard Clauson Re: De Boer Report,” August 8, 1939, CO 525/178/1, UKNA. 
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consider that medical problems are separate and distinct in a tropical country from other 
social problems.”55  Yet the only immediate postwar development grants for health 
proposed by the committee—and eventually funded by the UK Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act—was a chemotherapeutic intervention to treat demobilized soldiers and 
other Nyasaland Africans for venereal disease. The Medical Department’s share of total 
government recurrent expenditure declined from 9.0 percent in 1935 to 4.3 percent in 
1946. Expert investigations into health and agriculture would continue with the “second 
colonial occupation,” but these did not lead to the prioritization of either sanitation or 
curative medicine in Nyasaland (Chapter 5). 
 
III. The legacies of an aborted report: Afterlives of the nutritional link between 
health and wealth 
a) Kettlewell’s sequel: malimidwe, coercion and the nationalist battle 
 
But the Survey, and the interwar focus on nutrition throughout the Empire, was never 
solely focused on public health and curative medicine. Given Platt’s finding of “seasonal 
semi-starvation,” one would expect that the Survey might spur greater spending on 
agricultural interventions. Indeed, despite the fact that the Nyasaland Survey Papers sat 
unpublished in a London archive, and even though the Development Units were never 
fully realized, both the study data and the researchers who helped to collect it greatly 
influenced Nyasaland’s future agricultural policies. During the survey Richard 
Kettlewell, the Survey team’s agriculturalist, came to favor major changes in extant 																																																								
55 “Post War Development Committee, Draft Interim Report No. 3- Public Health, Nyasaland 
Secretariat,” August 9, 1944, FS/1/6/20, MNA. Members of the postwar development committee 
included Juxon Barton (chairman), GH Adams, W Tait Bowie, MP Barrow, HG Duncan, AF 
Barron, JA Lee, J Marshall), page 1. 
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African agricultural techniques. Less than a decade after his work on the survey, 
Kettlewell became director of Nyasaland’s Agriculture Department. From this post he 
sought to put into practice his plans for improved smallholder agriculture. Yet by the 
1950s the intrusive regulations that he implemented would prove so unpopular that 
politicians would use them to drum up opposition to the colonial government (see 
Chapter 8).  
 
Kettlewell’s involvement in the Nyasaland Survey made him a vocal proponent of soil 
conservation measures. He said his experience led him to the recognize that insufficient 
food production and resulting malnutrition would be an “inescapable consequences of 
increasing soil erosion.” The dangers of erosion were, to him, great enough to justify “the 
compulsory introduction of basic conservation practices.”56 Kettlewell was particularly 
interested in mandating the construction of “contour planting ridges.” This would entail a 
rule that all maize was to be planted atop 2-foot-high ridges of soil; African smallholders 
were to build these ridges using hoes. In his portion of the Nyasaland Nutrition Survey 
report, Kettlewell had lamented agricultural agents’ inability to convince smallholder 
farmers to take up ridging: 
The advantages of contour planting ridges have been appreciated for some time, 
and considerable propaganda has been devoted to their introduction; but where 
maize and other food crops are concerned, the native exhibits a rigid, and not 
unnatural conservatism against which relatively little progress has been made so 
far. It is frequently agreed that the change in method involves a great increase in 
the amount of work, but although this is scarcely true yet laziness, indifference 
																																																								
56 Richard Kettlewell, “Personal thoughts on the future of Africa,” March 1988, LSHTM 
Nut/01/05/04, Page 11. 
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and not knowing how else to set about it are probably the chief reasons for lack of 
response.57 
 
Kettlewell was firmly convinced not only that ridging would prevent erosion, but also 
that the perils of erosion merited coercive policies. Later in life, Kettlewell said he found 
a good part of his zeal after reading The Rape of the Earth: a World Survey of Soil 
Erosion, a 1939 book written by the British soil scientists GV Jacks and RO White.58 
During the Second World War Kettlewell could not secure the funds, the staff, or the 
support of his superiors to enforce a compulsory ridging campaign. But he found a 
kindred spirit in 1947, when Geoffrey Colby became Governor of Nyasaland. Colby 
transferred Director of Agriculture PB Garnett to the Gambia and, appointed Kettlewell 
to lead the department. Beginning in 1948, thousands of cultivators were arrested and 
tried in native courts for failing to construct ridges in their fields; those found guilty 
received punishments that varied from a 5-shilling fine to 6 months in jail.59  
 
																																																								
57 Berry and Petty, The Nyasaland Survey Papers 1938-1943, Agriculture, Food and Health. Page 
238 
58 “I well remember, early in my tropical career, reading in the classic on soil erosion (“The Rape 
of the Earth”) that ‘an inch of soil that took a thousand years to produce can be lost for ever 
overnight.’” Richard Kettlewell, “Personal thoughts on the future of Africa,” March 1988, 
LSHTM Nut/01/05/04, Page 3. Also see William Beinart, The Rise of Conservation in South 
Africa: Settlers, Livestock, and the Environment 1770-1950 (Oxford University Press, 2008); 
McCracken, A History of Malawi. Pages 317-320.  
59 Writing in 1965, Kettlewell explained that the Nyasaland Government “concluded that if it 
waited for the slow enlightenment of education to change age-old practices the loss of soil in the 
interim might well prejudice the whole future well-being of the Protectorate. It was felt that a 
measure of compulsion was necessary and justified for the common good, and accordingly in 
1946 the government enacted legislation to prescribe soil-conserving methods of land use, 
entrusting regional boards with the power to enforce them…Incorrigible offenders were fined and 
those who deliberately or persistently opposed its implementation or incited others to resist were, 
in some cases, given short prison sentences.” Richard Kettlewell, “Agricultural Change in 
Nyasaland: 1945-1960,” Food Research Institute Studies 5 (1965). Page 240. 
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Kettlewell thought Africans opposed ridging because it entailed “extra hard work,” but 
the historian Elias Mandala (who himself grew up in a rural Malawian village) has argued 
that there was an agriculturally sound reason behind smallholder resistance to ridging.60 
Aside from the immense work required to construct the ridges, many farmers believed 
ridging actually hastened soil erosion. Particularly on the flat, low-lying areas near Lake 
Malawi and in the Lower Shire Valley, farmers contended that wind would denude the 
sandy soil from high ridges.61 In a 2013 interview, a smallholder farmer from the rural 
Neno district remembered the anger this caused: “Any garden without contour bunds and 
ridges, people were punished, and even taken to the prison…that’s why people were not 
happy to go along with white people, we rebelled against their ruling…An African was 
under pressure with the Europeans ruling…why should they dominate? We wanted 
freedom, so we fought for it, even died for it.”62 
 
Indeed, in the coming years, opposition to Kettlewell’s campaign (popularly known as 
malimidwe, the Chichewa word for conservation) became a potent plank of African 
nationalist propaganda. In 1953 over a thousand people attacked the courthouse of Chief 
Mlolo, who had supported the regulations. That same year, the Nyasaland African 
Congress linked opposition to ridging to the campaign to stop the upcoming formation of 
a federation government that would place Nyasaland’s Africans under the control of 
white settlers in Northern and Southern Rhodesia (see Chapter 8). In the Lower Shire 																																																								
60 Richard Kettlewell, “Personal thoughts on the future of Africa,” March 1988, LSHTM 
Nut/01/05/04, Page 11. 
61 Elias Mandala, Work and Control in a Peasant Economy: A History of the Lower Tchiri Valley 
in Malawi, 1859-1960 (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990). Pages 90-91. 
62 Interview with SJ Kaphale, Matandani Village, Neno District, July 14, 2013. 
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Valley, women could be heard singing a song promising “death” to the “Federation 
capitaos” and to the “contour ridging capitaos.”63 Facing unrelenting opposition and 
without the support of Governor Colby, who departed Nyasaland in 1956, Kettlewell’s 
Agricultural Department relented; between 1957 and 1960, the number of court cases 
relating to ridging declined, even as many farmers refused to obey the regulations.64 In 
the years following Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s return to Nyasaland in 1958, his speeches 
before audiences of rural Africans consistently linked his opposition to the “stupid 
Federation” to the unpopular malimidwe regulations.65  
 
Thus did an idea (compulsory ridging) born partly of the Nutrition Survey help spur anti-
colonial protests two decades later. And these protests, in turn, led Federation officials in 
Salisbury to devote far greater sums (both in absolute terms and relative to overall 
government expenditure) to Nyasaland’s health sector than the colony had ever before 
seen (see Chapter 8). So, in the most roundabout of ways, one legacy of the Nutrition 
Survey was increased spending on government health services, but this only arrived 
decades later. 
b) Colonial income accounting and the fetishization of GDP 
 
The Nyasaland Nutrition Survey had another surprising legacy. The survey data formed 
the basis of the earliest “colonial national income” estimate not only in Nyasaland, but in 
all of colonial Africa. Though the survey was not intended for use in what we now call 																																																								
63 Magomero: Portrait of an African Village (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
Page 217. 
64 Kettlewell, “Agricultural Change in Nyasaland: 1945-1960.” 
65 Lawrence AB Malekano, “Peasants, Politics and Survival in Colonial Malawi” (PhD 
Dissertation, Dalhousie University, 1999). Page 142. Also see Philip Short, Banda (Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974). Page 92. 
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Gross Domestic Product, an economic researcher named Phyllis Deane would use it for 
this purpose. In later years the GDP would come to be heralded, by both Malawi’s 
government statisticians and by cosmopolitan economic experts, as the chief barometer of 
human welfare. This epistemology, which erased important distinctions through 
aggregation, stood in stark contrast to the epistemology of the Nutrition Survey. Platt’s 
survey methodology demonstrated, in numerous tables, differences in food consumption 
by age and sex within each village. Other tables (such as Figure 2.1) demonstrated stark 
inter-temporal differences in food consumption, thereby drawing attention to what Berry 
called “seasonal semi-starvation”—and what Malawians still call “hungry season” 
(nyengo njala). GDP, on the other hand, is a technology of aggregation. By summing 
production into a single annual index, it obscures both unequal inter-personal and 
seasonal distributions of production and consumption. Malawi’s GDP statistics did not, 
for instance, reveal the depths of despair faced by many of the most destitute during the 
worst of the 2015 and 2016 hungry seasons, after floods washed away crops and drought 
scorched the rest. The use of Nutrition Survey data for Africa’s earliest national income 
calculation is, then, another example of the malleable, even ironic uses to which the 
survey was put. 
 
Deane’s task, upon being hired by the UK National Institute for Economic and Social 
Research in 1943, was to experiment with a method of triple-entry national income 
accounting devised by Cambridge economists James Meade and Richard Stone. 66 Meade 
and Stone believed their system was a tool not only for economic planning in a single 																																																								
66 Austin Robinson, ‘Foreword,’ in Phyllis Deane, The measurement of colonial incomes: an 
experiment. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1948), p. v. 
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country, but also as a universal method capable of comparing nations and imperial 
holdings around the globe.67 For Deane the task was to attempt to measure ‘certain 
colonial incomes,’ first using sources available in London and, later, by conducting 
fieldwork. Initially, Deane and her advisors chose Northern Rhodesia (today, Zambia) 
and Nyasaland (today, Malawi) for her study (Jamaica was added later). Robinson wrote 
that the team chose Northern Rhodesia in part because he had worked on studies in the 
territory and knew of some sources of statistical material. He explained that Nyasaland, 
an adjacent colony, was chosen because Platt’s Nutrition Survey data could be used to 
estimate subsistence agricultural production as well as native incomes and 
consumption.68  
 
Working from London, Deane estimated the “national” income of these territories. The 
earliest date for which she had any sort of reliable data in Nyasaland was 1938. For this 
year, her estimate relied heavily on extrapolations from the Nyasaland Nutrition 
Survey.69 Deane hoped that her estimates would be used to guide economic policies, with 
two ends in mind. “We start,” Deane explained, “from the assumption that for all 
communities an increase in the volume of economic goods and services produced, and an 
improvement in its distribution over time and among persons and groups, are important 
																																																								
67 James Meade and Richard Stone, “The Construction of Tables of National Income, 
Expenditure, Savings and Investment,” The Economic Journal 51, no. 202/203 (June 1941). Page 
216. 
68Austin Robinson, ‘Foreword,’ in Phyllis Deane, The measurement of colonial incomes: an 
experiment. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1948), p. vii-viii. 
69 A seemingly arbitrary substitution of ‘colony’ and ‘nation’ is evident throughout Deane’s 
writings on national income accounting in colonial settings.  
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ends of economic policy.”70 Hers was not a minority position among economists; as early 
as 1934, Simon Kuznets and John Blair claimed, “Economic welfare cannot be 
adequately measured unless the personal distribution of income is known.”71  
 
But by the 1960s, in economic policy discourse in Malawi and elsewhere, the goal of 
increasing aggregate production was paramount. “The simplest indicator of economic 
progress of a community,’ explained a 1968 report produced by Derek Blades, a recent 
Oxford graduate then serving as Malawi’s Director of Census and Statistics, “is the 
movement of real income per head of the population. This is not an unqualified measure 
of improvements in the standard of living for the average inhabitant of a country but has 
been found a useful guide.”72 In Malawi, where wealth had long been concentrated 
among the owners of large agricultural estates, Blades’ assertion had great political 
import. Once the distribution of wealth was rendered invisible by the myopic focus on 
aggregate production, planners could easily justify extracting resources from smallholder 
farmers to finance export-oriented, large-scale, elite-owned agricultural estates. Indeed, 
Anne Conroy and colleagues have illustrated the ways in which Malawian policies have 
favored the estates in the decade following independence: 
																																																								
70 Phyllis Deane, Colonial social accounting  (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1953), p 
120.  
71 Simon Kuznets and John Blair, National income, 1929-1932: Letter from the Acting Secretary 
of Commerce transmitting in response to Senate resolution (US Government Printing Office, 
1934), p. 7. 
72 Malawi National Accounts Report, 1964-1967 (Government of Malawi, Zomba, 1968), p. 7. It 
should be noted that Blades’ choice to use Billington’s method for imputing prices runs counter 
to this narrative of modernization theory’s erasure of peasant production. But, as will be made 
clear in the next section, Blades possessed a greater curiosity about the economic contribution of 
non-monetary production and methods of measurement than most statisticians.  
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Customary land was annexed from the smallholder subsector; smallholders were 
legally prevented from growing important high-value crops (burley tobacco, tea 
and sugar were reserved for the estate subsector); smallholder producers of export 
crops were paid less than the export parity price by the state marketing 
board…with most of the resulting profits channeled into the development of the 
estate subsector.73 
 
During the post-independence decades such policies impoverished large portions of the 
population even as GDP growth figures remained strong (see Chapter 10). Once again, 
then, the Nyasaland Survey data came to be used to advance political goals never 
foreseen by Platt. 
c) WTC Berry and the Population Bomb 
A third surprising sequel to the Nutrition Survey was the change in thinking of WTC 
Berry. Berry had been a leading administrator and a vocal proponent of the Nutritional 
Development Units, and was dismayed and frustrated when their funding was not 
renewed in 1943. But in his memoirs, published posthumously in 1984, Berry wondered 
whether his efforts to save the lives of the sick and hungry in Nyasaland had only sped 
the descent into a Malthusian trap. After recounting a campaign to stem an outbreak of 
cerebro-spinal meningitis (CSM) in southern Nyasaland in 1937, Berry added the 
following note: 
The containment of the CSM outbreak changed nothing much and even less was 
changed for the better. Population pressure was all the greater for the survival of 
five hundred or so Africans who might otherwise have died. Because of this 
pressure forest land around the foot of Chiradzulu mountain had to be yielded for 
Agriculture with all that entailed, but that was another story, as Kipling might 
have said.74 
 																																																								
73 Anne Conroy, Malcolm Blackie, Alan Whiteside et al. Poverty, AIDS and hunger: breaking the 
poverty trap in Malawi (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY, 2006), pp. 17-18. 
74 Meade and Stone, “The Construction of Tables of National Income, Expenditure, Savings and 
Investment.” Page 25. 
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No such fatalism appears in the Nyasaland Nutrition Survey. In his agricultural studies, 
Kettlewell documented the relatively low ratio of arable land to land currently under 
cultivation near one of the survey villages.75 The medical reports—authored by 
Fitzmaurice and Berry—mention population only briefly. There the authors note that 
while “reference has been made to the fact that by comparison with Africa as a whole, 
Nyasaland is a relatively densely populated country…By European standards… 
Nyasaland is only sparsely populated.”76 During their brief tenure (1940-43), 
Nyasaland’s Nutrition Development Units were far more concerned with increasing child 
and maternal survival than with lowering birth rates.77 In short, population pressure was 
not a major concern in interwar Nyasaland.  
 
The idea that the country was locked in a Malthusian trap gained credence among 
Nyasaland officials during a 1948-1949 famine.78 Population control was a major focus 
of international development discourse in the 1960s and 1970s (see Chapter 9). By the 
end of his life, it seems, Berry had become convinced of the danger of the “population 
bomb.” His work early in life was dedicated to improving survival among rural Africans, 
but eventually he came to doubt that this would effect change “for the better.” 
 
																																																								
75 Berry and Petty, The Nyasaland Survey Papers 1938-1943, Agriculture, Food and Health. 
Pages 66-68. 
76 Ibid. Page 174. 
77 “Data on births and childbearing,” LSHTM Nut/02/05. 
78 Megan Vaughan documents how, during the famine, Nyasaland officials deployed neo-
Malthusian to obscure the recent alienation of arable land from African smallholders. Megan 
Vaughan, The Story of an African Famine : Gender and Famine in Twentieth-Century Malawi 
(New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
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By the time Berry made his late-life reflections of his medical work in Nyasaland, the 
nutrition paradigm had come full circle. The measures advocated in the 1960s and 1970s 
in the name of population control, including forcible mass sterilization and even inaction 
in the face of mass die-off (see Chapter 9), seemed to harken back to the days when 
nutrition was primarily a veterinary concern. Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans 
were, in this iteration of nutrition discourse, a herd grown too large. Whereas in 1920s 
and 1930s nutrition science had seemed to unite medical and agricultural specialists, later 
in the twentieth century concerns about the “population bomb” and “demographic 
entrapment” insinuated that doctor’s tools had outrun the agriculturalists, and were 
making their work harder. Medicine was saving people who could not be fed. Health 
services and population health were, in this logic pitted against one another. In their 
survey reports, neither Platt nor any of the other researchers even entertained such 
ideas.79 
IV. Conclusion 
This chapter has charted the rise and fall of a certain iteration of the “health is wealth” 
argument. In this paradigm, an interdisciplinary group of experts became increasingly 
concerned with labor productivity among African wage earners and farmers. Africans’ 
reputed lassitude, they believed, could be attributed to toll exacted by parasites and 
inadequate diets. Researchers proposed programs to remedy these problems. Their 
prescriptions were focused largely on improving agricultural production and increasing 																																																								
79 For a critique of these theories, see Paul Farmer, Matthew Basilico, and Luke Messac, “After 
McKeown: The Changing Roles of Biomedicine, Public Health and Economic Growth in 
Mortality Declines,” in Therapeutic Revolutions: Pharmaceuticals and Social Change in the 
Twentieth Century, Eds. Jeremy Greene, Flurin Condrau, Elizabeth Watkins (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2016). 
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access to health services. Given this focus, and given Nyasaland’s centrality to nutrition 
research, one would think that during this period Nyasaland’s Medical Department would 
have received a growing—or at least a steady—share of government spending.  
 
But when it came to dollars and cents, the interwar period of interest in nutrition as a 
determinant of productivity, and the oft-repeated claims that health spending was a down 
payment on development, did not materially affect government outlays for the Nyasaland 
Medical Department. Despite the enthusiasm expressed by WTC Berry and other 
researchers, their science did not increase recurrent spending on either medicine or public 
health. Between 1924 and 1939, the Medical Department’s share of total recurrent 
spending fell, inexorably, from 10.1 percent to 6.5 percent. The slide continued during 
the Second World War, as the Medical Department’s share fell further to 4.1 percent by 
1945. The percentage then rose briefly in the immediate postwar dawn, to 7.5 percent in 
1946, before falling to a new low of 4.2 percent in 1951 (see Figure 0.2).80 The absolute 
figures of current pounds sterling spent on health generally rose every year during this 
period, but they increased more slowly than general domestic revenues (derived in large 
part from ever more enthusiastic campaigns to collect hut taxes from subject African 
populations) and expenditures. Health spending may have been relatively more important 
part of colonial budgets during the early twentieth century, when the Colonial Office 
employed physicians to try to protect the health of the few officials making up the “thin 
																																																								
80 Published figures to calculate the share of capital (development) spending devoted to 
Nyasaland’s health sector are not available for each year, but the general paucity of funding to 
build and renovate hospitals, dispensaries, and training institutions during this period is detailed 
in Chapter 3. 
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white line” of the colonial administration.81 But once the worst of European mortality in 
the tropics had passed, the argument that “health-is-wealth” was not enough to save the 
Medical Department from becoming a shrinking priority in colonial budgets. 
 
Of course, the interwar focus on labor productivity did not lead experts to call only for 
greater spending on medicine. As this chapter has demonstrated, some colonial 
physicians and planters were enthusiastic about treatments for hookworm and other 
intestinal parasites. But few thought that African laborers would become more productive 
by pills and injections alone. The Nyasaland Nutrition Survey was not solely, or even 
primarily, focused on health care provision. Though Platt initially hoped for a magic-
bullet solution to malnutrition (along the lines of his discoveries about beriberi in China), 
ultimately he and his team focused on “seasonal semi-starvation.” This problem would 
not be solved by pills or injections, but by increased agricultural production. Yet the 
survey’s favored strategy to improve both health and agricultural production—the 
Nutrition Development Units—did not survive wartime austerity. After the Second 
World War agricultural production became a major focus of the Nyasaland Government 
(Chapter 6), but public health and medicine would not become a major priority of the 
colonial government until the anti-Federation movement of the 1950s. Popular politics, 
and not economic logic, would be the force that drove up government spending for 
medical care. 
 
																																																								
81 Reader, Africa; Vaughan, Curing Their Ills. 
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But even during the interwar era, there were political forces that helped increase medical 
spending in Nyasaland. The next two chapters will demonstrate that officials deciding the 
health budgets of interwar Nyasaland were more responsive to labor militancy in the UK 
and the Empire than to scientific treatises on the relationship between health and 
economic growth. Investments in health resulted from perceived threats to legitimacy, 
especially labor strikes in Britain and in her Colonial Empire. Budget cuts, on the other 
hand, often coincided with periods when officials with control over budgets (namely, 
officials in the UK Treasury) perceived no such threats. Health spending was, almost 
invariably, a function of unrest. 
 
	 125	
Chapter 3 
“Territories of vast potentiality”: British unemployment, colonial debts, and the 
subversion of intent to expand Nyasaland’s medical services, 1919-1936 
 
Abstract 
 
Using archival sources from both the United Kingdom and Malawi, this chapter argues 
that unemployment within the UK was, indirectly, a major impetus for increased 
spending on health in colonial Nyasaland during the interwar years. Nyasaland’s public 
finances had been mired in debt since 1919, when a railroad financier convinced the UK 
government to force Nyasaland’s government to guarantee an onerous loan for a doomed 
railway line. This debt kept the UK Treasury from approving any sizable increases in 
expenditure on health care in Nyasaland throughout the 1920s. This only began to change 
with the 1929 Colonial Development Act. Before the 1929 UK General Election, both 
Conservative and Labour politicians argued that government spending on roads and 
railways in the colonies could increase employment in the UK, both by spurring orders 
from British factories and by opening new markets. During the debate over the 1929 
Colonial Development Act, a few backbench MPs worked to ensure that the new funding 
could be used to build hospitals and clinics in the colonies. At the same time, officials in 
the Colonial Office in London convinced the Treasury to lessen the spending controls it 
had placed on Nyasaland as a result of the railway debt. As a result of these two lobbying 
efforts (and following a 1930 report on Nyasaland’s health sector by Dr. John Owen 
Shircore), the colony’s Medical Department was able to increase both its recurrent and 
development expenditure. Many of the district hospitals in Malawi today were built with 
funds made available by the 1929 Colonial Development Act. Thus did a handful of 
moral entrepreneurs in the British administration subvert a law’s original intent (to 
increase employment in the UK through the purchase of British manufactures) in order to 
ameliorate dismal colonial medical provision. This episode is another demonstration that 
the history of government health care in Malawi can only be told through a global, 
contingent and even ironic history of crisis politics. 
 
Prelude: Missing surgeons and a rotting leg 
 
It was not a clean space. Cockroaches scuttled about the floor and on bedframes in the 
men’s ward of the Mangochi District Hospital. Minutes after the floors were washed each 
morning, the roaches were back. The nightstands next the beds were cluttered with half-
empty bottles of the orange soda hawked by vendors outside the hospital gates.  
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Nor was the ward a space where anyone could seek privacy. In the large, open green-
walled room almost everyone’s words were audible, and actions visible. That morning in 
early February 2015, patients occupied all 36 beds—that is, until an attendant and a nurse 
wheeled away the covered body of a just-deceased patient. A dozen family and friends 
followed the stretcher to the morgue. An elderly man with a distended abdomen sat 
upright, talking to a family member who had just fetched his hospital-provided lunch of 
nsima (maize porridge) and beans. On a nearby bed, a cachectic man with glassy eyes 
stared blankly at the roof. 
 
But neither the cockroaches nor the other people were of much concern to a 15-year-old 
boy named Innocent in the ward that morning. Innocent had a far more serious problem: 
his right leg was rotting.  He had been shot a week earlier when, while walking his sister 
home from school, he happened upon a protest in Monkey Bay and was hit by a stray 
bullet fired by the local police (for more on the protest, see the prelude to Chapter 4). The 
bullet had torn straight through his knee, injuring the popliteal artery, which carries much 
of the blood supply to the lower leg and foot. Friends had taken Innocent to Monkey 
Bay’s government hospital, where he was transferred by ambulance to the larger district 
hospital an hour drive away at Mangochi. Upon arrival he had undergone emergent 
surgery to ligate (tie off) the popliteal artery. The site of the injury had been wrapped in 
gauze. Then he was put into a bed to recover. 
 
This surgery helped prevent him from bleeding to death. But what Innocent really needed 
in those crucial hours was a vascular surgeon. Though hemorrhaging blood from the torn 
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artery could have become the life-threatening without ligation, Innocent was almost 
certainly doomed to lose his leg if blood flow to the lower leg was not restored. Popliteal 
artery trauma is “the most limb-threatening of peripheral vascular injuries,” but in the 
United States gunshot victims with this injury can have their limbs salvaged—and blood 
flow restored—with prompt surgical repair involving a vein graft. Outcomes are 
particularly good if surgery is performed within seven hours of injury.1 Vein graft has 
been the standard of care for American soldiers with popliteal artery injuries since the 
Korean War in the early 1950s. A 2002 review of 24 published series of 678 penetrating 
popliteal artery injuries found a mean amputation rate of 11 percent, with lower rates in 
the more recent series.2 Yet this review drew from patients treated mostly in the United 
States and Europe. On the day Innocent was shot, there were no vascular surgeons in the 
whole of Malawi, a country of 15 million people.3 There were able vascular surgeons in 
South Africa, but emergent air evacuations were reserved for expatriate aid workers and 
government officials, not the children of subsistence farmers. Instead of receiving a 
procedure that could save his leg, Innocent was literally left in a bed to rot. 
 
Innocent’ right leg steadily deteriorated. First he lost feeling below the knee. Then the 
skin began to blacken. The toes shriveled and the toenails turned a ghostly silver hue (see 
Figure 3.1). Ten days after he had been shot, Innocent’s attending physician (who made 
rounds three times per week) warned him he would likely have to have the leg amputated  																																																								
1 Philip Mullenix, Scott Steele, and Charles Andersen, “Limb Salvage and Outcomes among 
Patients with Traumatic Popliteal Vascular Injury: An Analysis of the National Trauma Data 
Bank,” Journal of Vascular Surgery 44, no. 1 (2006): 94–99. 
2 Eric Frykberg, “Popliteal Vascular Injuries,” Surgical Clinics of North America 82, no. 1 
(February 2002): 67–89. 
3 Personal communication with Dr. Luckson Dullie, February 2015. 
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Figure 3.1: Innocent’s leg two days before amputation, two weeks after shooting. 
soon, to prevent gangrene from ascending from the necrotic tissue to the rest of his body. 
Two weeks after the shooting doctors wheeled Innocent into the surgical suite and 
amputated his right leg just above the knee. 
 
After the amputation Innocent was calm, but quiet. He deferred to his ever-present 
mother when I posed questions. When I asked if he planned to get a prosthetic leg, 
Innocent looked forlorn. “We would like one,” his mother explained, “but it is too much 
money.” A wheelchair would be of little use on the uneven and sandy trails near his 
home. The doctors in Mangochi had advised Innocent that he would have to let his stump 
heal for a few months, then he could travel to Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital in 
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Blantyre to be fit for a new prosthesis. He would have to pay for the prosthesis himself.  
The cheapest leg available would cost $250. To Innocent’ mother, who farmed a small 
plot of land just outside Monkey Bay, the idea that she could ever find so much money 
was absurd. Innocent faced the prospect of a bleak future with no mobility, and—as a 
consequence—no more school and no more work. 
 
For much of his admission, Innocent lay beside two fellow victims of the Monkey Bay 
shootings. Felix, 25 years old, had been shot through his right shin, fracturing the tibia in 
multiple places. The leg had been placed in a cast. Over the coming weeks his condition 
improved steadily, eventually regaining the use of the toes in his right foot. His biggest 
complaint was that the medicine he had been given for pain relief lacked mphamvu 
(power). The nurse on duty explained that he was being given pethidine, a powerful 
synthetic opiate commonly used in Africa even decades after concerns about toxicity and 
drug interactions have limited its use in the United States. Though this drug should have 
been strong enough to hold Felix’s pain at bay, the nurse administered it at irregular 
intervals, whenever she got around to seeing him in the course of tending to a ward full of 
seriously ill patients on her own. But even with this poorly managed pain, Felix seemed 
on course to make a complete recovery. 
 
The same could not be said for David, a 23-year-old recent graduate of a teachers’ 
training college in Lilongwe. On the day of the shooting, David was back home in 
Monkey Bay, living with his wife and newborn son and looking for work as a teacher. 
From his hospital bed he claimed he had not intended to become involved in the protests, 
	 130	
but was caught unaware when the crowd came by. When the police opened fire, a bullet 
struck David’s right leg behind the ankle, rupturing his Achilles tendon. At first glance 
David’s injury did not appear very grave. He had ruptured no major arteries, and had 
broken no bones. But without a functioning Achilles his leg would be severely weakened 
for the rest of his life. An avid football (soccer) player, David feared he might never run 
again. And he would be far less useful in farm labor without two strong legs. 
 
Seeking a remedy, David asked a clinical officer visiting from Queen Elizabeth Hospital 
if he had any ideas. The clinical officer (a medical provider with more training than a 
nurse, but less than a doctor) was in a training program for plastic surgery, and claimed 
some experience in relevant procedures. He said he could try to re-attach the two torn 
ends of David’s tendon (a procedure known as reanastomosis). But, the clinical officer 
continued, he would only do so “in private”—that is, in exchange for an under-the-table 
payment. David hurriedly cobbled together 8000 kwacha (about US$30). He obtained 
most of it from his malume, his mother’s brother, a relation who held great responsibility 
among the matrilineal, matrilocal peoples of southern Malawi.  
 
But the operation had failed. The surgeon explained later that the gap between the two 
pieces of tendon was too long to allow for reanastomosis. In such cases, surgeons in the 
United States and Europe often use tendons harvested from elsewhere in the body (such 
as the bottom of the foot) to reanastomose ruptured Achilles’ tendons, but the clinical 
officer admitted he was unfamiliar with these procedures. In the coming months David 
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would continue to seek a surgical remedy. The visiting clinical officer offered to try 
again, “in private.” 
 
The absence of surgeons trained in orthopedics and vascular procedures worsened the 
outcomes for David and Innocent, respectively. If they had lived near such specialists, 
both might have left the hospital with full use of both legs. As it turned out, neither 
would. David departed for home with a much-weakened right leg, and Innocent was 
discharged with a stump. Innocent said he hoped for a prosthetic leg, but he was not at all 
certain he would ever have one. For his part, David sounded surprisingly world-weary for 
a man so young. I asked whether he would seek a tendon transfer. “We will see,” he 
shrugged. 
  
I. Introduction: subversion of intent in metropolitan politics 
While the previous two chapters kept focused largely on events within Nyasaland, in the 
next four chapters the lens will turn increasingly to metropolitan Britain and other parts 
of the Empire. These chapters will re-examine an older historiography (written mostly in 
the 1970s and 1980s) on the politics of interwar and immediate postwar British colonial 
development spending. I will argue that, in both eras, the main enemies of colonial 
physicians and African medical assistants were not microbes of the gut and blood, but the 
longstanding parsimony of the UK Treasury. Officials seeking the funding increases they 
needed to purchase chemotherapeutic agents, diagnostic equipment, and even food and 
bed sheets could do so only through the deft manipulation of political crises elsewhere.  
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The first such manipulation occurred during and after the passage of the 1929 Colonial 
Development Act (CDA), discussed in this chapter. The Act was the culmination of a 
long-standing project of Conservative Colonial Secretaries Alfred Milner and Leo 
Amery. Their intent was to free up funds from a famously obstinate Treasury to build 
railways, roads and bridges in Britain’s Colonies, thereby increasing trade and 
employment both in Britain and her dependencies. Much of the historiography on the 
CDA has evaluated to what extent the act fulfilled this original aim. But what much of 
this work overlooks is the subversion of the law’s original intent by moral entrepreneurs, 
including British politicians and colonial administrators with an interest in improving 
colonial health services. A few little-known Members of Parliament amended the CDA to 
allow the Fund to be used to improve and expand health services. Once the bill was 
passed, the Colonial Office sought to use the new funding to build more hospitals and 
health centers, particularly in Nyasaland. A colonial physician and administrator named 
John Owen Shircore wrote both a critique of the low quality and poor reach of Nyasaland 
extant health services, and a plan to improve them. This report helped garner funding 
sufficient to fund the construction of 12 new district hospitals and 36 additional 
dispensaries. Even today, most of Malawi’s major hospitals can trace their construction to 
this tranche of funding. This chapter recounts a history of constructed scarcity, 
punctuated by a brief moment of increased infrastructure spending.    
 
II. The yoke of an odious debt 
a) Larcenous development: the Trans-Zambesi Railway loan guarantee, 1919-1922 
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The paucity of government medical provision in Nyasaland only began to change in the 
early 1930s, after the colony became a major beneficiary of the 1929 UK Colonial 
Development Act. Most histories of colonial development in Africa tend to downplay the 
significance of the 1929 Act; its passage did not mark a newfound willingness by the UK 
Treasury to spend much greater sums on African colonies, especially after the Great 
Depression led to further budget controls. 4 But for Nyasaland’s Medical Department, 
funding from the Colonial Development Act was a major windfall. Many of Malawi’s 
current district hospitals were first constructed with funds from this Act. The government 
health sector in Nyasaland saw such a disproportionate share of the Act’s funding 
because of persistent advocacy from medical officials in Nyasaland. 
 
In order to understand the profound departure that the Colonial Development Act funding 
represented for Nyasaland, it is necessary to review the fiscal administration of the 
Protectorate by the British during the interwar years. Just after the First World War, UK 
Colonial Secretary Lord Milner and Chancellor of the Exchequer Austen Chamberlain 
agreed to guarantee debt taken on by Mozambique Company (a private corporation 
funded by British investors) for the construction of a railway line (known as the Trans-
Zambesi Railway, or TZR) to run entirely outside Nyasaland, from the port of Beira to 
the southern bank of the Zambesi River in Portuguese East Africa.5  The railway line was 
an impractical one, creating a route too long to transport goods for a reasonable price 																																																								
4 L. J. L. Nthenda, “H.M. Treasury and the Nyasaland Administration, 1919-40” (Thesis PhD--
Oxford University, n.d.); D. J. Morgan, The Origins of British Aid Policy, 1924-1945 (BRILL, 
1980); E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa : The Politics of Economic 
Change, 1919-1939 (London: Heinemann, 1973). 
5 From the south bank of the Zambesi, goods would be transported across the river, and then 
loaded onto an existing rail line connecting Beira to Port Herald (today, Nsanje). 
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between Nyasaland and the Indian Ocean. It was a route much longer and costlier than 
another possible route terminating further north, at Quelimane. The uneconomical nature 
of the line is evidenced by the company’s failure to raise private capital sufficient to 
finance its construction.6 But Libert Oury, the Mozambique Company chairman and 
financier who deliberately kept a low profile, lobbied hard for British government 
financing; a line commencing at Beira would increase the profitability of his company, 
which had a number of financial interests in Beira. Oury appealed to Colonial Secretary 
Alfred Milner, arguing that the line would run entirely through British-held territory.7 
Milner was also concerned about rumors of American financiers planning to build a 
different railway in the region held by the Mozambique Company, and sought to preempt 
them with a British railway in order to cement British dominance in the region.8 
 
Not for nothing was Oury known as “the other Rhodes.” The British Consul in 
Mozambique called him “a financial spider sitting in the midst of his web in London.”9 In 																																																								
6 Leroy Vail, “The Making of an Imperial Slum: Nyasaland and Its Railways, 1895–1935,” The 
Journal of African History 16, no. 1 (1975): 89–112. Page 100. 
7 Landeg White, Bridging the Zambesi: A Colonial Folly (London: The MacMillan Press, 1993). 
Pages 42-44, 57-59. 
8 A letter from HJ Read, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the Treasury Department 
explained that while the Colonial Office had publicly offered reasons the construction of the TZR 
line was in the interests of Nyasaland, “there are other considerations (which can be stated only 
confidentially) which led Lord Milner to propose, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to accept, 
the arrangement now made” without the knowledge or consent of the Nyasaland Government. 
“On grounds of high policy it is very necessary that this country should lose no opportunity of 
strengthening its position in Portuguese East Africa, and the construction and operation of this 
line under what, in practice, will amount to British control is an important step in that direction. It 
is known that American capital is beginning to interest itself in this region, and there was good 
ground for suspecting that if the present arrangement could not be completed, and completed very 
promptly, the Portuguese Government would turn to American financiers.” HJ Read to Secretary 
to the Treasury Department, 18 August 1919, T 1/12467, UKNA. 
9 White, Bridging the Zambesi, Page 43. For a broad overview of the ties between finance capital 
and British colonial policymakers during this era, see PJ Cain and AG Hopkins, “Gentlemanly 
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the course of his campaign Oury plied a former Nyasaland governor, Sir Alfred Sharpe, 
with partnerships in a few of his many firms, including the Mozambique Company.10 
Sharpe had many friends in the Foreign and Colonial Offices, and was a member of the 
St. Stephen’s Club, a famous Westminster watering hole for Conservative Party 
politicians. Oury also organized regal dinners in Zomba to curry favor with officials. Yet 
he could not secure the support of Governor George Smith, nor could he win over most 
of the white settlers in Nyasaland. The latter feared (correctly, as it turned out) that they 
would ultimately bear a much of the cost of such an unprofitable venture. Oury did not 
despair, though, for he knew that the decision would ultimately be made in London 
(Figure 3.2).  
 
Indeed, by 1919 Oury had convinced Milner to support his plan. In decision pivotal to 
Nyasaland’s future finances, Milner decided—without consulting the Nyasaland 
administration—to guarantee the railway financiers an annual rate of return of at least 6 
percent for 25 years. Milner claimed, initially, that the UK Treasury would underwrite the 
guarantee. But the Treasury decreed that Nyasaland would guarantee the debt itself. If 
Nyasaland’s government should be unable to cover the losses from current revenues (80  
 
 																																																																																																																																																																					
Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas II: New Imperialism, 1850-1945,” The Economic 
History Review 40, no. 1 (February 1987): 1–26. 
10 White, Bridging the Zambesi: A Colonial Folly. Oury made Sharpe a director of the 
Mozambique Company, the Zambesia Mining and Development Company, and Beira Works Ltd. 
See Robert B Boeder, Alfred Sharpe of Nyasaland, Builder of Empire (Blantyre, Malawi: Society 
of Malawi, 1981). Sharpe continued to promote the interests of railway financiers (to the 
detriment of Nyasaland’s government finances) after 1922. See Charles Ponsonby, “Nyasaland,” 
Journal of the Royal African Society 74, no. 3839 (June 18, 1926): 734–52.  
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Figure 3.2: Trans-Zambesi Railway poster, 1925. Source: Exclusive News Agency, 
London. The caption reads: “Not only has this railway inaugurated a new epoch of 
economic prosperity for Nyasaland by providing it with direct access to an ocean port, 
but it has also opened up a region of great forests, a sportsman’s paradise wherein the 
elephant, the lion, the rhino and the antelope have roamed since the beginning of time.” 
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percent of which were derived from the African hut tax in 1917), the Protectorate would 
be forced to take out loans at 7 percent interest.11  
c) Treasury control and starving social services 
Sure enough, the railroad quickly racked up operating losses.12 As early as 1921, a junior 
Treasury official gave a pessimistic appraisal of the line’s financial prospects, and 
blamed the Colonial Office for misunderstanding—and even misrepresenting—the 
project. “When the question of the guarantee was under consideration [the] Colonial 
Office expressed the opinion that the guarantee would cease to be operative after the line 
had been working a year or two. I understand however it is now expected that the 
guarantee will be operative for many years.” After insinuating that Lord Milner had 
deceived the Chancellor of the Exchequer about the line’s future profitability, the 
Treasury dismissed the Colonial Office’s plea that the Imperial Exchequer indirectly 
assume responsibility for payments that would otherwise be a tremendous burden on 
Nyasaland’s budget for the foreseeable future.13 
 
																																																								
11 Vail, “The Making of an Imperial Slum.” The upshot, as Leroy Vail, was that “in spite of the 
fact that Nyasaland had not been consulted, in spite of the fact that the railway was to lie wholly 
outside the Protectorate, and in spite of the fact that the line gave no promise that it would ever 
pay its own way, the imperial authorities, without consulting Parliament, compelled the 
Nyasaland government to guarantee the interest at 6 percent for £1,200,000 worth of debentures 
for twenty-five years.” Page 102. Also see White, Bridging the Zambesi: A Colonial Folly. Pages 
58-59. 
12 GH Pirie, “The Decivilizing Rails: Railways and Underdevelopment in Southern Africa,” 
Journal of Economic and Social Geography 73, no. 4 (August 1982): 221–28. 
13 F. Skevington “Memorandum by Mr Skevington re: Estimates of the Nyasaland Protectorate 
for the year 1921-22,” February 9, 1921, T 161/91, UKNA. The insinuation that Milner had been 
misleading came in this passage: “It is not clear whether all the facts were put before the 
chancellor by Lord Milner.”  
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Nyasaland’s government suddenly faced a future of inordinate payments for a loan 
guarantee that they had had no hand in crafting, and that would scarcely benefit either its 
African or European population. Following a 1921 agreement between the UK Colonial 
Office and Treasury, Nyasaland was forced to devote one-half of annual revenues over a 
protected “standard revenue” of £275,000 toward the loan guarantee. Whenever 
Nyasaland’s Governors wrote to complain about the burdens of this arrangement, and the 
impediments it placed on sorely needed increases in expenditures (including spending on 
the medical department), Treasury officials repeated their calls for further tax increases 
and spending cuts.14 By 1928, the protected ‘standard revenue’ that Nyasaland could 
devote toward its own expenditures before spending half of additional revenues on the 
paying off the TZR loan had only been raised slightly, to £300,000.15 As Harold Philips, 
who had worked as both assistant district commissioner and Financial Secretary in 
Nyasaland, remembered, “Treasury control [was] a horrible thing…they couldn’t spend a 
penny unless it had first been approved by some backroom boy in London [who] didn’t 
know a thing about it.”16  
 
In July of 1928, Colonial Secretary Leo Amery complained to Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Winston Churchill that Nyasaland’s “social services are at a scandalously low 
ebb” and the “death rate is disgraceful.” Reporting the results of a meeting between his 
subordinates and lower-level Treasury officials, he recounted, “We asked for some little 
mitigation. But we were turned down by the Treasury pretty stiffly.” Churchill’s Treasury 																																																								
14 L. J. L. Nthenda, “H.M. Treasury and the Nyasaland Administration, 1919-40.” Page 256. 
15 Ibid. Page 258. 
16 Glyn Jones et al., Colloquium on Nyasaland Finance, April 23, 1980, Mss.Afr.s.1742, Box 1, 
File 27, BLOU. 
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offered a slight increase in the protected revenue to £325,000, but demanded in return 
increases in customs duties on “native” goods such as matches, salt, and beads as well as 
an increase in the hut tax. John B Sidebotham, a budget official in the Colonial Office, 
said this would place an overly burdensome tax on the people, particularly considering 
“about 20 percent leave the Protectorate to earn it and the rest suffer from debility.” No 
agreement was reached. Nyasaland’s Africans seemed doomed to remain impoverished, 
indebted, and without any robust social services.17 Such was the assessment of 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary Ormsby-Gore, who lamented, “The Treasury have for 
years resisted…any attempts to get Nyasaland out of the slough of despond.” Referring to 
the desperate need for “wise expenditure on public health, scientific agriculture,” and 
“education,” Orsmby-Gore declared, “The history of all grant-aided, i.e. Treasury-
controlled, dependencies in the last thirty years has always shown the starvation of these 
life-giving services.”18 
 
III. The 1929 Colonial Development Act 
a) Colonial Development as a remedy for metropolitan unemployment 
Nyasaland’s budget and health sector only began to be cleared from the “slough of 
despond” in 1930 thanks, strangely enough, to rising unemployment in Britain. The 
succeeding chapters will show how much Nyasaland relied not so much as ideas as on 
crises (both nearby and far-flung) for boosts in health spending. Such was the case here, 
where, as the historian Rudolf von Albertini notes, “It was the advent of the economic 
																																																								
17 L. J. L. Nthenda, “H.M. Treasury and the Nyasaland Administration, 1919-40.” Page 260. 
18 Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development. Pages 39-40. 
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crisis that brought these proposals into public discussion.”19 In the months prior to the 
1929 UK General Elections, leading members of the governing Conservative Party cast 
about for ideas to include in their election platform. The election was to be fought largely 
on the issue of unemployment; widely publicized statistics published by the Board of 
Trade every month showed the number of Britons registering for unemployment 
insurance rising in late 1928 (from 1.37 million in August to 1.57 million in 
December).20 Particularly in northern industrial constituencies, Conservative Members of 
Parliament (and the Unionist Party MPs in their governing coalition) worried about losing 
their seats to voter frustration over rising unemployment.21 Only two years earlier, in 
1926, the entire nation had ground to a halt for eight days during a General Strike in 
which millions of workers took to the picket lines.22 Although labor unrest had quieted 
significantly since 1926, and even though unemployment was not nearly as grave as it 
would become in the early 1930s with the onset of the Great Depression, the rising 
unemployment figures in late 1928 and early 1929 seemed to bolster the electoral 
prospects of the opposition Labour Party.  
 
In discussions of unemployment measures that the Conservatives might propose, 
Colonial Secretary Leo Amery repeated an idea that he and his mentor and predecessor, 
Lord Milner, had been advocating since 1922: to spend Treasury funds to build up 
																																																								
19 Rudolf von Albertini, Decolonization: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919-
1960 (Holmes & Meier Publications, 1982). Page 103. 
20 Paul Denman and Paul McDonald, “Unemployment Statistics from 1881 to the Present Day,” 
Labour Market Trends, January 1996, 5–18.  
21 Philip Williamson, “‘Safety First’: Baldwin, the Conservative Party, and the 1929 General 
Election,” The Historical Journal 25, no. 2 (June 1982): 385–409. Page 397. 
22 Eric L. Wigham, Strikes and the Government, 1893-1981 (Macmillan, 1982). 
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transportation networks in colonial holdings. Such a “colonial development fund” would 
combat domestic unemployment in two ways: first, road and railway construction paid 
for by the fund would spur orders for factories in Britain, and; second, the new 
infrastructure would open up new markets for British producers and consumers.23 A 
memorandum circulating in Whitehall in October 1928 promised that orders of millions 
of pounds of railway materials from the UK would reduce “industrial irritation” that 
could otherwise affect “the Ballot Box to the detriment of the government in power.”24  
 
But Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin was initially non-committal, and Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Winston Churchill adamantly opposed the departure such a fund would entail 
from the longstanding policy restricting colonies from accessing UK Treasury funds.25 
Churchill proved so obstinate that Amery asked Baldwin to remove Churchill from the 
Treasury (and to name as his replacement either Neville Chamberlain or Amery himself). 
Amery did not conceal his derision for what he saw as Churchill’s myopically martial 
understanding of the Empire: “If Winston could only be induced to go away and wage 
war somewhere something might perhaps be done.”26 
 
																																																								
23 Ian M. Drummond, “More on British Colonial Aid Policy in the Nineteen-Thirties,” Canadian 
Journal of History, no. 6 (1971): 189–95. For Milner’s proposal of an “Imperial Development 
Fund, “see Viscount Milner, Questions of the Hour (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 
1923). Page 155. 
24 Vail, “The Making of an Imperial Slum.” Page 108. 
25 For more on the history of Treasury control over the colonies, see Richard M Kesner, 
Economic Control and Colonial Development: Crown Colony Financial Management in the Age 
of Joseph Chamberlain, Contributions in Comparative Colonial Studies 7 (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1981). 
26 Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940. Page 143. 
	 142	
Eventually, Amery secured the support of other Cabinet members and Party leaders for 
the colonial development fund. In February 1929 JCC Davidson, Chairman of the 
Conservative Party and a close confidant of Baldwin’s, wrote to the Prime Minister that a 
large-scale policy of colonial development would not only address domestic 
unemployment, but also demonstrate that their party was “still full of energy” and “fire 
the imagination of the country.” Amery and Davidson eventually won over their 
colleagues. In early April, Churchill reluctantly conceded.27  
 
On April 18, Baldwin opened the general election campaign with an address before an 
audience of 2000 Conservative and Unionist Party loyalists in the Theatre Royal in 
London’s West End. He proposed a Colonial Development Fund as a major part of his 
party’s plan to fight domestic unemployment: 
If you sum up what our ideal is—to find permanent employment—you may sum 
it up in this way, I think: that it is the modernization of industry at home and the 
multiplication of markets overseas. And that has caused us to look once more at 
the development of our own Colonies…Overseas, and particularly in Africa, we 
have territories of vast potentiality, and we want them to develop…and so we 
shall provide out of our imperial funds such sums as are required—within a 
maximum, to be attuned by our needs…to pay the interest in the initial years of 
unfruitful schemes which otherwise must be postponed.28 
 
The Conservatives trumpeted the idea for a Colonial Development Fund in their General 
Election Manifesto. During Question Hour in the House of Commons in late April, 
																																																								
27 Williamson, “‘Safety First’: Baldwin, the Conservative Party, and the 1929 General Election.” 
Also see Philip Williamson, Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values 
(Cambridge University Press, 1999). Page 37. 
28 “Stanley Baldwin Speech to Open Conservative General Election Campaign,” The Times (of 
London), April 19, 1929, The Times Digital Archive. 
	 143	
Amery predicted that the fund would be used to build sorely needed roads and railways in 
British Africa.29 
 
While the Labour Party did not include a Colonial Development Fund in its own election 
platform, the Fund would come into existence under a new Labour Government. The 
Conservative Party met defeat in the May 30 General Election, losing 152 of its 412 
seats. The Labour Party won 151 new seats to climb to a plurality (though not a majority) 
of 287. Yet within weeks, the Labour Government took up the Conservative idea of a 
Colonial Development Fund as an immediate response to unemployment. This was 
largely the work of “Jimmy” Thomas, a former railway labor organizer and a Colonial 
Secretary in the first Labour Government (January-November 1924) who had been tasked 
by the new Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, with coordinating the new 
government’s response to unemployment. In the first post-election meeting of a 
committee to address unemployment, Thomas declared his intention to link new 
development spending in the colonies to job creation at home.30 Thomas did just this in a 
speech to the House of Commons on July 4, when he previewed an upcoming bill to 
authorize up to £1 million in annual spending for Colonial development.31 By July 11 the 
Treasury had issued a White Paper explaining the proposal, and on July 12 Thomas 
moved a resolution to establish both a Colonial Development fund and a Colonial 
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Development Advisory Committee to assist the Treasury in judging the merits of 
applications submitted by colonial governments.32 
b) The fascist vs. the pedant: the debate over including health in the Colonial 
Development Bill 
In their addresses, Thomas as well as Amery and Baldwin had always asserted that 
physical capital projects—and in particular, roads and railways—were to be the main 
beneficiaries of this new colonial development funding. Such projects, they promised, 
would entail large orders of manufactured goods (e.g. steel) for domestic factories, and 
would decrease shipping costs for primary products (such as cotton) shipped from the 
colonies to British manufacturers. 33 Health was not in a central feature of either the 
Conservative or Labour Party leadership’s original vision for the Colonial Development 
Act.34 Yet historians have noted the curious fact that a surprisingly large portion of the 
																																																								
32 “Colonial Development; Help from Annual £1,000,000 Fund,” The Times (of London), July 11, 
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fund...can be made a most potent instrument for accelerating the general development of many 
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of much-needed employment in this country.” Leo S Amery, Colonial Office, Volume 227 vols., 
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of the peoples under our charge” as an activity in which governors were “often splendidly 
supported by their wives.” It was an ancillary pursuit, important for colonial development only 
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funding made available by the 1929 Colonial Development Act (16 percent between 1929 
and 1940) went to health projects.  
 
Rarely explored in this historiography, however, is exactly why such a sizable share of 
funding originally promoted as a boon for transportation and communication networks 
was ultimately used to construct hospitals and clinics. To some chroniclers, the use of the 
Colonial Development Fund for health is evidence of a certain sort of failure. In his five-
volume Official History of Colonial Development, DJ Morgan writes of the period after 
the passage of the 1929 Act that “the subsequent move away from emphasis on economic 
toward concern with social projects serves to confirm the fact that viable economic 
openings were just not abundantly available in the Colonial Empire as a whole.”35 Yet 
this characterization overlooks the fact that during the 1929 debates over the Colonial 
Development Act, a few vocal backbench MPs worked to ensure that the “promotion of 
public health” was an explicitly authorized purpose of this new funding. The inclusion of 
health as a major aim of the Colonial Development Fund (CDF) was less a “failure” than 
a skillful subversion of Amery and Thomas’ original intent to decrease unemployment in 
the UK. Because CDF health funding would soon prove so important for Nyasaland’s 
Medical Department, the political maneuvers that effected this subversion of intent will 
be related here. 
 																																																																																																																																																																					
insofar as it allowed roads, bridges, and electrical plants to be constructed more expeditiously. 
One such instance in which health work had proven important took place, Amery recounted, in 
“the creation of a large hydroelectric power scheme in Perak [in Malaysia],” which was “carried 
out in a malarial jungle without involving any appreciable sickness among a body of 4,000 
workers, a condition which would have been incredible a few years ago.” Ibid. 
35 Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development. Pages 41-43. 
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When the Colonial Development Bill of 1929 was first discussed on July 12, a number of 
MPs urged that “medical services” should be included in bill’s list of  “means” by which 
the fund could be used to further colonial development. Five days later, when the bill was 
discussed again, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies William Lunn addressed these 
MPs, assuring them that the health services would be provided to laborers on 
infrastructure projects funded by the Colonial Development Act. Past experience, Lunn 
claimed, had shown “the wisdom of giving attention to the health conditions of those who 
labour in these great enterprises, and I think I ought to say that is equally important that 
health conditions should be considered either in smaller enterprises.”36 He then sought to 
move swiftly on to other matters. 
 
But one MP was wholly unsatisfied with this clarification. Lord Eustace Percy had served 
as a Conservative MP from Hastings since 1921. His policy interests lay primarily in 
health and education, as evidenced by his previous posts as Parliamentary Secretary to 
the Ministry of Health (1923) and President of the Board of Education (1924-1929).37 
Percy argued that the bill, as written, seemed to indicate to future officials (and he might 
have had niggardly treasury officials in mind) that health projects were not a legitimate 
use of the bill. If, he explained, grants for development of the health services “are to be 
permissible under the Bill, [they] will be admissible under Section I (I, 1)—‘any other 
means.’” But, he continued, “If you mention ‘any other means’ and specify one of those 																																																								
36 William Lunn, Colonial Development Bill, 1929, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1929/jul/17/colonial-development-
bill#S5CV0230P0_19290717_HOC_354. 
37 Philip Williamson, “Percy, Eustace Sutherland Campbell, Baron Percy of Newcastle (1887-
1958), Politician and Educationist,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, n.d. 
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other means, as is done in the paragraph in the words ‘including surveys,’ we run very 
great risks of finding that health will be excluded.” 
 
Sir Oswald Mosley, a Labour MP who helped coordinate the new government’s 
employment policies alongside Jimmy Thomas, answered Lord Percy. “I hope,” he said, 
“I can give some more encouragement than he found in the bill, because the governing 
words are—aiding and developing agriculture and industry…It should be clear that, 
where you are dealing with the promotion of industry, the health of those engaged in 
industry is of primary concern.” 
 
Yet Percy (who, according to a biographer, had a reputation for being “pedantic” and 
“always ready to magnify small differences”)38 persisted: “I am afraid that, 
grammatically, I do not find comfort in those words.”  
 
Mosley tried to quell Percy’s concerns with an example. “It is possible to introduce 
diseases which affect those engaged in industry, and consequently impair those who are 
thus engaged. Certainly, such diseases as hookworm, which notably impair the efficiency 
of those engaged in industry, can be dealt with under this bill…It would be a very narrow 
and very mistaken reading of the purposes of this Bill if the great human element, upon 
which, after all, all industrial efficiency rests in the first degree, was excluded from its 
purview.” 
 																																																								
38 Ibid. 
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At this moment, the physician and Unionist MP Vernon Davies entered the fray.39 “Why 
not include it specifically?” he asked Mosley. 
 
Mosley was not known for his tolerance of criticism. Within three years, he would leave 
the Labour Party to found the British Union of Fascists. By the late 1930s, he was best 
known as Adolf Hitler’s chief British apologist.40 On this day, Davies’ challenge brought 
Mosley to exasperation: “I have been trying for some five minutes to explain that it was 
included. Perhaps I went into such detail in trying to make that explanation that I 
mystified the honorable member.” 
 
Dr. Davies, though, remained as unconvinced as Lord Percy: “With great respect to the 
honorable Baronet [Mosley], I do not agree with him.” 
 
Aided by Davies, Lord Percy pressed ahead with his endeavor to include an ironclad 
provision to ensure health and education were not excluded from the CDF. He sought not 
only to further the health of European-employed laborers (as Mosley had assumed), but 
also the health of general “native” populations. Percy called for Mosley to insert two 
amendments to the Bill that would add the promotion of both education and health of the 
“native community” to the explicitly listed purposes of the fund. 
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When debate recommenced on the bill the next day (July 18), Mosley addressed Percy’s 
request. First, he moved to insert “the promotion of public health” as a purpose of the 
Fund. Second, he contended that the phrase “native community” was not appropriate 
because it might exclude “white settlers,” “Indian settlers” and “Arabs.” Finally, Mosley 
argued that education “does not really fall within the scope of this bill.” Education was, 
he explained, “a most important matter, but it falls under the ordinary colonial 
administration.” Mosley’s amendment passed without further discussion. The entire bill 
was approved by both the House of Commons and the House of Lords, and received the 
Royal Assent on July 26. 
 
The Commons debate was recounted at such length here because health funding under 
the Colonial Development Act became such an important part of the subsequent 
development of Nyasaland’s government health sector. In contrast to the previous three 
decades of colonial rule, the number of government health facilities for Nyasaland’s 
Africans expanded rapidly after the passage of the 1929 act (see below). That the health 
funding in the act was made possible only by the persistent objections of a “pedant” and a 
little-known physician in the House of Commons has not yet been fully appreciated in the 
historiography of the Colonial Development Act. George Abbott critiques the differential 
treatment of education and public health in the act as one of the “rather glaring 
inconsistencies” of the Act. This is certainly true; as the next chapter will demonstrate, 
the absence of funding for education contributed to Nyasaland’s shortage of medical 
providers, even as CDF monies were used to build new hospitals and dispensaries. But 
Abbott suggests that this exclusion of education was the work of the Colonial 
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Development Advisory Committee.41  It was not. The text of the House of Commons 
debates reveal that the inclusion of health was the work of Lord Percy and Dr. Davies, 
and the exclusion of education the product of the efforts of Sir Mosley.  
 
The debate also reveals how a few persistent politicians partially transformed a measure 
sold by Conservative and Labour leaders as an answer to a domestic concern 
(unemployment) into a fund for the construction of hospitals in the colonies. In 1929 
British unemployment was a crisis capable of overcoming the resistance to spending of 
the UK Treasury (just as colonial labor unrest would prove capable of quelling Treasury 
objections a decade later, see Chapter 5), but with this “emergency measure” virtually 
assured of passage Percy and Davies felt no obligation to ensure that the law hewed too 
closely to this politically potent justification.  
 
IV. The Colonial Development Act in Nyasaland 
a) Easing the terms of debt repayment and increased recurrent expenditure 
Officials in Nyasaland jumped at an opportunity to secure additional funds. In the autumn 
of 1929, Nyasaland’s Acting Governor, Wilfred Bennett Davidson-Houston, wrote Lord 
Passfield, the Labour Government’s Secretary of State for the Colonies (and, prior to his 
1929 peerage, a prominent socialist reformer known as Sidney Webb). The Governor 
informed Passfield that he hoped to submit proposals for funding to the newly established 
Colonial Development Advisory Committee (CDAC), a group of private eminences and 
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public officials in London tasked with deciding on the merit of submissions to the CDF.42 
At first prospects did not look good; the CDAC was already considering funding for a 
massive rail bridge over the Zambesi River, thereby connecting the port of Beira to 
Nyasaland by a continuous railway line.43 But Nyasaland’s new Governor, Shenton 
Thomas (a former prep school teacher less than three months into his first Colonial 
Service assignment) insisted that a bridge was not enough. Thomas wrote to the Colonial 
Office on January 30, 1930, explaining why Nyasaland remained so poor, and what it 
would take to increase production: 
Money is necessary for development and the money has not been forthcoming. 
And, until the money is forthcoming, the country will not develop, whether the 
Zambesi Bridge is built or not…Roads in themselves will not produce crops; 
crops cannot be grown without skilled and systematic agricultural supervision; 
and that supervision will only be partially effective unless it is exercised over a 
healthy population.44  
 
Governor Thomas’ main request (upon which he felt the other schemes for assistance 
were entirely dependent) was to use the Colonial Development Fund to allow for an 
																																																								
42  Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development. Page 53 
43 This bridge would connect the TZR (which ran from Beira to the southern side of the Zambesi 
River) with another, older railroad that ran between the northern side of the Zambesi and the 
southern Nyasaland city of Port Herald. The bridge would obviate the need for ferry transport 
across the river. Though this project would ostensibly aid producers in Nyasaland, most settlers 
did not want to see it built; they believed (as it turned out, correctly), that the debts they would be 
made to pay would vastly outweigh any gains to trade. Colonel Josiah Wedgwood, a Labour MP, 
channeled these critiques (and pointed to the influence of Oury and other financiers-cum-railroad-
boosters) in a speech to the House of Commons in 1929: “Nyasaland is a very small colony, and 
the people there with one accord have emphatically protested over and over again against being 
saddled with the Zambesi Bridge. The demand for this work does not come from the people who 
are to pay, or even from the people whose goods are to be transported over the railway. The 
demand comes from the vested interests concerned in the railroads, the port companies, and the 
land companies around the Port of Beira.” Josiah Wedgwood, Clause 1- Power to Make Advances 
for the Purposes of Colonial Development, 1929, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1929/jul/18/clause-1-power-to-make-advances-
for-the#S5CV0230P0_19290718_HOC_391.Also see White, Bridging the Zambesi: A Colonial 
Folly. 
44 From Morgan, The Origins of British Aid Policy, 1924-1945. Page 53 (emphasis added). 
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increase in Nyasaland Government’s ‘standard revenue’ from £300,000 to £450,000 for 
ten years (1930-1939).45 The ability to devote domestic revenues to domestic 
expenditures would, Thomas explained, allow him to increase recurrent expenditure on 
priority areas such as health. In a February 24 debate in the House of Commons, Leo 
Amery (by this point an opposition MP) spoke approvingly of Thomas’ proposal: 
Nyasaland has been a Treasury controlled territory, conducted, as such territories 
are apt to be, on the absolute minimum of expenditure…If we are to open up 
Nyasaland and its resources by this new connection with the sea [the Zambesi 
Bridge], it would be well worth while at the same time relaxing a little that 
extreme rigour which limits its medical services, its sanitary services, and its 
general administrative services.46  
 
The CDAC approved of Thomas’ proposal at their meeting in March and urged expedited 
negotiations with the UK Treasury, who still held sole power over Nyasaland’s standard 
revenue arrangement. Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies Sir Samuel Wilson 
lobbied Treasury Secretary Philip Snowden in a letter dated April 11. Wilson argued for a 
clean break with the parsimonious approach of the past decade: 
It is recognized that any Power with takes the responsibility of governing 
uncivilized races should, in the words of the League of Nations, ‘apply the 
principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust 
of civilization.’ In this duty British control has failed. The natives are underfed 
and under paid…such important social services as medical and sanitary 
work…have been so restricted as to fall far below the standard normally attained 
by backward British Dependencies….The Protectorate should at least be 
maintained in a condition to avoid the grave public discredit which would attach 
to Her Majesty’s Government, both in this country and abroad, should the present 
scandalous state of Nyasaland attract attention.47 
 
																																																								
45 L. J. L. Nthenda, “H.M. Treasury and the Nyasaland Administration, 1919-40.” Page 272. 
46 Leo S Amery, Colonial Office, 234 vols. (February 24 1930, n.d.), 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1930/feb/24/colonial-
office#S5CV0235P0_19300224_HOC_504. 
47 Morgan, The Origins of British Aid Policy, 1924-1945., 55-56. 
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This time, the Treasury agreed. Nyasaland’s standard revenue rose to £450,000, freeing it 
to spend more of the customs duties and hut taxes raised within the Protectorate on 
domestic services rather than on the TZR loan guarantee. Nyasaland’s recurrent 
expenditure on health rose immediately. After barely budging during the 1920s—rising 
only from £29,804 in 1924 to £33,191 in 1928—it increased to £42,496 in 1930, then to 
£49,138 in 1934. But the health sector did not receive an outsized portion of the increased 
domestic spending. Though absolute spending rose, the share of recurrent government 
expenditure devoted to health fell slightly, 10.1 percent in 1930 to 9.0 percent in 1934.48 
 
b) For once, London demands more spending on health 
Even more important for Nyasaland’s health sector was the development expenditure 
(spending on new buildings and equipment) made possible by the Colonial Development 
Fund. During the campaign to raise Nyasaland’s standard revenue, Governor Thomas 
also prepared a set of specific developmental schemes for CDAC consideration. In late 
1929, he sent a circular to each of his departments—including the Medical Department—
asking for proposals for development schemes consistent with the aims of the Colonial 
Development Act.49 Director of Medical Services FE Whitehead’s proposal was included 
in the Governor’s January 30, 1930 despatch to the CDAC, and were considered at a 
meeting on May 7. Thomas had included proposals for an agricultural laboratory, 
veterinary extension services, and telegraph and telephone improvements.50 Whitehead’s 																																																								
48 RD Bell, “Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Financial Position and 
Further Development of Nyasaland,” Colonial Office No 352 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary 
Office, 1938), Box 3, No 20, SoMA. Page 174. 
49 L. J. L. Nthenda, “H.M. Treasury and the Nyasaland Administration, 1919-40.” Page 263 
50 Morgan, The Origins of British Aid Policy, 1924-1945, 55. 
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proposal requested a total £80,596 for the Medical Department, with this funding to be 
split roughly equally between renovation of existing hospitals and dispensaries and 
construction of new facilities.51  
 
Not everyone in Whitehall was enthusiastic about the scale of this proposal. Sir John 
Campbell, financial advisor to Lord Passfield, objected to Governor Thomas’ suggestion, 
included in his letter to the CDAC, that in promoting the cause of European medicine in 
Africa “we should aim at nothing but the best.” Campbell’s penned a rejoinder: 
“Financial considerations cannot be disregarded; they are, in fact, all-important. One 
must cut one’s coat according to one’s cloth…If Nyasaland attempts to develop on what 
one may call ‘European’ lines, the attempt will fail, for the finances of the country will 
not stand it.”52  
 
But Blackett’s CDAC had the opposite reaction; they thought Whitehead’s proposal 
lacked sufficient ambition. While they approved many of Nyasaland’s other proposals, 
the CDACs sent the Colonial Office a request for a more comprehensive four-year 
program of medical and sanitary improvement in Nyasaland. They hoped for a new plan, 
more ambitious than Dr. Whitehead’s, that would reflect the new reality of increased 
standard revenue and, as a result, the capacity for higher recurrent expenditure. The 
CDAC letter indicated that the new plan should expand the government’s work in public 
health and sanitation (though not at the expense of previously proposed expenditures on 																																																								
51 FE Whitehead, Memorandum by the Director of Medical and Sanitary Services to the Colonial 
Development Advisory Committee, January 30, 1930, CDAC 525/136/15, Files 117-148. 
52 “Minute by Sir John Campbell,” April 22, 1930, CDAC 525/136/15, UKNA. 
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curative medicine).53 This encouragement to request more funding for health was 
unprecedented in Nyasaland’s relationship with Whitehall, and would scarcely be 
repeated again.  
 
The CDAC’s appetite for health spending (and, in particular, for public health and 
sanitation) was, in large part, a result of its members’ personal interests. This was 
particularly true of the CDAC’s Chairman, Sir Basil Blackett, the Calcutta-born son of 
missionaries who had worked for decades as a finance expert in the British civil service. 
Blackett’s interest in health was evidenced by his service as President of the British 
Social Hygiene Council, a government-funded body known before 1925 as the National 
Council for Combating Venereal Diseases.54 In 1932, Blackett published “A Layman’s 
Plea for a Positive Health Policy,” a pamphlet in which he argued for far greater 
emphasis on health education and preventive measures in the United Kingdom.55 During 
Blackett’s years at the helm of the CDAC, proposals for projects to improve curative 
medicine and public health projects in the colonies were both warmly reviewed and 
frequently approved. For instance, during fiscal 1930-31, health accounted for 18 percent 
of grants approved by the CDAC. In 1931-32 this figure rose to 44 percent.56 
																																																								
53 “Letter from LB Freeston (Secretary to the CDAC) to Under Secretary of State, Colonial 
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54 Jeremy Wormell, “Blackett, Sir Basil Phillott (1882-1935), Civil Servant,” Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
55 Basil Blackett, “A Layman’s Plea for a Positive Health Policy,” July 1932, MH 55/2, UKNA. 
56 Neal R Malmsten, “British Government Policy toward Colonial Development, 1919-1939,” 
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The CDAC’s request that Nyasaland in particular needed to spend more on health was 
supported by prominent figures in the Labour Government. Under-Secretary of State for 
the Colonies Thomas Drummond Shiels, a Scottish physician known for his sympathy for 
black African nationalists politicians and trade unionists,57 chaired a sub-committee of 
the CDAC devoted specifically to advancing “the use of a portion of the Colonial 
Development Fund for the promotion of public health in the Colonial Empire.”58 On June 
26, 1930, Shiels spoke in the House of Commons of the need for CDF support for health 
services in Nyasaland: 
The terms of reference of the Fund were broadly drawn, and it has been found 
possible to include in the schemes towards which assistance can be given schemes 
to develop and assist the public health service…There is no doubt that we have 
been hampered, especially in certain Colonies, such as Nyasaland, because of the 
former parsimoniousness of the Treasury, but we are now hopeful that in 
Nyasaland and other parts we may be able, with the help of the Colonial 
Development Fund, not only to assist in public health but also in the training of 
subordinate medical personnel and of midwives and in other ways to meet the 
very real need to which honorable Members have called attention.59 
 
Even Snowden’s Treasury echoed this encouragement, suggesting that Lord Passfield 
request from Governor Thomas “a complete scheme of development within the additional 
funds that will be available.” Among the priorities set out by the Treasury for the 
																																																								
57 WWJ Knox, “Shiels, Sir (Thomas) Drummond (1881-1953), Physician and Politician,” Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
58 “Report of the Colonial Development Public Health Committee,” Colonial Office, July 1930. 
CO 323/1090/1, UKNA, page 4. 
59 Thomas Drummond Shiels, Colonial Office, Vol 240 vols., 1930, 
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development scheme were “measures to improve the physical condition of the natives” so 
as to facilitate increased production.60 
 
By this point, neither Shiels, nor Blackett, nor even the Treasury felt compelled to 
demonstrate any proof that colonial health schemes would aid employment in Britain.  
With the bill passed, and the funds authorized, the Colonial Office finally felt freed to 
pursue development as it saw fit. This was a short-lived feeling, as we shall see—by 
1931, the deepening of the Great Depression would severely restrict their imaginations. 
But for the moment, the prevailing sentiment in Whitehall was—for once—to think big. 
Lord Passfield’s message to all Colonial and Mandated Territories of August 10, 1929 
had informed them that schemes need not promise immediate economic returns, but they 
should be submitted as quickly as possible.61 In 1930, the CDAC complained, in its first 
interim report, that the schemes being submitted were both too few and too unambitious. 
The Colonial Office responded by setting up a special committee to deploy public health 
specialists to the colonies to devise larger plans for submission to the CDAC.62 
 
V. The Shircore Report of 1930 
a) John Owen Shircore 
Seeking an ambitious scheme for Nyasaland in short order, the Colonial Office 
committee requested the assistance of Dr. John Owen Shircore, the Director of Medical 
Services in Tanganyika. Shircore was, by 1930, an experienced hand. The son of a 																																																								
60  Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development., Page 55 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. Pages 47-48. Also see Shiels, Colonial Office. 
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Captain in the Indian Medical Service, he had studied in Edinburgh, London and 
Cambridge before joining the Colonial Service in 1908. Shircore had worked in the 
northern Nyasaland town of Karonga as a medical officer, then in the East African 
Medical Service during the First World War. After the war Shircore oversaw the 
establishment of a new Medical Department in the former German territory of 
Tanganyika, first as Deputy Principal Medical Officer then, beginning in 1924, as 
Principal Medical Officer.63 There he launched massively popular voluntary 
chemotherapeutic campaigns, treating more than 374,584 cases of yaws and 72,377 cases 
of syphilis with a preparation of bismuth sodium tartrate and soamin (an arsenical) that he 
had devised himself.64 Shircore’s work in Tanganyika demonstrated that he was by no 
means blind to persistent Treasury concerns over cost containment; one of the major 
advantages he saw in his own injection for yaws and syphilis was that its cost was far 
lower than salvarsan, while being just as effective. 65 But he was also aware that both 
cost-cutting measures and ill-conceived mass interventions could do more harm than 
good. In dealing with sleeping sickness Shircore argued against tryparsamide 
monotherapy, since in high doses the drug often caused atrophy of the optic nerve (and 
consequent vision loss) or even death. Instead, he advocated dual therapy with lower 
doses of tryparasamide alongside suramin, a drug with less frequent, though still serious, 
side effects. Shircore also advocated individual examination of the sick over “wholesale 
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blood examination of village populations,” which “tends to destroy the confidence of the 
people…which results in obstruction and the concealment of cases.”66 
 
b) A scathing critique and a plan for expansion 
Shircore arrived in Zomba on August 9, 1930. Setting immediately to work, he covered 
more 1000 miles by motorcar in 40 days, visiting native hospitals, European hospitals, 
and dispensaries across the colony. Decades later, an obituary for Shircore would note 
that some colleagues had found his demeanor “detached.” But in his report on Nyasaland, 
submitted on September 20, Shircore’s tone was clear in its appraisal and passionate in its 
call for far greater funds. “It may be stated,” he stated in his introduction, “that, with the 
exception of an almost negligible addition of staff and a few beds to some of the 
hospitals, little progress had been made until the year 1929…The department is merely in 
embryo.”67 He recommended a significant increase in development expenditure, totaling 
£110,325 over the coming four years.68 
 
Shircore explained his recommendations by prefacing them with rather bleak assessments 
of Nyasaland’s medical personnel and facilities for Africans. Shircore considered 
European hospitals “adequate for their purpose.” But such was not the case for African 
hospitals. Taken together, these hospitals contained only 170 beds for an estimated 
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African population of 1.4 million in 1930.69 Patients were housed in a wattle and daub 
hut in Chikwawa and in “dilapidated” buildings in Fort Manning and Kota-Kota. The 
health facilities were too poorly funded, Shircore believed, to gain the confidence of the 
native people: 
The accommodation at the African hospitals is entirely disproportionate to 
demand…Drugs are adequate, but medical and domestic equipment, such as beds, 
blankets, sheets and pillows, require thorough overhauling. Similar remarks apply 
to the allocation of funds for the upkeep of patients. Africans, unless dangerously 
ill or destitute, will not apply for the treatment as in-patients or stay in hospital 
unless reasonably well provided with food and comfort. Additional wards at the 
established centres, likewise new hospitals, are urgently required.70 
 
Shircore proposed substantial increases in facilities, staff, equipment and training over 
the four-year period covered by the report. The largest line item, new facility 
construction, included the construction of seventeen new African hospitals: 12 would 
have 30 beds each and cost £2,050; four would have 50 beds each and cost £2,800; and 
one (in Zomba) would have 100 beds and cost £7,194. He also proposed a new European 
Hospital in Lilongwe, with 6 beds and a cost of £1,085. He recommended adding 36 new 
dispensaries—costing £300 each—to the existing stock of 83. In addition, Shircore 
recommended five new maternity and child welfare clinics, each with 12 beds, an 
operation room, a dispensary and an outpatient room, to be staffed by a European Health 
Visitor and four female African Maternity Assistants (£700 each).71 Medical and surgical 
supplies and equipment, including X-ray machines, were to be purchased for the major 
hospitals. 																																																								
69 “Annual Medical Report on the Health and Sanitary Condition of the Nyasaland Protectorate 
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Shircore also recommended more than doubling recurrent expenditure on personnel. This 
would allow for an increase in the number of medical officers from 11 to 18. Such an 
increase would, Shircore argued, greatly increase productivity, as it would reduce the 
share of time medical officers spent traveling long distances (often up to 150 miles) to 
see a single European patient. The number of sub-assistant surgeons was to be increased 
from 8 to 20 using recruits from Bombay. This class of providers completed the same 
curriculum as medical graduates in Great Britain, but they could be employed at far lower 
cost.72  A Bacteriologist was to be hired, and a properly equipped laboratory constructed. 
The Sanitation Branch was to be expanded to two European health officers and 80 
African sanitary inspectors.  
 
Shircore’s most expansive increase in staff would come in the cadre of African Hospital 
Assistants. In the short term, he recommended an immediate increase in the number of 
African Hospital Assistants from eight to 18. Then, over the following ten years, he 
planned to have Hospital Assistants replace the existing dispensers. “The majority of the 
dispensers,” he claimed, “possess no knowledge of drugs and merely dole out stock 
mixtures.”73 Instead of barely trained dispensers he sought a hospital assistant at every 
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health facility in the country, and at least one health facility for every 20,000 people. 
Even assuming zero growth in Malawi’s population, this ratio required the cadre of 
African Hospital Assistants to grow from eight to 70. To reach this figure, Shircore 
sought to emulate his work in Tanganyika by establishing a Medical Training School at 
Zomba. This school would replace an arrangement that the government maintained with 
the University’s Mission for Central Africa (UMCA) hospital in Blantyre, where African 
Hospital Assistants were trained in a four-year curriculum before being placed in the 
government’s employ. Shircore thought a government training school preferable to the 
subvention of a mission school, where the “atmosphere” and “methods” might differ 
from the government service and the ability to study at a large central hospital was not 
available to trainees. 
 
c) Aftermath of the report: plans, realized and unrealized 
Shircore’s report was not a radical document. His total request for development 
expenditure was slightly more than £110,000, only exceeding Whitehead’s original 
request to the CDAC by £30,000.74 And though Shircore called for improved facilities 
and staffing at African hospitals, he recommended nothing approaching equality in 
medical provision for Europeans and Africans in Nyasaland. For instance, the new six-
bed European hospital in Lilongwe would cost £1,085—more than half the cost of a 30-
bed African hospital—and was to be staffed by a Medical Officer, Nursing Sister, 
Sanitary Superintendent and Sub-Assistant Surgeon. Indeed as a 1931 Medical 
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Department report would find, the cost per patient per day was more than two times 
higher in European Hospitals than in Native Hospitals.75 
 
Blackett’s CDAC was enthusiastic about Shircore’s proposal, and did not accept the 
notion that there Nyasaland should finance the development of its medical services. The 
CDAC approved most of the funds requested, allotting a total of £101,410 to Nyasaland’s 
Medical Department.76 But the relative optimism did not last for long. During the depths 
of the Great Depression, the UK scaled back outlays from the CDF.77 As the Depression 
dried up government coffers throughout the empire, calls for ambitious schemes had 
turned to calls for economies. The Imperial Treasury eventually approved expenditures of 
only £78,284 for Nyasaland’s Medical Department. This amount was less than Nyasaland 
than Shircore had proposed, and even less than Whitehead requested of the CDAC in 
January 1930.  
 
Total disbursements from the Colonial Development Fund between its inception in 1929 
and October 1940 (when it was supplanted by the Colonial Development and Welfare 
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Fund) were £6,523,193.78 Nyasaland, a colony with three percent of the population of the 
British Empire in 1930, received 11.1 percent of total funding.79 Between 1930 and 1938, 
Nyasaland received £726,534 in grants from the CDF. The majority of these funds, 
£500,000, went towards the TZR loan guarantee (to allow for an increase in the standard 
revenue). Funding for the medical department represented less than 10 percent of 
Nyasaland’s total CDF funding.80 Still, the CDF assistance was more infrastructure 
funding than Nyasaland’s medical department had ever received before. Nyasaland was, 
then, a disproportionate beneficiary of the CDF, which in other colonies was far less 
significant contributor to public coffers. 
 
By 1938, 12 new hospitals (with a total of 510 beds), 36 rural dispensaries, and 3 
maternity and child welfare clinics had been constructed in Nyasaland with CDF 
monies.81 A newly constructed Zomba African Hospital was staffed by two medical 
officers, two nursing sisters, and a pathologist, and equipped with a new laboratory and 
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X-ray machine.82 But while Shircore had called in 1930 for X-ray machines in African 
hospitals throughout the country, as late as 1945 Zomba remained the only African 
hospital equipped with one.83  
 
Staffing remained the largest problem in the years following the Shircore report. The 
number of medical officers rose from 11 in 1930 to 14 in 1933, but it would not exceed 
15 until after World War II. Sub-assistant surgeons on government payroll rose from 8 in 
1930 to 10 in 1933, but rose no further during the decade. Nyasaland would never rely to 
the same extent upon sub-assistant surgeons as Tanganyika.  
 
The new development funding and increased recurrent spending, both made possible by 
the CDF, changed the quantity and quality of medical care at government hospitals in 
Nyasaland.84 In the early 1930s, medical officer Walter Gopsill was deployed to Cholo, 
an area in the south known for its tea estates. Heretofore the station had only a small 
outpatient dispensary for a district of 53,000 people. Shircore had called for the 
construction of a 50-bed hospital, as well as the appointment of a Medical Officer and 
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African Hospital Assistant.85 The funding was ultimately used to erect a 100-bed 
hospital. Gopsill was also heartened that “the native staff at the hospital had considerably 
increased and improved.” He worked alongside “well trained dressers, and dispensers, 
nurses,” and “one boy who showed promise I taught to do blood films and all microscope 
work, which was of tremendous assistance to me.”86 But some aspects of care remained 
poor. Funding to feed hospital patients was so paltry that Gopsill required inpatients with 
venereal diseases to supply their own “bags of mealie meal.”87 The only time the Medical 
Stores supplied his hospitals with sufficient bed sheets was just before an official visit by 
Nyasaland’s Governor.88 
 
VI. Conclusion: medicine as byproduct of colonial and postcolonial politics 
If Innocent had lived near a vascular surgeon, he might have left the hospital with both 
legs. The process of training, employing and equipping surgeons is no mystery. But it 
takes money, and money—as this chapter has shown—is something Malawi’s health 
sector has long been denied. Innocent’s avoidable amputation was the product of a 
thousand decisions and omissions that left Malawi without the equipped and trained 
medical practitioners needed to salvage his leg. Many these causes (such as the exclusion 
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of education from the 1929 CDA) are quite distal, and only come to light with an analysis 
that is both geographically broad and historically deep.  
 
The focus on health budgets, political economy, and the moral commitments or greed of 
individual actors might seem a tad retrograde. Since the postmodern turn, Africanists 
have written about scarcity in medicine, but they have been especially curious about the 
innovations, improvisations, appropriations, and hybridizations wrought by health 
providers and patients. This vein of inquiry has inspired rich literatures in both the history 
of medicine and medical anthropology.89 
 
Yet there are pitfalls to this focus, especially when it moves into the realms of policy and 
practice. Of late, the notions of “reverse and “frugal” innovation (terms imported from 
business management) have become infatuations in global public health.90 The term 
“reverse innovation” assumes that the flow of innovation has historically flowed from 																																																								
89 Projit Bihari Mukharji, Nationalizing the Body: The Medical Market, Print and Daktari 
Medicine (London; New York: Anthem Press, 2011); Julie Livingston, Improvising Medicine : 
An African Oncology Ward in an Emerging Cancer Epidemic (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2012); Hunt, A Colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, Medicalization, and Mobility in the Congo; 
Claire L. Wendland, A Heart for the Work : Journeys through an African Medical School 
(London: The University of Chicago Press, 2010); Stacey A. Langwick, “Articulate(d) Bodies: 
Traditional Medicine in a Tanzanian Hospital,” American Ethnologist 35, no. 3 (August 1, 2008): 
428–39. 
90 Shamsuzzoha B. Syed, Viva Dadwal, and Greg Martin, “Reverse Innovation in Global Health 
Systems: Towards Global Innovation Flow,” Globalization and Health 9, no. 1 (August 30, 
2013): 36. Syed, Dadwal and Martin are quick to point out that the “West” has, and never has 
had, a monopoly on innovation, they still embrace the term “reverse innovation.” The term itself 
was coined by Vijay Govindarajan. See Jeffrey R. Immelt, Vijay Govindarajan, and Chris 
Trimble, “How GE Is Disrupting Itself,” Harvard Business Review, accessed September 17, 
2015, https://hbr.org/2009/10/how-ge-is-disrupting-itself. Also see Nigel Crisp, Mutual learning 
and reverse innovation—where next? Globalization and Health 10 (2014); 14, and Thomas J 
Bollyky, “New cheap and improved: assessing the promise of reverse and frugal innovation to 
address noncommunicable diseases,” Discussion Paper, Council on Foreign Relation, June 2015. 
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“West” to “non-West.” This is, of course, obscurantist, continuing a long-standing and 
widespread ignorance about the history of innovations stemming from the “non-West.”91 
In this way, the politics of reverse innovation” are entirely inapposite to postmodern 
Africanist literatures, even if both share a concern with “innovation.” The politics of the 
term “frugal innovation” are subtler, but can have insidious side-effects. Extolling 
“necessity as the mother of invention” runs the risk of downplaying the fact that, now as 
in the past, the absence of strong health systems leads most often to suffering and death, 
not the spark of creativity.  
 
Reexamining the history of health spending—or lack thereof—in British colonial Africa 
does not necessarily require rehashing the same questions. At stake in much of the earlier 
literature on this subject was the nature of an imagined unitary soul of colonialism: was it 
benevolent or malevolent? The battle lines were clear; on one side stood the 
hagiographers, and on the other the radical critics.92 Here, though, I treat the British 
																																																								
91 Londa Schiebinger, Plants and Empire: Colonial Bioprospecting in the Atlantic World 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). Also see Abena Dove Osseo-Asare, Bitter 
Roots: The Search for Healing Plants in Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014). 
92 For examples of hagiographic accounts by colonial apologists, see such works as Gelfand, 
Proud Record; Gelfand, A Service to the Sick: A History of the Health Services for Africans in 
Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1953. For a canonical and wholesale of colonialism, see Walter 
Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications, 1972). 
Frantz Fanon believed that to admit the good that some colonial medicine did would be to 
concede too much. It would, he feared, allow colonial apologists (like Gelfand) to claim their 
entire exploitative regime was essentially good. “When the French authorities show visitors 
through the Tizi-Ouzou sanitarium or the operating units of the Mustapha hospital in Algiers, this 
has for the native just one meaning: ‘This is what we have done for the people of this country; 
this country owes us everything; were it not for us, there would be no country.’ There is a real 
mental observation on the part of the native; it is difficult for him to be objective, to separate the 
wheat from the chaff…In certain periods of calm, in certain free confrontations, the colonized 
individual frankly recognizes what is positive in the dominator’s action. But this good faith is 
immediately taken advantage of by the occupier and transformed into a justification of the 
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colonial enterprise as simultaneously exploitative, unfree and invested with moral fervor 
and even heroic works. I turn, instead, to more practical, even prosaic questions: when 
and why did colonial medicine actually reach African subjects? In what form? And with 
what consequences? The new resources for health discussed in these chapters were, in the 
scheme of things, paltry. But, as later chapters will demonstrate, the medical facilities 
constructed in Nyasaland in the early 1930s would in time become important—and 
highly valued—to millions of people. 
 
																																																																																																																																																																					
occupation…The colonizer perverts his meaning and translate, ‘Don’t leave, for what would we 
do without you?’” Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism (New York: Grove Press, 1965).Page 122. 
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Chapter 4 
“We have to wait for riots and disturbances”: Budget cuts in a uniquely quiet 
Nyasaland, 1935-1945 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter explores the role of political unrest in colonial medical spending. During the 
mid- and late-1930s, Nyasaland’s Medical Department annual expenditures barely 
budged, even as revenues continued to rise. This was a product, in part, of the perception 
in Whitehall that Nyasaland was a placid backwater, and therefore did not need the 
political palliative of health spending. This perception, and the resulting retrenchment in 
health spending, continued after the mchape anti-witchcraft movement swept across the 
countryside, and even after the return of the millenarian preacher Elliot Kamwana from 
forced exile in 1937. Looking elsewhere in the British Empire, though, officials saw far 
graver threats to economic and political stability. Between 1935 and 1940, waves of riots 
and strikes roiled the oil fields and ports of the British West Indies, the mines of Northern 
Rhodesia’s Copperbelt, and the cocoa farms of West Africa. This unrest proved capable 
of stirring the Colonial Office and even the UK Treasury to call for greater health 
spending as a demonstration of beneficence. The Colonial Office’s connection between 
unrest and social services spending was forged deliberately. Malcolm MacDonald, the 
son of the first Labour Prime Minister, became Colonial Secretary in 1938. He played on 
British anxieties about the future of the Empire to drum up support for the 1940 Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act. Most of the Act’s initial funding went to perceived 
centers of unrest, especially the West Indies. Medical administrators in Nyasaland 
complained bitterly to their superiors, but to no avail; few development funds went to 
colonies that did not provoke metropolitan anxieties. 
 
Prelude: When the ‘warm heart of Africa’ turns hot: protests against land 
alienation in a zone of media indifference 
 
Nicotine was dead. The news spread quickly among the crowd gathered on the dirt road 
outside the Monkey Bay District Hospital. The normally bustling shop stalls hawking 
sodas and mandazis (fried dough) had been shuttered. Policemen and soldiers stood guard 
inside the hospital gate. Huddled together in small groups, the adults spoke in hushed 
tones, their eyes downcast. No one wailed with grief, not yet. Those loud lamentations 
would come a few days later, at Nicotine’s funeral. Incongruously, a girl skipped around 
blithely in front of the hospital, her face alight with an unknowing smile. A young man 
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chided her. “Simuli ndi chisoni?” (“Have you no sympathy?”). The girl stopped, looked 
about, and quickly adopted the somber expression shared by all the other faces. 
 
Nicotine was a nickname, given to the good-natured youth in his early 20s because he 
always seemed to have a cigarette in his hand. This is unusual in Malawi where, although 
tobacco is the country’s leading export, few can afford a cigarette habit. Nicotine lived 
with his grandmother, and had recently received a good score on his terminal secondary 
school exams. One person in the crowd reported having seen Nicotine being beaten by a 
policeman, while another said he saw blood coming out of his nose. 
 
Earlier that day, people from the fishing village of Masasa had gathered outside a local 
government building where they had heard that their local hereditary chiefs and elected  
	 172	
 
Malawian soldiers in combat gear inside Monkey Bay District Hospital after protests. 
February 3, 2015. 
 
officials were holding a secret meeting with a representative from Mota Engil, a 
Portuguese multinational construction corporation. The Malawi Government and Mota 
Engil, a publicly traded company with over $2 billion in revenue in 2014, had been in 
talks for months about plans to build a 5-star resort hotel.1 It was to be, in the words of 
one Mota Engil promotional article, a “ranch-style resort, with a beautiful pool, a golf 
course and an inlet connecting the pool to the lake,” to be operated by “a world-famous 
brand name hotelier.”2 To the surprise of government officials, Masasa residents had 
																																																								
1 “Mota Engil Earnings Release 2014” (Portugal: Mota Engil Group, n.d.). 
2 European Times, http://emagazine.european-times.com/EPT-Malawi/transport-and-public-
works-mota-engil-global-leader-transforming-malawis-infrastructure 
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obtained a copy of closely-held plans showing the resort would displace their entire 
lakeshore village.  
 
After months with barely any official response to their vocal complaints and well-
reasoned petitions, Masasa residents were angry. Most of them had already been 
displaced seven years earlier from a verdant plot blessed with fertile farmland in order to 
make room for company housing. Now, they had built modest thatch-roofed huts on the 
beach, where most eked out a living as fishermen. They knew from experience not to 
believe those politicians who painted visions of El Dorado, in which the resort would 
bring jobs for the many. A $400-per-night lodge, offering snorkeling and water sports, 
had for years operated near their village. But this reclusive retreat warned residents not to 
approach if they did not want to risk being shot, and employed only a handful of locals.  
 
The soon-to-be-displaced had been promised monetary compensation, but the plot where 
they suspected they would be moved was suitable for neither fishing nor farming.  And 
Mota-Engil already had a reputation among rural Malawians for being untrustworthy. In 
the months leading up to the Masasa protest, another Mota Engil project had run into 
similar opposition in the nation’s southwest, in Neno District. After the Brazilian mining 
giant Vale subcontracted to Mota Engil to build a railroad from the Moatize coal mine in 
Mozambique to the coast, Neno residents accused both companies of reneging on pledges 
to compensate the displaced with money, schools and health facilities. Hundreds of 
protestors in Neno had even gone so far as to block the main road leading to the railway 																																																																																																																																																																					
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line.3 Masasa residents protesting Mota Engil’s machinations with local officials would 
soon prove just as determined. 
 
When officials left their meeting with a Mota Engil representative on the afternoon of 
February 3, they were met by an angry crowd.  The assembly had been stoked to a furor 
by a rumor that their own officials had just signed away their land. What happened next 
was the subject of much debate among local Malawians and cursory press reports (none 
of which were written on the basis of first-hand knowledge or detailed research). The 
account that follows is the consensus view of most of the dozen people I interviewed in 
Monkey Bay. The Masasa protesters destroyed the car of Traditional Authority 
Nankumba, a car they had heard had been paid for by Mota Engil. Both Nankumba and 
the Mota Engil representative were bloodied, but not gravely injured, by protestors. The 
Monkey Bay police deployed quickly from a nearby station, and after being pelted by 
rocks opened fire on the crowd using live rounds.  
 
The bullets struck eight people. Two would succumb to their bullet wounds, and an 
additional six would survive after being treated in nearby hospitals. Some of the victims 
were not even involved in the protest. Just as the officials emerged from their meeting, a 
nearby secondary school let out.  Among those shot (but not killed) were a 14-year-old 
male student and a 22-year-old man accompanying his sister on her walk home. The two 
men killed by the police were not even from Masasa. Nicotine lived in another village in 
																																																								
3 http://www.nyasatimes.com/2014/09/15/brazilian-vales-railway-project-faces-resistance-in-
malawi/ 
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Monkey Bay. The other victim, who died shortly after being transferred to Mangochi 
District Hospital, was a fisherman from Cape Maclear. 
 
After the shooting the crowd ran, but they were far from finished expressing their 
displeasure. A few men ran into town and ransacked a local bar owned by Ward 
Councillor Bulireni. Bulireni had been a local favorite, having run for office 
unsuccessfully a few times before winning the people over with displays of generosity 
such as letting people use his truck to drive to funerals. But he was rumored to have 
signed away the Masasa residents’ land to Mota Engil. 
 
Others ran to the home of Chief Njogo, also rumored to have agreed to the land 
alienation. While Njogo’s wife hid in a neighbor’s hut, enraged Masasa residents set fire 
to his kitchen and his outhouse, ripped the doors off their hinges, tore the screens off of 
the windows, and smashed his dishes. One man outside the hospital said he heard Masasa 
residents say they would rather die than move.  
 
Such violence was highly unusual for this sleepy town. Most residents could recall 
hearing gunshots in town only once before, in 1993. That event had occurred after 
President Bakili Muluzi had ordered the Malawi Young Pioneers, a paramilitary 
organization maintained by his predecessor, Hastings Kamuzu Banda, to disband. In 
response some Young Pioneers had driven through town on pickup trucks, shooting off 
guns and looking menacing, but people didn’t remember anyone being hurt. 
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This episode included all the outrages and David-and-Goliath drama one would expect to 
find in a muckraking magazine article.  But even in the Malawian press the coverage was 
sparse and one-sided. A Chichewa-language broadcast on the independent radio station 
Zodiak FM that evening featured an interview with Mangochi’s Police Inspector. None of 
the protestors were interviewed, nor were other witnesses. Local newspapers quoted 
statements from local politicians following the “fracas,” but no reporters interviewed the 
villagers threatened with displacement or even the victims of the police shootings. For its 
part, the foreign press did not cover the event.  
 
Not that it would have been easy for reporters to discern what had happened even if they 
had shown up. There was an imperative to obfuscate on all sides. No one I talked to 
around Monkey Bay admitted involvement in the protests. And why would they? It 
would profit them nothing, and risked punishment.  Fearing there would be police 
reprisals during the night after the protests, the men of Masasa found shelter outside their 
village. Mota Engil disclaimed any interest in building the lakeside resort, explaining to 
the press that it was more of a favor to the government. They denied that they had even 
sent a representative to the meeting on the day of the protest.  For its part, the Malawi 
government claimed that a much-criticized letter agreeing to the alienation of the Masasa 
villagers’ land was a forgery created by an opposition politician attempting to smear the 
ruling party. It seemed as though a great conflagration had erupted, and then disappeared 
from view. The episode barely registered in the media; as in the 1930s (see Chapter 4), 
Malawians could be seen by outsiders as an entirely placid people. 
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Still, the protests had lasting effects. Two months later, The Nation, a leading daily, 
published an op-ed decrying the protestors for throwing up “disincentives to investment” 
and denying themselves the opportunity for “thousands of jobs.”4 There would be no 
compensation, neither from Mota Engil nor the government, for the families of the two 
boys who had died, or the six who had been injured. Yet despite the paltry and biased 
media coverage, and the absence of any official remuneration for the injured, Mota Engil 
cancelled its planned $50 million project. Malawian President Peter Mutharika continued 
to plead with the company to reconsider.5 The protestors had proved surprisingly 
powerful, despite their near-invisibility in the local and international media. 
 
I. Introduction 
During the mid- and late-1930s, Nyasaland’s Medical Department budget barely budged, 
even as revenues continued to rise. This was a product, in part, of the perception in 
Whitehall that Nyasaland was a placid backwater, and therefore did not need the political 
palliative of health spending. This perception, and the resulting retrenchment in health 
spending, continued after the mchape anti-witchcraft movement swept across the 
countryside, and even after the return of the millenarian preacher Elliot Kamwana from 
forced exile in 1937. Looking elsewhere in the British Empire, though, officials saw far 
graver threats to economic and political stability. Between 1935 and 1940, waves of riots 
and strikes roiled the oil fields and ports of the British West Indies, the mines of Northern 
Rhodesia’s Copperbelt, and cocoa farms in West Africa. This unrest proved capable of 																																																								
4 Aubrey Mbuju, “Disincentives to investment.” April 16, 2015. 
http://mwnation.com/disincentives-to-investment-2/ 
5 http://www.times.mw/peter-mutharika-motor-engil-hold-secret-talks/ 
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stirring the Colonial Office and even the UK Treasury to favor greater health spending as 
a demonstration of beneficence. This connection between unrest and social services 
spending had to be forged deliberately. Malcolm MacDonald, a son of Ramsay 
MacDonald, the Prime Minister during the passage of the 1929 Colonial Development 
Act, became Colonial Secretary in 1938. He quickly played on British anxieties about the 
future of the Empire to drum up support for the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act. Most of the Act’s initial funding went to the perceived centers of unrest, especially 
the West Indies. Medical administrators in Nyasaland complained bitterly to their 
superiors, but to no avail; few development funds went to colonies that did not provoke 
metropolitan anxieties.  
 
The political scientist James Scott has argued that “most of the great political reforms of 
the nineteenth and twentieth century have been accompanied by massive episodes of civil 
disobedience, riot, law-breaking, the disruption of public order, and, at the limit, civil 
war. Such tumult not only accompanied dramatic political changes but was often 
absolutely instrumental in bringing them about.”6 This chapter will demonstrate both the 
veracity of this link between unrest and political change, as well as its logical obverse. 
That is, in the absence of perceived unrest, elites feel little urgency to change methods of 
governance or levels of social provision. 
 
It might be worthwhile to add a methodological note here. In a 1955 speech, the colonial-
affairs expert Lord Malcolm Hailey opened a speech with the following observation: 																																																								
6 Scott, Two Cheers for Anarchism: Six Easy Pieces on Autonomy, Dignity, and Meaningful Work 
and Play. Pages 16-17. 
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“Everyone must agree that as a source of study, history has one great defect; it is very 
untidy.”7 Indeed, the following three chapters might seem, to some historians devoted to 
geographic specialization, untidy. But this is, I hope, no defect. These chapters do not 
focus entirely on Nyasaland, nor on medicine. Instead, they recount labor strikes and 
riots, intellectual movements, and social and economic policy debates throughout 
southern Africa, the West Indies, Britain and the United States. These events affected, in 
indirect but clearly discernible ways, colonial policies and everyday practices in 
Nyasaland’s dispensaries and hospitals. But Nyasaland was not some passive receptacle 
of actions taken elsewhere. In later chapters (particularly 8 through 10), events in colonial 
Nyasaland and postcolonial Malawi will prove to have a profound impact on policies and 
practices throughout the southern African region and around the globe (see, for instance, 
the dissolution of Federation in Chapter 8, or the creative use of international crises by 
Kamuzu Banda in Chapter 10). A robust history of medicine in Nyasaland demands this 
transgression of political borders and disciplinary bounds. 
II.  The metropole strikes back: London demands an end to “lavish” care 
a) Too much, too fast: Whitehall questions the growth of Nyasaland’s Medical 
Department, 1935-38 
Officials in Nyasaland had yet to spend their last CDF dollars before they began to face a 
backlash from London. The perception in the Colonial Office and the Treasury was that 
the medical department had grown dramatically, perhaps even too dramatically. This 
perception became more prominent in the years after Basil Blackett, the chairman of the 
CDAC and advocate for new hospitals and health centers throughout the colonies, died in 																																																								
7 Lord Hailey, “Post-War Changes in Africa,” Journal of the Royal Society of Arts 103, no. 4955 
(July 8, 1955): 579–90. 
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a car crash in August 1935.8 Rumblings of cutbacks had begun even earlier. In May 1935 
the Colonial Office sent a letter to the Treasury, suggesting Nyasaland’s number of 
medical officers per unit of land area or per capita compared favorably with other 
neighboring colonies, and therefore the increases in recurrent expenditure it had 
experienced in recent years might be stopped.9 In a dissent dispatched from Zomba, 
Nyasaland’s Director of Medical Services reminded the Colonial Office that Nyasaland 
remained an impoverished colony with much lower per-capita recurrent health 
expenditure than other British colonies in southern and eastern Africa.10 Nyasaland 
Governor Harold Kittermaster echoed the Director of Medical Services’ argument, 
stating that on a per capita basis Nyasaland’s government spent less on health (7.4 pence 
per capita) than any other dependency in East Africa. Kittermaster also highlighted a 
different measure of staffing than the Colonial Office had, demonstrating that Nyasaland 
had fewer “qualified medical staff” [medical officer plus sub-assistant surgeons] than any 
other dependency in East Africa.11 Statistics could be used to serve different ends; 
Kittermaster recognized—as had Shircore—that Nyasaland had far fewer sub-assistant 
surgeons than Tanganyika and other British colonies in East Africa, and he used this fact 
to demonstrate the paucity of medical staff in his colony. “It would show poor 																																																								
8 Wormell, “Blackett, Sir Basil Phillott (1882-1935), Civil Servant.” 
9 “Precis of Relevant Correspondence with the Colonial Office on Medical and Health Services in 
Nyasaland,” May 3, 1939, S40/1/8/1, Document No 204, MNA.  
10 In a table, the report compares annual per-capita government medical expenditure (European 
and African) in Uganda (9.5 pence), Tanganyika (9.1 pence), Zanzibar (50 pence), Kenya (15.3 
pence), Nyasaland (6.7 pence) and Northern Rhodesia (11 pence). Some of these figures likely 
reflect higher settler populations, and may not indicate ratios of expenditure on African medical 
facilities. ADJ Bedward Williams, “Annual Medical & Sanitary Report for the Year Ending 31st 
December 1935” (Zomba, Nyasaland: Government Printer, April 5, 1936), Box 15, No 19, 
Society of Malawi Archive., pages 6-7 
11 G Howes, “Extract from a Despatch from the Governor’s Deputy, No 379 of the 22nd October, 
1935,” n.d., CO 525/161/4, Pages 36-38, UKNA. 
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appreciation of the generosity with which the Protectorate was treated by the Colonial 
Development Fund now to close down or curtail the activities in the hospitals.”12  
 
Yet Colonial Office officials persisted in portraying Nyasaland as a colony amply served 
with medical staff. To do this, they used their own favored statistical ratios. Marcus 
Greenhill, an 36-year-old official who had worked in the Colonial Office in London since 
the age of 20, argued that “the medical staff of the Protectorate was large in relation to 
the size of the country…in the southern Province where the population is largely 
concentrated it seems possible that fewer officers should be able to provide an efficient 
service with a corresponding reduction in expenditure.”13 This was a decided change in 
Colonial Office policy compared to just five years earlier, when Lord Passfield was 
Secretary of State for the Colonies under a Labour Government. By late 1935, the UK 
Government was a coalition of Labour, Conservatives, and Liberals, and this regime 
proved decidedly less friendly to health spending in Nyasaland. In addition, two 
downturns in global demand (one in 1929-1933 and another in 1937-38) led to 
plummeting prices for the mineral and agricultural commodities extracted from southern 
and eastern Africa. This, in turn, left colonial treasuries even more penurious than usual. 
																																																								
12 Ibid. 
13 Marcus A Greenhill, “Minute on Extract from a Despatch from the Governor’s Deputy, No 379 
of the 22nd October, 1935,” December 19, 1935, CO 525/161/4, Pages 1-2, UKNA. (Emphasis in 
original). In 1935, Greenhill worked in the Tanganyika and Somaliland Department (which 
oversaw Nyasaland). He had started his career in the Colonial Office as an Assistant Clerk in 
March 1919. See AJ Harding and GEJ Gent, The Dominions Office and Colonial Office List for 
1935 (London: Walterlow & Sons Ltd, 1936). Page xii. 
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Nyasaland’s African population found less of the waged work that helped them to pay hut 
taxes, while customs duties decreased.14  
 
These political and economic shifts drastically changed the appetite for development 
funding in London. The Colonial Office demanded spending cutbacks, and viewed the 
elimination of medical staff as the quickest route to such economies. Greenhill 
complained that government medical provision had expanded far too quickly, to a level 
beyond Nyasaland’s capacity to pay for it. “Nyasaland was provided with the necessary 
funds by the CDF for the provision of hospitals, clinics and staff quarters, but that seems 
no reason why all the money should have been spent at once. The result is that Nyasaland 
has a service far in advance of its present stage of development including a large number 
of hospitals and clinics, etc. which it cannot use to the fullest extent.”15  
 
b) Another doctor calls for more: the de Boer Report, 1938 
Not everyone agreed with this call for spending cuts; once again, the rebuke would come 
from a veteran member of the colonial medical services. In 1938, Henry Speldewinde de 
Boer began his tenure as Nyasaland’s Director of Medical Services. Born in Ceylon, de 
Boer had studied medicine at the London Hospital. After serving in the Royal Army 
Medical Corps during the First World War, he took postgraduate degrees at both 																																																								
14 H.S. De Boer, “Proposals by Director of Medical Services, Nyasaland, for Reorganization of 
Medical and Health Services,” June 17, 1939, CO 525/178/1, UKNA. 
15 Greenhill, “Minute on Extract from a Despatch from the Governor’s Deputy, No 379 of the 
22nd October, 1935.” Planned expansions of medical services in other British African colonies 
were also shelved during these years. Ann Beck describes the frustration of Tanganyika’s 
Medical Department over its Whitehall’s refusal to approve a school to train African paramedical 
staff during the 1930s. See Beck, Medicine, Tradition, and Development in Kenya and Tanzania. 
1920-1970. Page 11. 
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Cambridge and the London School of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. Beginning in 
1926, he spent five years as medical officer in Kenya, two as Deputy Director of Sanitary 
Services in Northern Rhodesia, and another five as Deputy Director of Medical Services 
in Uganda.16 In these colonies he was known for his interest in malariology and maternal 
and child welfare. 
 
Immediately upon his arrival de Boer toured the country and submitted a set of proposals 
on the Medical Department to the Colonial Office. He opened his report with language 
even more blunt than Shircore’s: “The present services are completely inadequate to 
touch even the fringe of our medical problem. They have not made true contact with the 
population as a whole, nor can they claim to have gained the confidence of any but a 
small section of the people. With our existing hospitals and dispensaries, it is doubtful 
whether [we] have made any serious reduction in the sickness and mortality rates...”17 De 
Boer criticized the paltry number of medical officers, who were “tied largely to the needs 
of the European population.” Sub-assistant surgeons were being asked to function as 
administrators, and even hospital assistants were being put in charge of entire district 
hospitals.  
 
De Boer recognized that Africans lacked trust in the efficacy of treatments, particularly 
those available at rural dispensaries. There were 90 dispensaries throughout the country, 
but de Boer argued the dispensers were held in so little regard by Africans that “the 																																																								
16 “Obituary: H.S. de Boer,” BMJ 1, no. 5034 (June 29, 1957): 1533–34. 
17 H.S. De Boer, “Proposals by Director of Medical Services, Nyasaland, for Reorganization of 
Medical and Health Services,” June 17, 1939, CO 525/178/1, UKNA.  
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average number of patients seen at most of our dispensaries does not exceed 15 a day,” 
and the majority of those patients presented only with minor complaints.18 Can this be 
taken as an indication that there are no genuinely sick persons in our African villages? 
What little we do know goes to prove the contrary!” When Africans did bring gravely ill 
patients to dispensaries, they had to be transferred to district hospitals by stretcher. Such 
trips often took more than a day and were sometimes impossible when poor roads were 
washed out during the rainy season.  
 
The answer to the lack of adequately trained medical providers was not, De Boer argued, 
to halt the construction of new facilities. Instead he called for a rapid increase in the 
number of hospitals beds for Africans, from approximately 700 to 1080. He also called 
for an increase in dispensary construction and an improvement in the training of the 
auxiliaries who staffed them.19 De Boer noted that even after the new Zomba African 
Hospital was built the only training facility for hospital assistants remained the UMCA 
mission in Blantyre. A training effort on the scale envisioned by Shircore had never been 
undertaken. De Boer called for a massive recruiting and training effort, with free tuition, 																																																								
18 Many officials in Nyasaland shared this view. A report from the Lilongwe District 
Commissioner in 1937 explained that the three rural dispensaries in his districts were “totally 
inadequate to serve a native population of approximately 140,000…of miserably poor 
construction in two cases, badly equipped, and staffed by very low-grade dispensers.” In March 
1938 Governor Harold Baxter Kittermaster made his own brief addendum to this report, adding 
only: “Poor dispensaries are worse than useless.” Harold Baxter Kittermaster, “Minute on Extract 
from Report on Lilongwe District 1937, MP. 18/38.C. to Director of Medical Services for 
Comment,” March 1, 1938, S40/1/3/2, no. 40, MNA.  
19 “Extract from Memorandum by DMS on Medical Policy, MP 49/35,” 1938, S40/1/3/2, no. 44, 
MNA. De Boer’s predecessor as DMS, TA Austin, had campaigned to speed the pace of new 
dispensary construction. He was particularly opposed to the requirement (designed to limit 
government expenditure) that Native Authorities cover most of the costs of construction 
themselves. TA Austin, “Letter from TA Austin, Acting Director of Medical Services, to Chief 
Secretary, Zomba, Re: ‘Rural Dispensaries: Applications for Native Authorities,’” April 30, 1938, 
S40/1/3/2, no. 42, MNA. 
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room and board at both the mission training school and at a government school. Between 
1940 and 1947, De Boer requested increases in medical personnel including medical 
officers (from 14 to 20), European nursing sisters (from 12 to 30) and, most notably, in 
hospital assistants (from 15 to 116). In total, his proposal called for additional capital 
expenditure of £122,766 (over eight years) and a considerable increase in recurrent 
expenditure, more than doubling from its 1938 level of £52,839 to more than £110,000 
by 1947. 
 
Realizing that questions about funding such a proposal would follow his report, De Boer 
proposed fiscal policies with which to fund his program. These proposals reflected De 
Boer’s understanding of Nyasaland’s role as a labor reserve for southern Africa, and 
demanded that industries benefiting from this migration take on additional 
responsibilities for the health of Africans remaining in or returning to Nyasaland. “It is 
believed that every batch of returning natives includes one or more individuals bringing 
back, if not new diseases, fresh strains of old diseases that may flare up and affect 
adversely the balance of nature that has existed. Our Africans are generally admitted to 
be our country’s only important asset. Can we say that it is not a wasting asset?”20 At the 
time, Southern Rhodesia remitted 6 of the 20 shillings it collected in taxes from 
Nyasaland’s migrants to the Nyasaland government; de Boer suggested that the entire 
amount (20 shillings) be sent back to Nyasaland. He also proposed that the Union of 
South Africa should levy a tax on Nyasaland natives living within its borders, to be 
remitted to Nyasaland. The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA), a 																																																								
20 De Boer, “Proposals by Director of Medical Services, Nyasaland, for Reorganization of 
Medical and Health Services.” 
	 186	
recruiting organization that drew recruits from Nyasaland for South Africa’s mines, 
would be “asked to contribute £2 per head of labour recruited in Nyasaland.” 
 
De Boer knew that most past proposals had not amounted to much. “The files of my 
department make for very sad reading,” he lamented. Past Directors of Medical Services 
had “little time to think on big lines,” and when they did “recommendations and demands 
have either been neglected completely or in approval so pared down and attenuated, that 
little progress eventuated.”21 Indeed, after an initial increase in recurrent expenditure on 
health in Nyasaland during the early 1930s (rising from £33,191 in 1928 to £49,138 in 
1934), the budget for health barely had budged for the rest of the decade (increasing only 
to £52,343 in 1939). Public sector health spending also came to occupy a smaller portion 
of overall public expenditures in Nyasaland. The medical department claimed more than 
10.1 percent of the Protectorate’s total recurrent budget in 1930, but this had dropped to 
6.5 percent by 1939.22 De Boer took over Nyasaland’s Medical Department at a moment 
far less ripe with promise and support from London than when Shircore had written his 
report in 1930. 
c) An “excessive” service: reception of the de Boer report in London 
The response to De Boer’s report clearly demonstrated the conflict between Zomba and 
London over the quality of medical services due Nyasaland’s African population. In a 
note accompanying De Boer’s report in May 1939, Nyasaland Governor Donald 																																																								
21 Ibid. 
22 “Annual Medical Report on the Health and Sanitary Condition of the Nyasaland Protectorate 
for the Year Ending the 31st, December, 1930”; “Annual Medical & Sanitary Report for the Year 
Ending 31st December 1939” (Zomba, Nyasaland: Government Printer, 1940), Box 15, No 19, 
SoMA. 
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Mackenzie-Kennedy—having arrived only two months prior from Northern Rhodesia—
expressed his support for the plan, saying its enactment would “avoid a continuance of 
what can only be described as a sham and a pretense—hospitals and dispensaries, 
inadequately staffed and insufficiently supervised.”23 Officials at the Colonial Office did 
not agree. Edmund Boyd, the Principal Private Secretary to the Colonial Secretary, 
praised de Boer’s “superabundant energy and enthusiasm,” but dismissed his proposals as 
the unreasonable wishes of an administrator “coming fresh from Uganda, where medical 
and public health standards have reached a pretty high standard.”24 Dr. Arthur O’Brien, a 
member of the Colonial Advisory Medical Committee who had joined de Boer for part of 
his inaugural tour of Nyasaland, opined that de Boer’s proposals for funding recurrent 
costs through charges on the governments of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were 
not “practical.” The only proposal in the report for which O’Brien’s offered whole-
hearted support was the call for improving housing and hospital accommodation for 
white settlers. The existing “European hospitals” were, O’Brien noted, “disgraceful” and 
had to be improved immediately; the expansion of African medical services could be 
“more gradual and spread over a longer period.”25 
																																																								
23 “Memo from Governor DM Kennedy to Chief Secretary, Zomba, Re: Dispatch to Be Sent to 
Colonial Office Concerning De Boer Report.” Three years earlier in 1936, Director of Medical 
Services Williams had described medical treatment for “non-native” Europeans as follows: 
“Government does not accept responsibility for providing hospital accommodation and medical 
attention for the non-official European community, yet in fact it does provide considerable 
facilities. Two European hospitals exist and accommodate both officials and non-officials. The 
fees charged to non-officials being much less than the cost of treatment and of the medical and 
nursing attention provided.” Williams, “Memorandum A: A Memorandum on the Health Policy 
in Nyasaland, From the Director of Medical Services to the Governor, the Colonial Office, and 
the Colonial Advisory Medical Committee.” 
24 “Minute by Boyd Re: De Boer Report,” August 14, 1939, CO525/178/1, UKNA. 
25 “Minute by Arthur John Rushton O’Brien Re: De Boer Report,” August 2, 1939, CO525/178/1, 
UKNA. 
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Gerard Clauson, a Sanskrit philologist and a rising star at the Colonial Office then 
serving as head of the recently established Social Services Department, was more blunt.26 
He dismissed de Boer’s proposals as “prohibitively expensive” before expanding on his 
view that Nyasaland’s medical services for Africans were actually too lavish:  
I admit that 1080 beds for 1,620,000 inhabitants, i.e. 1 per 1500, is not excessive, 
but the quality of the service is. It seems to me fantastic to take a native who all 
his life has probably never slept anywhere except on the ground or a few boards 
and, if he stayed sick at home, would continue to live in that way, and directly he 
gets into the hospital to put him into a bed with blankets, sheets and other 
appurtenances and wait on him hand and foot. The solution seems to be to imitate 
the French who provide much humbler accommodation at their hospitals, 
comparable to the proposed patients’ huts at the Dispensaries, into which the 
patient can be moved with his family and be nursed principally by them, the 
Government providing treatment but not attendance and food.27 
So while Nyasaland’s Director of Medical Services saw medical provision as 
“completely inadequate, and the Governor thought it a “sham,” Clauson argued African 
patients were being pampered. Bedding and food and professional attendance were, to his 
mind, much more than any African patient in Nyasaland might expect from a government 
medical facility. The answer was not more spending and more care for the sick, but rather 
less of both. De Boer thought African hospitals had empty beds because accommodation 
and equipment remained dreadful; Clauson said that it was evidence only that a large 
increase in the number of facilities was unnecessary. 
 
Particularly on the arguments regarding hospital feeding, doctors working in Nyasaland 
did not share Clauson’s opinion. Reporting on medical services in 1939, when the 																																																								
26 For a brief discussion of the creation of the Colonial Office’s Social Services department in 
1939, see Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society : The Labor Question in French 
and British Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page 69.  
27 “Minute by Gerard Clauson Re: De Boer Report.” Emphasis added 
	 189	
recurrent health budget decreased from his first year, de Boer complained it was 
“becoming more difficult to provide patients admitted with a satisfactory diet. In a 
country where the average inhabitant suffers from defective nutrition, good feeding is an 
important part of curative medicine.”28 Medical officers saw patients’ kin nursing and 
feeding the sick in their hospitals each day. Though grateful for such care-giving, the 
medical officers considered this a complement, rather than a substitute, for trained 
nursing and hospital feeding. In his memoirs WTC Berry, who worked in Nyasaland 
from 1936 to 1943, recalled the deficiencies in accommodation at rural district hospitals 
(“outstations”) and the reliance of harried staff on family caregivers: 
[The hospitals] were single-story buildings, built of brick with corrugated Iron 
roofs and cement floors, laid out round a quadrangle of grass or hard-packed 
earth. The space beneath the roofs was often, especially in out-stations, occupied 
by bats and sometimes by fierce, wild bees…On out-stations the crowd was more 
countrified and included more women, children, and babies…A problem in every 
hospital before the days of DDT, which only arrived in Nyasaland during the last 
years of the war and was, even then, in very short supply, were the bedbugs. They 
infested the clothing and bedclothes of the patients and lived in the cracks of the 
hospital walls…The patients’ relations came into the hospital too, sleeping in their 
own blankets between the beds and on the verandah. They brought their own food 
in with them (and, sometimes, their bedbugs) and their food helped to vary the 
patients’ diet; to that extent, and for some of the nursing, we depended on them. 
The patients’ diet consisted of maize meal, beans and, where available, fish. Leaf 
vegetables were cooked as side dishes…The hospital would have been a worse 
place without the relations and less used as a result.29 
Clauson penned his critical response to the De Boer report on August 8, 1939. Less than a 
month later, on September 1, Nazi Germany invaded Poland. In response, the UK and 
																																																								
28 “Annual Medical & Sanitary Report for the Year Ending 31st December 1939.” Page 25 
29 Berry, Before the Wind of Change. Page 4. Food has long been a significant line item on 
hospital budgets. In 1962 a prospective estimate of expenses of Nyasaland’s district hospitals by 
PR Stephens, the territory’s last Federation-era Director of Medical Services, found that at some 
native hospitals the per diem, per capita cost of feeding African inpatients would rival—and a few 
cases, exceed—the cost of drugs. PR Stephens, “Allocation of Expenditure, 1962/63” (Blantyre, 
Rhodesia & Nyasaland: Ministry of Health Regional Headquarters, June 25, 1962), 4.5.9R, Box 
9121, MNA. 
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France declared war on Germany. It had been difficult to secure finances for expanding 
medical services just before the war began; it was impossible during the war. As one 
official remembered, the war brought with it a new “disease” called “Algef—Apres la 
guerre est fini (‘After the war is over’)—a refrain which become the “customary 
direction on nearly all new proposals.”30 Not until after the war would Nyasaland’s 
health services become an imperial priority once more. 
d) The wages of quietus: cutbacks as a consequence of placidity 
To what can we attribute Whitehall’s distaste for health spending in Nyasaland during the 
mid- to late-1930s? Surely the Great Depression and the advent of the Second World War 
were significant factors, but as we will see in the next section, health services in other 
colonies garnered far more attention during this period. Economic and military 
imperatives were not the sole cause of the UK Government’s turn away from 
Nyasaland’s Medical Department over the course of the 1930s. Clauson and others 
rebutted De Boer’s report so readily in part because Nyasaland was seen as politically 
placid during the 1930s. While (as the next section will show) Northern Rhodesia and 
British West Africa and the West Indies erupted in labor unrest, Nyasaland’s officials 
reported no episodes of great concern. In an era when health was used as a political 
palliative, Nyasaland’s Africans seemed to issue no cry worthy of response. 
																																																								
30 Jones et al., "Colloquium on Nyasaland Finance.” Page 3. This policy of delay was evident in 
Nyasaland as well. In a letter to Secretary of State for the Colonies Oliver Stanley, Governor 
Edmund Richards explained the lack of progress on plans to improve the colony’s health services: 
“A comprehensive long-range scheme was prepared shortly before the outbreak of war by the 
then Director of Medical Services [HS De Boer]…A less elaborate scheme was prepared in 1940, 
but consideration of it had to be deferred on account of the war.” Edmund Richards to Oliver 
Stanley, 23 July 1943, CO 859/66/5, UKNA. 
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This is not to suggest that Nyasaland’s Africans were, in fact, quiet. There was plenty of 
discontent and political activity during this decade. In 1932, an anti-witchcraft movement 
spread rapidly across the Protectorate. Young men organized sessions in which people 
were made to drink a concoction known as mchape (a derivation of the word kuchapa, 
which means “to wash”), which they said would harm only practitioners of sorcery. The 
movement spread like wildfire, in part because it helped young men counter the authority 
of their elders.31 But while officials noted the movement in their reports, they were not 
overly concerned about it. Though witchcraft was technically illegal, authorities did not 
bother to imprison many involved in the movement.32 The system of indirect rule 
continued working decently well, and production on European estates was not much 
affected. This was not the kind of unrest that would spur increased health spending from 
colonial officials. 
 
Even in the face of politically subversive rhetoric, colonial officials remained nonplussed. 
In 1932, George Simeon Mwase sent officials in Zomba a typescript entitled “A Dialogue 
of Nyasaland Record of Past Events, Environments & the Present Outlook within the 
Protectorate.” The bland, nondescript title belied fiery contents, which included a 
provocative and heroic biography of the revolutionary preacher John Chilembwe as well 
as Mwase’s own criticism of contemporary race relations and living conditions in 
Nyasaland. Mwase, who had worked as a government clerk and storekeeper, was already 
well known to officials for his missives on the depredations of the colonial police and 																																																								
31 JC Chakanza, “Provisional Annotated Chronological List of Witch-Finding Movements in 
Malawi, 1850-1980,” Journal of Religion in Africa 15, no. 3 (1985): 227–43. 
32 McCracken, A History of Malawi. Page 210. 
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other matters, which he had written on behalf of the Central Province Universal Native 
Association since the late 1920s.33 But, as historian Richard Rotberg has noted, Mwase 
“had long been regarded by many white administrators as an excessively opinionated, 
‘harmless,’ compulsive writer of memoranda and tracts…the Government of Nyasaland 
had always replied to his missives in the noncommittal, routine manner it reserved for 
cranks and other meddlesome Africans.”34 Officials in Zomba filed away Mwase’s work 
in the archives, where it remained until Rotberg and his wife rediscovered and published 
it in 1967. 
 
Nyasaland officials were so unconcerned with unrest during the 1930s that they 
repatriated Elliot Kamwana, a millenarian preacher exiled on pain of death decades 
earlier for the anticolonial overtones of his ministry (see Chapter 1). Though the 
Nyasaland authorities of the era before the First World War had treated Kamwana as a 
dangerous revolutionary, the authorities of 1937 considered him harmless.35 When he 
returned from the Seychelles to his home village, Kamwana was even allowed to set up 
an independent church. The church rejected European medicine—perhaps, historian 																																																								
33 John McCracken, “Coercion and Control in Nyasland: Aspects of the History of a Colonial 
Police Force,” The Journal of African History 27, no. 1 (1986): 127–47. 
34 Richard Rotberg, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Strike a Blow and Die: A Narrative of Race 
Relations in Colonial Africa, by George Simeon Mwase (Harvard University Press, 1967). 
35 Evidence that officials in Zomba were no longer terribly concerned about religious and political 
movements in the countryside emerged in 1933. That year, the Nyasaland High Court ruled that 
Willie Kabvala, a headman in Ncheu who had refused to give the District Administration the 
names of members of the Watch Tower sect in his village, should not be convicted of any 
offense. While the Court acknowledged that Watch Tower had “caused considerable disorders in 
Northern Rhodesia,” and was prohibited in that territory, there was “not a tittle of evidence…in 
this case that the Watch Tower sect has any unlawful or improper object or that its meetings lead 
to disorder.” J. Haythorne Reed, “Rex v. Willie Kabvala, Case No.3 of 1933 (Criminal) in 
Revision,” in Law Reports Containing Cases Determined by the High Court of Nyasaland, Vol 
III, 1927-1933 (Zomba: Government Printer, 1934).  
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Henry Donati suggests, because a European doctor had once failed to heal Kamwana’s 
dying wife, or because of bad experiences as a hospital assistant in South Africa early in 
life. But officials showed little concern for his preaching, and allowed him to work 
undisturbed until his death in 1956.36 
 
For their part, officials in Zomba were so confident about political security that they used 
medical technologies not to quell discontent, but to enforce hated taxation policies. In 
1939 the Commissioner of Police reported that the most frequent assignment his men 
performed was collection of the hut tax.37 The courts, too, spent much of their time on 
taxation cases; of the 5517 cases tried in subordinate courts in 1936, 1812 were for 
“breaches of hut tax laws.”38  
 
The major concern of Nyasaland officials during mid- to late-1930s was collecting tax 
revenues. They saw little need to placate the masses of African subjects. During these 
years, political dissenters, millenarian preachers and anti-witchcraft movements did not 
much concern them. European estate owners, the major economic interests in the 
Protectorate, were able to pursue profits unimpeded by unrest. Political legitimacy in 
Nyasaland appeared secure—or, more precisely, secure enough to them to move ahead 
																																																								
36 Henry Donati, “‘A Very Antagonistic Spirit’: Elliot Kamwana: Christianity and the World in 
Nyasaland,” The Society of Malawi Journal 64, no. 1 (2011): 13–33. Also see Karen Elise Fields, 
Revival and Rebellion in Colonial Central Africa (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1985). 
37 McCracken, “Coercion and Control in Nyasland: Aspects of the History of a Colonial Police 
Force.” 
38 Bell, “Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Financial Position and Further 
Development of Nyasaland.” Pages 71-72. 
	 194	
with the overriding imperatives of revenue collection and budgetary retrenchment. For its 
part the Colonial Office called for economy, not new spending.  
 
III. Imperial disquiet as impetus for the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act, 1935-1940 
a) Copperbelt strikes in Northern Rhodesia and health as a political palliative, 
1935-1938 
Officials elsewhere in the British Empire did not feel this same sense of security. On the 
morning of May 29, 1935, the Commissioner of Northern Rhodesia’s Central Province 
called the colony’s Acting Chief Secretary to report a crisis. A thousand Bemba natives 
living in a town compound adjacent to the Roan Antelope copper mine in Luanshya 
District had marched to the compound offices. Troops from the Northern Rhodesia 
Regiment had already been flown to other mines from the colonial capital in Lusaka by 
the Royal Air Force two days prior, in response to other strikes. The Provincial 
Commissioner begged the Chief Secretary to expedite the transport of troops to 
Luanshya, but by the time they arrived blood had already spilled. The police—Africans 
led by white officers—were either taking refuge in the compound offices or trying to 
disperse the gathering by charging at the crowd outside. Some in the crowd hurled stones. 
The investigators heard conflicting reports of how the firing started, but they believed 
that the Police Superintendent’s attempt to frighten the crowd by firing shots into the air 
had spurred other police to open fire. They shot randomly into the assemblage of miners, 
domestic servants, and neighbors who had shown up in support of the strikers. Fold and 
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other European officials said they tried to stop the firing as soon as they heard it, but by 
the time the guns fell silent they had killed six people, and wounded 22 others.39 
 
Within days, the mineworkers were back to work across the Copperbelt, including 
Luanshya, but the brief wave of strikes—where there were not yet even any labor 
unions—shook the Colonial Office in London. Northern Rhodesia Governor Hubert 
Young commissioned a report on the “disturbances” led by Sir William Alison Russell, 
the former Chief Justice of Tanganyika. The investigators concluded that a major 
proximate cause of the strikes was the news of a tax increase in the mining areas.40 
Though Russell’s Commission found fault less with the tax increase itself than with the 
abrupt way in which the policy was announced to the workers, the incident stirred 
reformers to question what Africans in Northern Rhodesia saw in return for their tax 
payments.  
 
Colonial Office adviser Sir Alan Pim made Northern Rhodesia the focus of the last in a 
series of reports on financial administration in British Africa. The Colonial Office had 
tasked Pim with finding ways to reduce public expenditure and increase revenue in 
																																																								
39 “Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Disturbances in the Copperbelt, 
Northern Rhodesia, Presented by the Secretary of State for The Colonies to Parliament by 
Command of His Majesty” (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, October 1935); “Annual 
Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Northern Rhodesia, 1935” (London: 
His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1936); Ian Henderson, “East African Leadership: The 
Copperbelt Disturbances of 1935 and 1940,” Journal of Southern African Studies 2, no. 1 (1975): 
83–97. 
40 Historian Ian Henderson documents how news of this tax increase was spread between mines 
by a network of clerks who hailed from Nyasaland. Henderson, “East African Leadership: The 
Copperbelt Disturbances of 1935 and 1940.” 
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Northern Rhodesia.41 But his report, published in 1938, criticized the extraction of 
Northern Rhodesia’s resource revenues to public and private coffers in Britain, and called 
for additional expenditures on health, education, and infrastructure in Northern 
Rhodesia.42 On the state of the medical services, he wrote, “There are large 
concentrations of natives outside the reach of any doctor…Of the 12 Government 
hospitals for Natives. Only two…are good.” The report lamented that a comprehensive 
development scheme for improvement of medical and public health services, submitted to 
the CDAC (where Pim was a member) in 1936, had been awarded only £20,000.43 
																																																								
41 The Terms of Reference for Pim’s Commission, as provided by the Secretary of States for the 
Colonies, were as follows: “(i) To enquire into and report on the general financial position of the 
Territory with special reference to the practicability of: (a) reducing the cost of administration, 
whether directly or by reorganization, and; (b) developing and supplementing the existing sources 
of revenue, and (ii) to make recommendations generally.” Alan W. Pim and S Milligan, “Report 
of the Commission to Enquire into the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia” 
(London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1938). Page 1. Also see Andrew Roberts, “A History 
of Zambia” (London: Heinemann, 1976). Page 193. 
42 Pim and Milligan, “Report of the Commission to Enquire into the Financial and Economic 
Position of Northern Rhodesia.” See Page 290: “Taking the territory as a whole the present 
medical provision for a native population of 1,366,000 spread over a country a quarter as large 
again as France is entirely inadequate. Including every Government medical post and every 
missionary medical post aided by Government, no matter how small, how primitive and how ill-
trained its staff, a total is reached of some 70 posts where Government makes provision for 
medical aid to natives. On the generous assumption that each of these covers an area of 25 miles 
radius, or about 2000 square miles, more than half the territory remains unprovided for.” And see 
Pages 294-295: ‘The public health service is very inadequate and practically no maternity work or 
child welfare work has been done…The existing position cannot be regarded as in any way 
satisfactory and ought not to be allowed to continue.” 
43 Ibid. Pages 291-293. Hinden, Plan for Africa: A Report Prepared for the Colonial Bureau of 
the Fabian Society. Page 103. Compare this figure to the revenues garnered by the UK 
Government from taxation of Copperbelt mining companies. Between 1930 and 1940 the UK 
government kept £2.4 million in such revenues, while Northern Rhodesia received from UK only 
£136,000 in grants for development during that period. Roberts, “A History of Zambia.” Page 
193. The CDAC had considered the North Rhodesian health scheme at a meeting held just over a 
year after former chairman Basil Blackett’s death. The meeting was chaired by Sir Alan Rae 
Smith, and evaluated the scheme in language much less enthusiastic than similar schemes had 
been received under Blackett. “The Committee felt that if the sums required by this and other 
territories to meet expenditure of this character were to be met out of the Colonial Development 
Fund there was no saying to what extent demands might be made on the Fund with the result that 
the Fund might well be used up in the provision of health services.” The CDAC approved only 
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Recurrent expenditure on health had risen in absolute terms in the years since the 
protests, but only enough to keep pace with the rise in total recurrent expenditure.44 
Health was not yet a significant part of the response to burgeoning colonial unrest. 
 
b) Labor strikes in the British West Indies and health as a political rallying cry, 
1937-1939 
The role of health in colonial politics would soon change. As Pim and others pondered 
the factors leading to riots in Northern Rhodesia, labor unrest in British holdings in the 
Caribbean stoked even more concern about the direction of imperial policy. In June 1937, 
workers in the oil fields of Trinidad began a sit-down strike, demanding an end to racial 
discrimination in the workplace, unemployment insurance, workmen’s compensation, 
trade union recognition, and an end to an employment passbook system used to depress 
wages. Strikes proliferated throughout the island, growing to include dockworkers, 
laborers on sugar, cocoa and coconut plantations, domestic servants, and some 
government employees.45  In July, inspired in part by a labor organizer named Clement 
Payne who had arrived earlier that year from Trinidad, workers in Barbados rioted in 
Bridgetown and burned sugarcane fields in the countryside.46 Fourteen people were shot 
dead by police. In October, thousands of cocoa growers in the Gold Coast announced a 																																																																																																																																																																					
one-half of the £40,000 requested. See 94th meeting of CDAC, 27 January 1937, CO 970/2, 
UKNA. 
44 Medical Department recurrent expenditure in Northern Rhodesia increased from £60,429 in 
1935 (representing 7.9 percent of total recurrent expenditure) to £74,132 in 1938 (representing 
8.0 percent of total recurrent expenditure). See Pim and Milligan, “Report of the Commission to 
Enquire into the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia.” Appendix X. 
45 W. Richard Jacobs, “The Politics of Protest in Trinidad: The Strikes and Disturbances of 
1937,” Caribbean Studies 17, no. 1/2 (1977): 5–54. 
46 Jeremy Seekings, “‘Pa’s Pension’: the Origins of Non-Contributory Old-Age Pensions in Late 
Colonial Barbados,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 35, no. 4 (2007): 529–47. 
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boycott of “non-essential” European goods and a hold-up of sales to buyers (including 
the British-based confectionary Cadbury) who had colluded to lower producer prices.47 
By the close of April 1938 the disquiet reached Jamaica. Sugarcane workers on an estate 
of the West Indian Sugar Company went on strike during the harvest, protesting low and 
irregular pay and dismal lodging. Within two days four protesters were dead and another 
13 were injured. In the next few weeks, dockworkers and the unemployed in Kingston set 
fire to buildings, while firefighters threatened to strike unless their wages were 
increased.48 The Peoples’ National Party, established by Jamaican attorney and protest 
leader Norman Manley in September 1938, promised free secondary education and 
healthcare for all Jamaicans.49 
c) Colonial labor unrest as a justification for colonial development, 1938-1940 
Manley was not the only person in a position of influence who thought that health and 
education might be of interest to newly restive colonial publics. Social services were 
foremost in the mind of Malcolm MacDonald, a 36-year-old M.P. appointed to serve as 
Secretary of the State for the Colonies in Neville Chamberlain’s Conservative 
government while Jamaica erupted in May 1938. MacDonald, son of the recently 
deceased former Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, had been a Labour Party member 
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until both he and his father were evicted from the party when the latter formed a 
“National” Government with Conservative Ministers. But the younger MacDonald 
retained his longstanding interest in colonial development policy, and agreed with the 
Labour MPs who were calling for a Royal Commission to investigate the “disturbances” 
in the West Indies. In a memo calling for the appointment of a Royal Commission, 
MacDonald argued one necessary response to the unrest was an improvement in social 
services supported by an expanded system of imperial grants.50 Labour MP Arthur 
Creech Jones also made this link explicit in a speech before the House of Commons: 
The truth is that until riots and disturbances occurred and we had unrest beginning 
to sweep from one end of our Colonial Empire to the other, very little was really 
being done [in social services]. This burst of activity is largely due to the fact that 
at last the workers are demanding that something should be done. It is a sad 
commentary on our method of government when we have to wait for riots and 
disturbances to force us to do what is…right.51 
 
Such rhetoric had already proved successful. By the time Creech Jones made this speech, 
MacDonald had only just announced that both the Prime Minister and the Treasury had 
acceded to his call for the appointment of a Royal Commission.52 The Commission’s 
Terms of Reference—“to investigate the social and economic conditions [in the British 
West Indies], and matters connected therewith, and to make recommendations”—was 
rather broad and vague, but the members knew that they had been tasked with finding an 
antidote to the unrest.53 
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52 Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940. Page 205. 
53 “West India Royal Commission Report, Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to 
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Over the next eighteen months, as the Commission did its work, MacDonald prepared to 
use its findings to announce a fundamental overhaul of the Colonial Development Act. 
He and others in the Colonial Office believed that imperial grants should be vastly 
increased, from the existing £1 million per year to £10 million per year. Significantly, in 
contrast to the grants given under the existing Colonial Development Act, such funding 
should be allowed to cover recurrent expenses for health and education.54  
 
By 1939, as the specter of war loomed ever larger in government plans, MacDonald 
stressed the impact that such financial support could have on Britain’s standing in the 
world and, more practically, its defense. MacDonald had been a labor organizer, and 
knew how to foster a sense of crisis. He used these skills within the Cabinet to argue for 
colonial development. As MacDonald added in a minute to a Colonial Office meeting 
from 9 December 1938, “It was an essential part of [Britain’s] defense policy that her 
reputation as a Colonial power should be unassailable.” 55 His efforts to drum up concern 
about colonial stability were aided by recent events. Over the summer, dockworkers had 
halted trade with strikes in the significant African port cities of Port Sudan (April-May 
1939), Dar es Salaam (July 1939) and Mombasa (July-August 1939).56 Few of the 
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striking workers and rioting subjects throughout the Empire had uttered slogans calling 
for health and education, but MacDonald and others portrayed social services as an 
effective and economical palliative for political unrest. 
 
Within two weeks after Britain declared war in September 1939, a Treasury official 
chastised the CDAC for planning to continue to meet to consider colonial development 
proposals: “We are not unmindful of the importance which your Secretary of State 
attaches to social services and economic development in the Colonies…but first things 
must come first…Here, as in other services at home, we shall have to resign ourselves to 
stand still now.”57 MacDonald, for his part, argued a reformed approach to colonial 
development would avert costly unrest during the war. Even more importantly, it would 
improve British standing abroad, particularly in the United States, thereby helping to 
ensure the UK to retained its empire in a postwar settlement.58  
 
Treasury officials continued to object to the use of imperial funds for recurrent social 
service expenditures, which they believed would put “the Colonies on the dole from 
henceforth and forever.” But MacDonald would not give in, replying that it was 
“essential to get away from the old principle that Colonies can only have what they 
themselves can pay for: they must have what a first-class Colonial power may reasonably 
be expected to provide.” Pressing upon political arguments about Britain’s reputation in 
wartime, MacDonald eventually succeeded. Treasury yielded, agreeing in principle to the 
funding of both capital and recurrent expenditures so long as funding for both came from 																																																								
57 Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940. Page 214 
58 Ibid. Page 213 
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a single source.59 The Colonial Office agreed that this single source of funding, voted 
annually by Parliament, should be capped at £5 million, rather than their original 
proposal of £10 million. Treasury, for its part, had agreed to forgive £11 million of the 
£15 million in debt owed by the colonies to the Imperial Exchequer.60 In a 1939 review 
Treasury officials had already deemed the hope of repayment of much of this debt “an 
obvious unreality,” and lauding increased aid to impoverished colonies while continuing 
to insist upon such debt payments seemed, even to them, “not reasonable.”61 
 
MacDonald had secured the necessary concessions from the usually-parsimonious 
Treasury, but his plans to publicly release his proposals alongside the Royal 
Commission’s report were not to be realized. In a decision that would anger Labour MPs 
including Clement Attlee and Arthur Creech-Jones, the Prime Minister’s Cabinet had 
decided that the document was so critical of British policy as to provide fodder for Axis 
propaganda.62  
 
The Report itself was no radical document. It attributed some of the problems in the West 
Indies to the “moral standard” of the “negro population.” But the authors did highlight 																																																								
59 Ibid. Page 218-219 
60 Colonial Development: A Factual Survey of the Origins and History of British Aid to 
Developing Territories, British Aid 5 (London: The Overseas Development Institute Ltd, 1964). 
Page 24. 
61 Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940. Page 221. 
62 In a House of Commons debate on April 20, Creech-Jones and Attlee demanded MacDonald 
explain why they were withholding the full report. MacDonald’s response was pure evasion: “The 
government intend to go right ahead with action arising out of the report.” The Report of the West 
India Royal Commission, also known as the Moyne Report, was not published in full until after 
the war’s end in 1945.  See House of Commons Debate February 1940, Vol 357, cc.1164-61164. 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1940/feb/20/west-indies-royal-commissions-
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the many grievances presented by members of the “negro” and “coloured” populations, 
including the problems of “colour discrimination,” the lack of support for peasant 
agriculture, and restrictions on strike actions. The Commission even declared “a “right to 
strike,” and considered “any restriction of this liberty of action…tantamount to industrial 
servitude.” In line with MacDonald’s campaign for social service provision, the report 
devoted many pages to the woefully inadequate provision of health and education. The 
report’s authors noted that spending on health (as a percentage of overall government 
expenditure) and government medical officers (relative to population) were both higher 
in most West Indies colonies than in any British African holding. But still, the report 
called for expanded medical auxiliary training, more rural clinics and hospitals, and far 
greater spending on preventive medicine throughout the West Indies. Increased spending 
on health services was, according to the report’s authors, an integral part of the imperial 
response to recent unrest on the islands.63 
 
Though Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s cabinet refused to publish the report, they 
did permit MacDonald to publish the Royal Commission’s summary recommendations 
alongside the Government’s new Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and 
Welfare. Both were released on February 20, 1940. That day, a publicity campaign 
coordinated by Colonial Office staff included a speech by MacDonald to the House of 
Commons and an address by Lord Moyne, Chairman of the Royal Commission; the latter 
was broadcast on radio in Jamaica.64 The Statement of Policy touted by MacDonald was 																																																								
63 “West India Royal Commission Report, Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to 
Parliament by Command of His Majesty.” 
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only six pages of text, but its drafting had occupied the Colonial Office and Treasury in 
heated debate for months. The final text highlighted His Majesty’s Government’s 
agreement with the Royal Commission’s recommendation that £1 million per year should 
be spent on education, health services, housing, slum clearance, and land settlement in 
the British West Indies. The statement continued to explain that while the Commission 
conducted its investigation, the UK Government had “been examining the position in the 
Colonial Empire generally.”65  It announced a new colonial development policy, in which 
“assistance will be available not only for schemes involving capital expenditure 
necessary for Colonial development in the widest sense but also for helping to meet 
recurrent expenditure in the Colonies on certain services such as agriculture, education, 
health and housing.”66  
 
The simultaneous release of the Statement of Policy and the Royal Commission 
recommendations had the political effects that MacDonald had desired. The Colonial 
Development and Welfare bill moved, uneventfully, to passage. Though MacDonald was 
transferred to a new position as Minister of Health after Churchill replaced Chamberlain 
as Prime Minister in May, the bill’s progress through the legislative process continued, 
and the act received the Royal Assent on July 17, 1940.67  
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The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 was, then, a dividend of disquiet. 
Both the labor unrest of the mid- and late-1930s and the outbreak of war furnished 
MacDonald with powerful political arguments capable of overcoming the longstanding 
objections of the Treasury.68 Colonial Office reports and speeches by Labour MPs had 
stressed the need for a focus on social welfare in the colonies even before the 
“disturbances” in the West Indies, but the threat to imperial legitimacy helped soften the 
objections of Treasury officials and other skeptics. The 1940 Act was, according to 
historian Stephen Constantine, “devised as a method of removing legitimate grievances in 
the colonies, stabilizing the empire and defusing criticism of British colonial rule. The 
emphasis on colonial development and welfare was, then, essentially a defensive 
operation, to provide a new justification which would legitimize the perpetuation of 
colonial rule.” 
 
d) Explaining the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act: imperial 
legitimation or altruism? 
But one question remains unanswered in MacDonald’s arguments for—and Constantine’s 
analysis of—the Colonial Development and Welfare Act: why did health and education 
spending seem a logical response to labor unrest? After all, investigations of the protests 
in Northern Rhodesia, Trinidad, Barbados and Jamaica pointed to taxes, low pay and 
poor working conditions as the causes of unrest, not the level of social service 
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provision.69 Constantine seems to indicate that the answer lies in a spirit of imperial 
altruism (he closes his analysis with quotes from other historians lionizing the generosity 
of Empire), but there was a much more self-interested reason for the focus on public 
sector social services at the start of the Second World War. For officials in the Colonial 
Office, it was much more politically palatable to propose increased health and education 
spending than to contemplate more fundamental changes to the extractive economic 
systems. The sites of protest, such as the Luanshya mine and the West Indies Sugar 
Company plantation, were owned by companies registered in Britain that reaped 
tremendous profits from the mineral wealth and cheap labor made available in the 
colonies. Investors in such companies were—for the most part—British voters, and 
among the most invested were a wealthy British MPs and Lords. It was more palatable to 
such investors to use tax dollars on more nurses and teachers than to lessen their own 
company profits in order to increase wages.70 Such investors were also a target of 
MacDonald’s arguments about the reputation of Empire, for alongside the danger that 
Britain might lose her territorial possessions came the risk of investment losses through 
nationalization or expropriation by some other colonial power. Spending on social 
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services, then, was an attempt to “palliate” colonized publics and international criticism 
without more fundamental changes to the imperial economic system.71 
 
The fate of Nyasaland provides further support for this argument. Far less significant in 
economic terms, and seen to be relatively unaffected by labor unrest, Nyasaland garnered 
a fairly small share of the debt relief and new funding made available by the passage of 
the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare (CDW) Act. The Act decreased 
Nyasaland’s outstanding debt for the Trans-Zambesi Railroad loan guarantee from 
£550,000 to £300,000. Nyasaland’s share of debt relief (less than half) was far less than 
the overall share of colonial debt forgiven by the Imperial Exchequer (more than two-
thirds).72 The squeaky wheels, it seemed, got the grease. 
 
 
IV. Nyasaland, the still-quiet backwater: wartime neglect and the postwar dawn 
 
a) A medical service gutted by war, 1939-1942 
 
At the start of a new global war in 1939, Nyasaland’s public sector medical services 
became even more threadbare. Unlike the First World War, Nyasaland would not forcibly 
recruit hundreds of thousands of Africans for carrier duty, but its already paltry medical 
services would be drained once more. Three African medical officers were seconded for 																																																								
71 For arguments that health spending is a form of political palliation, see Stephen Constantine, 
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military service abroad in 1939, along with two African hospital assistants, 16 dressers, 
20 stretcher-bearers, and seven wagon orderlies.73 The Medical Department was 
prohibited from spending the resulting savings. Some of Nyasaland’s medical stores were 
also shipped away to aid the war effort. 
 
Initially De Boer reported that despite the staff withdrawals, only three dispensaries had 
closed.74 But in 1940, when Italy joined the Axis powers, another five government 
medical officers and one of the missionary doctors at the Church of Scotland Mission 
were released for military service in North Africa. Within two years, the number of 
medical officers had fallen from 18 to 10.75 The remaining doctors took on even more 
responsibilities than usual. Between 1940 and 1943, in addition to managing pilot 
Nutrition Units (see Chapter 1), Berry was the only government doctor in Kota Kota and 
Dowa districts; the two hospitals serving these districts were 90 miles apart.76 Medical 
officers were still overwhelmed by the scale of the work with which they had been 
tasked.  Speaking of his responsibilities as the sole medical officer in Mlanje in 
1941,Walter Gopsill explained: “As well as being in charge of a Hospital containing one 																																																								
73 McCracken explains that military laborers were obtained by less obvious forms of compulsion 
than during the First World War. “With the entry of Italy into the war in 1940, priority was given 
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hundred beds one was responsible for the control of Epidemic diseases in the area, the 
medical care of the European population, eight District dispensaries dotted about the 
district, inspections and care of factory staffs and the general public health of the district, 
also the inspection of the numerous Indian Stores and of course the Market. In addition, 
one was called out to treat European planters and their families. The African population 
was well over 100,000.”77 Obviously, very little of this work was done extensively. Many 
districts had no medical officer at all during the war. African hospital assistants were put 
in charge of daily operations at district hospitals in Chiradzulu, Chikwawa, Upper Shire, 
Ntcheu, Dedza, Dowa, Kasungu and Nkhata Bay.78 When the council of chiefs in 
Lilongwe District requested additional rural dispensaries in 1942, Governor ECS 
Richards informed them many of the freshly trained African auxiliaries were unavailable 
to staff new dispensaries because they had been recruited to the military.79 
 
b) The politics of scarcity: maintaining a placid populace 
De Boer may have been concerned about these conditions, but neither he nor other 
officials in Nyasaland wanted to see political protests erupt over the sorry state of social 
services. After years of riots in the West Indies and Africa, officials were alive once more 
to the dangers of disquiet. By the early 1940s, with all resources directed at the war 
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effort, they sought to mitigate the dangers in Nyasaland not through health spending, but 
by preventing African medical workers from organizing. After all, African medical 
workers were among the most educated colonial subjects in a time when education was 
considered as a risk factor for disquiet. In June 1941, Henry J. Banda and PJ Godfrey 
Mhango, two African medical assistants at the Zomba African Hospital, wrote de Boer to 
ask for his comments on their proposed constitution for a “Nyasaland African Medical 
Association.”80 De Boer and the Chief Secretary agreed to recognize the organization, 
but advised Mhango and Banda to “concentrate on the educational side.”81 The 
implication was that they should steer clear of other, more overtly political purposes. 
Their proposed constitution had suggested that the group would work to “attempt to 
overcome the difficulties and to examine the complaints of members of the 
Association.”82 For colonial officials, such hints at labor organizing were not welcome. 
 
The colonial administrators were successful at maintaining political calm in Nyasaland 
during the war. At the same time medical services did not fare well. During the Second 
World War, with both mission and government personnel depleted and growing patient 
censuses, the administration attempted to coordinate government and mission 
healthcare.83 In some cases the absence of adequate medical provision spurred such 
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frustration that remaining medical officers resorted to uncommon measures.  In 1942 
John Owen Shircore returned to Nyasaland, where he had begun his career in the colonial 
service over thirty years earlier. As a veteran medical officer on the cusp of retirement, 
Shircore wrote to the Director of Medical Services to explain there was a “considerable 
population” in his district (Karonga) “for whom there are no immediate medical 
facilities.” Sick Africans in an area called Mlale faced an “arduous journey” to reach his 
hospital in Karonga. Patients who were carried all the way to the hospital were often so 
ill they died en route or shortly after arrival. Shircore suggested renovating a building in 
Mlale owned by the estate of a European farmer; the building could, he explained, be 
used as a government dispensary.84 The prevailing government policy at the time was to 
deny requests for new dispensaries unless construction was financed out of the budgets of 
Native Authorities (who kept a small share of hut tax revenues). In this case, Mlale’s 
Native Authority, Chief Kyungu, wanted to see the new dispensary built but said he 
lacked the funds to pay for it. Shircore offered Chief Kyungu £100 out of his own savings 
to pay for the building.85 He did not wish to be repaid. Both Kyungu and the Governor 
gratefully accepted this offer. The next chapter will further explore the unwillingness of 																																																																																																																																																																					
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medical officers to accept what they considered to be unprofessionally low standards of 
medical provision. It will show that neither Shircore’s frustration nor his determination 
were unique, but might be understood as manifestations of a professional imperative in an 
environment of heavy morbidity and forced scarcity. 
 
c) Miracle drugs in small quantities: Nyasaland’s first antibiotics 
 
Even as staff left for military service and the recurrent budget flat-lined, admissions at 
government hospitals climbed rapidly during the early 1940s. After an increase (from 
3,958 in 1930 to 10,052 in 1935) that coincided with the construction of new hospitals 
with CDF funding, inpatient admissions remained fairly steady through the start of the 
war, rising only to 11,102 in 1939. But then patients came quickly; inpatient admissions 
rose to 20,008 in 1941, then to 23,369 by 1945. For the first time since the construction 
of a dozen district hospitals in the early 1930s, many government facilities were 
overcrowded. In August 1941, DMS de Boer noted that during a recent visit to Kota Kota 
he found 114 patients in a hospital with only 70 beds. “There were patients lying on the 
ground between beds and in the passage-way down the middle of the wards.”86 
 
Some of this increase can be attributed to the entry of sulphonamide antibiotics, which 
brought even dramatic changes to patient care even as its use was strictly controlled. The 
first sulphonamide, Prontosil, was marketed in the United States and Europe beginning in 
1935, and won acclaim after it was used to cure U.S. President Franklin Delano 
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Roosevelt’s son of a septic strep throat infection in 1936.87 WTC Berry used 
sulfanilamide (known by its trade name, “M&B 693”), another sulfa drug, in either 1937 
or 1938 (he does not specify the exact date) at Mlanje District Hospital for the treatment 
of gonorrhea. At Berry’s hospital this drug was so limited that he prescribed it only to 
inpatients. Berry also made sure to witness each administration of the medicine with his 
own eyes. “The dressers could not be trusted not to change the amount of the prescribed 
dose, or to substitute some similar but less potent tablet, retaining the surplus M&B for 
‘private practice,’ or for their sale on the black market.”88  
 
Doctors were excited by the arrival of the new sulfa drugs. Gopsill recalled how before 
the first sulfa drugs reached Nyasaland a fellow medical officer had died of septicaemia 
after a postmortem exam. Gopsill also remembered an epidemic of cerebrospinal 
meningitis in Mlanje that killed “thousands.” Once the new drugs arrived such outbreaks 
became less common and less devastating, as “one was able to protect contacts and 
carriers were in large degree eradicated.”89 In 1941, the DMS included in his report his 
hope that “the more regular use of M&B 693 in the treatment of [gonorrhea] at 																																																								
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government hospitals may in time bring infected persons in bigger numbers to those 
institutions.”90 
 
Chapter 7 will discuss the impact of antibiotics on popularizing government medicine in 
Nyasaland. For now, suffice it to note that the number of patients presenting for 
gonorrhea treatment in government hospitals and clinics did indeed increase following 
the introduction of sulfa drugs, rising from 1061 in 1935, to 2089 in 1945, to 3715 in 
1951. Patients seemed to have growing confidence that treatment for this condition was 
effective; in 1944 medical officers reported to the DMS that patients were becoming less 
apt to abscond from the hospital before the end of a treatment course.91 
 
 
Still, during the Second World War medical officers lamented that many sick patients 
still did not present to government facilities, or that when they did they often sought 
inappropriate treatments. Berry complained that for every ailment, from serious illnesses 
to mild aches, patients demanded injections. He ascribed this to the memories of yaws 
injections, which brought dramatic cures.92 Not all injections were equally popular. 
Medical officers lamented that they could convince few patients to submit to antimony 
tartrate injections for schistosomiasis. This was a fairly indolent infection; it could result 
in blood in the urine or, eventually, bladder cancer, but was not as disfiguring as yaws, 
																																																								
90 “Annual Medical and Sanitary Report for the Year Ending 31st December 1941” (Zomba, 
Nyasaland: Government Printer, 1942), Box 15 No 15, SoMA. Page 8 
91 “Annual Report of the Medical Department for the Year Ended 31st December 1944” (Zomba, 
Nyasaland: Government Printer, n.d.), Box 15 No 12, SoMA. 
92 Berry, Before the Wind of Change. Page 9 
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and the injection itself could precipitate serious malaria infections or abscesses.93 Megan 
Vaughan has described how African patients in Nyasaland knew the difference between 
the more expensive arsenical drugs (intravenous injections available at some hospitals) 
and cheaper mercurial compounds (intramuscular injections available at rural 
dispensaries). Seeking the former, they favored hospitals over rural dispensaries for 
syphilis treatment. African patients were, in Vaughan’s words, “discriminating” in their 
approach to drug therapy, and medical officers knew it.94 
 
While by the late 1940s government health facilities were becoming steadily more 
popular and more amply funded, hospitals and dispensaries were still not a meaningful 
part of experience of being governed for most Africans in Nyasaland. Outpatient 
attendance at government facilities rose steadily, though never dramatically, beginning 
with the construction of the first dispensaries in the early 1920 to the beginning of 
Federation in the mid-1950s (see Figure 4.1). Inpatient admissions rose steadily after the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
93 H De Boer, “Annual Medical & Sanitary Report for the Year Ending 31st December 1938” 
(Zomba, Nyasaland: Government Printer, 1939), Box 15 No 18, SoMA. Page 27. Abscesses were 
often secondary to the inadvertent injection of potassium antimony tartrate (an intravascular 
injection) to extravascular tissues. Gopsill wrote in 1931 that this often had the effect of 
“frightening away a primitive or nervous patient.” See WL Gopsill, “Schistosomiasis in 
Nyasaland and Its Treatment by Means of Fouadin,” Journal of the Medical Association of South 
Africa 5, no. 7 (April 11, 1931): 222–23. 
94 Vaughan, “Health and Hegemony: Representation of Disease and the Creation of the Colonial 
Subject in Nyasaland.” Page 191. 
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Figure 4.1: African and Asian outpatient attendances at Nyasaland government facilities, 
1914-1953. Source: Nyasaland annual Medical Department reports, 1914-1953. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: African and Asian inpatient admissions at Nyasaland government facilities, 
1914-1953. Source: Nyasaland annual Medical Department reports, 1914-1953. 
 
0200000
400000600000
8000001000000
1200000
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960
African	and	Asian	outpatient	
attendances	at	government	facilities
05000
1000015000
2000025000
3000035000
40000
1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955
African	and	Asian	inpatient	admissions	at	Nyasaland	
government	facilities
	 217	
CDF-funded construction of hospitals in the early 1930s, then more dramatically in the 
early 1940s following the introduction of sulphonamide antibiotics (see Figure 4.2). But 
as late as 1946, the Director of Medical Services worried that “no more than a beginning 
has been made in inducing the African population to take advantage of the medical 
facilities provided.”95  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
As Chapter 3 demonstrated, the Colonial Office used unemployment in the UK to garner 
funds for colonial development in the late 1920s. In the late 1930s, the Colonial Office 
secured additional funds through the deft use of metropolitan fears about colonial labor 
unrest. Yet while Nyasaland’s Medical Department benefited from the 1929 Colonial 
Development Act almost immediately, colonial medicine was far from a priority a decade 
later.  
 
In both periods, leading colonial medical officers authored reports on the sorry state of 
Nyasaland’s medical services. But they were received quite differently. Whereas Shircore 
had been invited to write such a report in 1930, and submitted his work to the 
sympathetic Basil Blackett at the CDAC, de Boer had no such license. Officials in 
Whitehall were unmoved by his (apparently unsolicited) report. Whereas the promised 
materiel orders from the construction of the Zambesi Bridge and the especial attention of 
a few key MPs rendered Nyasaland a place of imperial concern in 1929, a decade later 
the Protectorate was known only for its relative political quietus and economic 																																																								
95 PS Bell, “Report of the Medical Department for the Year 1946” (Zomba, Nyasaland: 
Government Printer, 1947), UMMC. Page 5. 
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insignificance. While other parts of the empire erupted in deadly riots and costly strikes, 
Nyasaland seemed to offer little evidence of unrest. Nyasaland was not entirely quiet, but 
the anti-witchcraft and millenarian movements of the 1930s did not arouse much official 
concern. Ironically enough, health services would suffer for this seeming placidity. 
 
This chapter, and the last, also demonstrates something else. The scathing tone of both 
the Shircore and de Boer reports provides further evidence of an emerging 
historiographical understanding of the differences between colonial doctors and other 
colonial administrators. Members of the UK Colonial Service have long been stereotyped 
as Oxbridge-educated white males born into at least some wealth, endowed with a 
penchant for sports, practical minds and adventurous spirits. In general, historians 
believed them to have shared a “world-view that was politically conservative, any more 
radical elements within it being silenced for the sake of preserving the status quo.”96  
 
Yet Anna Crozier has demonstrated (through prosopographical analysis of members of 
the Colonial Medical Service in Uganda, Tanganyika and Kenya) that medical officers 
hailed from a “more diverse social group” and trained at more varied institutions.97 These 
differences in biography between doctors and other colonial officers could help explain 
why Shircore, de Boer, and a number of medical officers in Nyasaland during the 
Federation years (Chapter 8) were so critical of the quality of medical services available 
to Africans. Both had trained at leading medical schools in the UK (de Boer in London, 																																																								
96 Anna Crozier, “The Colonial Medical Officer and Colonial Identity: Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania before World War Two” (PhD Dissertation, University College London, 2005). Pages 
214-215. 
97 Ibid. Page 217. 
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and Shircore in Edinburgh). Both had connections to South Asia; de Boer was born into a 
burgher family in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Shircore’s father was in the Indian Medical 
Service.98 The Indian Medical Service included famous researchers and enjoyed greater 
resources, and held much greater prestige than the East African Medical Service.99 And 
both de Boer and Shircore had practiced in other East African colonies, all of which spent 
more per capita on health for Africans than Nyasaland. Neither man was by any means a 
radical, but their backgrounds left them dissatisfied with the state in which they found 
Nyasaland’s medical services. Each wrote scathing reports that called for far greater 
spending on health.  
 
These reports were a necessary, though (as this chapter has shown) not sufficient element 
in expanding Nyasaland’s health services. They reveal contests over budgets and 
resources between colonial medical officers and the Colonial Office. These debates rarely 
appear on the physicians’ memoirs, which as Crozier notes, tended to “sensationalize 
Africa” while avoiding quotidian bureaucratic realities.100 Yet, as the next chapter will 
demonstrate, sometimes the most bureaucratic prose that creates the greatest sensations. 
In the midst of the Second World War, an Indian-born British economist named William 
Beveridge would author his own report, one that would radically shift discourse on 
medical policy throughout Britain and her Empire. 
																																																								
98 DV Altndorff, “Genealogy of the Speldewinde Family of Ceylon,” The Journal of the Dutch 
Burgher Union 33, no. 3 (1944): 76; Crozier, “The Colonial Medical Officer and Colonial 
Identity: Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania before World War Two.” 
99 Crozier, “The Colonial Medical Officer and Colonial Identity: Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania 
before World War Two.” Page 62. 
100 Anna Crozier, “Sensationalising Africa: British Medical Impressions of Sub-Saharan Africa 
1890-1939,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 35, no. 3 (2007): 393–415. 
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Chapter 5  
Beveridge beyond the British Isles: health in wartime development and postwar 
visions of social protection, 1939-1945 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter examines wartime and early postwar debates over social and economic 
rights in Britain’s colonies in southern Africa. During the Second World War Churchill’s 
Coalition Government sought to defend the British Empire not only against Axis troops, 
but also against critics in the United States. For its part, the Labour Party sought to define 
its colonial policy. Within the party, the members of the Fabian Colonial Society 
discussed the relationship between their political commitments to democratic socialism 
and the practice of colonial rule.   
 
The UK Government responded to its critics by touting spending on colonial 
development in the midst of war, while the Labour Party called for additional spending 
on colonial social welfare. At the same time, social policy became a focal point of 
Britain’s domestic politics. William Beveridge’s wildly popular Report on Social 
Insurance and Allied Services, published in November 1942, called for rationalizing and 
expanding programs of social protection including unemployment insurance, health care, 
and subsistence payments for the elderly and infirm.  
 
For some commentators, including Beveridge and prominent members of the Labour 
Party, the social and economic rights embodied in the report seemed applicable not only 
to Britain, but also to its colonies. Immediately after the war Beveridge planned a trip to 
India, where he hoped to write a report on social protection that included programs for 
subsistence farmers as well as industrial laborers. Though they had their own pre-existing 
politics of social protection and social medicine, the Beveridge Report also provided an 
additional political weapon to advocates in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. This 
chapter provides an account of a contingent moment, when various sorts of social welfare 
were debated in southern Africa.  
 
Prelude: “I have taken them into my hands”: kinship and state social protection in 
2015 
 
Walking down the main dirt road of the Neno boma (district capital) one morning in mid-
January of 2015, I saw a stream of men and women using bicycles or wheelbarrows to 
carry large bags. On closer inspection, I discovered the bags were filled with 50 
kilograms each of urea fertilizer. I asked a young man where he had obtained his bag. He 
pointed to a primary school about 100 meters up the road. I asked him if he had 
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purchased the fertilizer: “Munagula feteleyza?” He answered no, he had received it: “Ayi, 
ndinalandira feteleyza.” The distinction was an important one, as the price of imported 
fertilizer had skyrocketed with the devaluation of the kwacha against the US dollar and 
the euro.  
 
I walked to the primary school, past young men (and even women) straining to carry the 
bags on their backs. Parked in front of the school was a large blue lorry with an empty 
bed, with a few stragglers standing by their bags.  The driver of the lorry explained that 
he had driven from Blantyre that morning with 270 bags of fertilizer, which had been 
distributed that morning. This distribution, he explained, was not a part of the main 
government-sponsored fertilizer subvention program (popularly known as the “coupon”); 
that fertilizer had been sold a month ago. This was a public works program, wherein 
heads of those households identified as vulnerable by village headmen were employed in 
fixing roads. In return for their labor, each household received a 50-kilogram bag of 
fertilizer and 10 pounds of maize seed. 
 
Safety-net programs such as this work-for-farm-input program are, in the words of one 
World Bank assessment, “core instruments for reducing poverty and managing risk.”1 In 
2015 Malawian social policy included such anti-poverty interventions as targeted cash 
transfers, cash-for-work programs, subvention of farm inputs and free healthcare and 
primary education. Each of these programs has come under criticism, from within and 																																																								
1 Victoria Monchuk, Reducing Poverty and Investing in People: The New Role of Safety Nets in 
Africa (The World Bank, 2013), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/978-1-4648-
0094-8. 
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from outside Malawi. For instance, the World Bank has long contended that chiefs and 
politicians distribute fertilizer coupons not to Malawi’s poorest people, but to friends and  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 5.1: Private and public forms of social support in Malawi 
 
Forms of kinship/village social support - Child fosterage (permanent or temporary)  - Caring for the sick, accompaniment to hospitals (woyanganira wodwala) - Sharing food - Working fields of the sick - Paying school fees of family members - Piecework labor (ganyu) in fields of wealthier relatives and neighbors - Community donations for marriages, funerals and health care costs 
 
Forms of Government social protection - Free public sector health care - Free primary education - Public works programs during hungry season - Targeted fertilizer subsidies - Targeted cash transfer programs 
________________________________________________________________________ 
influential supporters.2 Newspapers in Malawi often run editorials decrying the cost of 
providing healthcare and primary education without fees.  And the targeted cash transfers 
remain little more than pilots, and have not reached many of the most destitute in 
Malawi. 
 
For most Malawians social support is crucial for survival, yet relatively little of it comes 
in the form of government programs (see Figure 5.1).  One particularly common form of 
kinship-based social support is child fosterage, wherein young children live for in the 
homes of relatives other than their birthparents. This is especially important for families 
																																																								
2 Ibid. Page 101. 
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with many young children; for parents in this particularly stressful time of the life-cycle 
of a family, there were many mouths to feed and few hands to help in the field and 
around the home.3 A year ago, Francis sent his daughter Lucia to visit (kucheza) her 
maternal grandmother in Lilongwe for three months. For weeks while living with Francis 
I thought Monica was also his daughter; they would call her “my child” (mwana wanga). 
But, while inquiring about his extended family, I finally discovered that Monica was, in 
fact, the daughter of Edith’s brother, David. Edith and Francis were helping to care for 
Monica for a time, while David and his wife—who had less material wealth than Francis 
and Edith—cared for their newborn baby.  
 
In other households in Mbeya village, grandparents cared for grandchildren. In some 
cases, the parents had died early, while in others they were away working in Lilongwe or 
South Africa. In a number of these households the grandparents were barely able to 
provide for the children. An old woman with a marked limp said she had given birth to 
seven children, but only two survived. Two of her late daughters had each given birth to 
five children. Seven of those children now lived with her. The grandmother said she 
received some support from her other three grandchildren, who were older. One worked 
at the Pumulani Lodge nearby, another worked in in Blantyre, and the third lived in a 
nearby village. But she placed the most hope in one of her grandsons, currently in his 
penultimate year of secondary school. She showed me his report card, which listed him as 
third in his class. His teacher complimented his “seriousness.” Beaming with pride, the 																																																								
3 This period in the life-cycle of the peasant family has long been known to bring special 
vulnerability, particularly since the painstaking demographic work of Aleksandre Chaianov in 
tsarist Russia. See Aleksandre Chaianov (trans. RD Irwin), The Theory of the Peasant Economy 
(American Economic Association, 1966). 
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grandmother described her great expectations for the boy: “He will take care of me” 
(adzasamalira ine). The care could not come a moment too soon. Only a few days ago, 
while trying to transport a bag of fertilizer to her field, the grandmother had slipped and 
dropped the heavy bag on her own foot. It was quite swollen, but she did not think she 
had broken any bones. She did not think it would do any good to go to the clinic. 
 
Many adults in Mbeya had to provide not only for young children, but also for their 
elderly parents. For the last two years, Francis’s mother, Anna, has found it difficult to 
complete her daily chores. She suffers from osteoarthritis that so advanced that she can 
walk only slowly, and with a grimace on her face. Her husband, Chisomo, Francis’s 
stepfather (Francis’s father died twenty-five years ago) is even more disabled.  Though 
the medical assistants who see him in rushed visits at the nearby Monkey Bay hospital 
have diagnosed him with nothing more than benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH), a 
common condition among older men the world over, he lives in such chronic pain that he 
rarely ever rises from his banana-leaf mat (For more on Chisomo’s medical history, see 
the prelude to Chapter 7). The couple could do little to support themselves. Neither Anna 
nor Chisomo could complete the walk to the maize fields to help with planting or 
weeding, though they maintain a tiny garden behind their home. Once every morning 
Anna hobbled down to the shore of the lake with a pail to gather water to wash her 
dishes. One morning, I even saw her chopping at a felled tree with a heavy axe in an 
attempt to gather firewood. 
 
	 225	
It has fallen to Francis to do much of the work in caring for his ailing mother and 
stepfather. He gives them a portion of each year’s harvest. Edith often cooks extra food to 
bring to them; often Anna joins them in their home dinner (while Chisomo finds the short 
walk too painful on most days).  “I have taken them into my hands,” Francis explains, “so 
now it is as if I have two houses.” 
 
Even within his immediate family Francis must cope with expensive social needs.  For 
the past two years Lucia has complained of intermittent dull pain in her chest and in the 
left lower quadrant of her abdomen. This often keeps her home from school, and her 
teachers have complained that she lags in some subjects.  When Lucia first complained of 
this pain Francis had taken her to the private clinic twelve kilometers away in Cape 
Maclear—a fee-charging clinic but one that is widely thought to give more thorough 
exams than the public hospital in Monkey Bay. The doctor there could find nothing to 
explain the symptoms, and transferred her to Mangochi District Hospital, where she 
remained as an inpatient for two weeks. After those physicians failed to explain her 
condition, Lucia and Francis went to Zomba Central Hospital. She received an X-ray 
there, but no diagnosis. Her sojourn continued to Kamuzu Central Hospital in Lilongwe, 
where she stayed for four days but without any answers or relief. Today she still 
complains about this pain, which reduces her to tears for hours at a time. Whenever 
Lucia’s pain is mentioned, the expressions on her parents’ normally cheery faces quickly 
change to chagrin. 
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Francis does not complain much about these familial responsibilities. But he does say that 
they have prevented him from building up much in the way of savings. Even though most 
of Lucia’s care was at public clinics, weeks of food and long trips to hospitals proved 
expensive. In addition to providing food for his parents and a home for Monica and 
Samuel, he also spent four years paying secondary school fees for his late sister’s son, 
William. The problem with meeting these obligations—beyond the pain and suffering 
that has engendered them—is that it has wiped out his “capital” (here Francis uses the 
English word).  Francis and Edith rarely produce a harvest greater than their household’s 
own consumption in the coming year, so they make very little money from crop sales.  
 
To make cash, Francis prefers to buy usipa in bulk from fishermen in his village, then 
travel on the back of a lorry to larger towns away from the lake (such as Limbe or Dedza 
or Lilongwe) where he can sell them the fish by the pail at a decent markup in outdoor 
markets. But in order to make the initial bulk purchase he needs to amass cash. With all 
of the obligations to pay school fees and find transport to hospitals and provide food for 
kin he rarely has this cash for long. He feels like he rarely has any savings to guard 
against a bad harvest or another family emergency, let alone save for a business 
investment.4 With his limited collateral he is unlikely to qualify for a small business loan 
																																																								
4 See Chapter 7 for modernization theory’s solution for this problem. Modernizers recognized this 
problem of savings being wiped out by extended family obligations. Their solution was to try to 
overcome the “obstacle” of extended family obligation by a kind of psychic retraining, a modern 
mentality with a smaller sphere of mutuality. But, as anthropologists have shown again and again, 
people are not going to just let relatives die if they can help it, though sometimes the obligations 
become so overwhelming that they cannot meet them all. Furthermore these obligations fall into 
readily discernible categories, such as food, medical care, education, housing, all of which could 
be met by the state in a robust welfare regime. These are not luxury goods to be delayed until the 
“age of mass consumption” (as modernizers thought) but (as Francis demonstrates) the very 
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from the bank in Monkey Bay. Even if he did, the annual interest rate charged for such a 
loan is nearly 30 percent. 
 
So systems of social support exist, even if imperfectly and at great personal cost.  While 
newspaper columnists constantly denounce the “culture of dependency,” rural Malawians 
often say it is the government that is overly demanding.5 As Francis explained in a 
discussion of taxation, “The government finds ways to get money from the poor.” In the 
colonial era this took the form of the annual hut tax; the consequences of non-payment 
were described in Chapter 1. Under Hastings Kamuzu Banda, who ruled from 1964 to 
1993, every man, woman and child had to buy a Malawi Congress Party card every year; 
the consequences of non-payment will be described in Chapter 9. In the “multi-party” 
era, since 1993, consumption taxes increase the prices of basic goods. People expect 
benefits from their government because they have been made to pay for them.6 
I.  Introduction 
 
In contrast to the 1930s—when plans authored by Shircore and De Boer were frustrated 
by complacency in London about the legitimacy and staying power of British Empire—
by the mid-1940s colonial labor unrest and global conflagration engendered sufficient 
																																																																																																																																																																					
preconditions for saving and capital formation. See Hansjorg Dilger. “‘My relatives are running 
away from me!’ Kinship and care in the wake of structural adjustment, privatization and 
HIV/AIDS in Tanzania,” in Morality, hope and grief: anthropologies of AIDS in Africa (New 
York: Bergahn Books, 2010), 102-126. Also see Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future : 
Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 
p 183. 
5 Mpambira Kambewa, “The Malawian extended family, promoting ‘dependency syndrome’?” 
March 22, 2015. http://www.pabwalo.com/debate/the-malawian-extended-family-promoting-
dependency-syndrome/ 
6 Consider, Francis explains, a woman who sells mandazi in the market. “When she buys the ufa 
(flour) she is paying extra. The government gets that extra!” 
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concern to spur increased funding for health programs. The wartime craze over William 
Beveridge’s plans for social security reforms—including a National Health Service—also 
increased attention to health policy in Britain’s colonies. Some of this attention and 
funding reached Nyasaland, where government health services grew in both resources 
and popularity in first postwar decade.  
 
In the prelude to this chapter, I began to explore present-day understandings of 
obligations that Malawians articulate, obligations between family members and between 
state and citizen. In this chapter, and the next, I will explore the history of contesting 
notions of obligation in late colonial British Nyasaland. One set of obligations formed the 
moral basis for the postwar British welfare state. These ideas circulated widely in the 
British Empire, forcing the Colonial Office to lay out just how much of the welfare state 
could and should be enacted outside the British Isles. Another set of obligations 
circulating during this period concerned social protection in the African village. 
Discussed by anthropologists, these notions of “traditional” safety nets were repeated 
often by colonial officials seeking to justify the absence of robust welfare provision in the 
colonial state. These two sets of assumptions about the relationship between the state and 
the people would inform a debate, in Nyasaland and elsewhere, about the responsibilities 
of colonial British administrations to subject African peoples. 
 
Nyasaland’s first rural dispensaries grew from the ashes of the First World War (Chapter 
1), and the first district hospitals were built after a brief efflorescence of enthusiasm for 
development spending in 1929 (Chapter 3). This chapter focuses on the years 
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surrounding the calamitous Second World War, when uncertainty about the future of its 
imperial possessions once again overcame the consistent chorus of claims about scarce 
resources long used to protect the UK Treasury from demands for spending on health in 
the colonies.   
II. British colonial development discourse during the Second World War 
a) “The Bantu are willing to give everything for victory”: extraction in British 
Africa during the Second World War, 1939-1942 
The historian Stephen Constantine ends his history of the politics of British colonial 
development in 1940, but debates over aid to the colonies for health and other social 
services did not abate with the outbreak of war.  To be sure, the escalating war effort did 
dampen imperial expenditures on social services and other development projects in the 
colonies. In February of 1940 the Statement of Policy had acknowledged that spending on 
the Colonial Development and Welfare fund was not likely to reach the legislated 
maximum of £5 million per year “at any time during the war.”7 MacDonald’s successor 
as Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Lloyd, added his own note of pessimism after 
the law’s enactment: “Much that we had hoped to do under this Bill when it became law 
must wait for happier times.”8 Though the law allowed for £5 million in annual spending, 
in the first year (1940-41) the UK government spent only £177,802 on Colonial 
Development and Welfare fund schemes.9  
 
																																																								
7  “Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare Presented by the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.” Page 6. 
8 Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940. Page 222. 
9 Ibid. Page 222. 
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Meanwhile, colonial treasuries were impelled to ship away both men and treasure to aid 
in the war effort. The transfer of financial resources could be substantial. Between 1939 
and 1945, the Imperial Exchequer received monetary “gifts” made by colonial 
governments, native rulers, and private groups and individuals in the colonies. Such gifts 
emanating from public and private sources in Nyasaland during the war years totaled 
£164,214.10 This amount represented nearly three times Nyasaland’s recurrent budget for 
health in 1939. In 1940 alone the South African protectorate of Basutoland so tightened 
its belt that revenues exceeded expenditures by £100,000; the entire surplus was 
transferred to the Imperial Exchequer for the purchase of Spitfire fighter aircraft. “The 
Bantu,” declared the London-based Royal African Society in 1941, “are willing to give 
everything for victory.”11 
 
And give they did. The supply of men drawn from the colonies was even more 
impressive. By the end of the war, 473,000 soldiers in Britain’s army hailed from the 
Colonies. These soldiers made up a particularly large share of troops in battles against the 
Italians in East Africa and, later, against the Japanese in Burma. An estimated 7,000 died 
in combat, and an additional 7,000 were wounded. A government report after the war 
claimed that the “majority” of the troops from the colonies had volunteered, though some 
																																																								
10 “Report on the Colonial Empire (1939-1947), Presented by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty” (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
July 1947), House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online. Appendix II. Other African 
colonies handed over even more wealth: Northern Rhodesia gave £409,942, while Tanganyika 
gave £420,988. 
11 “Editorial Notes: The South African Protectorates,” Journal of the Royal African Society, 
October 1941, 293–94. 
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had been conscripted.12 Labor had also been conscripted in some colonies (including 
Nigeria, Kenya, Tanganyika, and Northern Rhodesia) during the war to increase 
production of agricultural and industrial products for the war effort.13 
 
b) Wartime development spending as a response to fear of losing the empire, 1942-
1945 
While the colonies gave blood and treasure from the outbreak of war, they only began to 
receive substantial quantities of Colonial Development and Welfare funding after the war 
cabinet grew concerned about critics within Britain and in the United States. In 1942, 
Labour MPs in Parliament and some quarters of the press pointed to the discrepancy 
between CDW spending to date and the originally publicized figure of £5 million per 
annum.14 In April of that same year, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US 
President Franklin Roosevelt had “their first serious political argument” over the future of 
the British Empire, particularly India. Indian nationalists had threatened to withhold 
support for the Allied war effort, so Roosevelt asked Churchill to make a firm 
commitment to grant Indians greater self-government. Churchill rebuffed his request, 
then and repeatedly during the war.15  
																																																								
12 “Report on the Colonial Empire (1939-1947), Presented by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.” Page 9. British East African military forces 
rose from 11,000 on Sept 1, 1939 to 228,000 on May 1, 1945; British West African military 
forces rose from 8,000 on Sept 1, 1939 to 146,000 on May 1, 1945 See Appendix III, page 116. 
13 Ibid. Page 10. 
14 Colonial Development: A Factual Survey of the Origins and History of British Aid to 
Developing Territories. 
15 William Manchester and Paul Reid, The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill: Defender of the 
Realm, 1940-1965 (Little, Brown, 2012). Page 506. Colonial Development: A Factual Survey of 
the Origins and History of British Aid to Developing Territories. Page 26. James P. Hubbard, The 
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Anti-imperial sentiment in the United States, a concern of the Colonial Office in the 
1930s, was proving an even greater danger to Britain as it became clear that the United 
States would have the preeminent role in the postwar world. In May 1942, US Under-
Secretary of State Sumner Welles announced that an Allied victory “must bring in its 
train the liberation of all people.”16 United States Vice President Henry Wallace urged 
the Roosevelt Administration to advocate for immediate independence for colonized 
peoples.17 In a May 1942 speech, Wallace predicted a “Century of the Common Man” 
that would commence after the war. The advent of this Century would bring a rapid end 
to European empires: 
No nation will have the God-given right to exploit other nations. Older nations 
will have the privilege to help younger nations get started on the path to 
industrialization, but there must be neither military nor economic imperialism. 
The methods of the nineteenth century will not work in the people’s century, 
which is now about to begin. 18 
 
Colonial development spending was, to apologists of British imperialism, a 
demonstration of beneficence directed not only at colonized subjects, but also at 
Roosevelt and other American architects of the coming postwar world. Colonial 
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development was a version of Wallace’s vision of a global New Deal, but without his call 
for an immediate end to colonial rule. 
 
Amidst these pressures, the UK Government accelerated its approval of new Colonial 
Development and Welfare Fund schemes. Up until October 31, 1942, after two years in 
operation, the Secretary of State for the Colonies had approved only 167 schemes 
involving a total financial liability of just over £2 million. Most of these plans were for 
possessions in the Caribbean, where memories of unrest were freshest and American 
attention greatest. But the next two and one-half years (November 1, 1942 to March 31, 
1945), the Secretary of State approved an additional 381 schemes involving liability of 
almost £14 million.19 CDW schemes classified under the heading “medical, public health 
and sanitation” also increased after 1942. During the first two years 35 such schemes 
with an aggregate cost of £330,000 were approved. During the next two and a half-years 
65 such schemes were approved, involving costs of more than £2.6 million.20 
 
c) Seeking a colonial policy for the Left: the Labour Party before the Second World 
War, 1900-1939 
International pressures were not the only influence on UK policy on colonial 
development. During the War, the most prominent site in Britain for discussion and 
debate over how the government should improve living standards for the colonized was 
the Fabian Society. Given the Society’s history, this was an unlikely forum for such 																																																								
19 “Report on the Colonial Empire (1939-1947), Presented by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.” Page 11. 
20 Ibid. Page 13. 
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discourse. The Fabian Society had been established in 1884 to engage, according to the 
historian Mark Minion, in “a long and gradualist fight against the evils of late-nineteenth-
century capitalism.” The Fabian Society was also established in opposition to those 
Marxists and trade unionists who called for social transformation by way of revolution. 
Instead, the Fabians sought to achieve socialism in Britain through peaceful politics—
their members founded the Labour Party—as well as dissemination of information and 
democratic discourse.21 Toward that end, the Fabians published essays, books, and 
pamphlets, primarily on domestic economic issues.  
 
Disagreements within the Society had caused its membership to steer clear of discussions 
of imperial policy, particularly after 1900. During that year, in the midst of the Boer War, 
the Society published an essay by Irish playwright George Bernard Shaw entitled 
“Fabianism and Empire: a Manifesto.” Shaw argued that since imperialism was a fait 
accompli, the Fabians should support the British Government and help develop the 
empire into a “great socialist Commonwealth.” But a large portion of the Society 
sympathized with the Boers against what they saw as British imperial aggression. 
Thirteen members, including future Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, resigned in 
protest. Thereafter, until the end of the Great War, the Society published few tracts on 
international affairs.22  
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Fabians became more vocal on colonial policy when Lord Passfield (Sidney Webb), a 
leading Fabian, became Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1929, but the Society’s 
reticence on imperial issues finally ended in 1940, when Rita Hinden, a 31-year-old 
economist raised in South Africa and Palestine, suggested the establishment of a Fabian 
Colonial Bureau, a new section of the Society devoted to the problems of the Empire.23 
Her own doctoral dissertation at the London School of Economics had focused on 
Palestine as a case study in colonial economic development.24 At the first meeting of the 
bureau, on October 26, Hinden was elected secretary.  
 
To chair the bureau, the founding members chose Arthur Creech Jones, a Labour MP 
who had served over two years in prison as a conscientious objector during the First 
World War. Creech Jones had been interested in colonial issues since 1926 when, as a 
leader of the Transport and General Workers’ Union, he had provided advice to Clements 
Kadalie, the Nyasaland-born General Secretary of the South African Industrial and 
Commercial Workers’ Union. During the interwar years, Creech Jones served on the 
Labour Party’s Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions and helped found the Trade 
Union Congress’ colonial affairs committee.25 By the outbreak of the Second World War, 
he had become the de facto spokesman for the Labour Party (and Britain’s political left 
more broadly) on colonial issues. To Creech Jones, the mission of the Bureau was to 
serve as “a clearing-house of information on current colonial problems, and for the 																																																								
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formation of a group of liberally-minded persons, expert in colonial matters, who would 
sponsor research an inquiry into subjects concerned with the welfare and development of 
the colonial peoples.”26 
 
The bureau was not a band of anti-colonial activists. This was evident from the 
(uncritical) title of the group’s bi-monthly journal, Empire, begun in May 1941. In 
general, the sympathies of the group members led them to call for increased spending on 
social services and welfare programs, policies of racial non-discrimination, and increased 
participation of colonized peoples in political administration. Yet from the outset, many 
leading policymakers and public voices on colonial affairs viewed the Bureau with 
skepticism. The Colonial Office subscribed to Empire, and copies were circulated 
throughout the office. But in July 1941 Colonial Office assistant under-secretary JA 
Calder penned a minute expressing his desire to establish “some guidance as to the 
propriety of members of this office supporting this Bureau by subscriptions or 
donations.”27 CJ Jeffries, another assistant under-secretary, opined, “There is no absolute 
reason why members of the office should not, in their private capacities, support this 
Bureau with subscriptions and donations. But I think it is better that they should not do 
so.”28 Jeffries did not offer any reasons for this counsel, but he might have shared the 
concerns articulated by the editors of the Journal of the Royal African Society when they 
“welcomed” the formation of the Fabian Colonial Bureau in October 1941. “The 																																																								
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usefulness of this new movement,” the editors warned, “will depend upon the degree of 
accuracy, and of the absence of prejudice due to preformed opinion, to which its work 
attains. No doubt its workers will be alive to the pitfalls for research inherent in starting 
from a political background.”29 
 
But even if some in the Colonial Office and intelligentsia were put off by Fabian 
socialism’s foray into imperial affairs, the members of the Colonial Bureau were an 
august group. Besides Hinden and Creech Jones, the other founding members were: 
evolutionary biologist Julian Huxley; Labour MP John Parker; former Labour MP James 
Francis Horrabin; socialist writer Margaret Cole; development economist W. Arthur 
Lewis; physician and former Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies Sir Thomas 
Drummond Shiels; author and long-time secretary for the Labour Party’s Advisory 
Committee on Imperial Questions Leonard Woolf (better known, in many circles, as the 
husband of the writer Virginia Woolf); imperial historian Margery Perham; and historian 
of race relations William M Macmillan. Their contacts with leading publications were so 
strong that within six months of the Bureau’s first meeting they had published articles in 
The Economist, The Manchester Guardian, the New Statesman, Time and Tide, Reynolds 
News, the Evening Standard, and the Daily Herald. They had also recruited over a dozen 
MPs who agreed to pose questions on the Bureau’s behalf in Parliament or directly to the 
Colonial Office. They had also found volunteers to maintain a press-cutting service that 
																																																								
29 “Editorial Notes: The Fabian Society’s Colonial Bureau and the Journal Empire,” Journal of 
the Royal African Society, October 1941, 297–98. 
	 238	
drew from colonial journals available in London.30 This was no fringe group, but rather a 
well-resourced operation endowed with immense stores of social capital. 
 
c) A Colonial Charter: social services as the socialist’s justification for Empire 
Members of the Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB) produced most of the literature that 
defined the Labour Party’s stance on colonial issues. Early in the war, FCB members 
tried to ensure that increased spending on colonial development and welfare was a major 
focus of Labour’s rhetoric. In April 1940, the Advisory Committee on Imperial 
Questions, long led by Leonard Woolf, had issued the Labour Party’s Declaration of 
Policy for Colonial Peoples. This document argued that improving health was a major 
part of Britain’s justification for continued colonial rule. Though the document did not 
say so explicitly, this promise to improve health seemed to provide a justification 
sufficient to reconcile (for most Fabians) the contradictions inherent in socialist advocacy 
for the persistence of imperialism.31 In seeking to bring Britain’s possessions to eventual 
independence, improving health was a necessary and urgent step: 
Political self-government is not enough. It must be accompanied by economic 
independence and economic self-government. By economic independence we 
mean a new orientation of motive in colonial policy, putting first the satisfaction 
of urgent colonial needs (for instance nutrition and the conquest of the disease) 
and treating external trade as a secondary and auxiliary object.32 
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In September of 1941 Leonard Woolf sought to lay out, in greater detail, how this 
commitment to “the satisfaction of urgent colonial needs” would manifest in Labour 
Party policy should it be handed the reins of Government. In a draft “Memorandum 
formulating a colonial policy for the Labour Party after the war,” Woolf argued, “Much 
larger sums will have to be found” for economic development, education, and health 
“than is now usual in colonial budgets.” But, he continued, the lack of education and the 
low standard of health amongst the colonized caused the poverty that so limited colonial 
revenues usually required to fund public services. This “vicious circle” could be broken 
only with capital from Europe or the United States. Because resulting growth would 
necessarily be slow, this capital had to be provided on terms more generous than market-
rate loans.33 
 
Woolf’s focus on social services spending found critics on both the left and right even 
within the Labour Party. On the left, long-time colonial commentator Norman Leys urged 
deletion of the section of the memorandum calling for “costly education and health 
services.” He argued that land alienation, direct taxation of the poorest, and legal 
restrictions on free movement and political organizations were the fundamental causes of 
colonial poverty. His focus deemphasized the contribution of health and education to 
endemic diseases, which “can be uprooted only as and when a general advance is made, 
that need not be slow but must be liberative.” 34 To Leys, Labour’s focus should remain 																																																								
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on these causes, rather than on the social services that had so recently been the stated 
focus of Colonial Office policy under the Conservative PM Neville Chamberlain.35  
 
Farther to the right, Thomas Reid (who would become a Labour MP in 1945) contended 
it was political suicide to advocate colonial social service spending outlays to a “groaning 
British taxpayer” besieged by war and want. Colonies had low “taxable capacity,” so 
such “obviously desirable boons cannot be provided, unless we, or other altruists, finance 
the needs of about 500 million poverty-stricken people in the midst of our own 
bankruptcy.” Woolf’s proposed platform, Reid said, was not only “generally 
impracticable” and “unjust to our own people,” but “electorally disastrous to Labour, and 
therefore to the public and the world for whom a Labour Government in Britain after the 
war is a sine qua non of success for all.” In any case, since “tropical people do not 
exercise birth control and breed up to the bare subsistence or below it as a rule,” health 
and education spending would result in an increase in population rather than an increase 
in per-capita wealth.36 Labour, then, was not at all united in their visions for colonial 
development. Fierce critics of extractive economic policies (e.g. Leys) mingled with neo-
Malthusian colonial apologists (e.g. Reid), while still others (e.g. Woolf) tried to steer a 
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middle course similar to the prewar policies pursued by the Colonial Office under 
Malcolm MacDonald. 
 
Even with this dissension within the Labour Party, members of the Fabian Colonial 
Bureau soon reiterated calls for social services following supportive words from British 
officialdom’s favored colonial expert, Lord Hailey. Hailey, a retired member of the 
Indian civil service, had become the preeminent public intellectual on colonial issues 
since the publication of An African Survey, a massive interdisciplinary study under his 
direction, in 1938.37 In a keynote address to the annual meeting of the Anti-Slavery and 
Aborigines Protection Society on May 28, 1942, Hailey suggested that the increasing 
expectations of state social protection within Britain should also extend to the colonies. 
These expectations entailed a “conception of the State not merely as an agency for 
maintaining justice and equal rights, or for preventing abuse…but as the most active 
agency for promoting social welfare and improving the general standard of living.” 
Judging the legitimacy of colonial government with the same criteria as domestic 
governance would “serve to justify our position as a colonial power to the outside world, 
and to mitigate some of the suspicion which now attaches to it.” He called for a statement 
outlining “our obligations to the colonial peoples…not as those of trustees, but as those 
incumbent on the modern state in regard to the improvement of the social services and 
the standards of living in its own domestic backward areas.”38 																																																								
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Hailey said this statement should come in the form of a “Colonial Charter.” The Colonial 
Charter, he explained, would be a supplement to the Atlantic Charter, a document signed 
by Churchill and Roosevelt in August 1941 to express shared aims in fighting the war. 
That document had included a “wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored 
to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.” Before the House of Commons on 
September 9, Churchill said he felt compelled to clarify that the Atlantic Charter applied 
only to “the states and nations now under Nazi yoke,” and did not address the “separate 
problem progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples 
which owe allegiance to the British Crown.”39  
 
Hinden, who noted the “disappointment” of peoples “in the colonies” to Churchill’s 
unwillingness to include them in the promises of the Atlantic Charter, quickly took up 
Hailey’s call for a Colonial Charter.40 Within a week of Hailey’s address, she had drafted 
a memo to members of the Bureau to explain her thoughts on the politics and content of 
such a charter. In a political stroke reminiscent of MacDonald’s arguments to the 
Treasury a few years prior, Hinden pointed to a colonial crisis to call for increased social 
spending. In Hinden’s case, the crisis was the fall of British Malaya to the Japanese in 
January of 1942. This defeat of British, Indian, Australian and Malayan forces “seemed 
to indicate an apathy on the part of the colonial peoples to a British victory.” This crisis 																																																								
39 Hubbard, The United States and the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa, 1941-1968. Page 
10. 
40 After the Atlantic Charter was issued, but before Churchill insisted that it did not apply to the 
colonies, Clement Attlee had spoken before a union of West African students studying in London. 
He told them that the charter applied to all peoples in the world, including colonial subjects. See 
Ibid. Page 30. 
	 243	
of legitimacy should be addressed with “specific pledges and guarantees as to the future 
of the Colonial people on the successful outcome of the war.” Hinden argued that one 
guarantee capable of increasing martial zeal in the colonies was a promise to improve 
social services.41 
 
The Bureau had already called for a “charter of colonial social welfare” in a pamphlet 
published earlier that year.42 In his May 28 address, Lord Hailey said that the Charter 
should promise “the extension to the colonies of the obligations accepted by the modern 
state to provide a minimum of social services for all its citizens.”43 Hinden went even 
further, suggesting that a Colonial Charter prepared by the Bureau should include an 
imperial “responsibility” to “secure a uniform standard of social services.”44 Her 
language showed a stronger commitment to egalitarianism than that produced by the 
Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, which in its own proposed International 
Colonial Convention, declared, “Measures for improving health and preventing and 
curing disease shall be expanded.”45 There was clearly a movement afoot, at the highest 
levels of left-leaning intelligentsia on imperial policy, to spur greater spending. As the 
last section demonstrated, approval of colonial development and welfare schemes 
(including medical projects) did accelerate by the end of 1942. Much of this discourse did 
focus on the need to quell imperial unrest and gain support for the war effort in the 																																																								
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colonies. But beginning in late 1942 there would arise another impetus—from within 
Britain itself—for colonial experts and colonized peoples to advocate for greater state 
provision of social protection. 
 
III. Beveridge at home, Beveridge abroad: social protection and health in the 
Empire and Commonwealth, 1942-45 
a) Domestic labor unrest in the political response to the Beveridge Report, 1942 
Sir William Beveridge made for an unlikely international celebrity. Detractors derided 
him as a mechanistic bureaucrat. Indeed, the bureaucracy was in his blood; he had been 
born in Bengal, the son a judge in the Indian civil service. He had spent his entire career 
either in the civil service (the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Munitions, and the 
Ministry of Food) or in academia (the London School of Economics and, later, Oxford). 
Though a recognized expert on social insurance, he had only authored a single book 
(Unemployment: a problem of industry, in 1909) before the Second World War. In 
appearance he presented a slender frame, a heavy brow and a shock of straight white hair 
combed over a bald scalp.  
 
He was hardly a firebrand. He favored the Liberal Party—the party of John Maynard 
Keynes, Lloyd George, and John Stuart Mill—over democratic socialist Labour, but until 
he himself ran for Parliament in 1945 Beveridge had always maintained that academics 
should refrain from overt commitments to political parties.46 As Director of the London 
School of Economics—a school founded by the Fabian Socialist Sidney Webb—																																																								
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Beveridge recruited faculty of every persuasion, including the Austrian economist and 
hero of libertarians Friedrich von Hayek. He made for an unlikely father of the “welfare 
state,” a phrase he detested. He lauded individual initiative, decried sloth, and 
championed private efforts at charity and social uplift.47 
 
But ever since his youthful days working at Toynbee Hall in Britain’s East End, 
Beveridge had been firmly committed to a “national minimum,” in which “no one is to 
fall below a certain standard.”48 In 1942, Beveridge’s proposals to render this 
commitment a reality made his a household name in Britain and in many parts of the 
English-speaking world.  
 
The fame began with the publication of the Report on Social Insurance and Allied 
Services in November 1942. The report was the product of an interdepartmental 
commission tasked with providing recommendations on means to improve the 
coordination of social insurance programs. Beveridge noted that Churchill’s Government 
had created the commission in June 1941 in response to a demand by the Trades Union 
Congress.49 But according to the historian Daniel Rodgers, this was not supposed to be 
an influential commission, and Beveridge himself did not really want to lead it. 
Beveridge saw himself as an expert on efficient use of manpower. He had declined offers 
to sit on official committees investigating old-age and health insurance, claiming they 
were not within his field of expertise. The assignment Beveridge most wanted was to 																																																								
47 Ibid. Beveridge even authored a book in 1948 entitled Voluntary Action. 
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direct the allocation of wartime labor, but he lacked the connections within the Ministry 
of Labour necessary to secure the post.50 Recognizing that his “welcome had run out” in 
the main war coordination effort and consigned to a task deliberately designed to be 
obscure and out of the way, Beveridge set to work on the social insurance report.51 
Though many other prominent officials had been named to the commission, Churchill’s 
government would not endorse the document, so Beveridge called the rest of these 
members “advisers” and made himself the report’s sole signatory.  
 
In 299 pages of text and tables, Beveridge’s report painstakingly detailed a plan to 
expand and rationalize Britain’s programs of social protection, including unemployment 
insurance, subsistence payments for the elderly and infirm, children’s allowances. He 
also proposed a government-run health care system to be financed entirely by general 
taxation and provided free at the point of care.52 Despite the report’s dry prose and 
seemingly interminable tables, it was a sensation. Within two weeks of its release, nine in 
ten Britons were telling pollsters they approved of it. Within a year, 600,000 copies of the 
report had been sold. 53 In 1945 the London correspondent of the New York Herald 																																																								
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Tribune reported, “Beveridge has become almost a common noun in the English 
language. It stands for hope.”54 
 
Churchill had worked with Beveridge decades earlier on the National Insurance Act of 
1911, but was initially skeptical of the proposals. The Prime Minister told his War 
Cabinet that he did not wish to encourage “false hopes and airy visions of Utopia and El 
Dorado.” Harold Nicolson, Churchill’s Minister of Information, opined in his diary that 
Beveridge was a “vain man,” and predicted Conservatives would “welcome the Report in 
principle, and then whittle it away with criticism.”55  
 
But to many Britons, the Beveridge Plan was neither a dry technical exercise nor a 
utopian dream. It was, to them, a practical promise for a better society after the guns fell 
silent. A number of historians and sociologists of wartime and postwar Britain have 
written of a popular consensus on the need for “fairness,” a product of both generalized 
Depression-era want and shared wartime sacrifice. In this milieu, political opposition to 
welfare spending and social protection programs was, for a time, muted.56 The Labour 
Party, led by Clement Attlee, quickly lent its support for the Beveridge Plan as a key part 
of its postwar domestic platform.57 Throughout 1943 Beveridge addressed large crowds 
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across the country to drum up support for his proposals. He even starred in a newsreel 
that summarized his proposals to cinemagoers across the nation.58  
 
As in the 1920s and 1930s (see chapters 3 and 4), labor unrest proved a crucial impetus 
for a change in government policy. Some British workers in key industries were clearly 
growing tired of forbearance on questions of material security. Following years of 
relative quietus in the late 1920s and 1930s, labor stoppages became more common 
during the war. In the midst of a legal ban on strikes and lockouts, labor stoppages 
increased in the UK. Nationwide, strikes escalated from 922 in 1940 to a new record peak 
of 2194 in 1944.59 Neither mass arrests by government nor calls for patience from union 
leaders proved effective deterrents to workers striking for higher wages and other 
protections, particularly in the economically crucial coalfields.60 In the face of rising 
unrest, Churchill finally decided to issue some promises on postwar social protection. On 
the evening of March 20, 1943, in a radio broadcast carried nationwide, Churchill called 
himself a “strong partisan of national compulsory insurance, for all classes, for all 
purposes, from cradle to grave.” He added: “We must establish on broad and solid 
foundations a national health service.”61 Most of Beveridge’s proposals would be 
implemented after the war, under Attlee’s Labour Government. The health care proposal, 
a key pillar of the Beveridge Report, was made manifest in the 1948 inauguration of the 
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National Health Service, a single-payer health care system provided free at the point of 
care to all British citizens.62 
 
b) Social protection in South Africa: African pensions but not health care, 1942-
1943 
For many, Beveridge’s aims of “freedom from want” and universal healthcare seemed 
possible and urgent not only in Britain, but also in the Colonies and Commonwealth. As 
his Report became a bestseller in Britain, visions of social protection abounded around 
the globe. These visions were not always welcome. As one official in the UK actuary 
office lamented in a November 1943 letter, “It is unfortunate that the ideas in the 
Beveridge Report have stimulated a vague but strong desire for ‘social security’ in so 
many parts of the world where they are manifestly inappropriate without severe 
limitation.”63 Yet political officials could not afford to entirely ignore calls for social 
security. In the British Empire and Commonwealth, reports on social security 
commissioned by political leaders invariably included mentions of health, and often were 
followed by fuller investigations of national health services.  
 
In early 1943, as MPs in the Union of South Africa’s Parliament called for 
comprehensive welfare schemes, Prime Minister Jan Christiaan Smuts made the worried 
observation in a letter to a friend in London that “it is here very much as with you, where 
people talk Beveridge instead of war and Hitler.” Though Smuts privately lamented the 
“preoccupation with the postwar paradise on earth,” he would lead his United Party to 																																																								
62 Judt, Postwar. 
63 Epps to George Gater, 5 November 1943, ACT 1/717, UKNA. 
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victory in June 1943 by coopting the Labour Party’s rhetoric. Smuts persistently 
promised a society in which “there will be no forgotten men.”64 African political leaders 
in South Africa also made use of this Beveridge moment to advance their claims. In 
December 1943 the African National Congress unanimously adopted a report written by 
Dr. Alfred Xuma, the Congress’ President-General. The document has been called “The 
Atlantic Charter from the Africans Point of View,” or the “Bill of Rights,” or “Africans’ 
claims in South Africa.” Dr. Xuma combined Beveridge’s proposals with the rights 
articulated by Atlantic Charter, and insisted that both should be applied to Africans. 
Though Xuma’s document was focused foremost on rights of political representation and 
an end to economic exploitation, it also demanded “equality of treatment…in the State 
social services, and inclusion on an equal basis with Europeans in any scheme of Social 
Security.” In a section devoted to health services, Xuma, a medical doctor educated at 
Northwestern University in Chicago, urged “the establishment of free medical and health 
services for all sections of the population.”65 
 
Responding to demands to follow in Beveridge’s footsteps from many sections of South 
Africa’s population, Parliament appointed a Committee on Social Security and a National 
Health Services Commission (NHSC) to investigate and issue proposals in their 
respective remits. In 1944, following a report from the Committee on Social Security, 
Parliament passed the Pension Laws Amendment Act, establishing war pensions and 																																																								
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extending non-contributory old-age pensions and disability grants to African men and 
women. The maximum benefit payable to Africans was less than one-third the maximum 
for white pensioners, but the inclusion of Africans in this massive new social security 
program was a significant departure from earlier policies.66  
 
The NHSC also reported its findings in 1944. Drawing upon the community-based health 
centers of Sidney and Emily Kark in Natal, the report recommended a network of 400 
such centers, which were to be accessible to all races, free at the point of care and funded 
by a common “health tax.” Though inspired in part by Beveridge, the report’s 
recommendations were far from a facsimile of his report. As historian Shula Marks has 
observed, “The break with the hospital system, the centrality of the health centers, and 
the focus on health education all put the commission’s report ahead of the contemporary 
Beveridge Report.”67 Enthusiasm for Beveridge might have helped spur Smuts to promise 
schemes for social protection, but South Africa had its own extant politics of social 
medicine that shaped the reports commissioned by his government. 
 
Yet the NHSC’s plan would not come to fruition. Smuts, who had opposed efforts to 
strengthen public sector health care for decades, dismissed the report as “utopian” and, 
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save for a few clinics, the commission’s vision was never realized.68 Perhaps the most 
influential result of this work was that it caught the attention of the physician John Grant, 
a consultant for the Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health Division, who in 1947 
drew upon the report of the NHSC to call upon every nation in the world to enact family 
allowances, maternity benefits, home help, housing and food assistance, and universal 
access to medical care.69 In addition, the wartime South African politics of social 
medicine also made its way to the World Health Organization, where Sidney Kark, 
deputy chief health officer Harry Gear, and George Gale all later worked.70 
 
c) Social protection in Southern Rhodesia: African health care but not pensions, 
1943-1945 
Southern Rhodesian officials were similarly compelled by the Beveridge Report to 
investigate reforms to systems of social protection, though their conclusions differed 
from those in South Africa. In a radio broadcast on March 6, 1943, Prime Minister 
Godfrey Huggins (a physician who had once practiced in London) announced that the 
government social security officer, Frank Thomas Russell (a former schoolmaster), had 
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been tasked with an investigation of possible reforms of existing social security 
programs. 
 
In the first part of his report, issued in 1945, Russell focused on public pensions. Here he 
recommended expanded protections for European settlers, but he explicitly excluded 
Africans. Russell argued that even though Africans had been included in South Africa’s 
unemployment and disability insurance and old-age pensions, in Southern Rhodesia 
Africans should continue to be excluded because “the Natives [in Southern Rhodesia] are 
less urbanized, less dependent on wages and to a large extent self-supporting in less 
crowded and better reserves.” The most appropriate tools for improving African welfare, 
Russell argued, were not “civilized” social security protections but national economic 
policies that increased aggregate production.71  
 
In the second part of the report, however, Russell turned his focus to social services, and 
in particular to health services. Though animated mostly by the quest to find an 
arrangement by which poor whites could have some private practitioners’ fees covered by 
general tax revenues, Russell also investigated the medical care for Africans. He called 
for greater spending for preventive and curative health services, especially for “natives.” 
Russell believed that for both natives and non-natives, the government should undertake 
nationwide surveys of nutrition and urban housing, and the compilation of vital statistics. 
He called for free school meals and milk for schoolchildren (immediately for non-natives 																																																								
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and “as soon as possible” for native school children) and food subsidies for natives in 
reserves.72 He called for increased personnel and spending on preventive activities 
including sanitation, health propaganda, and TB sanatoria. For curative services, he 
contended that while the segregated facilities and personnel devoted to the care of the 
European community were, on the whole, sufficient, those devoted to the care of natives 
were woefully inadequate. Russell estimated that his proposals required an increase in the 
share of government expenditure devoted to health (defined in the broad sense 
encompassed by his proposals) from its 1942 level of 8 percent to 10 percent.73 In 
monetary terms, this represented an increase in spending from general revenue of 
£100,000 on preventive services (for natives and non-natives) and of £150,000 on 
curative services for natives. Russell believed that Africans should continue to receive 
medical attention free at the point of care in government facilities, and proposed various 
schemes to lessen the financial burden on Europeans, who at that time usually paid 
private practitioners for outpatient services while paying fees at government hospitals for 
inpatient care.”74 
 
After Russell completed his report in 1945, Huggins appointed a Commission to 
investigate a National Health Service. The chair of this commission (which included 
Russell) was Dr. Charles Frederic Morris Saint, Professor of Surgery at the University of 
Cape Town. This report concurred with Russell’s. “There must be thousands of patients 
who never see a doctor…No doctor could possibly attend to 100,000 patients, or even 																																																								
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50,000, as is the case in several districts of the Colony.”75 It argued for increased medical 
training for Africans (which would, in turn, demand expanded secondary education), and 
the construction of hospitals and clinics in more remote regions around the country. The 
commissioners argued against fees for African patients, and said that spending on health 
services for Africans should not be related to the taxes they paid, “for the poorer the 
community, the greater is the need for health expenditure upon it.”76 
 
Some of the report’s plans were acted upon in the following years, though the expansion 
in access to care was not dramatic. Training of “African female nurses” had previously 
been left entirely to the missions, but in 1945 a new government-run training program 
was begun at the Memorial Hospital in Bulawayo.77 Care remained free at the point of 
care for Africans. The number of government rural clinics increased from 76 in 1946 to 
88 in 1952, and additional wards were added existing clinics. 78  
 
But the muted expansion was entirely inadequate to keep up with burgeoning demand. At 
Gwelo’s African Hospital, for instance, the number of beds rose from 62 to 72 between 
1945 and 1950, but the number of inpatients more than doubled, from 2175 to 4092. Even 
colonial apologist Michael Gelfand, then a medical officer at Gwelo Hospital, 
remembered how patients covered all the floors and blocked the hallways. He also 
recounted that the European Hospital in Gwelo received a new X-ray machine after the 																																																								
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war, while the African hospital remained without any until 1954. Huggins’ administration 
in Salisbury rebuffed requests additional staff, facilities, and equipment, citing “financial 
constraints.”79 
 
d) Beveridge’s aborted mission to advise on “freedom from want” in India, 1945 
 
At the end of the war, Beveridge had an opportunity to apply the lessons of his Report to 
India, where he had been born in 1879. In July 1945 the Labor Department of the 
Government of India invited Beveridge to chair a Planning Committee tasked with 
designing social security measures for industrial laborers.80 Beveridge was eager to 
accept the invitation, but strongly suggested the committee’s scope should be broader, for 
“an Enquiry limited to the very small part of the population engaged in industrial labour, 
however valuable in itself, would not justify…such words as ‘freedom from want.’” A 
broader report that examined rural labor and urban non-industrial labor would, Beveridge 
believed, be “something quite different” from his report on social insurance in Britain.81 
But India’s colonial Labor Department insisted on limiting the terms of reference to 
industrial labor, and Beveridge eventually turned down the offer. He focused his efforts 
instead on an upcoming tour of the United States.82 
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Had he returned to India, what programs might Beveridge have proposed? Would social 
services have played a role in his scheme? Beveridge’s papers offer little insight, though 
there is one hint that he might have had an interest in health in particular. Of the five 
candidates he considered to serve as his assistant on the India report, the only one 
stationed in India was Major Geoffrey Stone, a young Brit whose focus in the previous 
decade had been nutrition research. But Beveridge himself never seems to have authored 
a plan to achieve freedom from want in any British colony.83 
IV.   Conclusion 
 
Descriptions of welfare regimes in the political science literature are often based on ideal-
types, such as Esping-Anderson’s tripartite division into the social democratic, the 
conservative and the liberal. These, in turn, are abstracted from regimes of social 
protection in Europe.84 In recent years the number of typologies has expanded to include 
“liberal-informal” welfare states in Latin America and “productivist” welfare states of 
East Asia.85 African states, however, are mostly grouped among regimes of social 
insecurity wherein large swaths of the population can rely on little protection.86 But the 
categories of welfare regimes in this literature tend to elide the long-standing debates 
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over the proper scope and scale of social protection among impoverished, mostly rural 
colonial subjects in Africa and South Asia.87 
 
This chapter recounted a contingent moment, when various sorts of social welfare were 
considered in late-colonial southern Africa. This era was a brief one. Though old-age 
pensions would be retained for black South Africans throughout the apartheid era that 
began in 1948, the value of such pensions differed sharply along racial lines. And, as the 
next chapter will make clear using Nyasaland as a case study, the Beveridgean moment 
did precious little to ensure material subsistence among Africans facing famine and other 
forms of dire want during the late 1940s.88  
 
Still, the early 1940s was a watershed moment, one driven in part by crises and changing 
expectations of government in Britain and its Empire. From relatively industrialized and 
independent South Africa to the heavily agricultural British colony of Nyasaland, 
discussions over welfare state policy during the 1940s fostered ideas about public sector 
health care, subvention for agricultural inputs, and public pensions that have had lasting 
consequences for African political discourse and public budgets. As the next chapter will 
demonstrate, the shift in thinking in Britain about the role of the state in social provision 
would prove especially influencial in debates over the quality and reach of medicine in 
the colonies. While officials tried to write off other portions of the Beveridge Report as 
inapplicable to rural Africa, the universality of disease and the growing efficacy of 																																																								
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medical therapeutics made medical spending appear all the more urgent in places like 
Nyasaland. 
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Chapter 6 
“The old imperialism has come to an end”: Nyasaland as case study of postwar 
development, 1944-1952 
 
Abstract 
 
Though Beveridge’s plan for social security in the United Kingdom interested a number 
of colonial commentators and colonial officials, plans to extend such programs 
throughout the Empire were almost invariably limited to waged labor. Still, increased 
access to health services was a piece of Beveridge’s vision most officials agreed should 
apply even in rural Africa. Health services also figured in the colonial plans of the Labour 
Party, which came to power following a landslide victory in the 1945 UK general 
election. Arthur Creech Jones, a leading light in the Fabian Colonial Bureau and the new 
Colonial Secretary under Labour, touted a promised expansion of health services to 
buttress his claim that “the old imperialism has come to an end.” But, at least initially, the 
rise of Labour did not seem to usher in any new era in colonial medical services. This 
new era would follow another wave of unrest, which swept across Empire in the late 
1940s. Only then did the Colonial Office begin to increase spending on hospitals, clinics, 
and training institutions. Between 1944 and 1952 Nyasaland received some aid for 
venereal disease treatment, and officials in Zomba finally began to improve and expand 
training of African medical auxiliaries. But, in these years just before the advent of a 
controversial Federation with Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland’s politics 
remained too quiet to merit any concerted attempt to expand African health care services. 
 
Prelude: No money for diapers: seeking social security in communal and chiefly 
obligations 
 
Izeki is pressed for cash. Before she departed for the afternoon, his wife told him she 
needed cloth diapers for their new baby. She expected Izeki to give her money to buy the 
diapers by the end of the day. On this point, she was very insistent. She warned that she 
did not want find him still empty-handed upon her return. 
 
At first, Izeki did not know what to do. He simply did not have the money. But all of a 
sudden, he had an idea! He walked from the porch of his mud-brick hut down the narrow 
path to the dirt road. There he tore small branches from a short tree. He laid the branches 
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on the road, in two lines separated by five meters. Between the lines he placed a small 
plastic bowl. Then he returned to his porch and sat down. 
 
Soon, this exercise had the desired effect. One passerby dismounted his bike when he 
came to the branches, and walked between the two lines before remounting his bike once 
he passed them. Then, another passerby—a man walking a goat—stopped to drop a few 
bills into the bowl.  Two women stopped to drop money in the bowl, then walked up the 
path to talk to Izeki. A few moments later, a man named Jakobo followed suit.   
 
Izeki had made use of a local practice used to collect funds for an impending funeral. The 
passers-by were under the impression that there had been a recent death in Izeki’s home. 
Those who had come to his home were coming to pay their condolences. When Jakobo 
reached the porch, he rattled off a string of lamentations. Nkani basi! Nyimbo basi! 
Azimayi watopa! (Enough of this news! Enough of this [funeral] music! The women are 
tired [of mourning!]). 
 
Izeki, acting downtrodden, thanked Jakobo for coming. “What happened?” asked Jakobo. 
 
 “One of my children was hit by a car in town while walking to school,” Izeki explained.  
 
“Where will the funeral be held?” Jakobo asked. “In town? Or in the village?”  
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Tentatively, sensing he was being a bit too far into the lie, Izeki answered, “Here, in the 
village.” 
 
“Well, in that case, I will bring the money to the mfumu,” Jakobo offered. “He will 
organize the funeral, of course. That is his job.” 
 
“No!” yelled Jakobo. Composing himself, he explained, “I want to plan it myself.” 
 
Izeki’s wife returned to this scene, and fell into inconsolable sobbing. Seeing the 
branches and the bowl and the assembled mourners, she naturally assumed that someone 
had died.  
 
Unable to maintain the lie any longer, Izeki admitted no one had died. “I just didn’t know 
where to find the money to buy diapers,” he confessed. His wife stopped crying, and 
joined the rest of the crowd in angry yelling. Jakobo grabbed the money and returned to 
everyone the donations they had given. 
 
The story of Izeki’s spectacular failure is fiction. It was a Chichewa-language sketch 
performed by the popular Malawi comedy duo Izeki and Jakobo. A video of this 18-
minute sketch, titled Matewera amwana (“Children’s diapers”), had over 30,000 views 
on YouTube in the three years since it was first posted on January 18, 2013. The sketch 
resonates with its Malawian audience because it makes light of one of the most binding 
community obligations in present-day Malawian villages, that of helping to pay for and 
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attending local funerals. Izeki and Jakobo’s sketches often draw upon anxieties about 
trust in impoverished village communities. In a more recent sketch, which garnered over 
16,000 views on YouTube in its first eighteen months, a crooked preacher is found to be 
pocketing money donated by his congregation in a collection for the sick.1 
 
In real life, the village chief must navigate these anxieties about distrust and expectations 
of protection. He (or sometimes she) serves as a tenuous link between the (limited and 
patchwork) support provided by the central government and the (strained) networks of 
support within kinship groups. Even though, as the last chapter detailed, chiefs were 
lauded as wealthy providers for the needy during the colonial era, now (as then) they 
have neither the capacity to provide in times of need, nor the social expectation that they 
should do so. 
 
In Nyanza village, the chief does not appear formidable. Chief Nyanza (the village is 
always an eponym of the chief) is an elderly man with the kind of face that looks stern 
even when that is not his intention. He has a prominent brow, sunken, slit-like eyes and 
hollowed-out cheeks. His body is incredibly slender, though he says he is in good health. 
At one meeting he sports a bright pink button-down shirt, gray pants that are too short for 
his legs, and worn black sneakers.  Like most chiefs in the Mangochi area, he wears a 
white kufi cap during official meetings.  Though the chief is a Catholic, the chiefly garb 
in the region has been influenced by the Yao Muslims who have held sway in the region 
since they invaded from the south in the mid-nineteenth century. 																																																								
1 Izeki ndi Jakobo- Kusutsa galu mkukumba (“Translation?”). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eHZ2of3vyNw 
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Writing about fieldwork he had performed in the late 1940s in a village not far away, 
social anthropologist Clyde Mitchell had concluded, “A village headman may expect 
little material benefit from his position of authority…the position of headman is no 
sinecure.”2 The same could be said almost three-quarters of a century later. Chief Nyanza 
lived in a modest home similar to Francis’. It was not the most well-appointed home in 
the village, though its construction had been paid for by the owners of a resort lodge 
nearby. The lodge owners had sought to make a display of goodwill to counteract their 
reputation as a forbidding and miserly neighbor, and the chief had accepted the gift. At 
meetings the chief almost always looked tired. Sitting in what looks like a beach chair on 
the porch of his home, he delivers an opening statement, then looks as though he might 
be sleeping until he opens his eyes at the end of the meeting to deliver a concluding 
statement.  
 
But he was trusted. He became chief in 2008 following the death of his brother, who had 
been chief since the late 1960s. He had been born in the village but had spent most of his 
life in his wife’s village twenty kilometers to the south. He was summoned to return to 
Nyanza because he was widely reputed to be an honest man and a strong advocate. After 
one meeting where he had appeared to be sleeping through the entire proceedings, he 
perked up to deliver a concluding statement. The meeting had mostly consisted of a 
lecture delivered well-dressed local officials with desk jobs in the Parks Department. 
They had driven to the meeting in a pickup truck to warn the assembled residents of 																																																								
2 J. Clyde Mitchell, The Yao Village: A Study in the Social Structure of a Nyasaland Tribe 
(Manchester [England]: The Manchester Press, 1956). Page 113. 
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Nyanza that they would be fined if they were found to be illegally cutting down branches 
in the surrounding the protected forest that surrounded their village. The Nyanza 
residents were annoyed by what they heard as condescension and unwillingness to 
consider their needs. They did not wish to contribute to deforestation, but none could 
afford gas stoves, and few could by charcoal. Without firewood, how could they cook 
their food?  
 
When the chief spoke, he seemed to channel their frustrations. “We were here before this 
land was named a national park, and we will be here long after you have left your jobs,” 
he told the officials. “The lodge has cordoned off so much of the land where we used to 
collect firewood,” he continued. “We were not consulted about this, but now we have to 
go even further to find wood.” He concluded with a barely veiled challenge, “We will do 
what we must to live.” 
 
Though his subjects appreciated such proud soliloquies, the chief could to little else to 
improve their lot. In an interview, the chief explained his responsibilities. First, he was a 
gatekeeper for some forms of public provision. So, for instance, he decided which of the 
households in his village should be given limited coupons for fertilizer subsidies, or food 
packages distributed during emergencies. Second, he was charged with allocating land to 
new entrants to the village. Third, as Izeki and Jakobo’s skit averred, he was responsible 
for organizing the funeral when anyone in the villages 300 homes died. Fourth, he 
adjudicated disputes within the village.  This last responsibility, he said, was work rife 
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with difficulties (ntchito wavuto) that often involved him getting yelled at by drunken 
combatants. 
 
 
Chief Nyanza was not a rich man.  He worried about money; like Francis, he had spent 
much of his income seeking a remedy for a family member in chronic pain.  His wife had 
felt pain in her chest after meals for the past year. The hospital in Monkey Bay had 
prescribed cimetidine (an H2-receptor antagonist used to treat heartburn and peptic 
ulcers), but this treatment provided no relief. She had felt no relief after visits to the fee-
charging clinic in at the Catholic mission nearby, or the private hospital in Cape Maclear.   
 
The chief and his wife had even traveled hours to see a famed sing’anga (traditional 
healer). The sing’anga had told the chief that his wife was dying because she had been 
taking on improper responsibilities. She had, he said, been helping to manage the 
mfumu’s relationship with his people, hearing stories that she was not meant to hear. 
Since that time the chief had tried to shield his wife from his official duties, but there had 
been little improvement. He hoped to go back to the sing’anga for another consultation, 
but lacked the money for transport and fees. Like Francis he feared that the year’s maize 
harvest would be poor; unlike Francis he had no livestock to sell off in times of need. 
Like Izeki in the comedic sketch, the chief was trying to find money to meet his wife’s 
needs. While his office held some vestigial authority, it was not a fount of power and 
wealth. Much as he might wish to be, he was no great provider for his people. He could 
not even salve his own wife’s pain. 
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1. Introduction 
Beveridge’s ideas did not prove as influential in the colonies as they would at home. 
Though his 1942 report on social security in the United Kingdom interested a number of 
colonial commentators and officials, plans to extend such programs throughout the 
Empire were almost invariably limited to waged labor. Still, increased access to health 
services was a piece of Beveridge’s vision most officials agreed should apply even in 
rural Africa. Health services also figured in the colonial plans of the Labour Party, which 
came to power following a landslide victory in the 1945 UK general election. Arthur 
Creech Jones, a leading light in the Fabian Colonial Bureau and the new Colonial 
Secretary under Labour, touted a promised expansion of health services to buttress his 
claim that “the old imperialism has come to an end.” But, at least initially, the rise of 
Labour did not seem to usher in any new era in colonial medical services. This new era 
would follow another wave of unrest, which swept across Empire in the late 1940s. Only 
then did the Colonial Office begin to increase spending on hospitals, clinics, and training 
institutions. Between 1944 and 1952 Nyasaland received some CDW aid for medicine 
and public health, and officials in Zomba finally began to improve and expand training of 
African medical auxiliaries. But, in these years just before the advent of a controversial 
Federation with Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland’s politics remained too 
quiet to merit any concerted attempt to expand African health care services. 
 
II. Social Security in “subsistence economies” 
a) Idealizing traditional village systems of social security in Nyasaland, 1944-1949 
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The India Office’s refusal to allow Beveridge to propose social security programs outside 
of industrialized urban areas reflected a broader prejudice in colonial orthodoxy. During 
the 1930s and 1940s, the Colonial Office propounded an idealized vision of African 
villages with their own robust, if primordial, forms of social security. This portrait, 
buttressed by ethnographic work and repeated in numerous reports, had the useful 
function of deflecting demands to increase public expenditure on social welfare 
programs. The argument that villages had their own sufficient social security mechanisms 
proved of great use for penny-pinching officials in heavily rural colonies—colonies like 
Nyasaland. In fact, the only participants in the debate who did not seem to believe in the 
immense capacities of traditional mechanisms of African social protection were Africans 
themselves, who insisted they should be included in social security programs.  
 
The assumption of “traditional” village African welfare was especially prominent in 
publications immediately following the fervor surrounding the Beveridge Report, which 
had increased expectations for colonial social security programs. In May 1943, the 
London-based Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society drafted “An International 
Colonial Convention.” The Convention called for immediate implementation of expanded 
social insurance programs, but focused most of its attention on waged laborers. It did 
include more generalized demands, namely that “free education shall be made available 
to all colonial peoples,” and that “measures for improving health and preventing disease 
shall be expanded and medical research increased.” But in calling for social insurance to 
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mitigate “the effects of sickness, unemployment and old age,” the draft convention 
focused on “persons dependent on the money economy.”3 
 
Assumptions about the robustness of village social protection was more explicit in the 
writings of Lucy Mair, a former student of Bronislaw Malinowski who had aided Lord 
Hailey in producing the African Survey (she was also Beveridge’s stepdaughter).4 In 
1944, while working for the UK Ministry of Information, Mair wrote a report titled 
Welfare in the British Colonies that was published by the non-governmental Royal 
Institute for International Affairs. Mair argued that in “traditional African societies…the 
aged and sick were cared for by their relatives.”5 Moreover, in the more centralized of 
these societies people were protected by “a king or paramount chief” against disasters 
that threatened to overwhelm the resources of smaller kinship groups. Political leaders 
used the wealth garnered from the tributes of their followers to “store up a reserve of food 
against famine” or “offer hospitality to the many people who visited his fort.”6 Mair 
concluded that African societies offered “a complete system of social security provided 
for by the obligations of kinship.”7 
																																																								
3 “An International Colonial Convention, Prepared by the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection 
Society.” 
4 Beveridge married Jessie Mair (née Jessie Janet, widow of David Mair), one month after he 
released his report in 1942. Lucy Mair’s was Jessie Mair’s daughter (from her previous marriage). 
5 Mair, Welfare in the British Colonies. Page 9.  
6 Ibid. Page 10. 
7 Ibid. David Stevenson, a missionary medical officer who worked in Nyasaland in the late 1950s, 
echoed this belief in his 1964 MD thesis. “While Malawi has many poor people, most individuals 
have a definite place in the community and obtain food and shelter (if sometimes rather 
inadequate by our standards)  as a natural right. The idea of communal and family 
responsibility…has great advantages in ensuring a measure of social security for each individual. 
David J.D. Stevenson, “The Health Services of Malawi” (Thesis presented for consideration for 
the degree of Doctor of Medicine, University of Glasgow, 1964). Page V. 
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In April 1945, the Colonial Office echoed these arguments in a report entitled Social 
Welfare in the Colonies. The report claimed that prior to the imposition of colonial rule, 
the peoples of the British Empire “had worked out their own methods of dealing with 
social problems according to the resources at their disposal, often with remarkable 
success.”8 In Great Britain public provision of welfare was necessitated by the fact that 
there had been, until recently, little credence in the idea of a community as “an organic 
whole whose health and vitality depend upon the well-being of all its constituent 
members.”9 Lacking such a belief, the weak, poor and unconnected were left without 
support in European societies. By contrast, the report claimed, in African villages notions 
of communal obligation had been widely accepted since time immemorial. European-
style systems of social security were needed, then, only in urban areas, where the social 
norms of traditional life were threatened by “contact” with “industrial civilization.”10 
 
The authors of these works could turn to earlier ethnographic work to support their claim 
that African villages offered their systems of social protection sufficient to obviate the 
need for social security. But, as John Iliffe has pointed out, anthropologists based their 
analyses of communal obligations on the testimony of chiefs, who in the 1930s had an 																																																								
8 “Social Welfare in the Colonies” (London: Colonial Office, April 1945), Box 11, No 9, SoMA. 
Page 2. 
9 Ibid. Page 2. 
10 Ibid. Pages 2-3. This argument was of a piece with the culture-contact thesis of Bronislaw 
Malinowski, a social anthropologist then teaching at the London School of Economics. 
Malinowski had supervised the doctoral dissertation of Lucy Mair. In a posthumously published 
book, Malinowski decried the “anarchy and disorganization” resulting from “detribalization” 
among the “floating population of the copper belt and in the lowest Black proletariat of Native 
townships and locations.” Bronislaw Malinowski, The Dynamics of Culture Change: An Inquiry 
into Race Relations in Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945). p 53. 
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interest in telling tales of “aristocratic philanthropy.”11 When the anthropologist Margaret 
Read wrote of the Ngoni—whom she had lived amongst before joining the Nyasaland 
Nutrition Survey—she recounted social expectations that chiefs would feed the hungry 
and house the homeless.12 But Read heard these stories from chiefs themselves, who 
sought to legitimate their rule by portraying themselves as providers for their material 
security. Iliffe found contrary reports from missionaries and travelers in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, of neglected orphans, abandoned epileptics, discarded blind or 
mentally ill men and women.13 But in the early decades of indirect rule, which afforded 
chiefs wealth and power while allowing colonial administrations to shirk responsibility 
for social provision, it was convenient for both groups to promote the mythology of a 
robust system of primordial social security. 
 
Even when chiefs abandoned this mythology, officials holding the purse-strings of the 
budget held fast. British colonial officials claimed publicly that they were seeking both to 
modernize agricultural production in rural areas without upsetting the existing systems of 
social protection. It is unclear whether officials really believed in the existence of 
primordial systems of social protection, or that they could preserve them while 
completely transforming the economic base. Nevertheless, repeating this fiction seemed 
useful in justifying the paucity of government social services and social insurance. Take, 
for instance, the official response to chiefs in Mlanje District in May 1949, when they 
asked “whether government through the Native Treasuries would agree to financial 																																																								
11 Iliffe, “The Poor in the Modern History of Malawi.” 
12 Margaret Read, The Ngoni of Nyasaland (Oxford University Press, 1956). 
13 Iliffe, “The Poor in the Modern History of Malawi.” 
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assistance being given to orphans.” The Provincial Commissioner replied that he had 
rarely ever seen an abandoned orphan. The chiefs’ requests grew more urgent in the 
coming months, as a poor harvest in the previous years made it clear that famine was 
approaching. Chief Chikumbu argued that aged, disabled and orphaned who were without 
relatives were the most vulnerable in such times. The African Council of the Southern 
Province proposed that three-pence from each annual tax should be placed into a fund to 
aid such cases, but Nyasaland’s Financial Secretary objected: “If any sort of arrangement 
was set up on the lines contemplated by the PC, the whole thing would snowball and 
become a crippling financial liability in a very short time.” When, that same year, the 
Colonial Office Adviser on Social Welfare wrote a report urging the administration in 
Zomba to pursue social welfare with greater vigor, the Chief Secretary demurred: “The 
conclusions are to spend more money,” he summarized, “and we have no more to 
spend.”14 While Southern Nyasaland hurtled toward a deadly famine—one in which 
officials would express their shock at widespread social abandonment of the aged, the 
disabled, the orphaned—the Nyasaland Government ruled that “special funds” for the aid 
of the vulnerable were counterproductive, as they “would lead to a further breaking down 
of the system of social security which has in the past been a feature of African rural 
society.”15 
 
Both during the war and in the years immediately following it, British administrators in 
Africa saw the need for government provision of social security as particular to waged 
labor. Peasant producers of cash crops could be afforded a measure of protection through 																																																								
14 Iliffe, The African Poor. P 267 
15 Iliffe, “The Poor in the Modern History of Malawi.” Page 266. 
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agricultural marketing boards, which “provide the peasant proprietor with the maximum 
safeguards against wide fluctuation in the prices of the produce upon the sale of which 
his livelihood depends.”16 But for “subsistence economies,” including most of 
Nyasaland, the colonial administration did not plan to provide the family allowances, 
disability insurance and old age pensions then being universalized in the UK. The 
mythology of robust traditional social security was a useful crutch: as a 1944 Colonial 
Office report, titled “Social Security in the Colonial Territories,” insisted: “In subsistence 
economies…the tribe or the family still helps substantially to provide against old age, 
indigence and, to a more limited extent, sickness,” so “the first consideration should be to 
support, for the time being at least, the existing social structure which ensures this 
traditional provision.” The main point of this report was not to plot out progressive steps 
towards an African welfare state, but to ensure that the reader understood that social 
security in the Colonies was not a responsibility of the Imperial exchequer. “In all cases 
the process must be visualized as one of an internal redistribution…The importance of 
avoiding the establishment of a standard of minimum maintenance which may prove 
beyond the capacity of the community cannot be overemphasized.”17 Cash payments to 
individuals would only follow increases in aggregate production within the colonies, and 
would not be financed from outside. 
 
It was not only stingy colonial officials who argued that social security was unnecessary 
in Nyasaland. The problem lay also in prevailing conceptions of the function of social 																																																								
16 “Social Security in the Colonial Territories,” Papers on Colonial Affairs (Colonial Office, June 
1944), Mss Brit Emp s.332, Box 47, File 4, BLOU. Page 4. 
17 Ibid. Pages 4-5 
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security according to leading reformers. In the United States and Europe, mid-twentieth-
century architects of social insurance often saw their goal as the replacement of 
“traditional” protections that had disintegrated during the proletarianization of labor. In 
the United States, for instance, New Dealers in the administration of President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt looked to the idealized solidarity of villages in Poland for the ethos 
they were trying to recapture.18 Because state social security was supposed to function as 
a photographic negative of residual traditional social supports, it was easy to see it as an 
unnecessary redundancy in seemingly remote agrarian locales (e.g. much of Nyasaland) 
where village life appeared intact. 
b) Health as an exception to Colonial Office insistence on village social security 
And yet there was at least one piece of Beveridge’s vision of “freedom from want” that 
did figure in Colonial Office plans for non-wage-earning populations. Increasing 
spending on preventive and curative health care was a major part of the stated intent of 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, and continued to be included in 
colonial plans for post-war development. Lucy Mair may have extolled the virtues of “a 
complete system of social security” in “traditional” African societies, but she also argued 
that because disease remained widespread in these societies “the importance of 
[government] medical work is particularly great.”19 The same Colonial Office reports 
that insisted that cash payments to the needy could only be financed by funds raised 
within the colonies also stated that colonial health and education were a metropolitan 
responsibility. “Even where the traditional organization is fully maintained, it is generally 
itself quite incapable of providing allied social services, particularly of public health and 																																																								
18 Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age. 
19 Mair, Welfare in the British Colonies. Page 72.  
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education, and the village or tribal social security provision needs to be systematically 
supplemented by extension of Government public health and education services.”20  
 
Beveridge had called for universal access to health care as a pillar of his plan for 
“freedom from want.” This was one pillar of the Beveridge Report that would extend to 
colonial plans for Africans even in rural areas.21 While they insisted most colonized 
Africans would have to make do with traditional social security mechanisms, no 
prominent contemporaries in the Colonial Office argued these traditional support 
mechanisms could cure the sick as readily as the recently released antibiotic and 
antimalarial drugs. These drugs, which had already begun to transform medicine in both 
rich nations and poor colonies, would figure prominently in postwar plans.  
 
III. The realities of postwar development 
a) Nyasaland’s Postwar Development Committee, 1944-1945 
Many officials in Nyasaland’s colonial administration hoped that health would be a 
significant beneficiary of postwar CDW grants. Director of Medical Services Arthur 
Williams, who had been educated at Cambridge and who had worked in West London 
Hospital before joining the Colonial Medical Service in 1912, offered a litany of 
complaints about the state of his department in the introduction to his 1944 proposal for 
postwar development.22  While the hospitals built in the 1930s were in fair repair, “the 																																																								
20 “Social Security in the Colonial Territories.” 
21 In describing how the Government of Nyasaland “managed to avoid specific provision for the 
poor for more than a decade after the Second World War,” Iliffe does note one exception: a “free 
if limited health service.” Iliffe, “The Poor in the Modern History of Malawi.” Page 268. 
22 “Obituary: ADJB Williams, OBE, MRCS, LRCP,” BMJ 1, no. 5084 (June 14, 1958): 1421. 
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same cannot be said with respect to the standard of nursing, diagnostic facilities and 
transport services for the seriously sick and injured, and in the development of maternity 
and child welfare clinics at Government hospitals.” Only a single hospital in the entire 
country had an X-ray machine, which Williams insisted was “an essential part of the 
doctor’s diagnostic equipment.” Most of the hospitals lacked electricity. To those who 
doubted the handicap this posed, he advised ‘the difficulties of doing either surgical or 
maternity work at night with no illumination other than a hurricane lantern or 
temperamental pressure lamp have to be experienced to be appreciated.” The entirety of 
Nyasaland had two ambulances, and both were intended primarily for the use of 
Europeans. The personnel of rural dispensaries were equipped with few diagnostic skills 
or—because few were entrusted with intravenous injections or pills in short supply—
medicines capable of effecting cure.23 
 
Preventive health campaigns fared little better: the existing contingent of 50 African 
“sanitary assistants,” charged mainly with vaccination efforts in rural areas, lacked the 
education to understand or explain their work to fellow Africans. Williams criticized 
those distant officials who lamented Africans’ unwillingness to build cement floors in 
homes and pit latrines, or to use soap, or wear shoes (all necessary to prevent hookworm 
and other endemic infections). These critics, he said, propounded the virtues of 
prevention without helping Africans pay for cement, or soap, or footwear.24  																																																								
23 Arthur DJB Williams, “Post-War Development of Medical Services,” 1944.  
24  Ibid. TA Austin, one of Williams’ predecessors as Director of Medical Services, had made 
similar arguments a decade earlier. In a report on a study of a village community on the island of 
Chilwa, Austin wrote, “Treatment, education and propaganda unless accompanied by financial 
and technical aid will not accomplish much. Until alternative facilities in the form of uninfected 
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All of these deficiencies, Williams argued, could be addressed if he was given sufficient 
funding. Nyasaland’s Post-War Development Committee, a body composed of officials 
and Europeans serving on the Legislative Council, agreed. In 1945, the committee 
submitted a report requesting a vast increase in the quantity and quality of medical 
provision. Their ten-year plan even proposed an increase in the number rural medical 
centers from the current figure of just over 100 to 400. Such an increase would be made 
possible by of a concomitant increase in primary education and a new Medical Training 
School in Blantyre to supplement the number of hospital assistants emerging from 
existing institutions in Zomba and at mission stations. The Committee’s ten-year plan 
foresaw an increase in capital and recurrent health spending over the ten-year period 
totaling £1.8 million. 
 
Nyasaland’s Post-War Development Committee argued that this new funding should 
come from metropolitan grants and the repayment of money owed by the Imperial 
exchequer, not from domestic revenue. In sum, the Committee’s proposals (for health and 
all other departments) planned for £7.5 million in capital and new recurrent costs 
associated with the development schemes it had proposed between 1946 and 1955. The 
committee requested that £6.5 million of this funding should come from CDWF grants. 
The remaining £1.0 million, they suggested, should be paid for by “the Protectorate’s 
surplus balances which have been loaned to His Majesty’s Government during the war.” 																																																																																																																																																																					
bathing places and protected wells are available, contaminated water from Lake Chilwa must be 
used and schistosomiasis will continue to be a menace to the health of the people.” Williams, 
“Annual Medical & Sanitary Report for the Year Ending 31st December 1935.” Page 91. 
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The Exchequer had called these transfers “gifts” from the colonies, but Nyasaland 
officials wanted the money back.25 
b) Effects on postwar colonial health spending of Labour’s victory in the 1945 UK 
general election 
The prospects for such plans, in Nyasaland and elsewhere, appeared brighter following 
the July 1945 UK general election. In the nation’s first general election in ten years, 
Clement Attlee’s Labour won a landslide victory, increasing its seats in the House of 
Commons (a 640-seat body) from 154 to 393. The Conservatives, led by Winston 
Churchill, lost nearly half their seats, plummeting from 385 to 197. With a sizable 
majority of seats in Commons, Labour claimed a mandate to remake British society in the 
postwar dawn. They set to work implementing Beveridge’s recommendations, including 
the National Health Service. Transformation seemed certain to reach the colonies, 
especially after Attlee named Fabian Colonial Bureau chair Arthur Creech Jones his 
Secretary of State for the Colonies in October 1946. Indeed, just as he assumed this 
office, Creech Jones spoke before the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, 
the same group before which Lord Hailey had called for a Colonial Charter in 1942. 
Creech Jones’ address was full of grand promises:  
So far as Britain is concerned, I think we can assume today that the old 
Imperialism has come to an end…We are determined as a people now to face up 
to the problems presented to us in the territories which we have to administer. We 
have to try to convey to the world as well as to the people in the territories for 
which we are responsible some understanding of our purpose and we have to win 
their completest confidence…The past has left a legacy of trouble. It has 
somehow to be dealt with in the progressive work we seek to do today…We have 
																																																								
25 “Report of the Post-War Development Committee,” 1945. 
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to harness nature to the will of man and to safeguard the life of man and hold in 
check disease.26 
 
A more prosaic manifestation of this almost millenarian rhetoric could be seen in the 
revamped Colonial Development and Welfare Act. The renewal of the Act was begun 
before the election and completed in October 1945, three months after Clement Attlee 
had moved into 10 Downing Street. The 1945 Act extended the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Fund’s term of existence from 1951 to 1956, and increased funding to a total 
of £120 million between 1946 and 1956.27 Even before Labour’s 1945 victory, the 
Colonial Office deployed development officers to the colonies to help draft new 
schemes.28 
 
Yet if these new development officers and Labour’s victory seemed to augur a flood of 
new money, Nyasaland’s administration would soon learn—as Shircore and De Boer had 
before—that recent unrest was a more powerful motivator for development funding than 
dismal indices of poverty and medical provision. When the Colonial Office announced 
the CDW allocations to every colony on November 12, 1945, Nyasaland was promised 
only £2 million, less than one-third of its request.29  
																																																								
26 “An Address by Rt Hon A Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the Annual 
Meeting of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society” (London, UK, October 24, 
1946), Mss Brit Emp s.332, Box 47, File 4, BLOU. 
27 Colonial Development: A Factual Survey of the Origins and History of British Aid to 
Developing Territories. Page 32. This sum included £20 million carried forward in allocations 
awarded but not yet spent under the 1940 Act. 
28 Nyasaland shared its development officer with Northern Rhodesia. “Editorial: Colonial Tasks,” 
Times (of London), January 10, 1945, The Times Digital Archive. 
29 “Nyasaland Development Programme, Revised 1947,” 1947. Also see Colonial Development 
and Welfare, 12th November 1945, from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Colonial 
Governments, Printed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of 
His Majesty, December 1945, London, HMSO, Cmd.6713, UKNA. Eventually, of the £2 million 
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Per-capita allocations were much higher for Caribbean colonies that had experienced 
significant strike action in the 1930s. Nyasaland, a colony with 2 million inhabitants in 
1945, was allocated £2 million (£1 per capita). Trinidad, with a population of 547,000 in 
1945, received £1 million (£1.83 per capita). And Barbados, a colony with 187,000, 
received £800,000 (£4.28 per capita). Jamaica, a colony with 1.3 million inhabitants in 
1945, was allocated £6.5 million (£5 per capita).30 Between 1940 and 1946, over half of 
the £10.4 million expended from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund had gone 
to the West Indies. It was still seen as a potential locus of unrest, and as America’s 
window to British imperialism.31 The post-war allocation announcement indicated 
development spending would continue to favor the West Indies. Following this 
announcement, Williams had to curtail his planned expansion of the medical services 																																																																																																																																																																					
that Nyasaland received from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund between 1946 and 
1955, £348,830 (17.4 percent) was spent on the Medical Department. This included  £205,000 for 
hospitals and training schools, £111,770 for health units and dispensaries, £9,440 for ambulances 
and other equipment, and £22,620 for leprosy settlement). By the early 1950s, though, some of 
these projects (such as the training schools) had been delayed. See “Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act 1945, Nyasaland, Public Health Plan, CDWAC No 1077, 17 February 1947, CO 
525/210, UKNA. 
30 “Return of Schemes Made Under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, by the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies with the Concurrence of the Treasury in the Period from 1st April, 1946 
to 31st March 1947” (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, July 1947), House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers Online. 
31 Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940. P 201. Criticism 
from American officials and celebrities was especially concerning to colonial officials. In an 
October 1946 speech, Secretary of State for the Colonies Creech-Jones lamented, “There has 
been, only recently, a number of statements by responsible people in American public life in 
which Britain has ben characterized as an imperial power pursuing her own material aims and 
little actuated by the purpose of winning freedom and building up the social life of the people in 
the Colonies. It is unfortunate, too, that this view is shared by those of negro descent in the 
United Sates…The latest statement I saw came from Paul Robeson himself after his interview 
with President Truman last month when it is alleged he said: ‘The British Empire is one of the 
greatest enslavers of human beings..’”  “An Address by Rt Hon A Creech Jones, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, to the Annual Meeting of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection 
Society.” P 4. 
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considerably. The post-war development plan written in 1947 had reduced new 
expenditures over the coming ten years from £1.8 million to £1.0 million. 32  
 
c) Labor unrest, once more: Colonial development following strike waves of 1946-
1948 
But if stated intentions and welfarist ideology were not enough to significantly increase 
spending for health, colonial unrest could do wonders. In 1946, another wave of strikes 
began; this time the focus was not the West Indies, but British Africa. A range of laborers 
from dockworkers to domestic servants organized general strikes in Mombasa (in Kenya) 
and Dar es Salaam (in Tanganyika) in 1947, while railway workers and miners struck in 
the Gold Coast.33 In 1948 general strikes paralyzed both Zanzibar and the Southern 
Rhodesian city of Bulawayo.34 Between 1946 and 1948 agricultural tenants, railway 
workers and hospital orderlies struck to protest price controls, low pay and poor working 
conditions in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.35 In 1949-1950, 46 strikes in Nigeria resulted in 
577,000 man-days of labor lost.36  
 
Major grievances motivating these actions included shortages of consumer goods, 
inflation, low wages and poor working conditions, but as in the late 1930s health would 
figure prominently in the Colonial Office’s response. In 1950 the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act was revised once more, adding another £20 million to the total fund 																																																								
32 “Nyasaland Development Programme, Revised 1947.”  
33 Iliffe, “A History of the Dockworkes of Dar Es Salaam.” 
34 Cooper, Decolonization and African Society. Page 226. 
35 Curless, “The Sudan Is "not yet Ready for Trade Unions’: the Railway Strikes of 1947-48.” 
36 Cooper, Decolonization and African Society. Page 226. 
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(bringing the maximum to be awarded by March 1956 up to £140 million).37 In the 
November 1950 House of Commons debate over this increased funding, Members of 
Parliament once more made the link between unrest and social welfare spending. Stanley 
Awbery, a former trade union leader and Labour MP from Bristol, was most explicit. He 
urged his colleagues to spend far more than the planned £140 million. “We have to win 
the confidence of the people of the Colonies,” he declared. “A little help given two 
decades ago might have prevented the mountain of trouble we are experiencing today. 
Our record of omissions in this field of social welfare has proved fruitful soil for both 
unrest and Communism.”38 
 
The wave of labor strikes in Africa had helped greater rhetorical (and financial) 
commitments to social services, including health.39 A significant portion of the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act would go toward health schemes. Between 1946 and 
1955, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act approved £17.0 million in grants and 
loans for health services schemes. The only category of funding receiving a larger 
amount was education, which received £19.0 million.40  
																																																								
37 Roy Lewis, 10 Years of Colonial Development and Welfare, 1946-1955 (London: Central 
Office of Information, 1956). Page 16. 
38 Stanley Awbery, Colonial Development and Welfare Bill, Volume 480, cc1135-251, 1950, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1950/nov/09/colonial-development-and-welfare-
bill#S5CV0480P0_19501109_HOC_342. 
39 Steven Feierman has made a similar argument about the link between health and protest. In a 
1985 review article on “the social roots of health and healing in modern Africa,” he explained: 
“In the colonial situation the ultimate arbiter was in the metropole; employers of labor were well-
represented there, but the potential African beneficiaries of improved health care had little 
influence in the colonial mother-country. What influence they had emerged from the politics of 
resistance and of nationalism.” See Steven Feierman, “Struggles for Control: The Social Roots of 
Health and Healing in Modern Africa,” African Studies Review 28, no. 2/3 (June 1985):. 123. 
40 Lewis, 10 Years of Colonial Development and Welfare, 1946-1955. 
	 283	
 
In apportioning these additional CDW funds (as well as the reserves from the initial 
allocation), both African and West Indian colonies were among those receiving new 
funds. Some of the largest increases were allocated to postwar hotbeds of unrest. 
Between 1945 and 1960 the Federation of Nigeria (including Cameroons) was allocated 
£36.4 million and Kenya was allocated £9.7 million, more than any other colonies in the 
entire British Empire. Nyasaland, though it was not such a hotbed until the Federation 
period, also saw some benefit to the increased funding. Between 1945 and 1960, 
Nyasaland was allocated £4.9 million in CDW grant aid.41 
 
To be sure, the increase in spending is not entirely attributable to colonial unrest.  Creech 
Jones would later point to larger postwar forces that had not allowed for full and 
immediate implementation of the Act: “The new Government in Britain had to cope with 
confused international relations, with anarchical economic conditions, with scarcities of 
supplies and low production, with complicated issues of finance, and with demands for 
capital and goods at home and in the Commonwealth which could not be satisfied.”42 
With these pressures abated, Parliament and the Treasury were less opposed to increased 
CDW expenditure. The CDW Fund expended only £3.5 million in 1946-1947, but this 
figure rose to £16 million by 1954-55.43 
 																																																								
41 Between 1946 and 1955 Kenya and the Federation of Nigeria (including Cameroons) received 
more CDW aid than any other British Colonies. Kenya received £9,657,000), while Nigeria 
received £36,380,000. Ibid. p 19. 
42 Colonial Development: A Factual Survey of the Origins and History of British Aid to 
Developing Territories.  Page 31. 
43 Lewis, 10 Years of Colonial Development and Welfare, 1946-1955. 
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There was increasing recognition of the benefits of a “stabilized,” productive labor force. 
After the Second World War, the UK Government sought to bolster its dwindling dollar 
reserves by expanding exports of African primary products. Part of the strategy to do so 
was to render labor more productive through “stabilization,” allowing families to live 
together rather than relying on migrant labor to mines and plantations. In order to allow 
for this stabilization, companies and colonial administrations built better housing and 
expanded health and education facilities near these centers of production.44 But while this 
move toward stabilized labor was an important factor in expanding health services in 
some places, it was less important in Nyasaland. Some workers on Northern Rhodesia’s 
copper mines enjoyed greater social service provision and higher wages, but the 
economic logic of labor stabilization affected few among Nyasaland’s overwhelmingly 
rural smallholder population.45 
 
d) Assessing the impact of Labour rule on health services in Nyasaland 
In the end, what difference did it make to African patients in Nyasaland that Labour held 
power in Britain? Did the ideals of the Fabian Colonial Bureau actually impact decision-
making in Whitehall?  
 
The existing historiography insinuates that the Labour Party’s rhetoric of socialist 
planning “for the Common Weal” in the colonies masked a basic continuity with imperial 
policy of the previous half-century. In a discussion of the mostly abortive large-scale 
agricultural mechanization programs (e.g. the Tanganyika groundnut scheme) pursued 																																																								
44 Feierman, “Struggles for Control.” 
45 Roberts, “A History of Zambia.” Pages 187-190. 
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during under Labour, Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton point to “the obvious 
similarity of Labour’s policies to those enunciated by the ‘archimperialist’ Joseph 
Chamberlain some four decades earlier.” Chamberlain, who became Colonial Secretary 
in 1895, had argued that the British were “the landlords of a great estate,” and had 
favored policies favorable to settler-run plantations.46 Historian Paul Kelemen recounts 
that by the 1951 UK general election, both the Conservatives and the Labour left argued 
that Attlee’s government had exploited the colonies. Noting the increasing sterling 
balances of the colonies, in 1952 the leftist editorial board of the weekly Tribune argued 
that even considering the CDW aid provided by the Imperial Exchequer, “the 
colonies…are financing us!” These histories argue that the ideological commitments of 
the Fabian Colonial Bureau seem to have had little impact on the actual practice of 
economic policy-making in the 1945-51 Labour Government.47 
 
In the realm of health policy, though, the archives reveal that Creech Jones’ subordinates 
echoed some of his ideological commitments in consequential policy deliberations. In 
February 1949, the Colonial Office heard from the Crown Agents for the Colonies that 
UK manufacturers were declining to fill their orders because of instructions from other 
government ministries “that their output, or a large proportion of it, must be retained for 
the home market.” The Colonial Office was particularly concerned about export controls 
on medical supplies, namely “surgical dressings, surgical instruments, and electrical 
medical machinery.” X-ray machines were a particular concern. This technology had 																																																								
46 Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, “The Origin and Course of Fabian Colonialism in 
Africa,” Journal of Historical Sociology 4, no. 2 (June 1991): 143–74. 
47 Kelemen, “Planning for Africa: The British Labour Party’s Colonial Development Policy, 
1920-1964.” 
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become particularly important for tuberculosis diagnosis and monitoring, as new 
chemotherapeutics (especially streptomycin) began to reach clinics around the world. 
One manufacturer of X-ray machines had told the Crown Agents in February 1949 that 
“he was allowed by the Ministry [of Health] a small quota merely to maintain his export 
connections,” and that the company planned to export only one mobile X-ray machine 
(which was destined for Nigeria) in the next two years.48 “Orders for hospital and 
medical equipment placed as long ago as 1945 have still often not been executed,” 
complained Morris in a letter to the Ministry of Health.49 
 
Henry Wilkinson, Comptroller of Supplies for the Ministry of Health, confirmed that he 
had placed some controls on exports, but noted that even though orders of X-ray 
machines for the NHS were “seriously in arrears,” he had “released” one unit to the 
Tanganyika groundnut scheme in 1948 in addition to the unit recently promised to 
Nigeria. Wilkinson explained that, due to acute shortages and arrears in orders of gauze, 
lint and bandages in the UK, only one-quarter of surgical dressings produced 
domestically were exported. He noted further that, despite shortages of surgical 
instruments and streptomycin in NHS facilities, all Crown Agents orders for these items 
were being met. In all, he concluded, the colonies were “getting a fair share of the 
available supplies.”50 
																																																								
48 “Committee on Colonial Development: Export to the Colonies of Items of Equipment Which 
Are in Short Supply in the United Kingdom, Memorandum by the Colonial Office,” February 7, 
1949, MH79/629, UKNA. 
49 William Alexander Morris, “Letter to Henry Wilkinson, Comptroller of Supplies, Ministry of 
Health,” February 16, 1949, MH79/629, UKNA. 
50 Henry Wilkinson, “Export to the Colonies of Items of Equipment Which Are in Short Supply in 
the United Kingdom, a Note by the Ministry of Health,” February 14, 1949, MH79/629, UKNA. 
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At a March 28 meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Colonial Development, this issue 
became the subject of heated dispute. According to the meeting minutes, Wilkinson 
insisted he was “not willing to contemplate the diversion to export of anything which 
would endanger the health of this country.” Hilton Poynton, an Under-Secretary of State 
for the Colonies who had previously served in Sierra Leone, “stressed that this view was 
not acceptable…as His Majesty’s Government had an equal responsibility for 
safeguarding health in the Colonies.”51 Poynton and Wilkinson eventually agreed to a 
proposal put forward by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, in which the Colonial 
Office would provide other ministries “guidance on particular items which were for the 
time being of concern to the colonies.” Poynton inserted the proviso that “colonial orders 
for these items should be treated on an equal footing with home orders.”52  
 
Shortly after this agreement was reached, Nyasaland finally received long-sought 
additional X-ray machines. Nyasaland’s Postwar Development Committee had called, in 
1944, for an increase in the Medical Department’s supply of X-ray machines from one to 
eight. By 1952, this figure had increased only to three, with machines in Lilongwe, 
Blantyre and Zomba. In 1951 the department was also afforded its first radiologist, who 
in turn trained three African hospital assistants. The number of X-rays performed had 
																																																								
51 S.R. Ashton, “Poynton, Sir (Arthur) Hilton (1905-1996), Civil Servant,” Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (Oxford University Press, 2009); “Cabinet Committee on Colonial 
Development” (Cabinet Office, Great George Street, SW, March 28, 1949), MH79/629, UKNA. 
52 “Cabinet Committee on Colonial Development.” (March 28, 1949) The committee did agree to 
“some degree” of “home favoritism” for fuel supplies. 
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risen from 1,570 in 1950 to 2,956 in 1952.53 Still, this expansion paled in comparison to 
the concurrent increase in X-ray facilities in the home market. Between 1950 and 1952 
the National Health Service added 560 X-ray units across the United Kingdom.54 Thus, 
the United Kingdom received more than 280 times more X-ray units than Nyasaland, 
though the population of the former was only 17 times larger than that of the latter.55 
“Home favoritism” in the form of budgets if not export controls, was alive and well.  
 
IV. Staff, space, and stuff in the postwar health system 
 
a) The fight against venereal disease: new treatments for the postwar moment, 1944 
Shircore was unwilling to await the end of the war to see a new dispensary built in his 
district. But the war did end, and soon retrenchment of colonial budgets turned to 
expansion. In 1944 Nyasaland’s government convened a Post-War Development 
Committee, chaired by a veteran administrator named Juxon Barton who was then 
serving as Chief Secretary. One of the committee’s reports concerned public health in 
Nyasaland. This report began with a warning, that the “economic development of 
Nyasaland…is not likely to be satisfactory because a large proportion of the Native 
population suffers from the debilitating effects of malaria, hook-worm, bilharzia and 
other parasites.”56 The Colonial Office was also concerned with health in Nyasaland, 
																																																								
53 “Annual Report of the Medical Department for the Year 1950” (Zomba, Nyasaland: 
Government Printer, 1951), University of Malawi Library; “Annual Report of the Medical 
Department for the Year 1952” (Zomba, Nyasaland: Government Printer, 1953), Box 15, No 2, 
SoMA. Page 19. 
54 “Shortage of X-Ray Films,” BMJ 1, no. 94 (January 12, 1952): 94–95. 
55 In 1950 the estimated population of Nyasaland was 2.8 million, while the population of the 
United Kingdom was roughly 50 million. 
56 Post-war development committee 1944, Interim report No 3 –public health [authors are Juxon 
Barton (chairman), GH Adams, W Tait Bowie, MP Barrow, HG Duncan, AF Barron, JA Lee, J 
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particularly with venereal diseases brought back by African soldiers returning from war 
(many had served in South Asia, notably Burma).57 Given the concern with under-
population in the colonies in the 1930s and early 1940s (see Chapter 1), the anticipated 
spread of gonorrhea and syphilis, the “great preventer of life” and “great destroyer of 
life,” respectively, justified spending on medical services.58 There was also new funding 
available for medical provision across the British Empire; the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act (CDW), which had first passed Parliament in late 1939, finally secured 
funds from the Imperial Treasury toward the war’s end.59 In May of 1945, the Colonial 
Office granted Nyasaland its first tranche of CDW funding when it approved an 
application for a five-year, £42,000 grant to Nyasaland to provide free medical treatment 
for gonorrhea and syphilis at government and mission institutions.60 
 
b) Buildings and drugs are not enough: a call for better training and equipment, 
1944 
Arguments that venereal and other diseases would stanch Nyasaland’s postwar growth 
helped spur a broader reappraisal of the quality of care in government health facilities. As 																																																								
57 W.A.M. to Mr. Boyse and Mr J.B. Williams, April 11, 1945, CO 525/199/5, UKNA. 
Approximately 27,000 Malawian soldiers enlisted during the Second World War. According to 
John McCracken, “outright compulsion was largely avoided. Instead, provincial and district 
officers threatened native authorities and headmen with the loss of privileges if the failed to 
provide sufficient numbers of recruits. McCracken, A History of Malawi. p 239. 
58 “Post War Development Committee, Draft Interim Report No. 3- Public Health, Nyasaland 
Secretariat.” Page 3 
59 The historian Ann Beck notes that the word “welfare” was included in the name of the act to 
“indicate the new special emphasis to be given social improvement, for it had been found that 
emphasis on schemes of a capital nature gave too much priority to material development.” Ann 
Beck, Medicine, Tradition, and Development in Kenya and Tanzania. 1920-1970, First Edition 
(Waltham, Mass: African Studies Assn, 1981). Page 5. 
60 Edmund Charles Smith Richards, “CDWAC No 527: Nyasaland. Venereal Disease: Purchase 
of Drugs for Treatment. Application for Free Grant of £42,000,” January 23, 1945, CO 
525/199/5, UKNA. Also see Governor’s Despatch No 72 of the 12th July, 1944, on the subject of 
Venereal Disease, to Colonial Office 
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of July 1944, treatments for gonorrhea (sulphapyridine tablets) and syphilis (bismuth and 
neosalvarsan tablets) were provided at all district hospitals. But of the 91 rural 
dispensaries, only the four staffed by African hospital assistants (with four years of 
training) were allowed to administer these drugs. Because of the toxicity of the most 
important injections, and presumably because of the scarcity of sulphapyridine tablets, 
African auxiliaries at the rest of the dispensaries were entrusted only with “palliative 
treatment” such as dressings and bandages for traumatic wounds.61 A 1944 commission 
on venereal disease in Nyasaland recognized the inadequacy of training not only as an 
impediment to venereal disease control, but also to “the diagnosis and treatment of other 
prevalent and preventable diseases.” Many of the most commonly used drugs in this era 
could be highly toxic. Injections of quinine (for malaria), antimony tartrate (for 
schistosomiasis), emetic (for amoebiasis), and bismuth and mercuric compounds (for 
syphilis and gonorrhea) were prepared by boiling a tablet on a tablespoon over a spirit 
lamp, then injecting the dissolved solution. In addition to the toxic effects of the drugs 
themselves—antimony tartrate, for instance, was known to cause splenic contraction and 
a subsequent rise in circulating malaria parasites—poor preparation and administration 
technique could result in abscesses or even death.62 Nyasaland’s venereal disease 
																																																								
61 See 1944 commission on VD. Also see De Boer, “Annual Medical & Sanitary Report for the 
Year Ending 31st December 1938.” page 27: “Treatment of [schistosomiasis] at dispensaries has 
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commission recommended expanding the availability of treatment through increased 
training of African hospital assistants (to be posted, contrary to the name, at both 
hospitals and dispensaries) and laboratory assistants.63  
 
The Postwar Development Committee argued that while Nyasaland’s medical buildings 
were “said to compare favourably with similar institutions in other African territories,” 
the Protectorate lagged in “the standard of nursing, diagnostic facilities, equipment and 
medical transport services,” and “in the development of maternity and child welfare 
clinics.” They requested funds for X-ray machines and electric lighting at eight district 
hospitals, 11 new ambulances (to be added to the current stock of only two), and the 
transfer of patients at the Lunatic Asylum (then under the Prison Department) to a new 
200-bed Mental Hospital (to be administered by the Medical Department). The 
committee recommended 18 additional European medical officers and 30 additional 
European nurses. Most importantly, the training of hospital assistants should be 
undertaken at a four-year Medical Training School able to accommodate four classes of 
15 students each. The committee did not seek a medical school—Nyasaland lacked even 
a single government secondary school until 1946—but instead recommended sending 
“those of outstanding ability’ to Makerere College in Uganda.64 
																																																																																																																																																																					
physicians considered neosalvarsan superior to mercury for the treatment of syphilis. Nyasaland’s 
government facilities for Africans continued to use mercury, most likely because it was cheaper. 
63 IC Ramsay et al., “Report Submitted by the Committee Appointed to Consider and Make 
Recommendations on the Problem of Venereal Disease in Nyasaland,” January 26, 1944, CO 
525/199/5, UKNA. 
64 Before the 1940s, only two Africans from Nyasaland were known to have completed a medical 
degree. Both DRS Malikebu (MD, 1926) and Hastings Kamuzu Banda (MD, 1937) studied in the 
United States, at Meharry Medical School, a black institution in Nashville. Malikebu became a 
missionary doctor at the Providence Industrial Mission in Chiradzulu, while Banda would not 
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Finally, the Postwar Development Committee recommended a rapid of increase in 
recurrent expenditure on health. Over the ten years between 1934 and 1943 the Medical 
Department had averaged £54,100 in annual recurrent expenditure. Between 1941 and 
1943 the average was £66,000. The report recommended increasing annual recurrent 
expenditure to £157,500 by 1949. They also recommended £453,125 in development 
spending on health facilities and equipment over five years.65 
 
c) Postwar growth of medical spending and staffing, 1945-1952 
Nyasaland’s medical department did enjoy increasing recurrent and capital budgets 
during this postwar period. By 1949, recurrent expenditure on health in Nyasaland was 
£163,321; its peak in the years prior to the 1953 advent of the Federation came in 1951, 
when recurrent health expenditure in Nyasaland reached £185,800. Between 1945 and 
1952 recurrent spending in current pounds sterling more than tripled. Capital expenditure 
in the medical department came a few years later than requested, but between 1948 and 
																																																																																																																																																																					
return until 1958, not to practice medicine but to lead the anti-Federation movement (see Chapter 
4). Only one African from Nyasaland, Sam V Bhima, was sent to Makerere in the 1940s. He 
returned in 1952 with a medical diploma, and was posted to the Zomba African Hospital.  No 
other Africans from Nyasaland earned medical degrees until the early 1960s, when Harry 
Bwanausi, Anne Ascroft and Vida Nwira, returned from studies abroad. See Mkandawire, Living 
My Destiny. Pages 90-91 
65 “Post War Development Committee, Draft Interim Report No. 3- Public Health, Nyasaland 
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1953 it totaled over £284,368 (with additional expenditure on health facilities included in 
the Public Works Vote).66 
 
But the postwar expansion of Nyasaland’s health sector was not as impressive as these 
numbers appear to indicate. First, the postwar years were a period of increasing primary 
commodity prices and intensified tax collection drives. As a result, domestic public 
revenues (not including grants-in-aid) rose substantially, from £1.2 million in 1946 to 
£3.9 million in 1952. Yet the postwar Governor, Geoffrey Colby, who held this post 
between 1948-1956, did not prioritize health. When he requested additional CDW 
funding from the Colonial Office, it was not for health care but rather for roads, 
telecommunications, and electricity. During his tenure, even the Protectorate 
government’s applications to the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund claimed the 
medical system was already quite adequate: “There is at present a reasonably 
comprehensive curative service in relation to the economic and social development of the 
Territory.”67 Colby’s only interest in health, as indicated by his requests to the Colonial 
Office, was in improving clean water.68 The share of recurrent expenditure devoted to 
Nyasaland’s medical department fell from 7.2 percent in 1947 (the year before Colby 
																																																								
66 “Annual Report of the Medical Department for the Year Ended 31st December, 1945” (Zomba, 
Nyasaland: Government Printer, 1946), Box 15, No 11, SoMA; “Annual Report of the Medical 
Department for the Year 1952.” 
67 “Application for a grant from Colonial Development and Welfare Funds: Medical 
Department,” 1950, CO 525/218/11, UKNA. 
68 Colin Baker, Development Governor: Sir Geoffrey Colby - A Biography (IB Tauris & Co Ltd, 
1994). Page 91. 
	 294	
arrived) to 4.1 percent in 1951, before beginning to rebound to 5.9 percent in 1952 (the 
year before the start of Federation).69 
 
d) Training African medical providers in postwar Nyasaland, 1945-1952 
Auxiliary medical training finally increased after the war, following decades of smaller 
efforts. These African providers included dressers, dispensers (used interchangeably with 
“dressers” in Nyasaland), hospital assistants, medical assistants, and varied “classes” of 
nurses and midwives. Though these cadres had long formed the front line of Nyasaland’s 
government medical provision, governments in British Africa only began to assume 
responsibility for training (previously done entirely by missions) in the mid-1930s. There 
were relatively few educated Africans from whom these training institutions could draw. 
As detailed in Chapter 3, the Colonial Development Act of 1929 did not include funding 
for primary or secondary education. Shircore (in 1930) and De Boer (in 1938) had both 
lamented the limited training and knowledge of dressers put in charge of dispensaries. De 
Boer claimed that the only improvement in the training of dressers since Shircore had 
called for an overhaul of dresser training was a two-month course at the Zomba African 
Hospital.70 By the early 1940s dressers had usually completed Standard 4, and were able 
to read and write, but their lack of fluency in English often frustrated medical officers.71 
A few dressers were trained by medical officers at district hospitals to deliver anesthesia 
during surgery (sometimes medical officers’ wives also filled this role), but here the 																																																								
69 These figures differ from those quoted in Baker’s Development Governor, but he does not cite 
his source for the figures, whereas mine come from Nyasaland’s annual Medical Department 
reports. 
70 De Boer, “Proposals by Director of Medical Services, Nyasaland, for Reorganization of 
Medical and Health Services.” Page 7. 
71 Berry, Before the Wind of Change. Page 16. 
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“minimal qualification was to be able to render the patient unconscious without killing 
him!”72 
 
For decades the colony’s few African hospital assistants were trained in courses at the 
Universities’ Mission for Central Africa (UMCA) hospitals, first in Livingstonia before 
then in Blantyre after 1928. The Nyasaland government had first accredited the UMCA 
curriculum in 1909, and the Blantyre mission school received public subsidies.73 Some of 
the graduates of these programs joined Nyasaland’s medical department.74 In the 1910s 
and 1920s the course of study was three years, including 850 lectures on subjects 
spanning the basic sciences as well as public health, clinical medicine and surgery, and 
even medical jurisprudence. This curriculum increased to four years in 1928, lengthening 
to include additional clinical training in medicine, surgery, pathology, nursing and 
anesthesia. The prerequisite educational requirements also increased over the years, from 
completion of Standard 3 in 1911 to completion of Standard 6 by the 1930s.75 Hospital 
assistants’ literacy, numeracy, work ethic, social grace, and medical knowledge often 
impressed medical officers; Berry remembered a case in the early 1940s when a hospital 
assistant corrected his own failure to order a blood film to check for malaria in a febrile 
patient admitted for schistosomiasis treatment.76 Berry recalled another, Dan Ngurube, as 
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the “cleverest of all our hospital assistants.” At times, Berry reminisced, Ngurube 
“corrected the diagnoses made by (unidentified) white Rhodesian or South African 
doctors” on patients sent home as invalids from the mines.77 
 
Organized training of African hospital assistants in a Nyasaland government facility 
finally began after the Second World War. The Zomba African Hospital was renovated 
with CDW funds with new classrooms, male and female student hostels, and a recreation 
hall, as well as additional exam rooms, a new pharmacy, a bigger pathological laboratory 
and an antenatal clinic.78 The new hospital drew its senior African staff largely from the 
UMCA mission hospitals or from veterans of the Kings’ African Rifles.79 The most 
educated of the new male matriculants were expected to become Medical Assistants after 
two years of training; the top performers among them would go on to train as Hospital 
Assistants. Other male students could become medical aides (below medical assistants), 
health assistants (a cadre focused on community public health campaigns) and laboratory 
assistants, while female trainees could become midwives or (after 1951) nurses.80 
 
Austin Mkandawire completed Standard 6 in 1948. To his chagrin, he had not been 
selected to attend Blantyre Secondary School, then the only government secondary 
school in Nyasaland. Mkandawire applied and was accepted to the Zomba Medical 
Assistant training course along with fifteen other new students. After two years of 																																																								
77 Ibid. Page 5 
78 Mkandawire, Living My Destiny. Page 89 
79 For more on the involvement of Nyasaland soldiers in the Second World War, see McCracken, 
A History of Malawi. 
80 Mkandawire, Living My Destiny. Page 97. 
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training he passed his exams with distinction, and was among the four selected to proceed 
with the hospital assistant training course. In his memoirs, Mkandawire recalls his pride 
in this moment: 
The hospital assistant course gave one status and therefore was the envy of 
everyone in the medical field. It was a prestigious position to reach and I felt 
privileged to have had the honour of being selected. I was thrilled knowing my 
financial position would also improve substantially so that I could at last pay for 
my studies. The highest hospital assistant scale was £240 per annum and that of a 
senior medical assistant was £198 per annum...I reached the highest point of £240 
when I was promoted to principal hospital assistant in 1957.81 
 
Mkandawire admitted, with characteristic forthrightness, that he enjoyed the status 
afforded hospital assistants. But the “status”—or lack thereof—due African auxiliaries 
became a point of contention in the micro-politics of Nyasaland’s African hospitals. 
Among the few Africans to with the financial resources to complete primary school, the 
students at Zomba were, for the most part, born into relative wealth; Mkandawire, for 
instance, was the son of a teacher at the Livingstonia Mission. Many former students at 
Zomba’s African Hospital came to occupy positions of power and privilege outside 
medicine after independence. John Kadzamira, who decided not to work in medicine after 
completing the medical assistant course without being selected for hospital assistant 
training, joined the Postal Service and became Postmaster General following 
independence. Another classmate became Secretary General of the Malawi Congress 
Party, another became a diplomat, and a third rose to a high rank position in the Malawi 
Police Force.82 Mkandawire himself eventually completed a medical degree in Ireland in 
1971. 
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Despite the status they brought to medical training and the status they earned by dint of 
that training, in the early 1950s these students were Africans in a segregated colonial 
society, and were treated accordingly. Mkandawire recalled an Irish surgeon named 
Roberts who had been posted in Nyasaland since 1942. He was Nyasaland’s first surgical 
specialist, “loved, revered and almost worshipped by the Africans, to whom he was 
dedicated and with whom he formed a special relationship.” Mkandawire remembers 
himself as Roberts’ favorite trainee in his cohort, and he often assisted on cases. But 
Mkandawire vividly remembered one night while preparing for a surgery, he was “kicked 
in the ribs” by his mentor because he accidentally placed Roberts’ boots on the wrong 
feet.83 
e) Politics of health in Nyasaland on the eve of Federation: protesting nursing care, 
1952 
While they suffered the condescension—and even physical abuse—of European doctors 
and nurses, African medical professionals were sometimes seen by African patients as 
haughty and uncaring. In a January 1953 letter from Rose Chibambo and other members 
of the Nyasaland African Women’s League to the Director of Medical Services, the 
Women’s League leaders complained about the treatment of women by African nurses in 
Zomba’s African Hospital: 
It is a sorrowful thing that these criticisms are directed on the African Nurses who 
should be more aware of their responsibility in caring for their fellow African 
Women, than anybody else…In most cases those women who are admitted are 
dangerously ill and are incapable of doing anything on their own, but when the 
patients seek Nurses’ help, it is very surprising that they are very resentful and 
care very little. Indeed, the men are doing far better than the Nurses in these 
wards, for they really have their spirit of service to their fellow people. The 																																																								
83 Ibid. Page 101. Roberts apologized fifteen years later, when Mkandawire reminded him of the 
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Nurses unlike the men have no sense of responsibility towards their fellow 
women patients. …When a patient asks for a bedpan she finds that it takes a 
considerable time before she can receive help; and when it is too late she cannot 
help but spoil her beddings. When this happens the nurses become very 
cross...The result is that the patient loses all the confidence in both medicine and 
the staff and also discourages many from coming to the hospital…It seems a rule 
at the hospital to make patients to take water for drinking from the taps by 
themselves. But in most cases the patients are so ill that they cannot rise and walk 
to bring water and in this regard it is the duty of the Nurse to bring the water for 
the patients…In the Labour Ward when the pains are so severe that some of the 
women cry…the Nurses turn round to mock and frighten the women…Through 
the medium of the authorities they should learn of their immense responsibility 
and duty to their people.84 
 
While in the late 1930s Colonial Office officials claimed Africans could do without 
nursing at hospitals, by the early 1950s Africans themselves were demanding better 
nursing care. Caregiving by strangers was proving a thorny issue. The Women’s League 
invoked their status as “fellow people” to argue that African nurses should render 
impartially solicitous care.85 
 
This episode also demonstrates a markedly different politics of medicine than the one that 
would begin under Federation the next year. Here, African patients complained to 
European administrators about the unprofessional behavior of African health care 
workers. Under Federation rule, African publics (and leaders like Rose Chibambo) would 
be united in their protests against the Federation regime and its medical system, even as 
they accessed government health facilities ever more frequently. 																																																								
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V. Conclusion 
 
Though spending on health in Nyasaland rose in absolute terms between the end of 
World War II and the start of Federation, it was not a distinct priority of Governor 
Colby’s administration. And Nyasaland, a quiet backwater of the imperial estate, was not 
afforded anywhere near the level of financial support given to development projects in 
Jamaica after the 1938 protests, or to schemes in Kenya and Nigeria following their late-
1940s bouts of labor unrest. Nyasaland was economically insignificant and politically 
peaceful. It seemed, to many observers, to be fated to remain a land filled with semi-
subsistence farmers and a few European settler plantations. Exports had grown during the 
postwar boom in commodity prices, but Nyasaland not seem to present any particular 
prospects for anything other than a handful of tobacco and tea estates, or recruitment for 
mine labor elsewhere in southern Africa. 
 
In 1953, the imposition of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland would change all of 
this. Many Nyasaland Africans had spent time in Southern Rhodesia, and they did not 
relish the prospect of having their home soil ruled by whites in Salisbury. They did not 
react with their characteristic calm and good cheer to Whitehall’s accession to Southern 
Rhodesian demands for federated rule. Nyasaland became, in the 1950s, a focal point of 
organizing, agitating, civil unrest and violent repression. Not coincidentally, the colony 
also experienced its most rapid expansion in health spending and health services in its 
history. During the prior decades of quietus, Nyasaland only received metropolitan 
resources for health after unrest elsewhere. But in the Federation era, Nyasaland itself 
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became the dramatic lead. For a tumultuous decade, officials would portray popular 
hospitals and health centers as symbols of beneficence. Nyasaland’s health sector would 
expand far more under the thumb of a regime of avowed white supremacists (in Southern 
Rhodesia, between 1953 and 1963) than under rule by democratic socialists (in the UK 
Labour Party, between 1945 and 1951). The politics of health would become especially 
potent, though, because government medicine had rather suddenly become incredibly 
popular. 
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Chapter 7 
Patients finally arrive, but may not be welcome: the simultaneous rise in 
attendances for health services and modernization theory, 1945-1970 
 
Abstract 
 
During the 1950s and 1960s the number of Africans attending government health 
facilities in Malawi increased rapidly, from 1.3 million in 1954 to 10.2 million in 1967. 
The rise in attendance at medical facilities was driven primarily by the training of 
auxiliaries than by the entrance of new chemotherapeutic agents with demonstrated 
efficacy and fewer adverse effects. At the same time, many prominent development 
experts of the era believed government spending on curative medicine was fiscally 
imprudent. University economists from the US and the UK argued for “modernization,” a 
strategy for rapid industrialization that required focusing public expenditure on 
infrastructure and industry. To modernization theorists, health was an unproductive 
welfare state benefit, inapposite to the primary goal of GDP growth. This chapter 
highlights a conflict between a newly popular government medical service and a disfavor 
for medical spending among economic experts. The tension between public demand for 
biomedicine and expert opinion arrayed against it serves as a prelude to the political 
propaganda and contests over government medicine during the Federation and early post-
colonial eras.  
 
Prelude: “Life is capital” 
Tsinu lina nditadwala (One day after falling ill) 
Ndinapita kuchipatala (I went to the hospital) 
Nditafika kumeneko (When I got there) 
Ndinapeza odwala ena (I found some patients) 
Ataimana pakhomo (Waiting by the door) 
Kukanizidwa kulowa (Forbidden to enter) 
Ndinafunsa ndichiani (I asked what it was about) 
Akuti nthawi sinakwane (They said it was not time yet) 
… 
Patapita nthawi pang’ono (After a short while) 
Atavala suti yache (Some gent arrived) 
Alonda ananjemnjemela (Wearing his suit) 
Awana inu lowani (The guard shook with deference) 
Kukodola mkulu uja (Pointing at the gent) 
Tonsefe tinyanganana (We just looked at each other) 
Tati dziko lathu lokondedwa (Wondering about our beloved nation) 
Kukhala tidzikhala chonchi? (Is this to be our lot?) 
Pakuti tilibe maina (Because we are nobodies.) 
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--Charles Nsaku, Kuchipatala (At the Hospital), 19991 
 
It was finally clear to my why Chisomo insisted on arriving so early. By the time we 
dismounted the bicycles and paid the cyclists who took us the 12 kilometers from 
Chisomo’s home to the Monkey Bay hospital, it was already 7:30AM. Entering the 
outpatient department of this hospital, rebuilt with funds from Iceland’s government a 
decade ago, there were already 30 other people waiting to be seen. They sat along the 
wall of a long hallway, mostly in silence. Some sat on benches with their heads in their 
hands. Most of the women were seated on the floor, their legs stuck out ramrod straight, 
in the manner I had seen many women sit while eating in Mbeya village.  
 
The medical assistant (MA) arrives a half-hour late, 8:30AM. She was a young woman 
wearing a white coat and a tired, harried expression. As soon as she unlocked the door, 
there was a mad dash to follow her inside. The queue formed in the hallway was less the 
agreed order in which the patients were to be seen be seen than the starting line of a race 
every time the door opened. The visits were incredibly short. Each patient spent two to 
three minutes in the room before exiting to fight through another crowd to gather the 
prescribed medicines at the dispensary. 
 
Chisomo eventually cajoled and cornered his way into the room, and invited me to join 
him. He did not wait for the MA to ask him a question. Instead he handed over a tattered 
yellow booklet. This was the same booklet that everyone in the country keeps in their 																																																								
1 John Lwanda, “Poverty, Prophets and Politics: ‘Marxist’ Discourses in Malawi Music, 1994-
2012,” in Indigenous Language Media, Language Politics and Democracy in Africa, Eds. 
Abiodun Salawu and Monica Chabita (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), 211–34. 
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possession and brings to such visits. (Most Malawians are in the habit of calling it a 
“passbook,” a relic, perhaps, of the passbooks blacks were made to carry in Southern 
Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa.2)  Chisomo explained that he needed a new urinary 
catheter. Looking at his passbook, the MA could gather as much. The book contained 
cursory notes scribbled during his recent visits. Most contain only two or three lines. The 
last one, from six weeks prior, read simply: “BPH, catheter change, return 2 weeks.” 
Chisomo said he had not returned for so long because he was in too much pain to walk, 
and did not have other means of transport until I offered to pay two young men to take us 
to Monkey Bay by bicycle. 
 
The MA stepped out of the room to get a new urinary catheter set from the equipment 
room. She returned, asks Chisomo to lie on an exam table, and proceeded to replace the 
catheter without keeping the catheter tubing, or her gloves, sterile. When she finished 
Chisomo sat up and pulled up his pants. The MA wrote a prescription for ciprofloxacin in 
his passbook. This was, she explained, to treat a urinary tract infection that he had all but 
certainly developed from having catheter in his bladder for so long. She told him to return 
in another three weeks. 
 
To any American medical provider this whole scene would seem highly unusual. BPH, a 
condition in which the prostate enlarges, is a common condition in older men around the 
world. It is almost never a life-threatening condition; its main effect is to render urination 
more difficult by blocking outflow of the bladder into the urethra. In the United States it 																																																								
2 Wicken, “African Contrasts.” Pages 23-24. 
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is often treated with medicines that allow urine to flow more readily. If symptoms do not 
improve, surgery to remove some of the prostate tissue might be indicated.  In some 
cases, a catheter is placed directly into the bladder—this is known as a suprapubic 
catheter. But aside from some significantly impaired elderly patients, few people in the 
United States use Foley catheters (which run up the urethra to the bladder) for longer than 
a few months. Such a treatment almost invariably leads to a urinary tract infection that 
can damage the bladder and the kidneys.  
 
Another curious feature of the way in which Chisomo was managed was the ready 
assumption, at all his visits, that BPH was his diagnosis. Difficulty passing urine in an 
elderly male does not automatically mean that male has BPH. He may, or he may not. 
There are other, more worrying diagnoses, including kidney stones, prostate cancer or 
bladder cancer that can cause similar symptoms. The notes in Chisomo’s passbook 
detailed no prior workup to rule out these diagnoses. The persistence of Chisomo’s pain 
(which left him on writhing in agony on a mat most days) and the high prevalence of 
Schistosoma haematobium (a well-established cause of bladder cancer) on the southern 
shores of Lake Malawi rendered unjustifiable the assumption that his only diagnosis was 
BPH.  
 
A complete workup might have required a referral to one of Malawi’s central hospitals, 
but there were things that could have been done even in the office. For instance, a rectal 
exam can help differentiate between BPH and prostate cancer. No such exam was noted 
in Chisomo’s passbook. With only two years of training after secondary school, the MA 
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might not have known the full differential diagnosis for Chisomo’s presenting 
complaints. More importantly, though, she felt rushed. More importantly, she was rushed. 
By the time Chisomo’s visit was complete—which, unlike the others, had taken ten 
minutes—the line for the outpatient department had grown to sixty people. The MA was 
the only provider in the department that day. She expected to see about 100 patients, as 
she did most days. Thus, for want of time and training, a sick man was given a cursory 
exam and poor treatment for a condition he may not even have. 
 
Even still, Chisomo reported feeling better in the days after his clinic visits. Like many, 
he found government medicine valuable, if hard to access and not at all adequate. Like 
many, he brought home the stories of relief (albeit partial and temporary) that lead many 
of Malawi’s sick to form long queues outside outpatient departments every morning. But 
a week after his visit, I found Chisomo again lying on the ground outside his home, 
writing in pain. He was struggling to pass any urine, and reported the return of his 
excruciating abdominal pain. 
 
Better care was on offer nearby, for those who could pay. After one of Francis’s 
neighbors, an elderly woman named Dalitso, complained of diffuse abdominal pain, I 
offered to accompany her to Catholic Mission at Nankwhali. The mission was about six 
kilometers east of Mbeya village on a windy dirt path. The clinic was part of a beautiful 
campus, thick with foliage. Walking up the hill to the clinic on Wednesday morning, 
churchgoers could be heard singing hymns inside a majestic church. The walls of the 
clinic were painted white and sky blue. The floors looked freshly cleaned. Only one other 
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patient (a mother with a baby) was waiting to be seen on the bench outside the 
immaculate exam rooms. Patients at the mission clinic were seen by a clinical officer; 
clinical officers are given more training than medical assistants.3 The clinical officer, 
named Paul, admitted that his job was much easier than it would be in the public sector.4 
The fees, he acknowledged, kept many sick people away, so he ended up seeing no more 
than 20 patients on an average day. This gave him more time to treat the patients who 
were able to afford to pay.  After having her vitals taken by an attendant, Dalitso was 
examined by Paul. Rather than simply listening to a chief complaint and scribbling in her 
passbook, Paul took her history and performed a physical exam. Finding symptoms 
consistent with intestinal amoebiasis, he prescribed erythromycin. The visit and the 
medicine cost 1500 kwacha (roughly US$5 dollars), much more than Dalitso, who lived 
																																																								
3 Medical assistants and clinical officers are the two major “mid-level” or “auxiliary” health 
cadres in Malawi. Medical assistants (and hospital assistants) have been trained at missionary 
schools in Malawi (by various names, with varied requirements), since the nineteenth century 
(see Chapter 1), and at government institutions beginning in the mid-1930s (see Chapter 6). Since 
2000, the required training to become a medical assistant (by obtaining a Certificate in Clinical 
Medicine) was two years of post-secondary, pre-service didactic training. Since independence, 
medical assistants have mostly been tasked with outpatient care. Clinical officers were introduced 
in Malawi in 1980. To become a clinical officer (by obtaining a Diploma in Clinical Medicine), 
one must complete three years of post-secondary, pre-service didactic training and one year of 
internship. Clinical officers are expected to care for hospitalized patients and outpatients as well 
and to perform some surgical procedures, including Caesarean sections. While most of the 
country’s few physicians (260 for a population of 13 million) work in urban areas, medical 
assistants and clinical officers are often tasked with providing care in rural dispensaries and 
district hospitals. Government and missionary training institutions offer a number of nursing 
degrees, which require between one and three years of pre-service and in-service training. See 
Adamson S. Muula, “Case for clinical officers and medical assistants in Malawi,” Croatian 
Medical Journal 50 (2009); 1: 77-78. Also see “Nurse/Midwife Training Operational Plan: Field 
Assessments, Analysis and Scale-up Plans for Nurse Training Institutions.” Lilongwe: Ministry 
of Health, 2011. 
4 In order of number of filled posts in 2010, the cadres of health workers in Malawi’s public 
health sector were nurses (including midwives), then medical assistants, then clinical officers, 
then environmental health officers (who are tasked with community public health work), and 
finally physicians. See Annex 2, Malawi Health Sector Strategic Plan, 2011-2016. Lilongwe: 
Ministry of Health, 2010. 
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alone in a decaying wattle-and-daub hut with a porous thatch roof and a wasp infestation, 
would have ever paid on her own.  
 
The disparity between the care for those who can pay to attend the private clinics, and 
those who must attend the public sector clinics, is perhaps best summed up by the slogan 
for a USAID-funded behavior-change campaign. One such poster was taped to a wall 
near the hospital dispensary in Monkey Bay, but they can be seen at all public facilities. 
In brightly-colored lettering above a smiling African face, the sign reads “Moyo ndi 
mpamba, samalireni!” The literal translation, from Chichewa, is “Life is capital, take care 
of it!” The campaign’s purpose was to encourage Malawians to wash their hands and 
treat their drinking water with chlorine to prevent diarrheal disease. No Malawians I 
asked had ever heard the aphorism before the Moyo ndi mpamba campaign began 
running radio advertisements three years prior. But the mantra “life is capital” seemed to 
encapsulate much of the experience of being both ill and impoverished in Malawi.  
Unable to pay for the superior care offered at private clinics and missions, most relied on 
a perpetually-underfunded public sector, where a few overworked, underpaid staff 
struggle to deal with Malawi’s massive disease burden. Few Malawians doubted that 
more “capital” would help them to live longer, healthier lives. They needed no ad 
campaign to be convinced of what is perhaps the most obvious fact of Malawian life. The 
mantra, repeated in posters plastered on the walls of crowded hospitals, seemed less an 
exhortation than a cruel joke. 
I. Introduction 
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“The native likes cough mixtures.” So explained Nyasaland Director of Medical Services 
Henry de Boer in a letter to the Chief Secretary in Zomba in June 1941. This was both an 
observation and a lamentation. De Boer wished it were not so; he yearned for the day 
when those prescriptions that were “actually necessary” were the same as those “desired 
by the patient.” But given the distance between prevailing medical opinion and the 
expectations of African patients, de Boer found it necessary to instruct his staff to use 
drugs with “great care” and not exhaust scarce supplies simply to appease patients.5 
 
De Boer’s letter came in response to a request for medicines made by local chiefs a few 
weeks prior. Two native authorities (Mbwana and Boghogo) in Chinteche District told 
the Senior Medical Officer in Lilongwe that many of their people suffered from 
“coughing,” while the nearest dispensary had no drugs to treat them.6 The Medical 
Officer deployed Fred Nyirenda, a Hospital Assistant then stationed at Chinteche District 
Hospital—and a graduate of the Livingstonia Mission’s training course in the early 
1920s—to tour the villages.7 Nyirenda reported that he found “only coughs and colds,” 
seasonal ailments that demanded no special treatment.8 The native authorities, and their 
people, would have to go without cough mixtures (the contents of the mixtures were not 
described in the letters, but they likely included opiates). 
 
																																																								
5 HS De Boer, “Letter from Director of Medical Services to Honorable Chief Secretary, Ref. Cen. 
Regy. MP No 1273/21,” June 21, 1941, S40/1/3/2, no. 124, MNA. 
6 Mbwana, “Letter from Native Authority Mbwana to Senior Medical Officer, Medical 
Department, Lilongwe,” June 10, 1941, S40/1/3/2, no. 127, MNA. 
7 Mkandawire, Living My Destiny. Page 47. 
8 De Boer, “Letter from Director of Medical Services to Honorable Chief Secretary, Ref. Cen. 
Regy. MP No 1273/21.” 
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Even if Nyirenda had found seriously ill patients—he was likely worried about 
tuberculosis—the discord between patient and provider would not have been resolved. 
Through the late 1940s, the mainstay of tuberculosis treatment for Nyasaland’s African 
patients was indoor bed-rest. But, as colonial medical officer John Goodall remembered, 
patients were loath to follow these instructions, and preferred to “flock outside and lie in 
the sun.”9 The few tuberculosis patients who submitted to more heroic measures, at the 
hands of colony’s sole surgeon, had a procedure in which the affected lung was 
collapsed, and the phrenic nerve crushed.10 While patients suffering persistent coughs 
eagerly sought cough mixtures, few submitted to long hospitalizations or painful (and 
most often futile) surgical procedures. 
 
But by the 1950s, the preferences of physicians and patients had both changed. With the 
arrival of novel therapeutics for a whole host of diseases (e.g. tuberculosis, malaria, 
syphilis, gonorrhea), European doctors and African hospital assistants secured a new 
therapeutic armamentarium. Patients and providers had far greater confidence in the 
efficacy of the new therapeutics. Take, for instance, tuberculosis. The number of patients 
voluntarily presenting for treatment increased from 366 in 1948 (before the use of 
streptomycin, PAS and isoniazid) to 1,946 in 1958 (after these drugs had been 
introduced). As this chapter will show, this pattern was repeated for a number of 
symptoms and ailments. There was, then, a convergence of perceptions of efficacy 
																																																								
9 John Goodall, Goodbye to Empire: A Doctor Remembers (Edinburgh: Pentland Press, 1987). 
Page 79. 
10 RM Morris, “Annual Report on the Public Health of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
for the Year 1956” (Salisbury, Rhodesia: Government Printer, n.d.), BL. Page 15. 
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between doctors and patients. As a result, inpatient admission and outpatient attendances 
rose markedly in the first two post war decades. 
 
In an influential 1977 article, historian of medicine Charles Rosenberg described a 
“therapeutic revolution” in the United States during the nineteenth century. This 
revolution entailed a divergence of perception between doctor and patient. At the 
beginning of the century, Rosenberg explains, therapeutics was “part of a system of belief 
and behavior participated in by physician and layman alike.” This system was so 
convincing to both physician and layman because “all the weapons in the physician’s 
normal armamentarium worked—“worked,” that is, by providing visible and predictable 
physiological effects: purges purged, emetics induced vomiting, opium soothed pain and 
moderated diarrhea.”11 Such visible activity demonstrated both the drug’s efficacy, and 
the physician’s competence.  
 
The “revolution” over the course of the nineteenth century involved a divergence of 
perception between doctor and patient. By the second half of the twentieth century, 
physicians and patients no longer shared a view of the body, nor did they have the same 
understandings of drugs’ actions on it. Patients retained faith in therapeutics, but since 
many drugs no longer had perceptible physiological effects, patients’ faith was based on 
the “imputed status” of the physician.12 
 																																																								
11 Charles Rosenberg, “The Therapeutic Revolution: Medicine, Meaning and Social Change in 
Nineteenth-Century America,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 20, no. 4 (1977): 485–506. 
12 Ibid. 
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This chapter chronicles the consequences of the mid-twentieth century antibiotic 
revolution in British Nyasaland. This revolution can be likened to Rosenberg’s revolution 
in reverse. Instead of a divergence of perceptions of efficacy between (both European and 
African) medical practitioners and (African) patients, this revolution involved a 
convergence of belief. Patients began appearing at government hospitals and dispensaries 
in far greater numbers once the drugs could meet shared expectations of efficacy. Patients 
did not seek drugs providing immediate physiologic effects, but rather those that 
provided lasting relief from their ills. Africans in pain were more likely to ask for aspirin 
than purgatives.13 “The native only judges by results,” the missionary physician J.B. 
Christopherson had concluded in 1921.14 While yaws treatment of the 1920s had 
provided some temporary relief, and hookworm therapy of the 1930s could clear parasitic 
infestations, European therapeutics could not cure Nyasaland’s worst illnesses before 
1945. And thanks to the experience of the hut tax and the carrier service, Africans had 
little trust in government institutions. Unlike the American physicians described by 
Rosenberg, British colonial doctors could not rely on “imputed status” to secure patients’ 
trust in Nyasaland. Colonial doctors were all too aware that news of their failures spread 
rapidly among Africans; patients, their families, and “witch doctors” shared these tales of 
woe.15 But the sick and their families proved ever willing to judge for themselves. When 
																																																								
13  Thomas D. Thomson, “Domasi Community Development Scheme Report, 1949-1954” 
(Zomba: Government Printer, 1956). Page 68. “There is no doubt about the popularity of 
European curative medicine. Bandages are displayed with pride, and there is a great local 
fondness for the taste of the stock cough mixture; Epsom salts are preferred to purgative pills and 
quinine to mepacrine; aspirin grows steadily in popularity…In 1953 less than half of the women 
whom began treatment for syphilis completed the cure, but in 1954 nearly two-thirds did so.” 
14 Christopherson, “The UMCA and Medical Work at Magila.” 
15 Gopsill, “A Few Notes on My Life in Zanzibar and Nyasaland from 1926 to 1945.” Page 11. 
After a recovering surgical patient died in Port Herald after being struck by lightning, Gopsill 
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more effective therapeutics entered public clinics after the war so, too, did African 
patients. 
 
A number of histories of colonial medicine in southern and eastern Africa have posited 
that the influx of these novel therapeutic agents, capable of curing common illnesses with 
fewer side-effects than their predecessors, drew patients to biomedical facilities.16 This 
argument is consistent with, but extends further, the ethnographic empirical data 
collected by John Janzen in what was then Zaire, which found that patients and the close 
kin who directed medical care-seeking decisions were empiricists. That is, the patients 
were likely to be brought to whichever healer—biomedical or “traditional”—had proven 
able to heal the sort of illness the patient seemed to be suffering.17 A number of other 
anthropologists studying patterns of care-seeking behavior among what used to be known 
																																																																																																																																																																					
lamented the loss of “good propaganda.” He explained: “Apart from the loss of life we were sad 
to lose the male patient because he could have been good propaganda. He had a stone removed 
from his bladder, the stone was the size of a large duck’s egg, and the patient was due to be 
discharged in a few days time. I had imagined him trotting round the villages with his stone in his 
hand. What a story in the beer gatherings. In a new area a Medical Officer has to build up his 
surgical and medical reputation. The African Witchdoctors are quick to seize on failures. They 
also have the habit of sending one cases at death’s door. Those patients through neglect or sorry 
treatment are in such a bad way that they are cheerfully awaiting death to release them from their 
pains. They are too far gone to save. The Witch doctors taunt ‘See what happens when you go to 
hospital.’” 
16 Messac, “Moral Hazards and Moral Economies”; The Steamer Parish; Iliffe, East African 
Doctors. 
17 See John M. Janzen, The Quest for Therapy in Lower Zaire (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978). Janzen explains the general course of care-seeking behavior for illness episodes 
among the patients he followed in the Lower Zaire in 1969: “All cases begin, by preference, 
either with Western medicine or with an nganga. If, in due course, healing results, or the expected 
death of someone like an old person occurs, a tacit evaluation is made that the illness was naturel, 
‘of God.’ Many illnesses and etiological evaluations end here. But if the affliction does not 
respond to symptomatic treatment, then it is suspected to be ‘human caused,’ or ‘supernaturally 
caused’…These areas are researched, evaluated, and dealt with by the therapy managing group on 
its own or with the help of a ritual counselor.” p. 221. 
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as “traditional peoples” have argued in favor of what we can call the “pragmatic 
empiricist” hypothesis.18  
 
But in the forty years since Janzen’s work, other anthropologists have posited 
determinants of demand for biomedicine among Africans that appear, to the allopathic 
physician, far less rational. Caroline Bledsoe and Monica Goubaud allowed that one 
criterion that the Mende of Sierra Leone used to determine whether to seek out “Western 
medicine” was “the reputed success of the drug in curing an ailment of a friend or relative 
that seems similar to their own.” Nevertheless, in her estimation, “the most important 
elements of logical consistency that governed people’s choices of medicines…seemed to 
be qualities such as shape, color, taste and consistency.” The logics underlying these 
criteria were unrelated to notions of efficacy recognizable to practitioners of Western 
medicine, relying instead on “Mende beliefs about the causes and cures of various types 
of illness.”19 
 
Bledsoe and others have provided convincing evidence of the importance of locally- or 
regionally-specific beliefs about illness causation in their health care decision-making.20 
																																																								
18 Writing in 1977, the anthropologist George Foster argued: “When, on the basis of empirical 
evidence, traditional peoples see that scientific medicine is more effective than their own, and 
when they can have scientific medicine on terms they deem acceptable, they are happy to turn to 
it.” George Foster, “Medical anthropology and international health policy,” Social Science and 
Medicine. 11 (1977); 10: 527-534. 
19 Caroline Bledsoe and Monica Goubaud, “The reinterpretation of Western pharmaceuticals 
among the Mende of Sierra Leone,” Social Science & Medicine 21 (1985); 3: 275-282. 
20 For a brief and (somewhat dated) review of this literature, see Sjaak van der Geest, Anita 
Hardon and Susan Reynolds Whyte, “Planning for essential drugs: are we missing the cultural 
dimension?” Health Policy and Planning 5 (1990); 2: 182-185. A more recent bibliography of 
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Yet most of these studies are based on intensive ethnographic methods rather than 
extensive statistical analysis. Few such investigations were conducted prior to the late 
1960s, meaning that they mostly missed the changing dynamics of health care seeking 
behavior with the initial introduction of effective antibiotic and anti-parasitic therapies 
during the colonial era. It remains unclear, then, how various logics of care-seeking 
behavior shaped patterns of demand for biomedicine in Africa, particularly during the 
late colonial era. This study uses colonial government disease returns over six decades to 
demonstrate that pragmatic empiricism is able to explain the major changes in patient 
attendances in Nyasaland’s public sector hospitals and dispensaries. Even with the 
necessary caveats about the accuracy of this data (see the next section), this analysis 
demonstrates a rapid increase in attendance at government facilities after the introduction 
of novel, more effective, chemotherapeutics.  
 
Even though it confirms an existing hypothesis, this study contributes to this literature in 
three ways. First, because care at government clinics was provided without charge 
throughout the colonial era, cost barriers to treatment were less important here than in 
settings with user fees, which include many post-colonial settings in which such care-
seeking investigations have been carried out. This lessens the influence of the variable—
access—that remains the overriding determinant of patient attendance figures in many 
impoverished settings, and allows for the more direct examination of patient 
																																																																																																																																																																					
this literature is provided in Susan Reynolds Whyte, Sjaak van der Geest, Anita Hardon. Social 
lives of medicines (New York: Cmabridge Universtiy Press, 2002). 
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preferences.21 Second, this is the first study of mid-twentieth century care-seeking 
behavior in southern or eastern Africa to make extensive use of colonial disease returns.22 
In doing so, it provides national-level statistical series in which the pragmatic empiricist 
hypothesis holds tremendous explanatory power. Finally, this study uses both qualitative 
and quantitative archival data demonstrate more precisely the timing of the increase in 
attendance in Nyasaland for a number of common ailments. In doing so, this chapter 
shows the profound specificity of mid-century demand for government medical care 
among Africans in Nyasaland. Patients began to present in greater numbers for a given 
disease after new, more efficacious treatments reached the clinic shelves. The increases in 
attendances for common diseases were independent of one another, and almost entirely 
determined by the introduction of novel therapeutics. 
 
This chapter seeks to address a literature on care-seeing behavior that was initially 
motivated by colonial-era concerns about “traditional…peoples’ underutilization of, or 
noncompliance with, the Western scientific medical system.”23 The evidence below 
suggests that Africans’ reticence to seek care at government facilities for specific 																																																								
21 A 1996 review of studies of treatment seeking for malaria concluded that “access, severity of 
illness, and cost are the major factors that determine the use of health facilities.” Even in colonial 
Nyasaland and postcolonial Malawi, health care was not accessible simply because it was free at 
the point of care. As this chapter will demonstrate, there remained significant barriers such as 
transport to distant facilities. SC McCombie, “Treatment seeking for malaria: a review of recent 
research,” Social Science & Medicine 43(1996); 6: 933-945. 
22 For a West African study of care-seeking behavior that uses colonial disease returns, see S. 
Kojo Addae, The Evolution of Modern Medicine in a Developing Country: Ghana 1880-1960 
(Durham Academic Press, 1997). Though Addae does not foreground the pragmatic empiricist 
hypothesis, the timing of the introduction of new therapeutics and the increase in attendances at 
government clinics in the Gold Coast is consistent with it. 
23 Bledsoe and Goubaud, “The reinterpretation of Western pharmaceuticals among the Mende of 
Sierra Leone,” 276. Interest in this literature was reinvigorated in the 1980s by a concern among 
international health experts about the “irrational” use of antibiotics in developing nations. 
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ailments at certain historical moments might not be wholly attributable to locally-specific 
beliefs about illness causation. Instead, demand for biomedical care might be readily 
explained by perceptions of therapeutic efficacy that were shared by both physicians and 
patients. The rising popularity of biomedical facilities documented in this chapter also 
sets the scene for Chapters 8 and 9, which concern the political consequences of the 
newfound demand for government medical facilities. 
 
II. The rise in attendances and spending at public sector health facilities, 1945-
1969 
a) A note on statistical production and interpretation 
The use of medical and fiscal statistics in this chapter and the next demands at least a 
brief discussion of the circumstances attending their production. I take most government 
budget figures on revenues and expenditures at face value. Colonial-era figures, 
presented to the UK Colonial Office and Treasury, were so central to governance and so 
closely monitored that their veracity can be generally accepted. Even in the post-colonial 
era, Hastings Kamuzu Banda was widely reputed to run an efficient and honest civil 
service, and his supporters and detractors alike deemed his budget figures accurate.24 
 
Greater difficulties arise in the use of statistics related to the number of patients attending 
medical facilities. I base much of my account on the rise in annual outpatient 
“attendances.” These figures are based on monthly reports filed by medical officers at 
hospitals and medical assistants at dispensaries. These figures are surely not entirely 																																																								
24 Gerhard Anders, In the Shadow of Good Governance : An Ethnography of Civil Service Reform 
in Africa (Boston: Brill, 2010). 
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accurate, but there is little evidence to suggest any systematic bias that could account for 
the increase in attendance figures over time. One possible problem is raised in the work 
of David Stevenson, a former missionary doctor, who wrote of the government figure for 
1962 that “out-patient attendances” represented “the number of treatments given, not the 
number of patients.”25 This definition is not repeated in the Medical Department’s annual 
reports. Yet if this was indeed the definition of “attendances” during this period, the rise 
in this figure might conceivably reflect an increase in the number of prescriptions written 
for each patient, and not just an increase in the absolute number of patients. While this 
might account for some of the increase in this index, it is unlikely to provide the whole, 
or even much, of the explanation for its phenomenal increase. The first-hand accounts to 
follow of once-empty facilities that had become, by the 1960s, incredibly crowded speak 
to the increase in patient numbers, and not just prescriptions.26 
 
Other statistics have even more profound questions surrounding accuracy and 
interpretation. Disease returns are, of course, based on individual diagnoses. For diseases 
where diagnoses were particularly uncertain—syphilis, tuberculosis, and malaria were 
famously difficult diagnoses at mid-century—disease returns cannot be read as the 
number of patients presenting with undeniable evidence of a given infection or other 
malady. In fact, after the Second World War Nyasaland’s Directors of Medical Services 
were sufficiently doubtful of the accuracy of diagnoses by medical aides in dispensaries 																																																								
25 Stevenson, “The Health Services of Malawi.” Page 23 
26 Stevenson’s remark also begs the question of whether outpatient attendances at missionary 
failities were also based on the number of treatments rather than the number of patients. I assume, 
in this chapter, that mission attendances and government attendances were measured in the same 
way. 
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that they did not include their disease returns in official statistics.27 Thus, after 1940 the 
figures presented in Figures 7.6a and 7.6b include only those returns submitted by 
hospitals (though the total number of patient visits included dispensary attendance). But 
this actually renders the increase in attendance for certain diseases (e.g. tuberculosis, 
syphilis) after the advent of novel therapeutics after the war all the more impressive. 
Even though the figures compiled after the war included statistics from fewer facilities, 
total attendances nonetheless increased dramatically. 
 
While statistics on patient attendance are uncertain, data on the incidence and prevalence 
of various diseases in the general African population were rarely collected. Individual 
medical officers conducted small surveys of such diseases as hookworm and 
schistosomiasis during the interwar era, but rigorous, large-scale studies of more life-
threatening conditions were uncommon. Commentator (and committed Fabian) Joan 
Wicken surmised that the dearth of epidemiological studies may have been a deliberate 
omission in colonial data-collection, as the absence of evidence of disease helped mute 
calls for greater spending. She pointed to a temporary impasse in negotiations with the 
WHO and UNICEF to conduct a survey of tuberculosis incidence in Nairobi’s slums 
																																																								
27 Before 1940, the disease returns for African outpatients included both rural dispensaries and 
hospitals. During the war, reports often did not report disease return statistics for African 
outpatients. The 1943 report was the first to exclude disease return statistics from rural 
dispensaries. See PS Bell, “Report of the Medical Department for the Year 1947, Nyasaland 
Protectorate,” 1948, 1, Box 15, No 9, SoMA. Page 5. “Dispensaries are staffed mainly by 
Medical Aides, whose standard of diagnosis is necessarily not high. Returns of diseases cannot be 
regarded as entirely reliable, and accordingly are not included in the tables at the end of this 
Report. The work done is nevertheless worth while, and is greatly appreciated by the African 
population which constantly requests additional dispensary services.” 
	 320	
“because the [City] Council would not undertake the necessary treatment and follow-up 
work.”28 Colonial settlers and officials recognized the fiscal benefits of ignorance. 
 
Population statistics were also dubious. Little is known of the methods used in the 1901 
“population count,” the first attempt to quantify the African population of Nyasaland (or, 
as it was known at the time, the British Central African Protectorate). The 1911 “census” 
was estimated by multiplying the number of hut-taxes paid by 2.8 (a protectorate-wide 
average of 2.8 people per hut had been estimated based on counts of people per hut in 
“certain selected villages”). Subsequent censuses in 1921, 1926, and 1931 ostensibly 
involved visits to by “enumerators” to every village.29 Budget retrenchments led to the 
cancellation of the census in 1936, and the war led to the cancellation of the 1941 
census.30  The 1945 census was the last of the colonial era. Population statistics of the 
late colonial years were notoriously inexact, and recapitulated the methods of the 1911 
census. David Stevenson remembered a Blantyre accountant admit that “the method of 
estimating the total population, in 1962, was to take the number of taxpayers, (supposedly 
all adult men, apart from those granted specific exemption for medical or other reasons), 
multiply by two to allow for those who avoided paying tax, and again by five to allow for 
dependents.”31  
 
																																																								
28 Wicken, “African Contrasts.” Page 67. Wicken did observe that the City Council eventually 
agreed to the survey, and to appropriate £5,000 for a clinic. 
29 Malawi Population Census, 1966, Final Report, Department of Census and Statistics (Zomba: 
Malawi Government, 1967). Page i. 
30 Berry, Before the Wind of Change. Page 9. 
31 Stevenson, “The Health Services of Malawi.” Page 38. 
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The first post-independence census was conducted in 1966. In this census, enumerators 
visited all 1.5 million “dwelling units” in the country.32 Censuses then followed roughly 
every decade, with one in 1977, and another in 1987.33 The relative infrequency of 
rigorous censuses during the twentieth century, and the lack of resources with which they 
were performed, should call into question the accuracy of any per-capita statistics. In the 
coming chapters, I use population statistics in order to provide rough per-capita figures. 
Though there is little evidence to indicate a systematic bias in these figures, they should 
not be regarded as accurate. 
 
The same cannot be said of GDP figures, perhaps the most contentious statistic of all. 
Nyasaland was one of the first colonies for which national income was estimated. But, as 
I have explored in other work (and mentioned in Chapter 2), these figures systematically 
discounted the contributions of smallholder agriculture in general and women’s labor in 
particular. The rapid growth in GDP during the post-independence years was a product of 
increasing production of cash crops on large agricultural estates, and the rising prices 
these crops fetched on international markets. But, as I will explain in Chapter 10, this 
growth in cash crop production was hastened by exploitation of the smallholder 
agriculture, and justified by GDP statistics that discounted the contribution of 
smallholders to economic indices. Meanwhile, surveys of actual production in rural areas 
were so rare and so poorly funded that it is impossible to invest much faith in them. So 																																																								
32 Malawi Population Census, 1966, Final Report, Department of Census and Statistics. Page i. 
33 William J House and George Zimalirana, “Rapid Population Growth and Poverty Generation in 
Malawi,” Journal of Modern African Studies 30, no. 1 (1992): 141–61. The United Nations Fund 
for Population Activities (UNFPA) funded both of these censuses. Also see Lemson Samson 
Chitsamba, “Malawi and the Politics of Foreign Aid” (PhD Dissertation, London School of 
Economics, 1990), Proquest. Page 393. 
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profound was the systematic bias in GDP figures that I will present them only rarely, and 
even then usually to explore their political uses.  
 
And to say much about the effects of medicine on mortality statistics would require vital 
statistics. But the British colonial administration did not systematically register births and 
deaths in the African population.34 Theirs was not a biopolitical regime. There was 
relatively little inquiry into the kinds of concerns Foucault believes characterize such 
regimes: “propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and 
longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary.”35 The colonial 
administration certainly preferred to govern a productive and docile population, but it did 
little to achieve such an ideal. Its main interest in monitoring the population was in 
ensuring universal payment of the hut tax. This, in turn, was an instrument to force the 
men to work in the region’s plantations and mines.36 In sum, there are few statistics 
																																																								
34 There was compulsory vital registration of Nyasaland’s Asiatic and European population. The 
Medical Department undertook “experiments” in the registration of native births and deaths in 
Fort Manning in the early 1932, and nationally in 1947. But even in the 1947 attempt, all that was 
compiled was the total number of births and deaths occurring in each district. Records of 
individual births and deaths—information necessary to calculate such basic indices as the life 
expectancy and infant mortality rate—were not compiled. ADJB Williams, “Annual Medical & 
Sanitary Report for the Year Ending 31st December 1933” (Zomba, Nyasaland: Government 
Printer, 1934), Box 15, No 21, SoMA. Pages 14-15. 
35 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 1st American ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1978). 
36 If biopolitics was a motive force for the rise of the welfare state in Western Europe and, to a 
lesser extent, the United States, it never worked with equal fervor in sub-Saharan Africa and other 
late modern colonial and postcolonial contexts. Achille Mbembe has argued that Foucault’s 
biopolitics is insufficient to understand the political realities of African states where the balance 
of political concern lies in with the productive capacities of life but rather with sovereign power 
over death. For his part, Jean Comaroff, for seems to call for more biopolitics, for he finds in it 
the possibility for life-saving claims-making by citizens on the South African state, To be sure, 
the colonial and postcolonial endeavors involved efforts to inscribe state prerogatives on the 
bodies of subjects; one need only look to the last century of resettlement schemes, justified with 
racialist and productivist arguments, to see this. But outside Europe, the imperative for docility 
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available for scholars seeking to discern the course of economic and demographic shifts 
in Nyasaland’s population. Those statistics that are available were designed not for 
accuracy, but to buttress the interests of the colony’s European elite. 
b) Charting the post-war rise in patient attendance at government facilities 
Writing in the British Medical Journal in 1960 Dr. Harry S. Gear, a Consultant to the 
Federal Ministry of Health in Salisbury, marveled at “the insatiable demand for European 
medicine. Where less than a quarter of a century ago the large majority of Africans 
avoided European hospitals and clinics, they are now overwhelming them.” The situation 
had changed drastically since both Shircore (in his 1930 report) and de Boer (in his 1938 
report) had lamented the sparse attendance by Africans in government hospitals and 
dispensaries (see Chapter 3). Africans in Nyasaland were turning to hospitals in much 
larger numbers than ever before. The number of outpatient attendances by Africans in 
1965 (8,710,732), the first full year of Malawi’s independence, was more than three times 
higher than in 1955 (2,505,547), and more than twelve times higher than in 1945 
(719,316). On a per-capita basis, attendance increased from 0.45 in 1953 to 2.52 in 1969 
(Figure 7.1). African inpatient admissions rose as well. Admissions in 1965 (92,892) 
were over two times greater than in 1955 (42,218), and almost four times greater than in 
1945 (23,369).  
 
 
 
 																																																																																																																																																																					
has been achieved largely by means other than anatamo- and bio-politics. Biopower may be a 
two-edged sword, but its weakness in many parts of the globe cannot be called a blessing. See J.-
A. Mbembé, On the Postcolony (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); J. Comaroff, 
“Beyond Bare Life: AIDS, (Bio)Politics, and the Neoliberal Order,” Public Culture 19, no. 1 
(January 1, 2007): 197–219. 
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Figure 7.1: African outpatient attendances per capita at Nyasaland/Malawi government 
facilities. Sources: Annual medical reports (colonial era, 1914-1964) and World Bank 
reports (postcolonial era, 1965-1982). 
 
c) Comparing government and mission outpatient attendances, 1940-1970  
The attendance figures also reveal something else. By the end of the 1960s, African 
outpatients attended government facilities far more often than they attended missions. 
Figure 7.2 shows that in 1940 outpatient attendances were more than six times higher at 
government facilities (559,189) than at missions (85,427). This ratio decreased during the 
1950s: in 1957, government facilities (2,237,514) and missions (1,770,701) had similar 
numbers of African outpatient attendances. But by the late 1960s, the figures were 
disparate once more; in 1969 government facilities treated more than four times as many 
African outpatients (11,075,729) than missions (2,428,034).37 Data on inpatients,  
																																																								
37 Maurice King, “Development Plan for Health Services, 1970-1985” (Zomba Malawi: Ministry 
of Health and Community Development, 1970), Malawiana Collection, Univrsity of Malawi 
Library. 
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Figure 7.2 Government vs. Mission outpatient attendances in Nyasaland/Malawi. Source: 
Annual reports for Medical Department, 1914-1964 and World Bank Reports, 1965-
1982. 
 
depicted in Figure 7.3, indicate that government facilities and missions admitted 
remarkably similar numbers of patients throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
The parity between government and mission inpatient figures, and the disproportionate 
share of outpatients going to government facilities, complicates the portrait of Malawi, 
still shared by many Africanists, as a land dominated by missions. To some extent this 
assumption is a result of the comparatively rich trove of histories and memoirs of 
missions in Malawi, and particularly those connected to the nineteenth-century physician-
explorer David Livingstone.38 Colonial officials often highlighted the number of  																																																								
38 See, for instance, Charles Good, The Steamer Parish; James William Jack, Daybreak in 
Livingstonia: The Story of the Livingstonia-Mission, British Central Africa (Forgotten Books, 
2012); Magomero.Livingstone, Laws of Livingstonia; James Tengatenga, The UMCA in Malawi. 
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Figure 7.3: Government vs. Mission inpatient admissions in Nyasaland/Malawi. Source: 
Annual Medical Department Reports, 1914-1964. 
 
missions, perhaps because making missions seem numerous absolved them of 
responsibility for expanding government healthcare. One historical account of medical 
services in Malawi begins with the observation that “the part played by the various 
Missions has been considerable.”39 While missions were, in Gear’s words, “the early 
predominant medical force” in Nyasaland, by the Federation years that age had surely 
passed. By mid-century medical missions were no more important for most Africans in 
Nyasaland than for Africans in other British colonies of southern Africa. Nyasaland’s 
Africans were, during the mid-twentieth century, no more amply served by mission 
																																																																																																																																																																					
A History of the Anglican Church 1861-2010 (Zomba Malawi: Kachere Series, 2010); Mary 
McCulloch, A Time to Remember: The Story of the Diocese of Nyasaland (Published for the 
Diocese of Nyasaland by the Universities’ Mission to Central Africa, 1959). 
39 Baker, “The Government Medical Service in Malawi.” 
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hospitals than were Africans elsewhere in the region. In 1962 Nyasaland had fewer 
mission hospitals (61) than either Southern Rhodesia (65) or Northern Rhodesia (80), 
even though Nyasaland had an estimated African population (2.93 million) higher than 
Northern Rhodesia’s  (2.46 million) and only somewhat lower than Southern Rhodesia’s 
(3.64 million).40 
 
As the last chapter detailed, Government medicine for Africans was so absent in the early 
decades of the twentieth century that missions really were the only facilities open to 
them, even if few could reach them and even fewer could afford the fees most charged 
for care. But during the two decades after the Second World War Africans turned in 
larger numbers to both government facilities and missions. Most Africans able to afford 
mission fees preferred them to government facilities, as many had reputations for better-
trained practitioners and better-stocked dispensaries. But the availability of care free at 
the point of service drew far more outpatients to government facilities. Missions also 
received grants from the government to pay salaries and purchase drugs. These grants 
became considerable during the Federation years, rising from £10,477 in 1952 to £72,000 
in 1958, and continued to rise after independence, reaching £102,000 in 1969. 
d) Explaining the rise in attendance at government facilities 
What can account for the rise in attendance at government medical facilities during the 
quarter-century after the close of World War II? Here I examine four possible 
explanations: first, a growing appreciation for European culture; second, increasingly 
																																																								
40 “Annual Report on the Public Health of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for the Year 
1962” (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1963), CSD 607, BL. 
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accessible facilities; third, better-stocked and better-staffed facilities; and fourth, the 
successful demonstration of new drugs.  
 
The idea that newly crowded hospitals were evidence of a wholesale turn away from 
African “tradition” and towards “modern” European culture was often invoked by 
Southern Rhodesian officials during the Federation years. One of Gear’s explanations for 
“the insatiable demand for European medicine” by 1960 was “the general acceptance of 
European culture and education.”41 This claim is less than convincing, as it seems 
unlikely that appreciation for “European culture” would reach a zenith during the years of 
the Federation government. These were years marked by popular protests against rule by 
a white supremacist regime based in Southern Rhodesia. Furthermore, Africans living in 
Nyasaland had been exposed to Europeans for centuries, from the Portuguese traders and 
British missionaries of the nineteenth century, to the British and German troops of the 
First World War, to the employers and foremen in the mines and plantations of Southern 
Rhodesia and South Africa (where hundreds of thousands had sought paid labor since the 
start of the twentieth century). Most Africans in Nyasaland were no more familiar with 
European life and culture than they had been during the last half-century. The peak 
population of European settlers in Nyasaland (most of whom lived in Blantyre or Zomba) 
during the 1950s and 1960s was 9300 (in 1960); the ratio of Africans to Europeans in 
Nyasaland during that year was 302:1. The penetration of “European culture” via mass 
media could not have been too deep; in 1968 less than 7 percent of rural Malawians (who 
																																																								
41 Harry S. Gear, “Some Problems of the Medical Services of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland,” BMJ 2, no. 5197 (1960): 525-530. 
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made of 92 percent of the population) lived in a household with a radio.42 The timing and 
precipitous nature of the rise in attendance do not support the contention that it was a 
manifestation of some general love of things European. 
ii) Hypothesis 2: increased access to medicine (new transport and facilities) 
A second possible explanation is that the rise in attendance might be attributed to more 
accessible medical facilities. But available statistical data offer relatively little support to 
this claim. The number of rural dispensaries and rural hospitals (usually defined as 
hospitals not staffed by a medical doctor) did not increase much, growing only from 96 in 
1946 to 112 in 1965. Though the Federal Ministry of Health proudly declared that the 
number of African hospitals had increased from 19 to 30 under their rule, most of these 
were smaller rural hospitals without medical doctors. Only three hospital construction 
projects with costs to the Federation of over £50,000 pounds were completed in 
Nyasaland between 1954 and 1960.43 This rather slight increase in facilities is 
insufficient to explain a twelve-fold increase in outpatient attendances. 
 
Changes in transportation, and in particular the spread of bicycle transport, did make 
medical facilities more accessible, but this can explain only a small part of the increase in 
attendances. While motor vehicle transport remained sparse throughout the colonial 
period, Nyasaland did experience a boom in bicycle ownership after the Second World 
War. The value of bicycle imports increased more than tenfold, from £26,000 in 1945 to  																																																								
42 Rural radio listenership survey for 1968: special report for Malawi Broadcasting Corporation, 
Department of Census and Statistics, Government Printer: Zomba, 1968, Table 6. 
43 These four projects were: Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital in Blantyre: £702,000, Kochira 
Leprosy Hospital in Fort Manning, £99,000; Zomba Mental Hospital: £70,000; Nkhata Bay 
District Hospital: £59,000. Roy Welensky, “National Health Development,” November 25, 1961, 
Welensky Papers, BLOU. Pages 7-8. 
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Figure 7.4: Scene outside Mlanje African Hospital, February 1964. Note the bicycle in 
the bottom right. Source: British Information Services, Central Office of Information, 
London, UKNA. 
 
£310,000 in 1953.44 By 1955, it was estimated that one in four able-bodied adult males in 
Zomba District owned a bicycle (Figure 7.4).45 These bicycles increased the range over 
which the sick could be transported; they remain a popular means of transport to health 
facilities in the twenty-first century. For patients unable to walk (but able to sit), transport 
on the back of a bicycle could replace the much slower stretcher that often required four 
carriers. But the role of this rise in bicycle transport, concentrated in urban areas and 
lakeshore communities, should not be overstated. In the late 1960s patients presenting to 
hospitals and dispensaries still came overwhelmingly from the immediate areas 																																																								
44 McCracken, “Bicycles in Colonial Malawi.” 
45 Fergus Chalmers Wright, African Consumers in Nyasaland and Tanganyika: An Enquiry into 
the Distribution and Consumption of Commodities among Africans Carried out in 1952-1953 
(Johnson Reprint Corp., 1970), Appendix B, in McCracken, bicycles in colonial Malawi. 
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surrounding hospitals. Even at the district hospital in the small lakeshore town of Nkhata 
Bay, 61 percent of outpatients came from less than two miles away.46 In 1970 there was 
still only one “health unit” [a facility the size of a dispensary and above] for every 20,000 
Malawians, about half of the recommended World Health Organization minimum at the 
time.47 
iii) Hypothesis 3: improved staffing and buildings 
The third argument, that patients came because the quality of the facilities had improved, 
has much to recommend it. Roughly coincident with the rise in attendance at government 
facilities was a marked increase in recurrent expenditure on the government health sector. 
As seen in Figure 7.5, recurrent expenditure on health (in current UK pounds sterling) in 
1965 (£1,068,377) was almost three times higher than in 1955 (£395,000) and nearly 
fifteen times higher than in 1945 (£72,896).  The rate of the rise in spending far outpaced 
																																																								
46 E. R. de Winter, Health Services of a District Hospital in Malawi (Van Gorcum and Company, 
1972), 106. 
47 Maurice King, The development of health services in Malawi, 1970-1985. Zomba: The 
Ministry of Health and Community Development, 1970. Pg 2. 
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Figure 7.5: Recurrent government health spending in Nyasaland/Malawi (current UK 
pounds sterling). Source: Annual reports of Medical Department, 1914-1964. 
 
the rate of population growth; recurrent expenditure on health per capita increased from 
3/100 pounds sterling in 1945 to 55/100 pound sterling in 1965. Almost 40 percent of the 
increase in recurrent expenditure during the decade 1955-1965 went towards the 
personnel budget, which rose from £204,528 in 1955 to £471,672 in 1965. Much of the 
rest of the increase is accounted for by spending on supplies and medicines, which rose 
from £108,000 in 1954 to £381,000 in 1962.  
 
Yet many deficiencies in staffing and procurement were never resolved. The budget 
included funding sufficient to employ 12 non-specialist, non-administrative government 
medical officers in 1949; this rose to 38 in 1953 before falling again to 12 again at 
independence in 1964. During most of these years the number of actual medical officers 
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did not reach these budgetary limits. For a few months in 1964 Malawi had only 3 
government medical officers. And, as the next sections will elucidate, while spending on 
supplies and drugs rose significantly, rationing of drugs and supplies and even prolonged 
stock-outs of widely used medicines plagued government facilities throughout the 
colonial, Federation, and independence eras. Staffing and procurement improved during 
some of the postwar years, but it also deteriorated in others. All the while, patients came 
in ever increasing numbers. 
iv) Hypothesis 4: new drugs and equipment 
This leads to the final and, in many ways, most convincing of the explanations for the rise 
in attendance: the introduction of new drugs. The main event here is the revolution in 
antimicrobial therapeutics.48 In the United States, the first sulfa drug reached the general 
public in the late 1930s; penicillin was first mass-marketed in 1945, followed in the 
coming years by bacitracin (1948) and chlortetracycline (1948). Effective therapy against 
pulmonary tuberculosis arrived with the use of streptomycin (1948) and isoniazid (1952) 
in combination.49 The antimalarial chloroquine reached US markets in 1946, replacing 
mepacrine, a drug used by American troops during the Second World War and widely 
																																																								
48 The mid-twentieth-century discovery of novel classes of pharmaceuticals included sulfa drugs, 
penicillin, tetracyclines, anti-tuberculosis and antimalarial agents, cortisone, vitamin B12, and 
anti-hypertensive agents. These drugs transformed the practice and reputation of medicine. This 
new therapeutic armamentarium prompted Lewis Thomas to call medicine the “youngest 
science.” It is this second “therapeutic revolution” to which I refer here. See Rosenberg, “The 
Therapeutic Revolution: Medicine, Meaning and Social Change in Nineteenth-Century America”; 
Richard Weinshilboum, “The Therapeutic Revolution,” Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 
42, no. 5 (December 1987): 481–84; Lewis Thomas, The Lives of a Cell : Notes of a Biology 
Watcher (New York: Penguin Books, 1978). 
49 James Le Fanu, The Rise and Fall of Modern Medicine (Basic Books, 2002); Messac, “Moral 
Hazards and Moral Economies.” 
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reviled for its neurologic side-effects.50 Promin, the first in the class of sulfone drugs, 
was used to halt the ravages of leprosy (also known as Hansen’s disease) in patients in 
Carville, Louisiana in 1941; a less painful drug, Dapsone, came into use in the early 
1950s.51 
 
Years—even decades—passed between the introduction of these drugs in the United 
States and their arrival in Nyasaland’s public facilities. Even after their introduction to 
Nyasaland, these drugs were often strictly rationed (see Chapter 8). But compared to the 
therapeutic armamentarium available to colonial medical officers and African auxiliaries 
before the war, these were powerful new tools. Penicillin began to arrive, in small 
quantities, at the end of the war. This drug would save patients with many serious 
bacterial infections. It came, lamented WTC Berry, “too late to save the life of one of our 
medical officers who died from septicemia, contracted after doing a postmortem in 
1944.”52 Penicillin also transformed therapy for syphilis. Previous therapy for Africans 
diagnosed with syphilis was a series of sodium bismuth tartrate injections (see Chapter 
3). These were painful and did not lead to permanent cure. Berry, a medical officer in 
Mulanje between 1936 and 1943, remembered that he had responded “unfeelingly” to a 
syphilitic male who complained of the pain of this injection “that he would have been 
																																																								
50 “Atabrine for Malaria,” Tactical and Technical Trends, Prepared for Army Ground, Air and 
Service Forces by Military Intelligence Service, War Department 26, no. 3 (June 3, 1943): 39; SR 
Meshnick and MJ Dobson, “The History of Antimalarial Drugs,” in Antimalarial Chemotherapy: 
Mechanisms of Action, Resistance, and New Directions in Drug Discovery (Totowa, NJ: Humana 
Press, 2001). 
51 John Parascandola, “Miracle at Carville: The Introduction of the Sulfones for the Treatment of 
Leprosy,” Pharmacy in History 40, no. 2/3 (1998): 59–66. 
52 Berry, Before the Wind of Change. Page 17. 
	 335	
wiser to have thought of that when he was making love with the woman.”53 By the late 
1940s, physicians could rid bodies of syphilis and prevent its ravages with a single 
injection of penicillin.54 
 
As demonstrated by Figures 7.6a and 7.6b, the number of patients suffering from a given 
disease who attended public sector clinics rose precipitously in the immediate aftermath 
of the introduction of novel therapeutics. For yaws, this increase followed the 
introduction of bismuth injections in the mid-1920s (see Chapter 1). 
 
For hookworm, the rise in attendance followed the introduction of carbon tetrachloride. 
In the late 1920s this drug, which was first used earlier in the decade by American 
veterinarians on dogs, was distributed free of charge to plantations for use by employers 
of African labor.55 By the early 1930s, mass voluntary anti-helminthic campaigns in the 
countryside drew thousands of African patients. Doctors ascribed the popularity of this 
 																																																								
53 Ibid. Page 18. Berry also remembered other commonly used therapeutics prior to penicillin’s 
arrival: “‘Prontosil’ [a sulphonamide] was the first antibiotic available, it turned the urine red. We 
used morphine and various milder pain relievers; antimony tartrate and Fuadin (by intramuscular 
injection) for bilharzia; arsenicals for syphilis and yaws.” 
54 Even though therapeutics for syphilis advanced with penicillin, as late as the early 1960s there 
was still no reliable serological test capable of differentiating venereal syphilis from nonvenereal 
treponematoses, such as yaws and endemic syphilis. David Stevenson, who had served as an 
Anglican missionary doctor in Nyasaland in the late 1950s and early 1960s, lamented this 
difficulty: “Syphilis is probably blamed for a lot of conditions for want of a better diagnosis. Full 
courses of penicillin may have to be given when the disease is only suspected. If reliable serology 
could be made widely available this could be avoided and valuable figures for the incidence of 
syphilis could be obtained.” Amy Beth Koff and Theodore Rosen, “Nonvenereal 
Treponematoses: Yaws, Endemic Syphilis, and Pinta,” Journal of the American Academy of 
Dermatology 29, no. 4 (October 1993): 519–35; Stevenson, “The Health Services of Malawi.” 
Page 100. 
55 Whitehead, “Annual Medical Report for the Year Ended 31st December, 1928.” Page 15. 
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Figure 7.6a: Disease returns at public sector health facilities and new drug introductions 
for TB, yaws, hookworm, and schistosomiasis. Source: Annual reports of Medical 
Department, 1920-1964. 
 
campaign to the visible and dramatic consequences of the therapy. While the doctors’ 
main target in administering carbon tetrachloride was the microscopic hookworm 
(thought be a major cause of anemia and low productivity, see chapter 2), patients given 
this therapy would also defecate macroscopic tapeworms.56 One of the doctors leading 
the campaign, William Watson, became known as Dr. Chimbudzi, which translates to Dr. 
																																																								
56 “Annual Medical Report on the Health and Sanitary Condition of the Nyasaland Protectorate 
for the Year Ending the 31st, December, 1930.” page 40; De Boer, “Annual Medical & Sanitary 
Report for the Year Ending 31st December 1938.” 
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Feces.57  By the 1950s Nyasaland’s doctors would complain what they saw as Africans’ 
tendency to ascribe great therapeutic efficacy to over-the-counter laxatives, but at least in 
the 1930s they were grateful to see perceptions dovetail.58 Yet carbon tetrachloride could 
also be highly toxic and even caused the death of a few patients; in medical reports, the 
deceased patients were blamed for not having heeded warnings to abstain from alcohol 
prior to treatment.59 
 
For gonorrhea, the rise in attendance followed the introduction of sulphapyridine in the 
1940s.  Sulpha drugs had been strictly rationed in the late 1930s (see Chapter 5). But in 
May 1945, the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund awarded Nyasaland a five-year, 
£42,000 grant for free treatment of gonorrhea and syphilis at government and mission 
institutions. 60 This money allowed more patients to access sulphapyridine than ever 
before, and patients receiving treatment for this condition rose accordingly. 
 
During the 1950s demand for leprosy treatment increased after the introduction of 
another novel therapeutic. Dapsone was, leprologist Dr. Gordon Currie explained, “far 
from being the ideal drug.” It had to be administered weekly, sometimes  
																																																								
57 Michael King and Elspeth King, The Story of Medicine and Disease in Malawi: The 150 Years 
Since Livingstone (Malawi: Arco Books, 1992). Pages 99-100 
58 Carbon tetrachloride could also be highly toxic and even caused the death of a few patients; in 
medical reports, the deceased patients were blamed for not having heeded warnings to abstain 
from alcohol prior to treatment. Carbon tetrachloride is soluble in alcohol, and can be absorbed 
from the intestines into the bloodstream along with alcohol. Gopsill, “A Few Notes on My Life in 
Zanzibar and Nyasaland from 1926 to 1945.” Page 12. 
59 Ibid. Page 12. Carbon tetrachloride is soluble in alcohol, and can be absorbed from the 
intestines into the bloodstream along with alcohol. 
60 Richards, “CDWAC No 527: Nyasaland. Venereal Disease: Purchase of Drugs for Treatment. 
Application for Free Grant of £42,000.” 
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Figure 7.6b: Disease returns at public sector health facilities and new drug introductions 
for malaria, leprosy, syphilis and gonorrhoea. Source: Annual reports of Medical 
Department, 1920-1964. 
 
for years, and it sometimes caused permanent nerve damage.61 But patients, doctors and 
nurses welcomed the end of the long era in which the mainstay of treatment had been 
infamously ineffective hydnocarpus oil. A number of missions had shuttered their 
leprosaria in previous decades, in part because, as John Iliffe explains, “the drugs did not 
work.”62 Many people had flocked to the mission leprosaria after the introduction of 
hydnocarpus oil injections in the 1920s. But by the 1940s neither patients nor providers 
had confidence in the efficacy of these drugs; those who lived on the settlements might 																																																								
61 G. Currie, “A Clinical Trial of Etisul in Lepromatous Leprosy,” Transactions of the Royal 
Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 57 (May 1963): 196–205. 
62 Iliffe, “The Poor in the Modern History of Malawi.” Page 257. 
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have stayed for the meager food and shelter they provided, while outpatients often came 
for treatment because the staff could excuse them from the obligation to pay hut tax.63 
Electra Dory, who directed the UMCA leprosarium in Likwenu during the Second World 
War, recalled the “apparent dejection and indifference” of the lepers. “They called 
themselves The Dead.” She remembered the futility of their therapeutic regimens: “We 
rammed—I fear that is the only word that describes the treatment—we rammed in the 
oleaginous product of the hydnocarpus wightiana, causing in some cases more pain and 
destruction than the lepra bacilli.”64 Curative treatment was only possible with the arrival 
of sulphone therapy.65 
 
This new efflorescence of public confidence was also seen in the patients with 
tuberculosis (following the release of streptomycin and isoniazid at public hospitals in the 
mid-1950s). In the 1960s attendances increased for schistosomiasis (after the introduction 
of lucanthone hydrochloride) and malaria (upon the dissemination of chloroquine).66 
 
																																																								
63 Mabel Drew, a nurse at Likwenu during the 1940s, remembered: “I found the crowds with their 
foul sores thinning, but some were waiting to obtain chits, which would exempt them from the 
hut tax.” Mabel Drew, “Nursing at UMCA Likwenu, Late 1940s,” in Expatriate Experience of 
Life and Work in Nyasaland, Volume Three, ed. Colin Baker (Cardiff, Mpemba Books, 2014), 
286. 
64 Electra Dory, Leper Country: A Candid, at Times Shocking, Account of a Medical Missionary’s 
Life among Primitive People in Africa (Frederick Muller Ltd, 1963). Pages 40, 44. 
65 Vaughan, Curing Their Ills. Page 84. 
66 Earlier treatment for schistosomiasis with antimony could be quite dangerous. As Gopsill 
explained of antimony treatment in the 1930s: “One had to take care when treating bilharzia, that 
the dosage was very gradually increased because if this was not so the antimony drugs given 
contracted the spleen and caused a flare up of malaria and after 3 injections the patient did not 
[come] back to have the 12 or more injections needed to form an effective cure.” Gopsill, “A Few 
Notes on My Life in Zanzibar and Nyasaland from 1926 to 1945.” Page 12. 
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Some prominent contemporary commentators on colonial medicine interpreted the 
increasing numbers of patients presenting for treatment (in the absence of any robust 
epidemiologic surveillance) as evidence of rising incidence of disease.67 But the rise in 
attendance was more likely a product of greater confidence in the efficacy of biomedicine 
among those who were already sick.  Such was the opinion of the medical officer in 
Mzimba, who reported in 1956 that “the increase in patients in hospital with Pulmonary 
Tuberculosis is not thought to represent an increase of the disease in the district as much 
as an increase in propaganda by Medical Aides in rural dispensaries. All but one of the 
cases in hospital were chronic in nature, mostly with fibrosis and cavitation.” Prior to the 
arrival of chemotherapy, the primary treatment for patients with tuberculosis in 
Nyasaland (and a common procedure elsewhere in the world) was a surgical procedure in 
which the affected lung was collapsed.68 This treatment was invasive and largely 
palliative.69 But by 1956, routine curative treatment in Nyasaland’s district hospitals was 
two out of three drugs (streptomycin, isoniazid, and PAS) “over a long period of time.” 
This was not, by Malawian standards, inexpensive therapy, and stock-outs of these drugs 
																																																								
67 Harry S. Gear, “Some Problems of the Medical Services of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland,” BMJ 2, no. 5197 (1960): 525–31., and DM Blair, “Annual Report on the Public 
Health of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for the Year 1958” (Salisbury: Government 
Printer, April 30, 1959), BL. 
68 Morris, “Annual Report on the Public Health of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for 
the Year 1956.” Page 15. 
69 A Hurst, HM Maier, and R Dwork, “A Critical Study of Pneumoperitoneum and Phrenic Nerve 
Crush in Pulmonary Tuberculosis,” Diseases of the Chest 13, no. 4 (August 1947): 345–59; RY 
Keers, “Pneumoperitoneum: Its Place in Treatment,” The British Journal of Tuberculosis and 
Diseases of the Chest 42, no. 3 (1948): 58–66; James L Livingstone, “Observations on the 
Treatment of Pulmonary Tuberculosis at the Present Time,” BMJ 1, no. 4908 (January 29, 1955): 
243–50. 
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were common in the 1950s (see Chapter 8). Still, they were standard of care, and the 
earlier surgical interventions were rarely performed.70 
 
Recent studies of AIDS treatment (with antiretrovirals) demonstrate that, in similarly 
impoverished settings, there exists a correlation between the introduction of effective 
chemotherapeutic agents and reported cases, particularly when treatment is given free at 
the point of care.71 There is plenty of reason to believe that the (often-delayed) 
availability of drugs was a major factor driving the increased attendance at government 
health facilities in Nyasaland. 
 
But even as African patients began to appear in far greater numbers at hospitals and 
dispensaries, many government officials wished they would stay home. Whereas in the 
1930s government officials had sought to bring more African patients to the clinic, by the 
late 1950s their successors were trying to stem the flow.72 Economic planners in Malawi 
(and their expatriate advisors) saw the claims on the government’s purse that the rush of 
patients had created as a drain on economic growth. The government finally had healing 
																																																								
70 Morris, “Annual Report on the Public Health of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for 
the Year 1956.” Page 15. 
71 David A. Walton et al., “Integrated HIV Prevention and Care Strengthens Primary Health Care: 
Lessons from Rural Haiti,” Journal of Public Health Policy, 2004, 137–58. 
72 See, for instance, a March 1938 memo by Nyasaland’s Chief Secretary, KL Hall who argued 
that African patients should continue to be provided government medical services free at the point 
of care in order to encourage them to come when sick: “In his present state of development it is 
essential that the Nyasaland native should receive every possible encouragement to present 
himself for European preventive and curative treatment and I can see no alternative, as a rule, to 
such treatment being given without charge until such time as the blessings of medical and 
surgical science are fully appreciated and the spending power of the indigenous population is 
improved.” Messac, “Moral Hazards and Moral Economies.” Pages 6-7. 
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technologies that Africans patients wanted, but as the next section will demonstrate those 
patients were, in some ways, no longer welcome. 
 
III.  Defying the experts: Increasing health spending against the tenets of 
modernization theory, 1950s-1960s 
a) Modernization lessons from a prison cell: Dunduzu Chisiza and Walt Rostow, 
1960 
Sitting in a prison cell in Southern Rhodesia in January 1960, Dunduzu Chisiza penned a 
letter. He was continuing a correspondence with Walt Rostow, a renowned economist at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and advisor to the presidential campaign of 
then-Senator John F. Kennedy. Chisiza apologized for his brevity: “We can use only two 
sheets of paper for each letter.” He continued, “There are many questions I would have 
liked to ask…but most of them would be classified as political by the authorities here—
and we are not allowed to mail out anything political.”73 The rest of Chisiza’s letter was 
not focused on his captivity, nor his captors, but rather on the future of his native 
Nyasaland, still under rule by the Federal Government in Southern Rhodesia. He sought, 
he explained, to write a “Master Economic Plan” [presumably to take effect after 
securing independence, though he could not write this from prison], and had found 
helpful guidance in this endeavor in summaries of Rostow’s Cambridge lectures on “the 
stages of economic growth,” which had recently been published in The Economist 
magazine. 
 																																																								
73 “Dunduzu Chisiza to Walt W. Rostow,” January 2, 1960, George Shepperson Papers, 
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In his letters Chisiza was effusive in his praise of Rostow’s lectures. Rostow responded 
personally, and mailed him a draft of his soon-to-be-published book, The stages of 
economic growth: a non-communist manifesto. Chisiza’s next letter called this work a 
“masterpiece” and “a very handy guide to those who are concerned with the problem of 
economic development in the underdeveloped countries.”74 Though still a young man—
only 29 when he wrote to Rostow—Chisiza had a deep interest in economic planning. 
Educated at the Livingstonia Mission in northern Nyasaland and at the Aggrey Memorial 
College in Uganda, he secured a scholarship to study the Economics of Underdeveloped 
Countries and Political Science at Fircroft College in Birmingham in 1958.75 During his 
time in the UK, Chisiza also took classes at the London School of Economics. But he had 
been in the UK only a few months before Hastings Kamuzu Banda asked him to return to 
Nyasaland to aid in the struggle to dissolve the Federation of Nyasaland with the 
Rhodesias. Within a year Chisiza, Banda and other nationalist leaders had been charged 
with attempted assassination and imprisoned in Gwelo, Southern Rhodesia, where 
Chisiza continued to read economics and struck up his correspondence with Rostow.  
 
In his book, Rostow drew upon his analysis of the previous two centuries of European 
industrialization to propose that all societies fell somewhere along a five-stage process of 
economic growth. First, in traditional society “pre-Newtonian” science and “pre-
Newtonian attitudes toward the physical world” do not allow people to systematically 																																																								
74 “Dunduzu Chisiza to Walt W. Rostow.” 
75 “Dunduzu Is Dead,” Malawi News, September 7, 1962., pg.2. Also see D. D. Phiri, Dunduzu K. 
Chisiza: Malawi Congress Party Secretary-General, Parliamentary-Secretary, Brilliant Thinker, 
Pamphleteer and Essayist, Malawians to Remember (Blantyre, Malawi: Longman Ltd, 1974). 
Pages 18-21. 
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apply knowable laws to increase productivity. People maintain a “long-run fatalism” in 
which they assume their grandchildren’s lot will be the same as their own. In the second 
stage came the “preconditions for takeoff”—which can be introduced by endogenous 
change (as in Europe) or by external shocks (the colonized world)—including the belief 
that economic progress was both possible and good; the emergence of enterprising men 
willing to mobilize savings in the pursuit of profit; and the establishment of centralized 
national states. Third, in the “takeoff” phase, growth became a normal condition, as the 
effective rate of investment and savings rose to 10% of national income, new industries 
in leading sectors expanded, and political authorities came to see modernization as 
“serious, high-order political business.” After this 20-year “takeoff” period came the 
penultimate stage, a 40-year-long “drive to maturity” involving “sustained if fluctuating 
progress, as the now regularly growing economy drives to extend modern technology 
over the whole front of its economic activity.” Finally came the shift from sector-led 
growth to expansion involving all sectors of the economy; this was the fifth phase, which 
Rostow called “the age of high mass-consumption.” Leading sectors of the economy had 
given way to “durable consumers’ goods and services,” income per capita had risen to 
allow most people to transcend concerns with “basic food, shelter, and clothing.” Much 
of the population was urban and employed in skilled factory labor or office work. Then, 
and only then, could society cease “to accept the further extension of modern technology 
as an overriding objective.”76 In sum, government spending on medical care and other 
social services would have to wait. 
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Figure 7.7: A campaign pamphlet for Dunduzu Chisiza’s candidacy in the 1961 
Nyasaland Parliamentary elections. Hastings Kamuzu Banda led the Malawi Congress 
Party, which had as a mascot the rooster (hence, “Vote Kamuzu and the Cock”). Printed 
by Malawi Press Ltd, Limbe, Nyasaland. From George Shepperson Papers, University of 
Edinburgh Archives. 
 
b) Chisiza’s vision for African modernization, 1961-1962 
 
For Chisiza, the primary benefit of this schematization of the process of modernization 
was that it seemed to indicate a practical roadmap explaining “what and how much to 
undertake during the various stages of economic modernization.”77 Soon after his release 
from prison in 1960 Chisiza would win become a Member of Parliament in Nyasaland 
and become a prominent voice in postcolonial African economic thought (Figure 7.7). 
Though he did not criticize Rostow explicitly his writings indicated disagreement with a 																																																								
77 “Dunduzu Chisiza to Walt W. Rostow.” 
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particular facet of his theory.78 First, Chisiza believed that the establishment of social 
security programs—including state-supported healthcare—should begin immediately 
rather than await the arrival of the fifth and final stage, “the age of mass consumption.”79 
On this point, above all, Chisiza believed that Nyasaland could—and, largely due to new 
expectations among postwar publics, should—diverge from the historical experience of 
the United Kingdom and other Western nations:  
Social security in an under-developed economy is something very close to a 
luxury. Scarcely any of the advanced countries ever provided it in the early stages 
of development. None could have afforded it without arresting capital formation. 
The same would seem to go for present-day under-developed countries. But there 
is a difference. At the time the advanced countries were shaping their economies, 
humanitarian ideals as we know them today had not been fully developed. The 
idea of social security had neither taken form nor caught the imagination of 
politicians. Today, however, the idea is echoed everywhere—even in the under-
developed countries themselves. For the governments of under-developed 
countries, therefore, to refrain completely from making an initial step towards the 
provision of social security on an appreciable scale, would be a dangerous 
political omission for the ruling parties. On the other hand, as already pointed out, 
full-scale social security is simply not possible. The compromise seems to be the 
provision of some measure of social security for those of the aged, infirm and 
disabled who have no one to depend upon.80 
 																																																								
78 In 1961, Chisiza became Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Finance. The Scotsman 
lauded his role as “the guiding hand” in the “informed determination of the Malawi Congress 
Party leaders to promote policies conducive to sustained economic growth.” The article described 
Chisiza as follows: “Essentially eclectic in his economic thought and appraisals, he regards the 
doctrinaire forms of capitalism and Socialism alike as imported luxuries, which the Nyasa 
economy can ill afford. Mr. Chisiza’s immediate economic responsibility is to prepare the 
financial background for Nyasaland’s withdrawal from the Federation. His greater and more 
enduring task is to implement the economic policies outlined in the MCP election manifesto.” 
“Nyasaland and the Future: Room for Expansion in Tea, Cotton, Coffee,” The Scotsman, October 
20, 1961. 
79 In Rostow’s Stages, social welfare and social security programs were instituted only in the final 
stage, which—by Rostow’s 1960 reckoning—only the US, Japan and some parts of Europe had 
reached. The key to moving through the stages was to increase savings; significant portions of 
GNP needed to be reinvested in the means of production. Social security programs were not, 
according to Rostow, forms of productive investment. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth a 
Non-Communist Manifesto. 
80 Dunduza Kaluli Chisiza, Realities of African Independence (The Africa Publications Trust, 
1961)., 17. 
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The history of the idea of “social security,” particularly following the 1942 Beveridge 
Report, in Nyasaland and the rest of the British Empire, was explored in Chapters 5 and 
6. But here, it is important for our argument to note that Chisiza did not disagree with 
Rostow’s argument that social security was economically unproductive—he, too, saw 
state spending on ill and the aged as contrary to the primary goal of capital formation. 
Nevertheless, Chisiza warned that the absence of social security programs in a 
modernizing nation was “a dangerous political omission”—a lesson that Malawi’s post-
independence leaders would learn following the unpopular and ultimately brief 
introduction of healthcare user fees in 1964 (see Chapter 8).  Chisiza’s influence was 
evident in the 1961 election manifesto of the Malawi Congress Party—an election the 
party would win in a landslide—which decried existing health services under the 
Federation Government as “grossly inadequate” and “deplorably poor,” and promised to 
provide “social security for those of the aged, infirm and disabled who have no one to 
depend upon.”81 
 
Chisiza believed the prolonged deferral of social spending was particularly unwise in 
African countries because Africans were social by nature. After winning a seat as a 
Member of Parliament in the 1961 Nyasaland elections, Chisiza became Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Ministry of Finance. After securing funding from the Ford Foundation, 
he convened a symposium of international development economists in Zomba. Yet 
though he had long shown deep interest in the quantitative tools and generalizable 
schemata of development economics, Chisiza’s speech at the symposium concerned not 																																																								
81“Malawi Congress Party Manifesto for the General Election,” August 1961, MNA., pages 13-14 
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input-output ratios, but his vision of an essential African outlook. Chisiza argued that 
economists and other policymakers had to respect that Africans were temperamentally 
predisposed to concern themselves with the lot of their neighbors: 
We of Africa…are fundamentally observers, penetrating others, relying more on 
intuition than on the process of reasoning. We excel in neither mysticism nor in 
science and technology, but in the field of human relations…We pursue happiness 
by rejecting isolationism, individualism, negative emotions, and tension, on the 
one hand; and by laying emphasis on a communal way of life, by encouraging 
positive emotions and habitual relaxation, and by restraining our desires, on the 
other…We believe in strong family relations, We have been urged by well-
meaning foreigners to break these ties for one reason or another. No advice could 
be more dangerous to the fabric of our society. Charity begins at home. So does 
the love of our fellow human beings…But I believe that, once so conditioned, one 
behaves in this way not only to one’s family, but also to the clan, the tribe, the 
nation, and to humanity as a whole.82 
 
Let us put aside the problematic essentialism of Chisiza’s ideal-type African, and turn to 
his point of contention with “well-meaning foreigners.” Chisiza was concerned here with 
the belief system that modernizers insisted that citizens of a developed nation must have. 
Chisiza believed Africans need not abandon their communal spirit in order to secure a 
prosperous future. In this claim Chisiza contradicted Rostow’s MIT colleagues MF 
Millikan and Donald Blackmer, who in a 1960 report for the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations lamented the sharing of income amongst extended family members as 
a traditionalist practice that would prevent the accumulation of savings necessary for 
economic growth.83 As Nils Gilman observed wryly in his history of modernization 
theory, “Letting the extended family go hungry was apparently one of the prices of 																																																								
82 Dunduza Kaluli Chisiza, “The Temper, Aspiration and Problems of Contemporary Africa,” in 
Economic Development in Africa: Papers Presented to the Nyasaland Economic Symposium, 1st 
ed. (Basil Blackwell, 1965). p 11. 
83 Rostow mentioned he was involved in this report in his correspondence with Chisiza, though he 
did not detail its argument. MF Milikan and Donald Blackmer, “The Emerging Nations: Report to 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” 1960. 
	 349	
modernization.”84 Chisiza was an advocate of “economic modernization,” but not the 
kind envisioned by the MIT researchers, where social ties of obligation would shrink to 
the level of the nuclear family.  
 
Much like the Colonial Office reports of the 1940s (see Chapter 6), Chisiza glorified 
“traditional” village social security, but unlike them he saw it as a supplement (rather 
than a substitute) for state social security. He believed Africans were demanding social 
security even though it not had been a part of the early history of European 
industrialization. Reducing inequality, taxing the wealthiest citizens, and providing for 
the vulnerable were part of Chisiza’s plans, he said, because they had become a part of 
the global social imaginary. Even if their country was not yet rich enough to provide 
benefits on the scale seen in Britain, they could not wait to make a start. 
 
The nationalist leaders imprisoned in Gwelo were a cosmopolitan bunch. Many of them 
had witnessed the expansion of health services and social security elsewhere. For his part, 
Hastings Kamuzu Banda had lived his life on three continents. He was a student in the 
United States during the Great Depression and the Roosevelt’s New Deal.85 He was a 
doctor in a working-class neighborhood in London at the dawn of the National Health 
Service in 1948. And when, in 1957, Ghana became the first black African nation to gain 
independence from colonial rule, Banda was there. In the years following Ghana’s 
independence—while Banda sweltered in a Rhodesian prison—the new nation would 																																																								
84 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future : Modernization Theory in Cold War America 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). p 183. 
85 “Obituaries: Dr. Hastings Banda,” Times (of London), November 27, 1997. 
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vastly increase spending on its Ministry of Health.86 Spending on health rose from 2.7 
percent of total recurrent government expenditure in 1954 to 6.3 percent in 1961.87  
 
But it was Chisiza, not Banda, who would speak at length about the need to bring the 
revolution in social and economic rights to Nyasaland. Shortly after independence in 
1964, Banda warned civil servants seeking pay raises and generous pensions that Malawi 
would be “no welfare state.” But, for the most part, with Chisiza dead, Malawi’s 
discourse on development did not include much talk of social security or economic rights. 
Still, the furor that followed the introduction of healthcare user fees in 1964 would prove 
Chisiza’s warnings about the political significance of government social provision 
prescient (Chapter 9). Despite the propagandistic simplicity in his description of African 
culture, Chisiza was by no means the only observer to note the centrality of obligation 
and mutuality to southern African thought and social practice. His thought was both path-
breaking in its own right and reflective of broader trends in thought and politics in late 
colonial British Africa.  
c) The quest for growth: GDP in Malawian development policy, 1962-1968 
Yet Chisiza’s influence should not be overstated, if only because he did not live long 
enough to exert it. On September 3, 1962, less than three months after the Nyasaland 
Economic Symposium, Chisiza was found dead in a car in a ditch. The historian Joey 
Power has written about both widespread rumors and a circumstantial evidence which 
point to Banda as the leader of a plot to murder Chisiza and frame his death as a car 
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accident.88 Power interviewed a number of Malawians who believe Banda orchestrated 
Chisiza’s death for fear of his rising prominence; Banda saw the young and charismatic 
speaker, with his international connections and a sterling reputation as a thoughtful, 
learned and popular leader, as a nascent threat.89 In the habit of calling other nationalist 
leaders his “boys,” Prime Minister Banda---whose autocratic tendencies would become 
clearer in the years to come, and who would be linked to politically motivated killings for 
the next three decades—was known to be unhappy with the regard given a man thirty 
years his junior.90 But no one has ever produced definitive evidence of Banda’s 
involvement in Chisiza’s demise. Whatever the cause of his death, Chisiza did not live to 
see his country secure independence. It would not be Chisiza, but Banda (and the external 
financiers of development loans and grants) who would dictate Malawi’s postcolonial 
economic policy. 
 
Chisiza’s objections to modernization theory’s disregard for health and other “social” 
services largely concerned its philosophical underpinnings and political ramifications. 
But he did not question the widespread belief among development experts of the era that 																																																								
88 Historian Joey Power explores the circumstances surrounding Chisiza’s death. For instance, the 
police inquest determined Chisiza had died from wounds to the head after his car plunged off a 
bridge, yet there was no blood in the car, and Chisiza’s wounds seemed old to a medical assistant 
who examined his body on the night of the “accident.” See Power, Political Culture and 
Nationalism in Malawi. Pages 164-169. 
89 Chisiza was eulogized as “a man of vision and energy” in The Guardian. Clyde Sanger, 
“African Nationalism’s Heaviest Loss: A Man of Vision and Energy,” The Guardian, September 
5, 1962. 
90 The most infamous incident of an apparently politically motivated killing orchestrated by 
Banda came in 1983, when three government ministers and a Minister of Parliament who had 
been critical of Banda perished in what officials claimed was a car accident. See Reuben 
Makayiko Chirambo, “‘Mzimu Wa Soldier’: Contemporary Popular Music and Politics in 
Malawi,” in Politics and Culture in the New Malawi, Ed. Harri Englund (Sweden: Elanders 
Gotab, 2002), 103–22. 
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health spending was not a productive investment.91 By the 1960s, referring to public 
sector spending on healthcare as unproductive “consumption” was not terribly 
controversial. And both Rostow and Chisiza agreed with colonial officials and nationalist 
leaders across the continent agreed that the first task of development was aggregate 
production growth. Nyasaland itself had been the site of one of the first experiments in 
“national” income accounting for a colony. During the 1940s, the British researcher 
Phyllis Deane had dug up Platt’s papers and conducted her own surveys and fieldwork to 
estimate Nyasaland’s national income in 1938 and 1948. Though Deane herself had 
argued that the distribution of income should be as important to development as 
aggregate national income, this was not a widely shared concern among economists prior 
to the 1970s.92 During the 1950s and 1960s, an increasing gross national product was 
synonymous with development. As Derek Blades, Malawi’s chief statistician, explained 
in Malawi’s 1968 National Accounts Report, “The simplest indicator of economic 
progress of a community is the movement of real income per head of the population. This 
is not an unqualified measure of improvements in the standard of living for the average 
inhabitant of a country but has been found a useful guide.”93 
																																																								
91 On more on the conflation of growth and development during this period, in Rostow’s writings 
and in the writings of others, see Reuben Makayiko Chirambo, “‘Mzimu Wa Soldier’: 
Contemporary Popular Music and Politics in Malawi,” in Politics and Culture in the New 
Malawi, Ed. Harri Englund (Sweden: Elanders Gotab, 2002), 103–22., and Luke Messac, “Far 
from the Tree: Keynesian Economists, British Social Anthropology, and the Political Uses of 
National Income Accounting in Postwar Southern Africa” (U.S. African Studies Association 
annual meeting, Indianapolis, Indiana, 2014). 
92 Phyllis Deane, Colonial Social Accounting. (Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 1953).; 
Phyllis Deane, The Measurement of Colonial Incomes: An Experiment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, n.d.).; Messac, “Far from the Tree: Keynesian Economists, British Social 
Anthropology, and the Political Uses of National Income Accounting in Postwar Southern 
Africa.” 
93 Malawi National Accounts Report, 1964-1967 (Government of Malawi, Zomba, 1968), p. 7.  
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d) Origins of modernization: capital investment as the key to development, 1939-
1946 
Rostow may have been one of the most famous proselytizers of growth through the 
ruthless accumulation of savings for industrialization, but he was neither the first nor the 
only advocate of this approach.  During the 1940s, widely cited theories of economic 
growth posited a central role for aggressive state-directed accumulation of financial 
resources (through external grants and loans and domestic taxation) to be spent on the 
machines, dams power plants and roads needed to operate factories and transport goods 
to markets. This was true for the (very similar) formal mathematical models devised 
independently by the British economist Roy Harrod in 1939 and the Russian émigré 
Evsey Domar in 1946; in both, aggregate production was assumed to be a linear function 
of the capital stock. And since “capital stock” was considered by development 
economists to refer primarily to physical capital (machinery, power, buildings, materials, 
etc.), prioritizing saving for “investment” over spending on “consumption”—that is, 
spending that did not build the capital stock—was the surest path to achieve growth.94 
The stock of physical capital was also central to a highly influential 1943 paper entitled 
“Problems of industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe” by Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan, an economist then based at the London School of Economics (he would join 
Rostow’s institute at MIT a decade later). Rosenstein-Rodan argued governments had to 
rapidly build up the “social overhead capital” (power, transport and communications) that 																																																								
94 Roy Harrod, “An Essay in Dynamic Theory,” Economic Journal 49 (March 1939): 14–33; 
Evsey D. Domar, “Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and Employment,” Econometrica 14, no. 
2 (April 1946): 137–47.; Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking 
of the Third World, With a New preface by the author edition (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 2011)., page 70 
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was a necessary precondition of industrial production before private companies could 
profitably pursue directly productive investments.95 
 
These authors did not directly address the potential for a productive role for healthcare 
services or healthy labor. They did not think to do so because health was not thought to 
play a role in the production function. The supply of labor was often assumed to be 
abundant, even “unlimited” (as the poor masses were occupied only with relatively 
unproductive subsistence agriculture), and because the productivity of factory labor was 
thought to depend mostly on physical capital and not on the workers’ level of health and 
education, the stock of physical capital was—in these models— the only meaningful 
determinant of economic growth.96 
e) Role of technology in economic growth and the continued absence of health, 1955-
1958 
Econometric analyses in the 1950s demonstrated that supplies of capital and labor were 
insufficient to explain past growth, but at the same time these methods seemed unable to 
establish the contribution of health interventions to macroeconomic statistics. Another 
MIT economist, Robert Solow, used a time-series of GDP estimates from the United 
States between 1909, and tested the relative contributions of capital and labor supplies 
(i.e. movement along the “production function”), on the one hand, and “technical 
progress” (i.e. a shift in the production function) on the other. Solow’s analysis found that 																																																								
95 Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, “Problems of Industrialization in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe,” 
Economic Journal, September 1943. 
96 W. Arthur Lewis, “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour,” The 
Manchester School 22, no. 2 (1954): 139–91. Note that technological progress—an exogenous 
variable not explained by the model—was important to the Solow-Swan model developed in 
1950s, but here, too, health was not explicitly invoked as a determinant of growth. 
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the 2.9 percent average annual growth rate of the US economy during the four-decade 
period could be explained as follows: 0.32 percentage points came from capital 
accumulation, 1.09 percentage points from labor, and 1.49 percent from “technical 
change in its broadest sense,” which he also called “total factor productivity.”97 Over the 
coming decades economists studying growth would propose to explain the elements of 
total factor productivity, but at least in the 1950s and 1960s health was rarely among 
them.98 Part of the problem was that rigorous investigation of the effects of population-
level health interventions on aggregate production remained statistically intractable. 
Whereas in 1955 the Director of the Pan American Sanitary Board justified malaria 
eradication by declaring that malaria was “a serious burden on the economy of every 
malarious country,” by 1958 the chief of malaria eradication for the Pan American Health 
Organization lamented that it had proven impossible to ‘affirm that [economic] progress 
has been the result of the control or reduction of malaria.’”99 Among development 
																																																								
97 Robert M. Solow, “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 70, no. 1 (1956): 65–94; Robert M. Solow, “Technical Change and the Aggregate 
Production Function,” Review of Economics and Statistics 39, no. 3 (1957): 312–20. Gerald M. 
Meier Konosuke Matsushita Professor of International Economics and Policy Analysis Stanford 
University (Emeritus), Biography of a Subject : An Evolution of Development Economics: An 
Evolution of Development Economics (Oxford University Press, USA, 2004)., 97. 
98 Albert Hirschman, a German economist on the faculty at Yale (among other institutions) was 
an exception. In a 1958 book titled The Strategy of Economic Development, Hirschman included 
health as an element of social overhead capital. But he was generally against formalization and 
remained a non-mainstream (though prominent) voice in the field of development economics. 
Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1958); Paul Krugman, “The Fall and Rise of Development Economics, Eds. Lloyd Rodwin 
and Donald Schon,” in Rethinking the Development Experience: Essays Provoked by the Work of 
Albert O Hirschman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995). 
99 Randall M. Packard, “Visions of Post-War Health and Development and Their Impact on 
Public Health Interventions in the Developing World,” in International Development and Social 
Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley, Calif.: University of 
California Press, 1997)., 97, 105-106. Compare this late 1950’s pessimism with writings from the 
early 1950s, such as the declaration by Harvard epidemiologist CEA Winslow, who in 1952 
declared: ‘When we consider on the one hand the wastage of the fruits of human effort with the 
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experts credence in the classification of health interventions as economic “investments” 
was, by the late 1950s, waning.100 
f) Arthur Lewis and health as consumption, 1954-1966 
A clear articulation of the disbelief among development experts in the “health is wealth” 
argument came in 1966, when the LSE economist Arthur Lewis published Development 
Planning: the essentials of economic policy. Lewis was already an eminence in the field; 
his 1954 article entitled “Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor” was—
and remains—a fixture in the canon of modernization. His “dual sector model” posited 
that growth through industrialization could be achieved fastest by drawing in laborers 
from “backward” rural areas and maintaining them at near-subsistence wages.101 By 
1966, he had heard enough from advocates of the “health is wealth” argument to include 
the following passage: 																																																																																																																																																																					
rearing of children who will die before they are able to make any economic return to society and 
in the support by those adults who remain in good health, of a large proportion of invalids 
crippled by preventable disease, it is difficult to see how one can seriously question the 
importance of the contribution of public health to global prosperity.’ CEA Winslow, The 
Economic Values of Preventive Medicine (Geneva, Switzerland, 1952), 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/101988/1/WHA5_TD_Preface_eng.pdf; CEA Winslow, 
The Cost of Sickness and the Price of Health, World Health Organization Monograph Series 7 
(Geneva, 1951). 
100 In a 1972 article, Ruderman lamented, “No method is known for comparing returns from 
expenditure on health, education, agriculture, manufacturing, and other activities, since the only 
common unit available to measure returns on a single scale is money. Many ingenious efforts 
have been made to guess at the money value of health activity, but even if it were possible to 
assign money values to improved health or longer life it is not always possible to identify the 
direct contribution of health services. Multiple causation must be taken into account and such 
elements as higher incomes, more food, better housing, and higher levels of education are known 
to be positively correlated with lower infant mortality, higher life expectancy, and other available 
health indices.” Ruderman, “General economic considerations in health planning,” International 
Journal of Health Services, 1972, page 109. 
101 Frederick Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development 
Concept,” in International Development and Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics 
of Knowledge (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1997).; and W. Arthur Lewis, 
‘Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour,’ Manchester School 22, 2 (1954), pp. 
139-91. 
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The social services are desirable in their own right, as a form of consumption, 
capable of competing with all other forms of consumption, and do not need to be 
defended as ‘investment.’ This defense, in any case, does not work, since in most 
cases, notably education and health, the quantity of service which the public 
seems to want is significantly greater than can be justified in the language of 
investment...At the margin the social services are consumption rather than 
investment.102 
 
Expanding on this argument, Lewis explained, “One cannot rest the case for medical 
expenditure in underdeveloped countries primarily on the economic value of the 
increased number of man-hours which it will provide, since most of them already have as 
many man-hours as they can cope with.” Lewis thought non-commercial agriculture 
inherently unproductive, and did not count small farmers as “employed” in his models. 
To his mind, economic production was in heavy industry and commercial large-scale 
agriculture, not smallholder farming. Farmers were not economically significant, whether 
healthy or ill.103 There was, he believed, economic utility in some public health 
measures—in particular water supply improvements, environmental sanitation, and 
vaccination—as these decreased the prevalence of diseases that made even employed 
workers less productive while making more land habitable. But, Lewis continued, most 
governments already invested in these measures, and the question for the development 																																																								
102 W. Arthur (William Arthur) Lewis, Development Planning the Essentials of Economic Policy, 
[1st U. S. ed. ]. (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).  Pages 161-163. 
103 Lewis explained hat the only portion of the population were those who saved their income and 
thereby helped in the work of capital formation. “The central fact of economic development is 
rapid capital accumulation (including knowledge and skills with capital)…We are interested not 
in the people in general, but only say in the 10 percent of them with the largest incomes…The 
remaining 90 percent of the people never manage to save a significant fraction of their 
incomes…The central fact of economic development is that the distribution of incomes is altered 
in favour of the saving class. Practically all saving is done by people who receive profits or rents. 
Workers’ savings are very small…In the beginning, the national income consists almost entirely 
of subsistence income. Abstracting from population growth and assuming that the marginal 
product of labour is zero, this subsistence of income can be yielded up to the expanding capitalist 
sector without reducing subsistence output. Lewis, “Economic Development with Unlimited 
Supplies of Labour.” Pages 416-417.; W. Arthur Lewis, “Unlimited Labour: Further Notes,” The 
Manchester School 26, no. 1 (January 1958): 1–32. 
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planner was whether or not more expensive outlays for curative medicine were merited 
on economic grounds. The answer, to Lewis, was no.  
 
Lewis spoke from a position of some experience. He had spent a year (1957-1958) in 
Ghana as an advisor to Kwame Nkrumah. At first he was excited to work with the first 
black-led postcolonial state in sub-Saharan Africa. But he had quickly become frustrated 
with what he saw as officials’ inability to prioritize interventions, to recognize that with 
limited resources spending had to focus on projects most likely to spur rapid growth.104 
Given the imperative to focus resources on investment activities, the governments of poor 
countries could not afford to provide enough general physicians to care for their entire 
populations.105 Still, Lewis admitted, as curative medicine was “the part of the medical 
service with which the public comes most into contact” and “what the public wants 
most,” he allowed that some government spending might go towards it if only in the 
name of “sentiment.”106 
 
																																																								
104 Robert L Tignor, W. Arthur Lewis and the Birth of Development Economics (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2006). Pages 161-3. 
105 Lewis, Development Planning the Essentials of Economic Policy, pages 85-86. Lewis 
explained he did not actually object to governments building a few expensive hospitals. He 
thought primary care was actually much more expensive if done comprehensively. The key point, 
to him, was that health care spending should be recognized as consumption rather than 
investment. Lewis argued that spending on health was necessary, not for growth, but because: 
“The rate of growth of public discontent is a logarithmic function of the rate of growth of the ratio 
of domestic savings to national income…The Government should spend liberally on social 
services, especially education, health and welfare services, and take aggressive steps to improve 
working class housing; adequate opportunities for secondary education are especially valued 
because they give working class families the sense of an opening future.” 
106 Ibid. 101-103. 
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The classification of healthcare provision as “consumption” and the general disregard for 
the role of health in economic growth helped to turn policy advisors and international aid 
agencies against health projects during the 1950s and 1960s. Sometimes it was just a 
useful cover for budget cuts. This was evident in Tanganyika’s Development and Welfare 
Plan for 1950-1956, which recommended a decrease in “social services” [including 
medicine] from the 16 percent of government expenditure it had claimed in 1947-1949, to 
12 percent for the coming seven-year period. Though the decline was motivated in large 
part by the fact that the UK Colonial Office had made clear that all recurrent expenditure 
would have to be paid for by territorial revenues, the plan’s authors justified the cut in 
social service spending by declaring outlays on medical expenditures “are considered to 
be as large as can reasonably be set aside in view of their non-productive nature, except 
in the very widest sense of the term.”107 
g) Health as consumption in Nyasaland and Malawi, 1954-1971 
Policymakers in Nyasaland during this two-decade period shared this opinion of health’s 
role as consumption and not investment. In a 1956 speech, Nyasaland Governor Geoffrey 
Colby explained that he planned to use grants from the UK Colonial Development and 
Welfare Fund on electricity, roads, communications and piped water in cities—the kinds 
of investments he believed could spur private enterprise and bolster public revenues—
rather than social services.108 A 1959 “Economic survey of Nyasaland” chaired by the 
British economist Daniel Jack acknowledged the territory’s inadequate health services 
but claimed “the need is so great it can only be me fully in the future when Africans are 																																																								
107 Beck, Medicine, Tradition, and Development in Kenya and Tanzania. 1920-1970., 201 
108 Geoffrey Colby, “Recent Developments in Nyasaland,” African Affairs 55, no. 221 (October 
1956): 273–82. Page 274. 
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able to meet the bulk of the cost themselves.”109 Health and education were, according to 
Jack, “unproductive” social services, which should claim a far smaller portion of public 
budgets than “services on which industry depends.”110 
 
This bright-line distinction between health as a social service, rather than an economic 
investment, continued after independence. Though the UK Treasury continued to provide 
budgetary support to the Malawi government from independence in 1964 through 1971, 
both Banda and the UK government sought to end such assistance as soon as possible; 
the UK advised spending on activities with rapid budgetary returns, and according to the 
historian Kathryn Morton these did not include health services.111 In the annual reports 
prepared by Malawi’s Economic Planning Division, health was not even included in the 
body of the report until 1973, and even then it was included in a chapter entitled 
“education and social services.”  
 
It can be difficult to trace the intellectual connections between the epistemic framework 
structuring reports by Malawi’s civil service and the peer-reviewed publications of 
leading development economists. But in this case, at least one connection is fairly direct. 
Henry Ord, a University of Edinburgh economics professor seconded to Malawi to serve 
as President Banda’s Chief Economist in the Economic Planning Division between 1968 																																																								
109 D.T. Jack, “Report on an Economic Survey of Nyasaland, 1958-1959” (Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1959), Box 4, No. 6, Society of Malawi Archive., 
pp. 33. DT Jack was Professor of Economics at the University of Durham, and became a favored 
expert of Federal Prime Minister Roy Welensky when he needed a pro-Federation voice. At 
Welensky’s invitation, Jack would serve on the Monckton Commission in 1960. 
110 Ibid. Page 61, paragraph 39. 
111 Kathryn Morton, Aid and Dependence: British Aid to Malawi, 1 edition (London: Routledge, 
2011). 117-118. 
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and 1970, wrote that he considered Lewis one of the world’s leading theorists of 
economic planning, and observed that Lewis’ writings had long been a mainstay of 
syllabi in courses on economic planning.112 Like Lewis, Ord advised the government to 
concentrate its spending on “productive investment projects,” namely “transport and 
power”; health is rarely mentioned in his papers.113 Malawi’s civil service, still heavily 
European in the late 1960s, was steeped in an intellectual milieu in which health was not 
an integral component of development. If Malawi did need a “big push” of outside 
financing to get its economy growing, health interventions were not seen as part of the 
effort. 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
Historians of medicine have documented many shifts in health seeking behavior impelled 
by the promise—rather than the proof—of better health outcomes.114 But the history told 
in this chapter is not one of overblown and un-kept promises. With the arrival of new 
therapeutics there were diseases cured and sufferings relieved. According to physicians, 
patients and historians alike, the new drugs of the postwar moment to counter bacterial 																																																								
112 “Responses to Survey by Henry W. Ord, Conference on the Teaching of Economics, a Survey 
written by JF Rweyamamu, Dept of Economics, University College, Dar Es Salaam,” June 10, 
1969, EPD/15/01/Vol II (14-2-8R, Box 20610), National Archives of Malawi. 
113 Henry W Ord, “Some Aspects of Economic Planning: Talk to Rotary Club, Blantyre, Malawi” 
(Blantyre, Malawi, July 10, 1969), EPD/15/01/Vol II (14-2-8R, Box 20610), University of 
Edinburgh Archives. 
114 For instance, historian Judith Walzer Leavitt has chronicled the growing popularity of 
physician-attended childbirths among wealthy white women in the United States during the late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. Convinced that male medical school graduates could 
shield them from the dangers of childbirth better than midwives, women of means turned in 
increasing numbers to doctors.  Yet, as Leavitt argues, as late as the early twentieth century 
“physicians’ safety record when measured by mortality statistics matched or was worse than the 
record of midwives, who follow a basically noninterventionist birth policy…physicians, with all 
their expertise and intervention techniques, did not, as they had promised, enhance safety of the 
birth experience for women.” Judith Walzer Leavitt, Brought to Bed: Child-Bearing in America, 
1750-1950 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Pages 56-57. 
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and parasitic infections had demonstrable effects on mortality.115 The increase in demand 
for therapy was not based solely on promised benefits. As the next chapter will 
demonstrate, Nyasaland’s Africans were unlikely to trust the promises of white officials 
and physicians during the late colonial era, an era of anti-colonial mobilization and 
profound racial strife. The colonized found proof of medicine’s efficacy not in official 
propaganda, but in experiences of family members and neighbors once on death’s door 
returning home healthy. This newly demonstrated efficacy had profound consequences. 
In the late colonial moment, medicine moved to the center of Nyasaland’s contentious—
even deadly—politics. 
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Chapter 8 
Counterrevolutionary therapeutics: medicine as a political palliative under 
Federation rule, 1953-1963 
 
Abstract 
This chapter is a political and social history of government medical care in Nyasaland 
during its final decade as a colony. During the 1950s and 1960s, recurrent government 
health spending in Nyasaland rose markedly. But what explains this rise in spending? 
After all, to many contemporary development experts government spending on curative 
medicine was fiscally imprudent, inapposite to the goal of GDP growth. Yet leading 
officials the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963) publicized financial 
commitments to hospitals and health centers. This chapter argues that increased public 
outlays on medicine were a response to (and an attempt to quiet) protests among late-
colonial African publics, particularly as new chemotherapeutics made government 
hospitals and dispensaries increasingly popular sources of health care. In the face of 
popular protests against rule by white supremacists in Southern Rhodesia, the Federation 
Government spent surprising sums on medicine in Nyasaland. But once the fate of 
Federation was sealed, officials in Salisbury cut spending and even shipped supplies from 
Nyasaland to Southern Rhodesia. Once the Federation’s propaganda campaign was over, 
healthcare providers found themselves deprived of the tools of their trade. 
 
Prelude: A brief history of ‘medical pacification’ in Africa 
 
In southern African history, medicine has often been used to demonstrate good will and 
secure legitimacy, particularly during moments of great strife and uncertainty. Writing of 
his dealings with a people in what is today Botswana during his first African expedition 
(1852-1856), the Scottish missionary physician claimed, “English medicines were 
eagerly asked for and accepted by all; and we always found medical knowledge an 
important aid in convincing the people that we were really anxious for their welfare.”1 
Livingstone and his acolytes would continue use medicine as such an “aid” when they 
established missions in present-day Malawi. It was, Livingstone and his followers 
believed, an important display of the beneficence of European civilization, and a peaceful 																																																								
1 David Livingstone, Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa : Including a Sketch of 
Sixteen Years’ Residence in the Interior of Africa, and a Journey from the (London: John Murray, 
1857). 
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counterpoint to the wars they had begun with Yao communities that continued to engage 
in the East African slave trade.2  
 
Within a few months of establishing the Livingstonia Mission at Cape Maclear (only a 
few kilometers from present-day Mbeya Village) in 1875, another Scottish doctor, Robert 
Laws, was performing surgeries on African patients. In his 1921 biography of Laws, 
William Pringle Livingstone attributes the early support the mission garnered among 
locals to Laws’ medical work: “The natives were quietly taking stock of the white men, 
observing all their actions, and reading their character more accurately than perhaps they 
knew. What chiefly won them was the medical work of the Doctor. Stories of his skill 
and kindliness were carried by the few whom he attended and retold in the villages, and 
one after another they ventured to the Station for medicine.” 3  
 
French imperialists would come to share this creed about the power of medicine to secure 
political support, or at least quietus. In 1901, at the height of campaign to quell rebellious 
subjects in Madagascar, French military official Hubert Lyautey was reputed to have 
cabled his commanding general the following: “If you can send me four doctors, I will 
send you back four companies.” In his later posts in North Africa, Lyautey became a 
leading proponent of what the historian Jim Paul has called “medical pacification.” In 
western Algeria and later, as the first Resident General of the French Protectorate of 
Morocco, he saw medical teams as key components of any invasion or 
counterinsurgency. 																																																								
2 Livingstone, David Livingstone’s Shire Journal 1861-1864. 
3 Livingstone, Laws of Livingstonia.  Page 92. 
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Often the very public demonstrations of goodwill were meant to quell critics of 
imperialism in Europe as much as restive African subjects. Concluding a speech before a 
medical audience in Brussels in 1926, shortly after his departure from Morocco, Lyautey 
described this strategy of pacification in terms both Machiavellian and principled: 
From the day when a notable, a qaid, or just some suffering devil decides to see a French 
doctor and leaves his office cured, the ice is broken, the first step is taken, and the 
relationship begins to be established…Certainly the colonial expansion has its harsh 
aspects. It is not either beyond reproach or without blemish. But if there is something that 
ennobles it and justifies it, it is the action of the doctor, understood as a mission and an 
apostleship.4 
 
As the coming chapter will demonstrate, this deployment of medicine as an antidote to 
political opposition was especially common during the late colonial era. Besieged by 
wholesale critiques of colonialism from prominent voices in Africa, Europe and the 
United States, colonial governments sought to propound the virtues medicine as proof of 
the veracity of the doctrines of “trusteeship” and “development.” Medicine figured 
prominently in political combat between proponents and opponents of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland during the 1950s and early 1960s, and it continues to play a 
major feature of in debates over the nature of late colonial British rule elsewhere in 
Africa.  In a Letter to the Editor of the British daily The Guardian in 2012, a veteran 
British soldier who served in Kenya during the Mau Mau Revolt, objected to the 
assertion by columnist George Monbiot (drawing on Caroline Elkins’ Imperial 
Reckoning) that “the British detained…almost the entire population of one and a half 
million people, in camps and fortified villages” where thousands were beaten or left to 
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die of treatable illnesses.5  Allen contended these settlements were not “gulags,” as Elkins 
had called them, but rather humanely devised villages “where proper security could be 
provided.” As evidence of British intent, he pointed to the “health centres” built by the 
British in those new villages, as well as “water supplies…sports grounds, markets and 
schools.” The provision of health care was the key to Allen’s case. For Allen, the 
existence of clinics helped prove colonial officials were “fully dedicated to the wellbeing 
and advancement of the people they served.” 
 
More recently, a number of African regimes have sought to make universal access to 
public sector health care a cornerstone of the post-conflict social contract. Côte d’Ivoire 
is one such example. After President Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down after losing an 
election in November 2010, forces loyal to challenger Alassane Ouattara revolted. An 
estimated 3,000 people were killed in six months of violence before French forces helped 
Ouattara’s militia capture Gbagbo in mid-April 2011.6 Immediately after Ouattara 
assumed the presidency, his government announced that long-standing fees at 
government health clinics had been suspended.7 The provision of free care was originally 
planned to last only until the end of May 2011, but in the government clinics remained 
free at the point of care for months. But after Laurent Gbagbo (who retained significant 
political support) been extradited to the International Criminal Court in The Hague in 																																																								
5 George Monbiot, “Deny the British Empire’s Crimes? No, We Ignore Them,” The Guardian, 
April 23, 2012, sec. Opinion, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/apr/23/british-
empire-crimes-ignore-atrocities; Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of 
Britain’s Gulag in Kenya, Reprint edition (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2005). 
6 “Laurent Gbagbo: Ivory Coast Ex-Leader Denies War Crimes,” BBC News, accessed January 
29, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35424653. 
7 “Cote d'Ivoire: Free Health Care, for Now,” IRINnews, accessed January 29, 2016, 
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November 2011, Ouattara’s government felt more firmly ensconced in power. Two 
months later, in January 2012 the health minister announced the government could no 
longer afford to maintain the policy of free care. Even after some fees were reinstituted, 
care for mothers and children under six years old remained free.8 
 
The most well-documented and dramatic example of the use of health in post-conflict 
reconstruction is Rwanda. In the decades after leading the invading army that put an end 
to the 1994 genocide—“the fastest mass extermination in history,” in the words of 
journalist Tom Burgis9—Rwandan President Paul Kagame made health care a key 
priority of his rule. Writing in the pages of the Wall Street Journal on April 7, 2014, the 
twentieth anniversary of the start of the genocide, President Kagame recounted the 
deliberate efforts his administration had made to integrate health into the long process of 
reconciliation: 
In Rwanda, we are relying on universal human values, which include our culture 
and traditions, to find modern solutions to the unique challenges we faced in 
terms of justice and reconciliation following the genocide…We chose to stay 
together…We passed a new constitution that transcends politics based on 
division…We extended comprehensive health and education benefits to all our 
citizens.10 
 
Facing ongoing threats to internal instability, and external criticism of heavy-handed rule 
and meddling in Congolese affairs, President Kagame made public sector health care a 
																																																								
8 By IRIN part of the Guardian development network, “Ivory Coast Forced to Drop Free Public 
Healthcare System due to Rising Costs,” The Guardian, January 27, 2012, sec. Global 
development, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/jan/27/ivory-coast-free-
healthcare-ends. 
9 Tom Burgis, The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the 
Theft of Africa’s Wealth (PublicAffairs, 2015). 
10 Paul Kagame, “Reflecting on Rwanda’s Past—While Looking Ahead,” Wall Street Journal, 
April 7, 2014, Opinion. 
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showcase of his government’s benevolence and seriousness of purpose. In the immediate 
aftermath of the genocide the country was the poorest on the planet, political violence 
persisted and the infrastructure (in health and other areas) was completely wrecked. But 
even after the improvement of health and economic indices to pre-genocide levels, 
Kagame’s government secured remarkable gains. Between 2000 and 2010 the maternal 
mortality ratio declined by 59.5 percent. Between 2000 and 2011 the under-five child 
mortality rate decreased by 70.4 percent. The decline in the crude mortality rate between 
2000 and 2012 was the fastest in the world during that period.11 The means by which 
these feats were accomplished—including high rates of community-based insurance 
enrollment and vaccination coverage—have been well documented.12 By 2011, Rwanda 
devoted a higher share of its government expenditure to health than any other nation in 
the African Union.13 This dissertation suggests that the fact that such intense efforts came 
in the wake of genocide should not be entirely surprising. 
 
Malawi has not experienced violence on the scale of Rwanda or Côte d’Ivoire in recent 
decades, but in the wake of its own (more peaceful) political transition the politics of 
health care showed some similarities. After years of labor strikes and ever more vocal 
calls from prominent quarters (including the Catholic Church) for an end to Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda’s 30-year-long dictatorship, Malawi’s held its first multi-party elections 																																																								
11 Farmer, Basilico, and Messac, “After McKeown: The Changing Roles of Biomedicine, Public 
Health and Economic Growth in Mortality Declines.” 
12 Agnes Binagwaho et al., “Rwanda 20 Years on: Investing in Life,” The Lancet, 2014, 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673614605742; P. E. Farmer et al., 
“Reduced Premature Mortality in Rwanda: Lessons from Success,” BMJ 346, no. jan18 1 
(January 18, 2013): f65–f65. 
13 “Abuja+12: Shaping the Future of Health in Africa” (UNAIDS, July 2013), 
http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/JC2524_Abuja_report_en_0.pdf. 
	 369	
in May 1994.14 Bakili Muluzi defeated the nonagenarian Banda, becoming Malawi’s 
second president. Shortly after taking office, Muluzi took steps to consolidate support 
among the rural poor (some of whom had seen Banda not as a democrat, but as a 
protector of material subsistence). He immediately abolished fees at government primary 
schools. Enrollment at primary schools increased from 1.7 million in 1993 to 3.9 million 
in 1994.15 He also refused to follow recommendations by the World Bank to institute 
user fees at Malawi’s health clinics. Whereas Banda had repeatedly told the World Bank 
he would institute the fees without ever doing so, Muluzi spoke publicly about his 
disagreement with the Bank, He was particularly vocal about his opposition to user fees 
in the months leading up to Malawi’s 1999 general elections.16 Heading into an uncertain 
election, which Muluzi’s United Democratic Front would ultimately win, the President 
clearly wanted his name associated with free health care access for Malawi’s people. 
 
 
But do health services consummate officials’ dreams of pacified populace? This chapter 
suggests the interaction between health and political unrest is more complicated. 
Unprecedented expenditure on health could not prevent anti-Federation forces from 
winning the public support and imperial acquiescence necessary to end the regime they 
so detested. But, as Chapter 9 demonstrates, the new government of independent Malawi 
added kindling to an incipient rebellion when it tried to end the long-standing policy of 
free public sector health care. The provision of health services has not always proven an 																																																								
14 Power, Political Culture and Nationalism in Malawi. 
15 Bakili Muluzi, Mau Anga: The Voice of a Democrat : Past, Present & Future (Pretoria: 
Skotaville Media, 2002). Page 17. 
16 Ibid. Page 183. 
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effective measure to pacify ongoing unrest, but the denial of public sector health care to 
the Malawian public has been a potent means to foster discontent. Health services may 
not be a cure-all for political regimes facing crises of legitimacy, but such regimes ignore 
health at their peril. 
I. Introduction: Disobeying the economists: Malawi health spending peaks in 
the heyday of modernization 
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland marked a decade-long, and ultimately 
abortive, political experiment at the close of the Nyasaland’s colonial era. Beginning in 
the interwar years, white settlers in Southern and Northern Rhodesia sought to join their 
two territories under a single government. By the mid-1930s, white settlers in Nyasaland 
and then-Governor Harold Kittermaster argued that shared government would bring 
economic benefits to their territory as well. After putting their efforts on hold during the 
Second World War, settlers resumed advocacy for a shared regional government in the 
late 1940s. The white settlers were, as John McCracken explains, increasingly fearful that 
without a stronger union between their previously separate colonies, the seemingly 
inevitable move in holdings of the British Empire toward majority rule would sweep 
them from power. When the Conservatives retook power from Labour in the 1951 UK 
elections, the Colonial Office’s erstwhile objections to a federated government vanished. 
In 1953, the Central African Federation—including Southern Rhodesia, Northern 
Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, with a capital in Salisbury—was inaugurated.17 
 
 
																																																								
17 McCracken, A History of Malawi. 
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The Federation era (1953-1963) coincided with the heyday of modernization theory; as 
shown in the previous chapter, modernizers tended to view public sector health spending 
as unproductive consumption. Given the esteem in which modernization theory was held 
by Federation and nationalist planners alike, it is surprising that health spending as a 
proportion of government spending rose to new heights during this period (see Figure 
0.1). Particularly during the years when Nyasaland was a part of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, this ratio reached unprecedented levels. The share of total 
recurrent government expenditure devoted to the Medical Department’s budget rose from 
4.2 percent in 1951 to 9.9 percent in 1958, before losing most (though not all) of the 
gains of the 1950s by falling to 5.7 percent in 1964. Combined with the preceding 
narrative, these figures reveal a curious fact: Malawi’s health spending reached an apex 
(as a share of government revenue) at the very moment when regard for health spending 
among international development experts was at its nadir. The thesis (encapsulated by 
Keynes’ dictum from the beginning of the chapter) that policymakers’ prescriptions 
follow the ideas of academic economists overstates the influence of the latter on the 
former. As this chapter and the next will demonstrate, the trends in government outlays 
for health during the Federation and post-independence era had much more to do with 
local popular politics than with the advice of international advisers.  
 
The relative impotence of the advice of modernization theorists during this period is all 
the more intriguing because officials in the governments of late-colonial Nyasaland and 
early postcolonial Malawi read—and actively sought out—the counsel of these leading 
lights in development economics. These officials believed the modernization theorists 
	 372	
were right about the unproductivity of spending on healthcare, but they devoted more 
money to it than ever before. Federation officials believed healthcare provision might 
mollify restive African publics. But if economic experts from the US and UK were 
unable to dampen outlays for health services in late-colonial Nyasaland and early 
postcolonial Malawi, the proponents of a new economic orthodoxy tried to shape health 
spending and health policy in Malawi during the late 1960s and 1970s. This period saw a 
recrudescence of interest in health among economic experts, but in contrast to the 
interwar era the most salient aspect of Malawian bodies was neither the microbes in their 
blood or the emptiness of their stomachs, but the fullness of their wombs (Chapter 9). 
 
This chapter will proceed in three main parts. The first section examines the politics of 
medicine during the years in which Nyasaland was a part of the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland (1953-1963); during these years, Federation officials in Southern 
Rhodesia made medicine the cornerstone of their public campaign to prove the 
beneficence of their rule and the moral depravity of the anti-Federation campaigners. The 
second section moves to medical practice in Nyasaland under the Federation, where the 
rhetoric of largesse encountered the quotidian realities of stock-outs and overcrowding. 
The next section moves to the close of Federation and the dawn of independence, when 
British officials demanded cuts in spending at public sector health facilities.  
 
II. The tangled politics of medicine and Federation 
a) The tumultuous advent of Federation: a partnership between a rider and a horse, 
1953 
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The increase in demand for biomedicine generally and for certain proven treatments in 
particular, took place during a period of profound political ferment in Nyasaland. Though 
the construction of renovation of health facilities, the hiring and training of health 
professionals, and the stocking of pharmacy shelves did not keep pace with the demand, 
all increased during the 1950s and 1960s. Though medicine became a more central 
component of colonial development in most parts of British Africa during this period, the 
increases in spending in Nyasaland during this period were particularly marked. This 
newfound attention was tied to the fact that the health sector was a central locus of 
political conflict in the years of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (September 
1953-December 1963). Both elite urban Africans and rural smallholders in Nyasaland 
objected to a political system which moved political authority from London to Salisbury, 
where the white settler government had long presided over a more segregationist and 
exploitative regime than the UK’s Colonial Office had ever pursued. Many Africans in 
Nyasaland had spent time in Southern Rhodesia; they knew its racist policies. They did 
not trust Godfrey Huggins, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia (and a physician 
himself), when promised the new federation would be a “partnership” between whites 
and blacks. Perhaps their concern derived from the fact that shortly after Huggins pledged 
to the Colonial Office that he would pursue “partnership,” he reassured his fellow white 
settlers that it would be “the partnership between a rider and his horse.”18 So opposed to 
Federation was Nyasaland’s African population that on a tour of British Africa, the 																																																								
18 In 1956, when Roy Welensky become Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, he spoke of 
“partnership” as a goal to be attained “over the next two hundred years.” LH Gann, “Lord 
Malvern (Sir Godfrey Huggins): A Reappraisal,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 23, no. 
4 (1985): 723–28. Also see Alex May, The Commonwealth and International Affairs: The 
Roundtable Centennial Selection (Routledge, 2010). Page 107. 
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traveling writer Joan Wicken wrote, “Nowhere else in East or Central Africa did I find so 
much bitterness or nationalism among the emerging indigenous population.”19 This 
attitude surprised her, “for public discrimination is less widespread [in Nyasaland] than in 
many other places.” Africans there did not have to carry passes, and the colonial 
administration had alienated a relatively small portion of the land for European settlers. 
Wicken ultimately inferred that Nyasaland’s African population must have been so 
politically charged because they believed they “must do something now before we get 
into a position like that in Southern Rhodesia.”20 
 
 Recognizing a crisis of legitimacy, officials in Salisbury consistently highlighted their 
concern for health in Nyasaland. At the same time, they sought to pin responsibility for 
epidemics on anti-Federation organizers. 
 
Some aspects of the formation of the Federation remain a mystery. “For all the hundreds 
of pages that have been written on the introduction of the Federation,” notes 
McCracken,” no convincing explanation has yet been provided as to why Whitehall 
insisted on the inclusion of Nyasaland.” The Bledisoe Commission, convened by the UK 																																																								
19 Wicken, “African Contrasts.” Page 23. Also see page 47: “I found not one African who 
favoured [Federation]..It is Congress which has braches throughout the country, and although it is 
strongest in the South, yet its influence is felt almost everywhere. And every Congress-man has 
one theme; Federation Must Go….Several times I tried to get a discussion on the economic 
benefits of Federation; these were either denied altogether, and economic ills ascribed instead, or 
they were shrugged off. The association with Southern Rhodesia which it involved was enough to 
condemn it, for ‘Southern Rhodesia is the country of apartheid.” 
20 Wicken considered Southern Rhodesia’s racial policies indistinguishable from those of 
apartheid South Africa: “Separate post offices, park benches, counters in shops and the most rigid 
segregation in residence…Further, every African has to carry not only his general registration 
book, but also a pass to be in the town and another if he has to be out late in the evening, and 
sometimes others for special purposes.” Ibid. Pages 23-24. 
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Government in 1937, found that native authorities, native associations, and other 
organized groups of Africans in Nyasaland were adamantly opposed to any closer 
political ties to settler-dominated Southern Rhodesia. In the early 1950s even the 
Nyasaland Governor Geoffrey Colby, opposed the new union out of fear it would lead to 
unrest among his colony’s African population. The inclusion of Nyasaland was, 
McCracken believes, likely part of a deal in which British officials agreed to allow 
Federation in exchange for handing off Nyasaland’s debts to the new government.21 
When, in the years following Federation, Africans in Nyasaland agitated for its 
dissolution officials in Salisbury reminded them that Britain was in no rush to take on 
these fiscal burdens again. In a 1962 pamphlet, Federation officials claimed they had 
included Nyasaland “at the insistence of the British Government…Britain had found the 
financial burden of the backward and impoverished Protectorate becoming increasingly 
onerous.”22 Whatever the motivation, in 1953 Nyasaland became the unwanted, 
impoverished, rebellious third member in a Federation dominated by the white settlers of 
the other two territories.23 
b) Moving the Ministry of Health to Salisbury, 1954 
Under the Federal constitution health was a federal, rather than a territorial, 
responsibility. Many governmental functions—including native and provincial 
administration, African education, European and African agriculture, fisheries, police, 
																																																								
21 McCracken, A History of Malawi. 
22 Federation and Nyasaland: The Facts (Salisbury: Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
1962). 
23 Other officials—most notably Andrew Cohen, leader of the African Division of the UK 
Colonial Office under Labour—had written in 1950 that “the creation of a solid British block of 
territories in Central Africa” would defend against the spread of South Africa’s apartheid 
ideology. McCracken, A History of Malawi. Pages 275-6.  
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environmental sanitation, and social welfare—remained in the portfolio of a Nyasaland’s 
Governor, who answered to the Colonial Office. The Federal Government was to take 
responsibility for immigration, import and export controls, railways, posts and 
communications, external affairs, and health. Health was something of an outlier on this 
list; the general logic of the division of responsibilities was to leave functions 
“predominantly or exclusively affecting Africans” with the territorial governments. 24 But 
health, which would seem to fit into this category, was placed under the direction of a 
Federal Ministry of Health based in Salisbury.  
 
The Southern Rhodesian negotiators who helped shape the Federal Constitution had two 
reasons to favor the designation of health as a federal responsibility. The first was that a 
Federal health service would be a good propaganda tool of the new government. As early 
as 1939, Viscount Bledisloe—chair of a 1937 Commission that had argued in favor of a 
Central African Federation—had argued before the UK House of Lords that Southern 
Rhodesian settlers were devoted to improving the health and education of Africans.25 By 
the 1950s, the pro-Federation politicians thought the accomplishments of a Federal health 
service might help counter those British observers (including Fabian Colonial Bureau 
																																																								
24 Ibid. Also see “Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constituion of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland” (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1960). Appendix VII: 
Possible Constitutional Changes, Pages 24-28. 
25 After criticizing the Northern Rhodesian government’s commitment to Africans’ health 
services, Bledisloe said the following of Southern Rhodesia: “You have got a real desire on the 
part of the white community to develop the country, to improve health conditions…no one can 
deny that during the last five to ten years there has been most notable progress in all these matters 
under the lead of the enlightened Prime Minister, Mr. Huggins.” Viscount Bledisloe, Rhodesia-
Nyasaland Royal Commission’s Report, 1939, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1939/jul/31/rhodesia-nyasaland-royal-
commissions#S5LV0114P0_19390731_HOL_94. 
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members Rita Hinden and Margery Perham, as well as the Nyasaland-born, London-
based physician Hastings Kamuzu Banda) who argued the Federation would spread 
Southern Rhodesia’s regressive racial policies to neighboring territories.26 
 
The second, and more important reason why Southern Rhodesian negotiators pressed to 
make health a responsibility of the Federal government was that doing so promised to 
save their own government a good deal of money. The Federation Government was in 
essence a massive financial transfer from Northern Rhodesia’s copper mines (which had 
been nationalized in the early postwar years) to Southern Rhodesia and, to a lesser extent, 
Nyasaland. Between 1955 and 1961, Southern Rhodesia received roughly 64 percent of 
Federal expenditure, though it contributed only 50 percent of Federal revenue.27 
Foreseeing this advantageous arrangement, Southern Rhodesian officials at the Lancaster 
House constitutional negotiations in 1952 were eager to see expensive departments 
delegated to the Federal government. Northern Rhodesian settlers, who sought 																																																								
26 In his 1949 anti-Federation tract, Banda wrote the following of Godfrey Huggins, Prime 
Minister of Southern Rhodesia: “Is it not…reasonable to suppose that a man who has so 
vigorously and persistently pursued a policy of discrimination and segregation in Southern 
Rhodesia will extend this policy to Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia?” Hastings Kamuzu Banda 
and Harry Nkumbula, Federation in Central Africa (London, 1949). Also see Philip Short, Banda 
(Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974)., 57-58; and Wood, The Welensky Papers, 146.  
27 According to Pearson and Taylor, Northern Rhodesia contributed the other 50 percent of the 
revenue, but received only 28 percent of expenditure. Nyasaland contributed almost none of the 
Federal government’s revenue, and received 7.8 percent of the expenditure. See D.S. Pearson and 
W.L. Taylor, “Break-up: Some Economic Consequences for the Rhodesias and Nyasaland” 
(Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia: The Phoenix Group, 1963). Hazlewood and Henderson have 
slightly different statistics, which show Nyasaland did make payments to the federal government, 
of about £2-3 million per year. See Arthur Hazlewood and PD Henderson, “Nyasaland: The 
Economics of Federation,” Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics 22, no. 1 
(1960). Also see William Roger Louis, “Misconceived Dominion: The Creation and 
Disintegration of Federation in British Central Africa,” in The Transfer of Power in Africa: 
Decolonization 1940-1960, Eds. Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1982). Pages 215-216. 
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amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia in order to defend their place in the racial 
hierarchy, agreed, as did the UK and Nyasaland negotiators present.28 
 
Federal control over health took effect on July 1, 1954. Thereafter, health budgets for the 
three territories were decided by the Federal Parliament, a legislature designed to protect 
settler interests. The Parliament consisted of 35 members, 26 of whom were elected by 
European settlers in their respective territories. Nyasaland had only seven members of 
parliament. Four of these were elected by European settlers, while the Governor 
nominated two Africans and one missionary. The missionary was ostensibly selected to 
represent “African interests.” 
c) “Our Mr. Chirwa must, like Oliver Twist, ask for more”: African discontent over 
health in an era of expansion, 1954-1960 
In many ways, this was an unlikely historical moment for rapid increases in health sector 
spending. As was discussed in Chapter 7, the tenets of modernization theory—ascendant 
in the academy and among Western aid agencies during this period—referred to state 
appropriations for health as “consumption” that did not contribute urgent aim of 
increasing aggregate production. This argument against health expenditure on Africans 
beyond tax revenues garnered from Africans themselves recurred during the Federation 
years. A 1960 economic survey of Nyasaland, commissioned by the Federal Government 
and led by the University of Durham economics professor—and Federation apologist—
Daniel Jack, explained that Nyasaland “is already receiving better health services than it 
can afford to pay for on account of heavy expenditure by the Federal Government, but the 																																																								
28 J.R.T. Wood, The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
(Durban: Graham Publications, 1983). Pages 256-257. 
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need is so great that it can only be met fully in the future when Africans are able to meet 
the bulk of the cost themselves.”29  
 
Yet under Federation rule, spending on services in Nyasaland (including medical 
services) was not tied to taxation. In net terms, Nyasaland received more funding than it 
contributed to the Federal budget, and officials in Salisbury eagerly took every 
opportunity to remind anti-Federation African leaders of this fact. In the very first month 
of Federal responsibility for health, Manoah Chirwa, one of the two African members of 
parliament from Nyasaland, complained that African interests had been neglected in the 
Federation budget.30 Reverend Percy Ibbotson, a white missionary selected to represent 
Southern Rhodesia’s “African interests,” chided Chirwa for his “slight exaggeration” and 
proceeded to list the projects related to African health and welfare slated for construction 
under the Public Works Vote. He also noted that even prior to Federation, the Southern 
Rhodesian government estimated it spent five times as much on African health, 
education, and welfare as it collected from Africans in taxes.31 An anonymous Letter to 																																																								
29 Jack, “Report on an Economic Survey of Nyasaland, 1958-1959.” Professor Daniel Jack 
became a leading defender of the Federation Government. In 1960, Prime Minister also tried to 
shape the findings the Advisory Commission for the Review of the Constitution of the Federation 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (also known as the Monckton Commission) by appointing Jack. Roy 
Welensky, Welensky’s 4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland (London: Collins, 1964). Page 692. 
30 During the Federation years, anti-Federation African members of the Nyasaland legislature 
criticized the inadequacy of medical services, though they were often ruled out of order when 
they tried to do so. These members also decried discrimination against African medical staff and 
African politicians and the dearth of medical specialists. They also claimed that African and 
European medical practitioners were opposed to working for the Federal government. See Baker, 
“The Government Medical Service in Malawi.” 
31 “Mr Chirwa Exaggerates about African Neglect,” Nyasaland Times, July 20, 1954. Federation 
officials hastened to point out that in net financial terms, Nyasaland received more than it 
contributed to the Federation budget. According to a Ministry of Information pamphlet published 
in Salisbury, between 1954 and 1962, Nyasaland contributed £6 million, or 1.4 percent, of the 
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the Editor of the Nyasaland Times (signed by “’Thoughtful, Limbe”), repeated Ibbotson’s 
statistics and concluded “Africans cannot have much to complain about in the provision 
of essential services. Our Mr. Chirwa must naturally ask for more, like Oliver Twist, but 
even he must agree that the Federal Development Plan coupled with the local projects in 
our own estimates, give Africans a very wide range of services that would take a long 
time to be paid with taxation.”32  
d) Health spending as a political palliative 
Why might Federation government officials have felt the need to tout spending on the 
health sector in Nyasaland? As is evidenced by Ibbotson’s response to Chirwa, they did it 
to demonstrate beneficent intentions while countering accusations of neglect and 
exploitation. From the outset, the Federation Government was unpopular among Africans 
in Nyasaland. Hastings Kamuzu Banda had penned arguments against Federation 
beginning with a letter to the Bledisloe Commission in 1938. By 1949, as a doctor with a 
thriving practice in North London, Banda co-authored a pamphlet outlining his 
opposition to Federation.33 In April 1953, just before the Federation came into being, the 
Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) organized a non-violent resistance campaign that 
included a strike by civil servants and farm laborers as well as boycotts of tax payments 
and purchases at European-owned stores.34  
 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Federation’s total ordinary recurrent revenue. During that same period, it received £41 million in 
Federation expenditure.  Federation and Nyasaland: The Facts. Federal spending in Nyasaland 
32 “Letter to the Editor: Should Taxes Pay for Services?,” Nyasaland Times, July 27, 1954. 
33 Banda and Nkumbula, Federation in Central Africa. 
34 McCracken, A History of Malawi., 330. 
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The NAC’s campaign happened to coincide with growing resistance among smallholder 
farmers to other colonial policies. Chief Gomani of Ncheu told his people to disregard 
unpopular soil erosion regulations enacted by the Department of Agriculture (see Chapter 
2). In May 1953 Geoffrey Morton, a colonial policeman who had become famous in 1942 
after men in his command killed Zionist militant Avraham Stern in Palestine, went to 
Ncheu with thirty constables to apprehend Gomani. But Morton’s mission ended in 
failure, as a crowd fended off the policemen while the chief escaped.35 Though the 
agricultural regulations preceded the Federation, and though they were the work of 
Kettlewell and Colby far more than Federation officials, the NAC leadership linked 
opposition to the agricultural regulations with the anti-Federation campaign. In the Lower 
Shire Valley, women could be heard singing a song promising “death” to the “Federation 
capitãos” and to the “contour ridging capitãos.”36  
 
None of these protests succeeded in preventing the advent of the Federation in August 1, 
1953. But unrest—spurred by a variety of grievances—continued. In mid-August on the 
European-owned tea and tobacco estates of southern Nyasaland, African tenants (many of 
whom had come from Mozambique in previous decades) rebelled against increasing 
labor demands and shrinking land allocations. The tenants were particularly enraged by 
two stories, one of a plantation manager who had stripped naked a woman he had found 
collecting firewood on his estate, and another a rumor of a planter who had killed two 																																																								
35 John McCracken, “Coercion and Control in Nyasaland: Aspects of the History of a Colonial 
Police Force,” The Journal of African History 27, no. 1 (1986): 127–47. Page 138. 
36 Magomero. Page 217. Capitão is a Portuguese word meaning “master” or “captain.” The tea 
and tobacco estates were close to the border Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique), from whence 
many of the tenants had emigrated in previous decades, hoping to escape the even more 
demanding exploitative taxation and forced labor regimes of that colony. 
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men who were stealing oranges. These stories confirmed the commonly held image of 
whites as chifwamba (cannibals), seeking African bodies. After many tenants refused to 
work on the estates, strikes spread to the railway as well as a plywood factory. Gangs of 
men blocked roads with trees and trenches, cut telephone wires, destroyed the homes of a 
half dozen chiefs, vandalized European-owned homes and businesses, and beat tax 
collectors. With Nyasaland’s police overwhelmed while the colony’s troops fought 
Chinese guerillas in Malaya, Governor Geoffrey Colby had to request policemen from 
neighboring colonies to reassert control. They did so, but only after killing 11 Africans 
and injuring 72 more.37 
 
These kinds of mobilization were far more concerning to colonial officials than the 
mchape movement of the early 1930s (see Chapter 4). Unlike mchape, the work 
stoppages and sabotage campaigns of 1953 threatened both the profits of settler 
companies and the authority of the colonial state. While most officials in London and 
Zomba were content to focus on tax collection and budget retrenchment in Nyasaland 
during the 1930s and 1940s (even as they responded with increased health spending to 
riots in the West Indies and West Africa), the unrest of 1953 impelled Governor Colby 
and Federal Prime Minister Huggins to seek to expand both policing and health services 
in order to quell unrest in Nyasaland.  
 
The police force remained a territorial responsibility under the Federal Constitution, so 
Colby worked to expand the police force. In 1954 Nyasaland’s Police Commissioner, 																																																								
37 McCracken, A History of Malawi. Page 313. 
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Charles Apthorp, established a branch, called the Police Mobile Force, consisting of 14 
European officers and 200 Africans. The main qualification was experience in battle. 
Most of the officers had served in Palestine before coming to Nyasaland, and each of the 
Africans had served at least five years in the Army. The force, designed for ‘use in 
disturbed areas,’ was quickly deployed to the restive southern districts, often beating 
villagers in house-to-house raids. By 1958 an expanded Mobile Force was tasked with 
patrolling the country to help enforce agricultural rules and put down civil 
disobedience.38 
 
But, as Bourdieu observed, the carceral “right hand” of the state is often accompanied by 
welfarist “left hand.”39 In Nyasaland’s case, health services were not nearly so robust as 
in Bourdieu’s France (nor were they simply tools of state social control), but officials in 
Zomba and Salisbury did tout them in an effort to draw attention away from popular 
discontent. Government officials made medicine the symbol of imperial virtue, often in 
lavish ceremony and florid language. Built at a cost of £702,000, the Queen Elizabeth 
Central Hospital was dedicated at a ceremony attended by the Queen Mother in Blantyre 
in 1957, and opened to patients in 1958 (Figure 8.1).   
 
The years after the start of Federation also saw rapid increases in spending on health, 
both in absolute terms and in the percentage of public spending. Recurrent Medical 
Department expenditure in Nyasaland more than quadrupled between 1951 and 1958,  																																																								
38 McCracken, “Coercion and Control in Nyasland: Aspects of the History of a Colonial Police 
Force.” 
39 Pierre Bourdieu, Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market, Trans. Richard Nice 
(New York: The New Press, 1998). 
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Figure 8.1: Queen Mother planting a rose tree on hospital grounds of Queen Elizabeth 
Hospital, Blantyre, Nyasaland, 1957. Source: Central African Journal of Medicine, 
August 1957.40 
 
increasing from £233,000 to £798,000 in that period (Figure 8.2).41 Recurrent medical 
expenditure as a total of total recurrent expenditure (including territorial expenditure as 
well as Federal expenditure on Nyasaland) increased during this period, rising from 7.3 
percent in 1952 to 9.9 percent in 1958.42 New construction of hospitals and dispensaries 
also accelerated. While the Nyasaland Medical Department’s capital expenditure (on new 
hospitals and dispensaries and equipment) totaled £26,082 in 1953, by 1959 this figure  
																																																								
40 “Mr Chirwa Exaggerates about African Neglect,” Nyasaland Times, July 20, 1954. 
41 Harry S. Gear, “Some Problems of the Medical Services of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland.” 
42 Hazlewood and Henderson, “Nyasaland: The Economics of Federation”; Jack, “Report on an 
Economic Survey of Nyasaland, 1958-1959.” 
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Figure 8.2: Medical Department recurrent expenditure, 1952-1964. Note: Years 1952-
1958 drawn from Daniel Jack, Economic Survey of Nyasaland, 1959. Table 15. Years 
1959-1964 drawn from Malawi Ministry of Health, A Conspectus, 1965. 
 
had risen to £198,554.43 All in all, the increase in medical expenditure during Federation 
era far outpaced the expansions of the interwar or post-independence periods. 
 
Despite the increase in medical spending, opposition to the Federation Government 
continued. Nyasaland was a net recipient from the Federation budget, but Africans 
scarcely felt like beneficiaries from this arrangement. Rural Africans opposed the 
continuation of the thangata system and the harsh enforcement of malimidwe regulations. 
Native poll tax rates increased during the Federation years, from 17s-6d in 1954 to 30s in 
1961.44 Indirect tax increases and cuts to maize subsidies disproportionately affected 																																																								
43 Harry S. Gear, “Some Problems of the Medical Services of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland.” The 1953 figures include UK Colonial Development and Welfare funds, while the 
1959 figure includes only Federation expenditure. 
44 GF Pollard, “Letter to the Editor from District Commissioner, Blantyre District,” The Times (of 
Nyasaland), August 27, 1954, MNA; David TT Frost, “The Economic Outlook for Nyasaland,” 
Race & Class 4, no. 2 (1963): 59–72. Page 61. 
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Africans. At the same time, spending on social services (particularly on education) 
favored Europeans.45 
 
In any case, to many of Nyasaland’s Africans the problem with Federation lay not in 
fiscal policy. They fundamentally resented being ruled by avowed white supremacists in 
Southern Rhodesia. In July 1958 Hastings Kamuzu Banda returned to Nyasaland to a 
hero’s welcome, after a cadre of young anti-Federation organizers had deliberately built 
him into a sort of Messiah that could garner the support of rural Africans. Banda and 
other members of the recently formed Malawi Congress Party toured the nation, 
denouncing the “stupid Federation.”46 SJ Kaphale was, in 1958, a 24-year-old 
schoolteacher. He was among the crowd at Chileka airport outside Blantyre to welcome 
Kamuzu back to Nyasaland after a half-century abroad. In a 2013 interview, Kaphale 
recounted his political commitments in that moment: 
In those days, the colonial government, once you misused cultivation in the 
garden, without putting bunds or, you were taken to prison, and they would uproot 
your entire maize stock. So when you come back, after six months, you get 
nothing. You are hungry. So we were not happy about what the colonial 
government was doing. So that is why we stood hard, fighting against the colonial 
government so that we should have our own government.47 
 
In March 1959, rumors circulated among settlers that members of the MCP were plotting 
a massacre. Nyasaland’s Governor’s declared a “State of Emergency,” and imposed 
martial law. Hundreds of Africans (including Kamuzu) were imprisoned, and over 50  																																																								
45 William J. Barber, “Federation and the Distribution of Economic Benefits,” in New Deal in 
Central Africa, Eds. Colin Leys and Cranford Pratt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), 81–
97. Exploitation also took other forms. 
46 Short, Banda. 
47 SJ Kaphale, Oral history inteview conducted by Luke Messac in Matandani Village, Neno 
District, Malawi, July 14, 2013. 
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Figure 8.3: Protest during Nyasaland’s State of Emergency at Chileka airport, Blantyre, 
26 January 1960. Source: HK Banda Archives, University of Indiana Library. 
 
were killed.48 During the State of Emergency, protests continued (see Figure 8.3), as 
Africans called for Kamuzu’s release and an end to Federation rule. 
 
In the midst of the resurgence of unrest, Federation officials redoubled their efforts to 
demonstrate legitimacy (to Whitehall as well as Nyasaland’s Africans) by increasing 
health spending, and by publicizing this spending. Recurrent expenditure on Nyasaland’s 
Medical Department rose from £766,329 in 1959 to £1,034,549 in 1962. This spending 
also showed health to be a greater priority in government budgets than ever before. 																																																								
48 SJ Kaphale, Oral history inteview conducted by Luke Messac in Matandani Village, Neno 
District, Malawi, July 14, 2013. 
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Medical Department expenditure accounted for 9.9 percent of Nyasaland’s total recurrent 
expenditure (including both the Federation and territorial budgets) in 1958.49 
 
Health also occupied a central position in official rhetoric during and after the State of 
Emergency. On New Year’s Day in 1960, the Nyasaland Times announced that the new 
90-bed Nkata Bay District Hospital was “virtually complete”; it had been built, the article 
noted “with funds provided by the Federal Government,” and it had “a modern operating 
theatre and X-ray plant.”50 That same year, Dr. Harry S. Gear, who had been a senior 
official in South African before leaving government to become assistant Secretary-
General of the World Health Organization, penned an essay in the pages of the Lancet, 
declaring: “Medicine’s true teachers and disciples give more to Africa than medical care 
in a hospital or clinic. Their integrity and philosophy are a demonstration of the goodness 
to be found in their culture.”51 Citing Proud Record, an apologia written by Southern 
Rhodesian physician Michael Gelfand and published by the Government Printer in 
Salisbury, the Nyasaland Times announced in May 1960 that there was “twice as much 
for health” in 1958 as in the year before federation (1952).52 Recognizing that the 
ultimate fate of their regime lay in the hands of London-based officials, Federation 
officials ran advertisements in British dailies. One such ad, in the November 23rd edition 																																																								
49 “A Conspectus Including the Development Plan for 1965-69” (Blantyre: Ministry of Health, 
June 14, 1965), MNA. 
50 “Nkata Bay Hospital,” Nyasaland Times, January 1, 1960, MNA. Page 1. 
51 Harry S. Gear, “Medicine and the New Africa: The Passing of Colonialism South of the 
Sahara,” The Lancet, Originally published as Volume 2, Issue 7158, 276, no. 7158 (November 5, 
1960): 1020–23. Page 1023. Gear also spoke of the “flood of patients” and the “hordes” that the 
Federation was treating in African hospitals and dispensaries. Harry S Gear, “Some Problems of 
the Medical Services of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.” 
52 “Twice as Much for Health,” Nyasaland Times, May 24, 1960. Also see Gelfand, Proud 
Record. 
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of the Evening Standard, made health care facilities a barometer of benefits of the 
Federation to African subjects: “Only a rapidly expanding Federal economy can provide 
the educational and health facilities and employment needed by this rapidly growing 
population…The health service has been greatly extended.”53 
 
Federation Prime Minister Roy Welensky lost no opportunity to brandish health care as a 
political weapon. He spoke of the “diagnostic X-rays and simple laboratories and 
operating theatres” that had become “a sine qua non at all hospitals from the district level 
upward.” He concluded that the Federation had “made a very great effort” in expanding 
the capacities of the health sector.54 He made clear links between his own efforts to 
highlight public sector medical provision and the need to quell social unrest. Speaking in 
the immediate aftermath of Nyasaland’s State of Emergency, he noted “the time is now 
more than ripe for the Federation to take a completely fresh look at what the nation now 
has provided in capital works and all the recurrent expenditure that results therefrom in 
the provision and maintenance of the…services and facilities, staff to run the institutions, 
drugs, food for the patients and all the other items that contribute to the total cost of 
providing hospital services.”55  
 
																																																								
53 The advertisement was quite explicit in linking the health benefits of Federation to the quest for 
continued legitimacy. In bold letters at the end of the ad, the copy read: “It would be a tragedy for 
all races in the Federation if this remarkable progress were stopped or reversed, if these great 
achievemetns were nullified, if economic and financial order were to break down and give way to 
chaos.” Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Office of the High Commissioner. “The first steps 
in Central Africa: Let facts have a hearing,” Evening Standard, November 23, 1960. Page 20. BL 
Newspaper Collection. 
54 Welensky, “National Health Development.” Pages 7-8. 
55 Ibid. Pages 7-8. 
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By early 1962, Federation officials were engaged in a last-ditch struggle to maintain a 
regime on the verge of dissolution. Wearied by years of rebellion in restive territories, 
particularly Mau Mau in Kenya and the Emergency in Malaya, the UK Government 
under Conservative Prime Minister Harold MacMillan had long signaled his preparedness 
to grant independence to many of the Empire’s remaining holdings. As early as January 
1960, after a visit to Nyasaland, MacMillan had a dour opinion of “the cause of 
Federation.” It was, he observed, “almost desperate because of the strength of African 
opinion against it.”56 In response to Macmillan’s acknowledgement of a “wind of 
change,” the Ministry of Information in Salisbury published a pamphlet on the benefits of 
the Federation to Nyasaland. The introduction sounded like a plea: “In light of current 
developments…it now seems opportune to survey the tremendous benefits Nyasaland has 
received from Federation and what the cost would be should that Territory decide to 
break away.”57 The first chapter was a paean to the growth of the health sector. The 
pamphlet told of “the human drama of the most undeveloped and backward part of the 
Federation being lifted in less than a decade to a parity in health services with its more 
highly industrialized and sophisticated neighbors.”58  
e) Did the Malawi Congress Party sabotage health? 1959-1962 
It was during this period (the early 1960s), as the Malawi Congress Party gained popular 
support and the Colonial Office edged closer to dissolution of the fractious Federation, 
that Federation officials in Salisbury and Zomba accused Banda and other MCP leaders 
of denying patients access to health facilities. In a session of Nyasaland’s Legislative 																																																								
56 McCracken, A History of Malawi, 384. 
57 Federation and Nyasaland: The Facts.  
58 Ibid. 
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Council in July 1960, Michael Blackwood said MCP members were forcing sick African 
patients to leave government and mission hospitals. Turning to MCP members on the 
council, he chided, “I hope you are ashamed of this.”59 Nyasaland Governor Glyn Jones 
claimed similar acts of “foul and monstrous” intimidation had occurred in the Central 
Province, where a pregnant woman was made to deliver her child in the bush and the 
superior of the mission had warned personnel against reporting such incidents to the 
police. Kanyama Chiume, the MCP’s Publicity Secretary, denied the accusations, calling 
them “a pack of fabrications like the massacre plot [a reference to an alleged plot to kill 
Europeans that officials had used in 1959 to declare a State of Emergency] to try and 
discredit the Malawi Congress Party in the eyes of the world.” 60 
 
Accusations against the MCP only grew more heated in the coming months. In October 
1960, the Nyasaland Times reported that a compulsory smallpox vaccination campaign 
had run into opposition in the Central Province: young children ran away from 
vaccination teams; a Native Authority told another team to leave his area before they 
could do their work; and another team was chased and stoned by a crowd.61 Initially this 
resistance was reported without any mention of the Malawi Congress Party. But by late 
November, the pro-Federation Nyasaland Times blamed the opposition to smallpox 
vaccination on “intimidation” by “Malawi Congress Party followers.”62 On December 6,  
 																																																								
59 “Sick Had to Leave,” Nyasaland Times, July 8, 1960. Page 1. 
60 “Government Doing Everything Possible,” Nyasaland Times, July 8, 1960. 
61 “Death by Smallpox Is Stalking Nyasaland,” Nyasaland Times, October 11, 1960, MNA. 
62 “Have Your Child and Yourself Vaccinated,” Nyasaland Times, November 25, 1960, MNA. Pg 
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Figure 8.4: Infant with smallpox, Central Province, Nyasaland. Source: Nyasaland 
Times, December 6, 1960, MNA. 
 
the Times ran a front-page photo of an African infant suffering from smallpox (Figure 
8.4). Below the horrifically pock-marked body, a caption read:  
Take a good look at this little pain-ridden child. He’s barely six months old—and 
will be scarred for life if he does not die. This picture is not a ‘Federal’ picture. It 
was taken by a man with no political axe to grind. Take another good look at  
smallpox and remember the handiwork of political agitators in the Central 
Province of Nyasaland.63 
 
Public health reports and medical publications echoed the accusation of “political” 
sabotage of the campaigns, though they did not always explicitly name the MCP as the 
culprit. The Annual Report on Public Health in the Federation for 1960 lamented, 
“Attempts to bring the outbreak under control were hampered by the political unrest and 
the incitement and intimidation of the people to evade and disrupt vaccination 																																																								
63 “Infant with Smallpox, Central Province, Nyasaland,” Nyasaland Times, December 6, 1960, 
MNA. Page 1. 
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programmes. Apart from the circulation of rumours that vaccinations were intended to 
cause sterility and death, there were many instances of active hostility and on several 
occasions teams had to be withdrawn for their protection.”64 Writing in the pages of the 
British Medical Journal in July 1961, months after resistance to vaccination had ceased, 
J. Mowat Sword, the Senior Medical Officer for the Central Province, attributed the 
smallpox “epidemic” to “political opposition to vaccination campaigns.”65  
 
A full-throated denunciation of MCP interference in the health sector is found in the 1962 
pamphlet Federation and Nyasaland: The Facts, which refers to health in Nyasaland 
during the Federation as a “Success—marred by politics.” After recounting statistics on 
the increases in spending, patient attendance, and new facilities, the pamphlet lamented: 
But this happy picture was sadly marred some 18 months ago when a campaign of 
disturbance and intimidation was started against the Federal health services…The 
efforts of Ministry of Health teams to vaccinate the people of Nyasaland against 
smallpox and other diseases were largely frustrated by leading officials of this 
political party who, while taking great care to obtain their own vaccinations, travelled 
around the country, urging villagers and schoolchildren to boycott the 
vaccinators…Nyasaland’s Minister of Education refused to allow the staff of the 
Federal Ministry of Health to visit African schools for that purpose and, in some 
areas, smallpox epidemics broke out among schoolchildren, and many of them died as 
a result.66 
 
The Federation pamphlet argued, “The attitude of extremist politicians in Nyasaland is 
that if health services have to be Federal Government ones they would rather have no 																																																								
64 DM Blair, “Annual Report on the Public Health of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
for the Year 1960” (Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia: Government Printer, May 27, 1961), BL. Page 
9. 
65 J Mowat Sword, “Smallpox in Central Province, Nyasaland,” BMJ, July 15, 1961, 165–66. 
66 Federation and Nyasaland: the facts. This publication also accused MCP leaders serving in 
government of refusing to adopt a Federal scheme of freely distributed oral vaccine for children 
living in urban areas against polio. The pamphlet charged further that the MCP ministers had 
refused to allow a chosen site for a new leprosarium to be assigned to Federal authorities, thereby 
delaying construction of the facility. 
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health services at all.” But, it continued hopefully, “with the wonderful hospital facilities 
all over the country, and the experience of the deaths from smallpox of unvaccinated 
children…the people of Nyasaland…are becoming more and more aware of the anarchy 
in health matters which would arise once the Federal services were completely taken 
away.” The use of health services as a symbol of legitimacy and beneficence was now 
explicit. 
 
Malawi Congress Party leaders denied these charges in their entirety. In the pages of 
Tsopano, an MCP newsletter, Publicity Secretary Kanyama Chiume called the 
accusations “unfounded and false.” Instead, he countered, “it was a man with UFP 
[Welensky’s party] sympathies, perhaps employed as an agent provocateur, who went to 
persuade people not to accept vaccination as it would cause sterility” to incite the people 
to boycott the vaccination teams. Far from being the culprits, he continued, MCP leaders 
were the saviors: “It is our officers who helped to save the situation.” Aboard a taxi 
bearing the flag of the party, the Provincial Chairman of the MCP had taken a vaccination 
team to a resistant village, “and since that time, work has been going on smoothly.” The 
entire “comic opera,” Chiume wrote, was an attempt to slander Dr. Banda and the MCP, 
similar to the “massacre plots” that served as pretext for the State of Emergency. Turning 
the charge of sabotaging health against the Federation, Chiume chided, “This sort of 
thing must come to an end so that…the nation can canalize the energy of its people into 
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doing those things that can and will eradicate poverty, disease and ignorance in the 
country.”67 
 
Historian John McCracken and Banda biographer Philip Short both dispute the charge of 
MCP intimidation. Resistance to vaccination was, McCracken argues, “more an 
expression of popular mistrust than the result of political action.”68 Given the 
contemporary reaction to agricultural regulations and the imposition of the Federation 
government, compulsory vaccination campaigns were likely to face as least as much 
opposition as they had in the past.69 
 
The resistance was also likely a function of the demonstrable lack of efficacy of 
vaccination. Africans in Nyasaland had long experience with smallpox vaccination. 
Compulsory since 1908, it was the only vaccine that black Malawians routinely received 
prior to 1973.70 The inability of government-run campaigns to prevent recurrent 
epidemics had become evident to many Africans by the first decade of the twentieth 																																																								
67 Kanyama Chiume, “Smallpox: The Truth,” Tsopano, January 1961. Page 7. 
68 McCracken, A History of Malawi; Short, Banda. 
69 In addition, popular opposition to coercive smallpox vaccination was by no means unique to 
Nyasaland or to Africa. Histories of Europe, the United States and South Asia provide ample 
evidence that such campaigns have been disrupted without the concerted efforts of political 
parties. For an example of resistance to smallpox vaccination in the nineteenth-century United 
States, see J. W. Leavitt, “Politics and Public Health: Smallpox in Milwaukee, 1894-1895,” 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine 50, no. 4 (1976): 553–68.. For a contemporary episode in 
England, see D Porter and R Porter, “The Politics of Prevention: Anti-Vaccinationism and Public 
Health in Nineteenth-Century England.,” Medical History 32, no. 3 (July 1988): 231–52. For an 
account of opposition to coercive vaccination in South Asia during the last stages of the global 
Smallpox Eradication Programme in the 1970s, see P. Greenough, “Intimidation, Coercion and 
Resistance in the Final Stages of the South Asian Smallpox Eradication Campaign, 1973-1975,” 
Social Science & Medicine (1982) 41, no. 5 (September 1995): 633–45. 
70 Alister C. Munthali, “Determinants of Vaccination Coverage in Malawi: Evidence from the 
Demographic and Health Surveys,” Malawi Medical Journal 19, no. 2 (June 2007): 79–82. 
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century (see Chapter 1). By the 1930s, official reports of “evasion” and even refusal to 
submit to compulsory vaccination were commonplace.71 Another intensive campaign had 
been launched in the Central and Southern Provinces in 1948, but a new epidemic arose 
less than a decade later, in 1956. When vaccinators returned to affected villages in 
Kasungu in 1956, they found “a great deal of prejudice against vaccinations. The women 
and children run away and hide in the bush until the vaccinators have left. Some of the 
villages have been visited five or six times without managing to vaccinate all the 
inhabitants.”72 
 
It is unsurprising then, that in the midst of the State of Emergency in 1960, rural Africans 
in some villages would again prove unwilling to submit to a procedure of seemingly 
dubious merit administered by a regime that had already shown nefarious intent through 
mass incarceration.73 Compulsory vaccination (as well as the burning of huts of smallpox 
cases) resembled other forms of commonly practiced coercive state action, including tax 
collection, forcible labor recruitment or door-to-door beatings by the Police Mobile 
																																																								
71 HG Bevan-Pritchard, “Letter on ‘Evasion of Smallpox Vaccines,’” 1930, M2/5/16, MNA. In 
John Lwanda, “Politics, Culture and Medicine in Malawi: Historical Continuities and Ruptures 
with Special Reference to HIV/AIDS,” 2002, http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1792.  
Also see Vaughan, “Health and Hegemony: Representation of Disease and the Creation of the 
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72 RM Morris, “Annual Report on the Public Health of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
for the Year 1956” (Salisbury, Rhodesia: Government Printer, 1957), BL. Page 15. 
73 Kanyama Chiume, “Smallpox: The Truth,” Tsopano, January 1961. Also see Blair, “Annual 
Report on the Public Health of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for the Year 1960.” 
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Force. While voluntary curative medicine at hospitals and dispensary was becoming 
increasingly popular in Nyasaland, compulsory vaccination was as unpopular as ever.  
 
The inefficacy of the vaccine itself, or the poor coverage of previous vaccination 
campaigns, could also explain the 1960-61 epidemic. According to Federation statistics, 
the smallpox epidemic of 1960 was no worse than other recent epidemics in the 
Federation. Sword’s article in the British Medical Journal reported 620 cases and 95 
deaths during the five months between November 1960 and March 1961.74 Compare this 
to the 1955-56 outbreak, which was worst in Northern Rhodesia though it did spread to 
Nyasaland. During 1955, Federation authorities reported 3,526 cases and 499 deaths in 
Northern Rhodesia alone.75 In 1956, Nyasaland officials reported 248 smallpox cases and 
6 deaths.76  
 
Official reports did not blame this epidemic on political agitation, either in Nyasaland or 
Northern Rhodesia. In fact, medical authorities in both territories mainly blamed 
inefficacious vaccines. “Many cases showed signs of previous vaccination,” and few 
newly vaccinated children showed “takes” (a “take” is a central lesion at the injection 
site, appearing between days 6 and 8 post-injection, which demonstrates a successful 
immune reaction to the vaccine).77 By 1956, the Federation Ministry of Health had 
																																																								
74 Sword, “Smallpox in Central Province, Nyasaland.” 
75 “Annual Report on the Public Health of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for the Year 
1955” (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1956). Page 7. 
76 Morris, “Annual Report on the Public Health of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for 
the Year 1956.” Page 6. 
77 “Annual Report on the Public Health of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for the Year 
1955.” Page 7. For a primer on “takes,” see “Evaluation of Takes and Non-Takes” (Centers for 
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discontinued use of lanolinated lymph, which had been produced in the Central 
Laboratory in Zomba, in favor of glycerinated lymph. This new lymph showed 
“immediate and noticeable improvement” in the rate of takes, but it was known to lose 
potency at high ambient temperatures, and in many of Nyasaland’s facilities it was not 
refrigerated.78 Anticipating this, Southern Rhodesian officials used more expensive 
freeze-dried vaccines (which had been available since 1909), but only in parts of their 
own territory.79 Yet four years later, during the 1960-61 epidemic in Nyasaland, 
Federation authorities blamed only the Malawi Congress Party; there reports contained 
no discussion of the rate of takes, or of potential problems with the vaccine itself. 
 
At the same time, Banda did not do as much as he could have to quell opposition to 
vaccination. Having just arrived in London on November 27, 1960 for negotiations with 
Welensky and Whitehall officials over the future of the Federation, Banda held a photo 
opportunity. As Banda stood holding a spear (“Because I am here to take and not to 
give,” he explained), a reporter from the Salisbury-based Rhodesia Herald asked him to 
tell his people to stop resisting smallpox vaccinators. The reporter claimed (in an account 
not repeated in other newspapers) that Banda refused to do so. Instead he insisted there 																																																																																																																																																																					
Disease Control, February 7, 2003), http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/takes-
non-takes.asp. 
78 Morris, “Annual Report on the Public Health of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for 
the Year 1956.” For contemporary studies of the heat-stability of the glycerinated smallpox 
lymph, see W. Chas Cockburn et al., “Laboratory and Vaccination Studies with Dried Smallpox 
Vaccine” (World Health Organization, October 3, 1956). Writing of his work as a medical officer 
in Nyasaland in the late 1950s, David Stevenson remembered: “I fear that in the past a lot of dead 
vaccine must have been used in vaccination—having seen out of date and unrefrigerated liquid 
vaccine in use.” Stevenson recommended the shipment of freeze-dried vaccine to rural areas. 
Stevenson, “The Health Services of Malawi.” Page 72. 
79 Morris, “Annual Report on the Public Health of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for 
the Year 1956.” Page 6. 
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was no smallpox epidemic in Nyasaland, only a propaganda campaign by the pro-
Welensky press. Furthermore, he explained, he had come to London not as a physician, 
but as a politician.80 
 
Though it was recounted by an unsympathetic newspaper, Banda’s response does seem to 
indicate a disinclination to quiet popular resistance, whatever the form, if it could 
destabilize the Federation’s hold on power. Unrest, Banda knew, was his ally in fighting 
the Federation. When addressing crowds of thousands or the press, he did not use 
measured tones. His message was simple and direct; he sought an immediate end to the 
“stupid Federation.”81 So even as the MCP blamed the opposition to vaccination on an 
agent provocateur, Banda, the most popular figure in the country at the time, would not 
speak out to end it.  
 
Banda’s refusal to explicitly call for Africans to follow the edicts of government 
authorities also reveals how crucial it seemed to him not to admit the value of any Federal 
government activities, even vaccination. To do so would, to the colonizer’s ear, be to 
concede the truth of Gear’s claims of Federal beneficence. The physician and 
revolutionary anti-colonial writer Frantz Fanon argued as much a few years later, when 
he explained the conundrum faced by the colonized who sought out European medicine: 
“In certain periods of calm, in certain free confrontations, the colonized individual 
frankly recognizes what is positive in the dominator’s action. But this good faith is 																																																								
80 “No smallpox epidemic in Nyasaland says Dr. Banda,” The Rhodesia Herald, Monday, 
November 28, 1960, page 1. BL, Newspaper Collection. 
81 Short, Banda. 
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immediately taken advantage of by the occupier and transformed into a justification of 
the occupation…The colonizer perverts his meaning and translates, ‘Don’t leave, for 
what would we do without you?’”82 
 
The contrast between Banda’s rhetoric during this era, and the language he used once he 
became Life President a few years later, is striking. As President, Banda extolled 
“discipline” and “obedience” as paramount ideals of citizenship. As will be demonstrated 
in later chapters, he swiftly and violently put down any hint of disquiet. Jehovah’s 
Witnesses who refused to buy the compulsory Malawi Congress Party (because the cards 
carried Banda’s image, Jehovah’s Witnesses considered them a blasphemous challenge to 
God the Father) found their religion outlawed. Popular healers who tried to claim earthly 
authority were forced to end their practices. Cabinet ministers who criticized government 
policies were found dead in ditches (see Chapters 7 and 9).83  
 
More importantly for public health, Banda’s leadership in the fight for independence won 
for him and his government the trust of many Malawians. Popular belief in the 
beneficence of Banda’s new government helped break the cycle of self-reinforcing doubt, 
in which resistance to vaccination campaigns (by a distrusted colonial government) had 
helped spur repeated outbreaks, which in turn spurred more distrust of the vaccination 
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campaigns.84 Medical authorities in the Federation reported a “much readier acceptance 
of vaccinations” in Nyasaland in the year following the 1961 elections, which Banda’s 
Malawi Congress Party won in a landslide.85 Progress against smallpox accelerated after 
independence. With freeze-dried vaccine donated by UNICEF and without popular 
opposition, smallpox was eradicated from Malawi in 1971.86 But a decade earlier this feat 
seemed a long way off, and smallpox control remained an arena for political conflict. 
Banda, for his part, was a fomenter of opposition. Disorder of any kind, even in public 
health, was his ally. 
 
A contemporary—and much more successful—disease eradication campaign in 
Nyasaland during the late Federation years demonstrates that Nyasaland’s Africans were 
discriminating in their shows of resistance. While smallpox vaccination had a long-
standing association with coercion, anti-yaws campaigns had always been voluntary (see 
Chapter 1). And though bismuth injections for yaws had only temporarily resolved 
lesions, they were sought out by patients in the 1920s. By the 1930s, on the other hand, 
smallpox vaccinators were already facing opposition in Nyasaland villages. Little 
wonder, then, that when another novel therapeutic, procaine penicillin, was used to 
conduct a yaws eradication campaign in Nyasaland during the Federation years, it was 
welcomed around the country. The yaws campaign, promoted worldwide by the World 
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Health Organization and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), was launched in 
1952, the year before Nyasaland was forced into the Federation. By the early 1960s, 
according to Austin Mkandawire, then a hospital assistant, “yaws had been entirely 
eradicated in Nyasaland.”87 The disparate experiences of yaws and smallpox campaigns 
suggests that opposition to vaccination was a product not only of anti-Federation politics, 
but of a legacy of coercion and recurring epidemics that left itinerant vaccinators without 
the trust they needed to convince communities to submit their bodies yet again. 
 
III. Medical practice under Federation: quotidian experience 
Beneath the slogans and propaganda campaigns that formed the discursive contests over 
medicine, what was the lived experience of medical practice in Nyasaland during the 
Federation years? In this section, the focus turns from political parties and pamphlets to 
correspondence between doctors, auxiliaries and pharmacists. Given the centrality of 
drug availability to the rise in attendance at public sector hospitals and dispensaries—and 
to the propaganda campaigns chronicled earlier—healthcare providers’ near-constant 
frustration over stock-outs and rationing of essential medicines and supplies is a jarring 
departure from public rhetoric. The administrators running central pharmacy stores and 
apportioning medical budgets denied hospitals and dispensaries the supplies they said 
they needed to treat the influx of patients. Yet medical practitioners—even those British 
doctors with a firm belief in the superiority of European over African life—were loath to 
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practice what they considered sub-standard medicine.88 The acrimony of these debates 
recapitulates (at a lower level of the colonial administration) the ardor of the disputes 
between a miserly Colonial Office and Directors of Medical Services (like de Boer and 
Shircore) calling for greater spending during the 1930s (see chapters 3 and 4). 
a) Rationing drugs to African patients 
i) Penicillin 
Limits on spending for new drugs meant that, for the average patient in Nyasaland, new 
therapeutics arrived much later than in America or Western Europe. This delay is clearest 
in the cases of penicillin and streptomycin, perhaps the two most famous drugs of the 
postwar decade. In the first years of their availability, Director of Medical Services had to 
personally decide how to apportion scarce supplies of these drugs. Penicillin, a 
remarkable new treatment available to Allied troops during the Second World War, was 
first mass marketed in the United States in 1945. But in Nyasaland, procaine penicillin 
was distributed to hospitals on a strict quota system as late as 1953. The three European 
hospitals (in Blantyre, Zomba, and Lilongwe) received far more, for their patient loads, 
than any of the African hospitals, but all were asked to limit its use to the treatment of 																																																								
88 Austin Mkandawire, a hospital assistant in Zomba African Hospital during the Federation era, 
remembered some of the racial stereotypes and epithets he heard a white doctor utter in 1955: “A 
new doctor by the name of Jeffrey had just arrived from Zomba African Hospital to relieve Dr. 
Eberlie who had gone on leave. He had been put on the medical side with me. Dr. Jeffrey was one 
of the federal new recruits to replace the many doctors who had resigned in protest against 
Federation. Most of these new recruits had ben brainwashed into treating Africans as inferior. 
They had quickly learnt to loathe the Africans and they willingly demonstrated their antipathy 
against Africans on the flimsiest excuse…He would sometimes…refer to all Africans as ‘the 
scum of the earth.’ Indeed other times he would simply make sarcastic remarks about Africans as 
‘thieves or liars.’ On many occasions Sister E Burnham, with whom I had worked, would avoid 
joining the doctor on rounds because of his attitude to Africans. During the rounds he would 
tactlessly make foolish jokes about the patient who had just died saying ‘well, let’s say he has 
kicked the bucket. Sister Burnham and I were never amused by this childish behavior.” 
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venereal diseases (“in particular congenital and primary syphilis and gonorrhea”).89 
Supplies were so limited that as late as 1954, venereal disease cases in rural dispensaries 
were not treated with penicillin, but rather with the arsenical compound neosalvarsan, a 
less effective drug with much more severe side effects that had been in use since 1912.90 
In August 1953 the Director of Medical Services informed hospitals that another 
formulation of penicillin—crystalline penicillin—was more abundant and could be used 
for bacterial infections beyond gonorrhea and syphilis, but within months the Medical 
Officers in charge of the African Hospital in Lilongwe and Mlanje complained that 
despite placing strict controls on their use both formulations were either out of stock or in 
short supply.91 In March 1954 the Director of Medical Services continued to warn against 
“indiscriminate use” of penicillin, but announced that the procaine penicillin quota would 
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be doubled.92 Three years later, the Medical Officer at Zomba African Hospital was still 
writing letters pleading for a larger supply of procaine penicillin.93 
ii) Ampicillin 
For years following the introduction of new treatments, Nyasaland officials closely 
guarded their use. In 1961 the British pharmaceutical company Beecham began selling 
ampicillin, a drug in the penicillin family with greater efficacy against gram-negative 
bacteria than earlier drugs. In January 1962 DJ Bail, the Medical Superintendent 
overseeing Zomba’s European and African hospitals asked HR Durrant, the Director of 
Medical Services (hereafter, DMS), if he could obtain a supply of the new drug.94 
Durrant’s staff replied that a very limited supply of ampicillin would be purchased for the 
Protectorate, and distributed in individual cases upon the personal approval of the 
Medical Specialist based at Queen Elizabeth Hospital. The letter made clear that 
Durrant’s primary concern in limiting the use of the new drug was cost containment.95 
iii) Streptomycin 
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New drugs against tuberculosis also arrived in African health facilities in Nyasaland 
much later than in wealthier countries.96 While supplies of streptomycin had been limited 
in the United Kingdom in 1946, patients in Nyasaland faced stock-outs of the drug almost 
a decade later.97 In 1954, streptomycin was distributed to Nyasaland’s hospitals on a 
strict quota that was insufficient to treat all of the patients with active pulmonary 
tuberculosis infections, while isoniazid (INH) remained completely out of stock at the 
central pharmacy for months at a time.98 “What do I do for pulmonary TB?” asked an 
exasperated Medical Officer at Mzimba in a letter to the Director of Medical Services.99  
 
Two years later Dr. John Goodall, Nyasaland’s Medical Specialist, complained to 
Director of Medical Services Howard Murcott that patients were again being denied 
																																																								
96 Delays in access to tuberculosis drugs were also seen among poor and socially marginalized 
patients in the United States. Barron Lerner chronicles the transition from surgical treatments for 
tuberculosis (often involving the excision of parts of the lung) to chemotherapeutic regimens 
following the entry of streptomycin (1948) and isoniazid (1953) in Baltimore. The transition was 
not immediate, especially for homeless patients with histories of alcoholism; even in the mid-
1950s these patients were deemed unlikely to comply with drug regimens, and were put under the 
knife. See Barron H. Lerner, Contagion and Confinement : Controlling Tuberculosis along the 
Skid Road (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
97 In chronicling the midcentury rise of the randomized controlled trial, Meldrum argues placebo-
controlled trials were initially justified on the basis of economic and pharmaceutical scarcity. 
Bradford Hill was able to conduct the MRC trial in Britain using placebo-controls in 1947 
because the US had made only a limited supply of streptomycin available to the UK. Marcia L. 
Meldrum, “A Brief History of the Randomized Controlled Trial: From Oranges and Lemons to 
the Gold Standard,” Hematology/Oncology Clinics of North America 14, no. 4 (August 1, 2000): 
745–60. 
98 “From the Medical Officer in Charge, African Hospital, Lilongwe, to the Director of Medical 
Services, Zomba, Re: Streptomycin Supplies,” March 5, 1954, Medical Department, Medical 
Requisitions, No 27, Ref No MS&S, SG3/27/165, MNA. EH Murcott, “From Director of Medical 
Services to the Medical Officer in Charge, Karonga,” March 8, 1954, Medical Department, 
Medical Requisitions, No 25, M.1/15/875, MNA. EH Murcott, “From Director of Medical 
Services EH Murcott to the Medical Officer in Charge, African Hospital, Zomba,” March 20, 
1954, Medical Department, Medical Requisitions, No 32, MNA. 
99 “Letter from Medical Officer in Charge, Mzimba to Director of Medical Services, Zomba,” 
April 29, 1954, Medical Department, Medical Requisitions, No 49, Ref No 19/54/69, MNA. 
	 407	
treatment because the central pharmacy was completely out of streptomycin. The Federal 
Ministry of Health in Salisbury, he lamented, had not dispatched the amount ordered. 
“Under these circumstances,” Goodall reported, “it appears that it is impossible to 
continue to treat tuberculosis patients in any satisfactory way.”100 
 
Treatment of tuberculosis with the newer therapeutics was, in the scope of Nyasaland’s 
meager Ministry of Health budget, expensive. In a 1964, a year of therapy for a single 
patient using isoniazid plus PAS cost £7-7s per person, while a year of therapy with 
isoniazid plus streptomycin cost £15-19s per person.101 That same year, per-capita 
government spending on the Medical Department was approximately 9s.102 The 
missionary physician David Stevenson estimated that the 2173 patients receiving 
tuberculosis treatment (at missionary and government facilities) in 1962 represented less 
than ten percent of total cases of active tuberculosis in the colony.103  
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But Goodall was not satisfied with persistent shortages of necessary drugs. Like Henry de 
Boer, Goodall had first witnessed colonial medicine in South Asia, where he had grown 
used to medical services more amply funded than in Nyasaland. Goodall had trained in 
Edinburgh before taking a post in the Indian Medical Service prior to the Second World 
War. During the war, he was stationed in Singapore, and even endured captivity under 
the Japanese. His sympathies were definitely pro-colonial, and he had no personal 
objections to the Federation. Goodall blamed Hastings Kamuzu Banda for “starting off 
riots and civil strife” after his arrival in 1958. “Until Dr. Banda arrived on the scene,” 
Goodall wrote in his memoirs, “Nyasaland was a happy and contented country.” When, 
prior to his imprisonment, Banda came to visit patients in Queen Elizabeth Central 
Hospital, Goodall refused to be formally introduced to him, “because I thought he was 
anti-government.”104 Like the colonial physicians who had preceded him, Goodall did 
not see Africans and Europeans as equals. But, like them, he did expect to find the drugs 
and equipment he felt necessary to maintain his own professional standards.  
iv) Mepacrine 
In the treatment of malaria, one of the most common illnesses among Africans in 
Nyasaland, patients attending government facilities suffered even greater delays in access 
to new treatment. Mepacrine, an antimalarial synthesized in Germany in 1931 (and used 
extensively by Allied troops during World War II after the Japanese cut off access to 
cinchona, which was needed for quinine), fell into disuse in the pharmacies of wealthier 
countries by the mid-1940s. The drug, known for its severe neurologic side effects and 
prolonged treatment course, was overtaken by chloroquine. But in the early 1960s 																																																								
104 Goodall, Goodbye to Empire: A Doctor Remembers. Page 92. 
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mepacrine was still the standard of care for the treatment of Africans in Nyasaland. Again 
cost was a factor in the delay; in 1954 the DMS noted that chloroquine was almost seven 
times the cost of mepacrine.105 Even among the Federation’s African population there 
were discrepancies in the standard of care. In 1957, malaria eradication activities in 
Southern Rhodesia included mass treatment campaigns with over half a million tablets of 
chloroquine.106 A year later, the Medical Superintendent at the Zomba African Hospital 
complained to the DMS that there was no chloroquine at all in Nyasaland’s central 
pharmacy.107 Only when the price of chloroquine treatment for pediatric cases (by 
injection) fell below that of mepacrine did it become the treatment of choice in 
Nyasaland.108 
v) Alcopar for hookworm 
A new treatment for hookworm emerged during the later years of the Federation but, to 
the chagrin of medical officers, it would not be made available in public clinics in 
Nyasaland. In 1958, clinical trials in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) of bephenium 
hydroxynaphthoate found the recently synthesized compound to be an effective cure for 
hookworm infection. Burroughs Wellcome began to market the drug as “Alcopar.” 
Alcopar was as effective and less toxic than tetrachlorethylene, then the standard of care 
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for hookworm, which caused nausea and dizziness in many patients. Unlike 
tetrachlorethylene (chemically similar to the carbon tetrachloride used in the 1930s, see 
chapter 7), treatment with Alcopar did not require patients to fast and drink saline before 
and after treatment to prevent (potentially fatal) gut absorption.109 Despite these benefits, 
the Federal Ministry of Health refused to procure Alcopar, claiming its cost (2 shillings 
per dose) was too high. David Stevenson, then a missionary doctor with the Anglican 
Church, considered the Federation’s decision penny-wise and pound foolish. Though 
tetrachlorethylene itself was cheap, many patients had to be hospitalized in preparation 
for treatment.110 
b) Equipment 
i) X-ray machines 
 
Physicians also complained about long delays in obtaining equipment they considered 
necessary. In a March 1957 letter to the DMS, Medical Specialist Dr. John Goodall 
described the condition of the X-ray machine at the Zomba African Hospital: 
I cannot at present screen chests or do barium meals. In addition, X-rays of spines 
and skulls are unsatisfactory…It appears that the requisite number of milliamps 
are not forthcoming to enable good pictures to be taken. The machine has given 
shocks to the radiographer. I have had to inform [a patient] today that I cannot X-
ray him till the machine is put in order.111 
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Dr. William Oliver Petrie, Medical Superintendent of the Zomba African Hospital, 
followed up two months later with another letter on the same topic, explaining that the X-
ray unit had broken down “once every fortnight” for two years.112  The problem 
remained unresolved in October 1957, when Goodall’s tone became more pointed: “I 
think you will agree that a Medical Specialist without X-ray facilities is extremely 
handicapped.”113 DMS Durrant approved the purchase of a new machine in December 
1957, but it was not installed until October 1958.114 
ii) Bone drills 
Medical officers reserved their most colorful expressions of frustration for the poor 
quality of their surgical supplies. One said the set of plaster shears in a European hospital 
“would make a very suitable foundation exhibit when a medical museum is started.”115  
In commenting on the DMS’ decision to substitute his request for bone drills with 
“ordinary engineer’s twist drills” supplied by a local firm,116 another physician resorted 
to language that was—by the standards of this genre of correspondence—dripping with 
condescension: 
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The drills fit. However unless they are made from Vitallium or stainless steel 
there is a very real risk of bone porosis due to small pieces of the drill metal 
wearing off in the process of drilling. I imagine that is why the proper bone drills 
are more expensive—they are made for the job.117 
 
c) Personnel 
 
Drugs and equipment were not the only essential components of a health system that 
were in short supply during the Federation era. Even as overall spending increased 
rapidly, the number of personnel in Nyasaland’s Medical Department steadily decreased 
during the 1950s. In 1959, doctors, nurses, and hospital assistants and other medical 
personnel stationed in Nyasaland and working for the UK Colonial Medical Service had 
to decide whether they would transfer into the Federal Service or resign. Up until that 
point, they had been allowed to remain in the Colonial Service (and work for the Federal 
Ministry of Health on secondment) for the first five years of the Federation. Many did not 
wish to make the transfer. African staff objected to rule by Southern Rhodesia. Some 
expatriate physicians also had political and ideological objections to Southern Rhodesian 
racial policy, but for many the greater drawback to the transfer was the fact that they 
would have to relinquish the career prospects and benefits (including pensions) of the 
Colonial Service. In the years leading up to this mandatory transfer, many of Nyasaland’s 
medical personnel resigned. The Medical Department’s staff numbered 1241 in 1951, but 
by the end of June 1958 it had dropped to 599. In all, less than half of the African staff 
employed by Nyasaland’s Medical Department at the start of Federation transferred to the 
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Federal Service.118 So even as health spending increased, the number of African and 
expatriate medical staff fell during the Federation years. 
 
d) Colonial Service medical officers: not socialized for scarcity 
Physician-anthropologist Paul Farmer and others have written of the phenomenon of 
“socialization for scarcity,” wherein doctors, public health professionals, and patients in 
resource-poor settings become accustomed, after years of paltry budgets, to dismal 
standards of medical provision.119 But in Nyasaland, the persistence of such vocal 
dissatisfaction from medical officers indicates that many of them never became 
socialized for scarcity. In unceasing demands for sufficient stocks of essential medicines, 
better drugs, functional diagnostic equipment and proper surgical supplies, the doctors 
objected to irksome delays, requisition denials and substitutions made in the name of cost 
containment. The tone of correspondence between medical officers and officials in the 
colonial capital often turned testy, as central administrators objected to cost overruns 
while medical officers rested their claims on inviolable professional standards. A Medical 
Officer in Karonga justified his request for a bronchoscope in a district hospital by 
declaring: “I would be failing in my duty if I did not ask for one.”120  
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In Chapter 5, I argued that the prosopographical profiles of the colonial medical service 
helped explain their expectations of colonial medicine. Nyasaland’s doctors were not a 
racially progressive lot, even for their times. Joan Wicken observed during the mid-1950s 
that while the Gold Coast had integrated hospitals (even before independence), 
Nyasaland retained racially segregated facilities.121 Nyasaland’s white doctors did not 
object to this segregation, but they did resent stock-outs of drugs and broken equipment. 
Rather than resorting to claims of racial equality or rights to healthcare, medical officers 
invoked the dignity of their profession. Facing budgets so limited that officials rationed 
soap and denied requests for bed sheets, medical officers persisted in demanding recently 
released chemotherapeutics and specialized equipment.122 They insisted that they could 
only faithfully discharge their duties if given the tools they had been trained to use.  
e) Wars for legitimacy lost, London and Salisbury order cuts in health spending, 
1962-1964 
Federal officials had worked assiduously to paint a picture of generosity in Nyasaland’s 
medical provision, but once the Federation’s fate was sealed budget cuts sparked a crisis 
in public sector health facilities. After years of accusing the MCP of sabotaging health 
campaigns, by 1963 Federal Officials were shipping drugs and supplies out of 
Nyasaland’s hospitals and back to Southern Rhodesia.123  
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By early 1962, officials in the Colonial Office in London had concluded that popular 
opposition in Nyasaland was too widespread for the Federation government to survive. In 
August 1961, in the most open elections before Banda’s fall from power in the 1990s, the 
MCP (running on a secessionist platform) won 99 percent of the vote on the 
overwhelmingly African “lower roll” of voters. MCP candidates even secured some 
European votes in three of the eight seats elected by the mostly European and Asian 
“higher roll.”124 Hastings Kamuzu Banda had been transformed from imprisoned 
firebrand to legitimate politician in little more than a year. British officials feared his 
threats of unrest could cause Nyasaland to devolve into their own version of France’s 
Algeria, or Belgium’s Congo, where insurgent wars and social conflagration had turned 
decolonization into imperial nightmares. One month after a conference in London to 
decide upon details of the transition, Richard Austen (“Rab”) Butler, head of the Colonial 
Office’s Central African Office, announced to Parliament in December 1962 that 
Nyasaland would withdraw from Federation. Butler and Banda had agreed, by that point, 
that Nyasaland would gain full independence from Britain by mid-1964.125 
 
Welensky and other Federal officials were incensed by Britain’s decision to allow 
Nyasaland to secede. They feared, above all, that if Nyasaland left the Federation, Britain 
would not allow the Federation to continue. Nyasaland remained a debt-ridden, 
economically insignificant, and restive colony. One of the primary benefits of the 																																																								
124 McCracken, A History of Malawi. Pages 380-381. The remaining five seats went to 
Welensky’s UFP. One of the three seats “won” by the MCP was secured by Colin Cameron, a 
white MCP-supporting independent candidate from Soche. 
125 McCracken, A History of Malawi, 384-389. 
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Federation to the UK Treasury had been the displacement of Nyasaland’s financial 
burdens on to the Rhodesias. Southern Rhodesians feared (rightly) that once Britain’s 
Colonial Office regained full responsibility for Nyasaland’s finances, it would side with 
opponents Federation (namely, British leftists and African nationalists). Settler control of 
both colonies would face grave threats.126  
 
While anti-Federation forces in Nyasaland finally convinced the Colonial Office to end 
the experiment in amalgamation, the balance of power in Southern Rhodesia shifted in 
favor of more ardent white supremacists. In Southern Rhodesia’s December 1962 
election the Federal Party lost power to the Rhodesian Front, a white nationalist 
organization that sought to make Southern Rhodesia an independent state under white 
rule. This they would do in November 1965, but in the interim the Rhodesian Front 
dispensed with the pretense of “partnership.”127 Officials in Salisbury used the final 
months of Federation rule to remove supplies and equipment from north of the Zambezi. 
Between July 1962 and July 1963, the Federal Ministry of Health organized the 
uncompensated transfer of £11,000 in medical stores from Nyasaland to Southern 
Rhodesia.128 Sally Hubbard, a visiting British nurse working in Zomba’s African 
Hospital in 1963, ruefully recalled “a frustrating morning with an official who could not 
believe that there just was not any more linen or other equipment lurking somewhere.”129 
 																																																								
126 Ibid, 386. 
127 Roberts, “A History of Zambia.” Page 225. 
128 Baker, “The Government Medical Service in Malawi.” Baker notes that this transfer “still 
rankled years later.” Also see Michael King and Elspeth King, The Story of Medicine and Disease 
in Malawi: The 150 Years Since Livingstone (Malawi: Arco Books, 1992), 155. 
129 Hubbard, “Nursing in Zomba, 1963-64.” 
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After the handover of health services to Nyasaland’s government, budget cuts and a rash 
of resignations further depleted Nyasaland’s medical system. As Prime Minister in pre-
independence Nyasaland—then as Prime Minister of independent Malawi, Banda tried to 
limit spending on health and other social services. The main impetus for these cuts was 
Banda’s determination to keep a promise he had made to Butler in their 1962 negotiations 
on the transition to independence; Banda had pledged to move the new country from an 
unavoidable initial reliance on British aid to budgetary self-reliance (with domestic 
revenues matching recurrent government expenditure) within ten years.130 In a move 
intended to keep this pledge, at the end of 1963 Henry Phillips (Banda’s Minister of 
Finance until independence) slashed spending on all former Federal services—including 
health—by 15 percent.131  
 
At the same time, so many doctors and professionals left the payroll that Nyasaland had 
trouble spending even its newly shrunken personnel budget. Most of Nyasaland’s small 
cadre of physicians, fearing for their livelihoods after the dissolution of Federation and 
independence, left the colony. A large number of health staff had already left in 1959, the 
year in which Nyasaland’s health sector employees had been required to transfer from the 
UK Colonial Service to the Federal Ministry of Health. But even for those few who had 
																																																								
130 Jones et al., Colloquium on Nyasaland Finance. Page 56. 
131 McCracken, A History of Malawi, 423; Phillips, From Obscurity To Bright Dawn: How 
Nyasaland Became Malawi, An Insider’s Account (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 177. The idea that 
Nyasaland had to cut back drastically on social services was repeated by many foreign observers. 
In 1963 David Frost, a Harvard researcher who had received funding from the Ford Foundation, 
wrote that “expanded public expenditure on social services which are not likely to have any 
immediate and fairly direct effect on the development of the territory is not feasible, however 
strong the humanitarian arguments in their favour may be.” Frost, “The Economic Outlook for 
Nyasaland.” Page 68. 
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stayed, this second transition seemed more uncertain. In May 1964, two months before 
independence, Nyasaland had no radiologist, no psychiatrist, and no Director for its 
Public Health Laboratory. Only 3 of 13 District Hospitals had a medical officer, while 
Medical Assistants ran the rest by themselves.132  The number of government medical 
officers in Nyasaland fell from 30 in 1962 to 12 in 1964.133 Largely as a result of this 
exodus, Ministry of Health spending on “personal emoluments” fell not by the required 
15 percent, but by over 27 percent (from £514,754 in 1963 to £375,650 in 1964).134   
 
Spending on drug supplies also decreased during this transitional period. Once the 
dissolution of Federation had been decided, officials in Salisbury cut spending on drugs 
in Nyasaland, from £380,922 in 1962 to £347,378 in 1963.135 This was, according to a 
1965 report by the Malawi Ministry of Health, a deliberate “running-down of stocks in 
Nyasaland before the Ministry was handed over.”136  
 
Between the announcement of dissolution in 1962 and the transfer of responsibility for 
health services to Nyasaland on November 1, 1963, doctors and nurses complained ever 
more bitterly about stock-outs and shortages. Hubbard remembers a trip to visit a Medical 
Assistant at rural dispensary in a mud hut: “The poor man had totally run out of 																																																								
132 “From HR Durrant (for Acting Director of Medical Services) to Medical Superintendent, 
Zomba General Hospital (through Provincial Medical Officer, Southern Province, Blantyre),” 
April 23, 1963, File No 3405 (Zomba Hospital Drugs and Medical Equipment), Document 
Number 201, MNA. Page 1. 
133 Goodall, Goodbye to Empire: A Doctor Remembers; “Annual Report on the Public Health of 
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for the Year 1962”; “Annual Report on the Work of 
the Nyasaland/Malawi Ministry of Health for the Year 1964.” 
134 “A Conspectus Including the Development Plan for 1965-69.” 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
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penicillin, the most commonly used and cheapest antibiotic, dressings and bandages. We 
had to tell him to wash the dressings and bandages and use them again, as we had none to 
spare in Zomba. We were able to send some penicillin…but he would then have to send a 
messenger to collect it.”137 To save money, Hubbard remembers, an administrator in 
Zomba’s African Hospital removed light bulbs at random from the wooden boxes being 
used to incubate premature babies. Orders of more specialized drugs were out of the 
question; in April 1963 Acting Director of Medical Services Durrant wrote to Zomba’s 
Medical Superintendent that his requisition for Viomycin, a second-line drug for 
tuberculosis, had to be denied “because of the present financial stringencies.”138 
Spending on drugs decreased further after the handover of responsibility of the medical 
services, falling to £315,092 in 1964. This was due less to Phillips’ cuts (which had 
already been achieved through the personnel exodus) than to the absence of an 
administrative staff sufficient to monitor stocks and place orders.139 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Biomedicine was a political symbol put to creative use by both rulers and ruled, 
Europeans and Africans, practitioners and patients. Medicine proved such a powerful 
symbol—of beneficence to some, or neglect to others—because of a rapid change in the 
popularity of government medical facilities among Africans during the 1950s and 1960s 
(see Chapter 7). The increase in attendance in the years immediately following the 																																																								
137 Hubbard, “Nursing in Zomba, 1963-64.” 
138 “From HR Durrant (for Acting Director of Medical Services) to Medical Superintendent, 
Zomba General Hospital (through Provincial Medical Officer, Southern Province, Blantyre),” 
April 23, 1963, File No 3405 (Zomba Hospital Drugs and Medical Equipment), Document 
Number 201, MNA. 
139 “A Conspectus Including the Development Plan for 1965-69.” 
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Second World War only accelerated in the 1960s.  The number of outpatient attendances 
at government facilities increased from 1.05 million in 1951 to 11.08 million in 1969.  
 
Such rapid change had profound political effects. Government hospitals and dispensaries 
were more popular than ever during the Federation era. As officials in Salisbury were 
wont to point out, African patients flocked in increasing numbers to health facilities. 
Their celebratory rhetoric about health became ever more self-laudatory during moments 
of unrest and political uncertainty. This pattern is evident in Figures 8.5 and 8.6, which 
track mentions of Nyasaland in Hansard, the official record of the UK legislatures 
(House of Commons and House of Lords). Mentions of Nyasaland peaked during the 
Federation era, and particularly during the two moments of the most profound unrest, 
1953 and 1959-1960. During these moments, when politicians in the UK debated the 
political future of Nyasaland, health became a central point of propaganda for both pro- 
and anti-Federation forces. 
 
But while public spending on medical services increased at unprecedented rates, and to 
unprecedented heights, both medical providers and patients realized that public facilities 
left much to be desired. Nyasaland’s overcrowded facilities were always low on drugs 
and short of personnel. These shortages would only grow worse as Malawi moved toward 
independence. But to the millions of Malawians who had endured colonial and 
Federation rule, free medicine had become, by 1964, a popular and widely expected 
service. So when, just after independence, the new government of Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda decreed that government health services would no longer be free at the point of  
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Figure 8.5: Number of “Nyasaland” in UK Hansard (Houses of Commons and Lords), 
1900-1970. 
 
Figure 8.6: Number of “Nyasaland” in UK Hansard (Houses of Commons and Lords), 
1950-1960. 
 
care, the backlash was swift and fierce. Malawians would remind Banda, in ways he 
could not afford to ignore, that they had not fought for freedom only to lose access to 
medicine. 
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Chapter 9 
Birthing a nation: the role of health in Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s political calculus, 
1964-1975 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter examines two controversies in health policy in the years immediately 
following Malawi’s independence in 1964. The first is the short-lived “ticky fee,” 
Malawi’s first and—thus far—its only experiment with health care user fees. Popular 
outrage over the fee, and Banda’s need to retain legitimacy among the country’s rural 
masses in the midst of the Cabinet Crisis and, led him to renounce the fees. The second 
moment is President Banda’s debate with the World Bank over population policy. 
Malawi’s government was not unique in opposing outside efforts at population control, 
but Banda’s ideology, which invoked what anthropologists of the 1970s called “wealth-
in-people,” made birth control particularly unacceptable. Medicine was not a priority of 
Banda’s early years. But there were certain policies that Banda would not enact, for he 
saw in them the potential for unrest. After 1964, he would countenance neither user fees 
nor birth control, and he would make grand displays of any of his government’s few 
developments in the health sector. Health, of a certain kind, remained a part of Banda’s 
ideology of protection and abundance, even if the budgets for health were anything but 
plentiful. 
 
Prelude: “They were not very helpful, I daresay” 
Growing up in the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland (today’s Botswana), Quett 
Masire was a true believer in the Protestant Ethic. Fiscal prudence and hard work figure 
prominently the stories he tells of his own life. He heard these virtues lauded as a student 
at Tiger Kloof, a secondary school for blacks in South Africa founded by the London 
Missionary Society. Masire also saw them in his father, a “jack-of-all-trades” and a man 
of great “drive.” As his family’s eldest son, at age 21 it fell to Masire to look after his 
siblings when his parents died. He admits he could be a harsh taskmaster with his 
brothers on the family farm. “It was,” he remembers, “virtually a punishment to work 
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with me.”1 He imbibed—and preached—colonial officials’ exhortations that “if one did 
things properly, then one would be properly rewarded.”2  
 
Later in life, as Botswana’s Minister of Development Planning and Minister of Finance 
(1966-1980) and President of Botswana (1980-1998), he made fiscal prudence a central 
tenet of policymaking. Though it had been a poor backwater during the colonial era and 
was considered economically unviable by many upon independence in 1966, some of the 
world’s richest seams of diamonds were discovered in the next decade. After driving a 
surprisingly hard bargain in negotiations with the DeBeers diamond cartel, the 
government began to receive half of the revenues from mining by the mid-1970s.  Thanks 
in large part to diamond mining, Botswana had the world’s fastest growing economy 
between 1970 and 2000.3 But despite the poverty of Botswana’s populace, and the 
enormity of social needs, under Masire’s stewardship Botswana’s government would 
consistently store away a significant portion of its diamond revenues as savings. “As 
farmers,” he wrote in his autobiography, “we have always known the importance of 
saving for a rainy day, or in our case for a dry day. So it was easy for us to adopt the idea 
of a budget policy that would build up reserves of foreign exchange or government cash 
deposits in relatively good years, knowing we would have to use them in years of 
difficulty.”4 Development economists have hailed Botswana its record of prudent 
																																																								
1 Sir Quett Ketumile Joni Masire, Masire: Memoirs of an African Democrat: Very Brave or Very 
Foolish?, ed. Stephen R. Lewis Jr. (Gaborone, Botswana: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Page 9. 
2 Ibid. Page 15. 
3 Dickson Eyoh and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, Encyclopedia of Twentieth-Century African History 
(Routledge, 2005). 
4 Masire, Masire. Pages 163-164. 
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macroeconomic management, which has it to escape the “resource curse” that leaves 
many other countries wholly reliant upon volatile global mineral prices.5 
 
But even the fiscally conservative Masire thought that World Bank policy of the late 
1960s took a too-narrow view of the determinants of growth and the aims of 
development. In the immediate post-independence years, Botswana and Malawi occupied 
similar positions as labor reserves on the periphery of the global economy. Not yet able to 
draw upon domestic mineral revenues to finance government programs, Botswana’s new 
government sought donor funding. When I spoke to the still-sharp-witted nonagenarian 
Masire in his Gaborone home in November 2015, he recalled his conversations with 
Bank officials during those years: 
The World Bank didn’t want to touch social infrastructure, because the rule of the 
day was expenditure should have a rate of return…And so we had a very difficult 
time to justify raising money for schools, raising money for hospitals.6 
 
“Social infrastructure” was Masire’s favored term of government health and education 
spending. He said that while the Bank and would provide concessional loans for 
“physical infrastructure” (e.g. roads, bridges, power plants and factories), they would not 
support additional social infrastructure.  
 
																																																								
5 In a 2001 paper, economists Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson wrote that Botswana’s “fiscal 
policy has been prudent in the extreme and he exchange rate has remained closely tied to 
fundamentals.” Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “An African Success 
Story: Botswana,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 
July 1, 2001), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=290791. Page 3. 
6 Personal Interview with former President Quett Masire, Gaborone, Botswana., November 6, 
2015. 
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During this era, the most important source of support for newly-independent British 
colonies was the UK Treasury.7 The UK government agreed to provide transitional grant-
in-aid to a number of former colonies for a few years immediately independence. But 
with the aim of ending grant-in-aid as soon as possible, the British government allowed 
its funds to be used only for projects it thought would result in rapid increases in 
aggregate production.  Recounting discussions with the British during Botswana’s grant-
in-aid period (1966-1972), Masire said: 
They were not very helpful, I daresay. They wanted to finance [health] only to the 
extent they were doing it during the colonial period, which was so minimal, 
because at the time the only government hospital was the Athlone Hospital in 
Lobatse, and even that hospital was built by the people of the Southern District, 
who had paid 1 shilling six pence each. Any other hospitals were church 
hospitals.8 
 
Botswana’s officials were constrained even from spending their own paltry domestic 
revenues to increase health expenditures. Even after independence, the British Treasury 
maintained effective veto power over Botswana’s government expenditures. Between 
1966 and 1972 they reviewed every proposed budget. “If they did not like something we 
proposed to do with our own resources, they would reduce their Grant-in-Aid by the 
same amount. Their pretext was that, since we used it for something they did not think 
appropriate, we did not need the money!”9 Because the British had made it known that 
they did not think health expenditure a good use of public funds, and because they so 
readily exercised their veto power, Masire and his staff did not seek to include significant 
increases in health spending in budgets during the grant-in-aid period. 																																																								
7 “Britain was our only major donor and financial supporter at independence. We could never 
have succeeded without that aid which initially provided over half our total expenditures of P12 
million.” Masire, Masire. Pages 153-154. 
8 Personal Interview with former President Quett Masire, Gaborone, Botswana. 
9 Masire, Masire. Page 218. 
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By the mid-1970s, however, World Bank President Robert McNamara and a number of 
bilateral aid agencies (including the UK’s Department for International Development) 
expressed greater enthusiasm for health spending in poor countries. Breaking into a grin, 
Masire suggested African political leaders should claim some credit for this shift: 
We would like to think we educated them. Because we said to them, look, without 
health, people cannot be productive. Without education, people cannot improve 
their production. It’s a question of time. It’s a long-term investment. For health, 
sometimes you can even look at it in the short-term. If people don’t show up for 
work, if people who are experts in a certain sector are dying, what they were 
doing suddenly were doing suddenly will come to a stop…So slowly, slowly, 
slowly, the penny dropped.10 
 
By the time this shift occurred, however, Botswana’s government was less reliant on 
donors, and could chart its own development policy.11 With substantial diamond 
revenues on the horizon, in 1972 the government announced it no longer needed British 
grant-in-aid.12 Nine years later, when plunging commodity prices and soaring interest 
rates led the leadership International Monetary Fund to insist that developing nations 
seeking assistance adopt fiscal austerity in exchange for financial assistance, Botswana 
declined their conditioned aid.  Early in his first term as President, Masire was 
“determined” to use savings accrued from previous years so that “development efforts 
																																																								
10 Personal Interview with former President Quett Masire, Gaborone, Botswana. 
11 “Before 1972, every thebe of development expenditure was funded by donors. In the late 
1970s, over half was donor-funded, and in the late 1980s, one-third of our development 
expenditures were funded by donors. Even during my last few years in office, donors contributed 
10% of our development budget, and donor aid was substantial in absolute amounts.” Masire, 
Masire. Page 153. 
12 Ibid. Page 156. 
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should proceed and not be seriously interrupted.”  Botswana successfully weathered the 
temporary downturn without IMF aid.13 
 
Botswana’s government was quite explicit in categorizing public sector health spending 
as “investment expenditure.” While modernization theorists like W. Arthur Lewis had 
long argued that health spending was unproductive “consumption,” Botswana’s policy-
makers framed improvements in health as integral to economic growth. The government 
began to use mineral revenues to finance recurrent health expenditures as soon as the 
grants-in-aid period ended.14 Beginning in the 1980s, the Ministry of Finance set a 
“Sustainable Budget Index” that directed the vast majority of spending derived from 
mineral revenues to “investment expenditure.” The government’s definition of 
“investment expenditure” included the entire development budget (one-time spending on 
infrastructural projects); the only categories of recurrent expenditure considered to be 
“investment expenditure” were education and health. Most of the recurrent expenditures 
for, say, the police or military or general administration had to be funded from non-
mineral revenues.15 
 
None of this is to suggest that Botswana’s government has proved particularly ambitious 
in its health spending, or that it has achieved particularly good outcomes. Absolute 
spending on health increased, but did not ever command pride of place among the 																																																								
13 Ibid. Pages 165-166. 
14 Personal Interview with former President Quett Masire, Gaborone, Botswana. 
15 Atsushi Iimi, “Escaping from the Resource Curse: Evidence from Botswana and the Rest of the 
World,” IMF Staff Papers, 663-699, 54, no. 4 (2007). Page 675. Also see “The Changing Wealth 
of Nations: Measuring Sustainable Development for the New Millennium” (Washington, DC: 
The World Bank, 2011), http://data.worldbank.org/news/the-changing-wealth-of-nations. 
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government’s fiscal priorities. In fiscal year 1969/1970, in the middle of the grant-in-aid 
period, health accounted for 7.2 of total recurrent government expenditure.16  Fifteen 
years later, with the country benefiting from growing mineral revenues and mostly free of 
influence over its budget process, health still accounted for 7.2 percent of total recurrent 
expenditure.17 In his 2008 autobiography, Masire lamented that his administration’s 
delayed response to AIDS might have facilitated the epidemic’s spread into one of the 
world’s worst.18 UNAIDS estimated that by 2005, the prevalence of HIV infection among 
adults aged 15-49 had reached to 25.4 percent, second only to Swaziland (26.2 percent).19 
Since 2003 Botswana’s government has mounted an aggressive response to AIDS. Today 
every citizen with AIDS has free access to antiretroviral treatment. These life-saving 
drugs have been supplied with support from the US President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief. 
 
																																																								
16 Recurrent health expenditure in 1969/1970 was 1.003 million rand. Total recurrent expenditure 
during that year was 14.012 million rand. See “Memorandum on Recent Economic Development 
and Prospects of Botswana,” Eastern Africa Department (International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and International Development Association, June 16, 1971), Documents and 
Reports Website, WBGA, 
file:///Users/lukemessac/Desktop/1971%20memorandum%20on%20recent%20economic%20dev
elopment%20and%20prospects%20of%20botswana.pdf.Table 16. 
17 Using 1985/1986 prices, recurrent expenditure on health in fiscal year 1984/1985 was 24.489 
million pula, while total recurrent expenditure was 338.794 million pula. See “Public Expenditure 
and Development in Botswana,” Country Programs I: Eastern and Southern African Region, 
(June 3, 1986), Documents and Reports Website, WBGA, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1986/06/03/000009265_3960
925235906/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. Pages 17, 78. 
18 Masire admits: “Our failure to deal with HIV/AIDS in an effective way” was “perhaps my 
greatest regret.” Still, he continued, “the disease is indicative of a lack of morality in the nation.” 
Masire, Masire. Page 237-239. 
19 “The Gap Report: Beginning the End of the AIDS Epidemic” (UNAIDS, 2014), 
http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/UNAIDS_Gap_report_en.pdf. Annex: 
Table 1.  
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Still, other parts of the health sector remain wanting. Access to care is not universal. Non-
citizens living in Botswana (including many thousands of Zimbabwean migrants) must 
pay the full cost of their drugs, diagnostics and consultation fees upfront at government 
clinics. Many cannot afford these costs and forgo treatment altogether. The quality of 
care is also less than one might expect from so wealthy a country. In 2015, long after 
Botswana had “graduated” to middle-income country status, doctors in some of the 
nation’s government hospitals struggled to care for inpatients without functional X-ray 
machines or reliable stocks of the reagents needed to run basic metabolic panels. 
 
Botswana, like Malawi and many other former British colonies, devoted rather small 
portions of government budgets to health in the decades following independence. The 
tone was set early on, in late 1960s, when almost all of the advice they received from 
donors and advisers was to focus spending elsewhere. The practice continued, even in 
Botswana, which challenged the categorization of health as “consumption” rather than 
“investment.” Botswana provides yet another instance where discourses of economic 
development (even a discourse, like Botswana’s, that is hospitable to health) cannot fully 
explain patterns of spending on health care.  
 
But there is another factor in Botswana’s history that could explain the surprising 
inattention to health. The nation’s transition to independence was bloodless, and it has 
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enjoyed prolonged internal peace in the years since then.20 As the coming chapters will 
demonstrate using the example of Malawi, placidity has its costs, and unrest its benefits. 
 
I. Introduction: historiography of Banda’s post-independence health policy: 
neglect from the good doctor? 
 
The historiography of medicine in post-independence Malawi is much thinner than that of 
its colonial precursor, Nyasaland. Probably the most widely read history of medicine in 
Malawi is Megan Vaughan’s Curing Their Ills, but this book focuses on the period 1890-
1950. John McCracken’s history of Malawi—titled, aptly enough, A History of Malawi—
ends its narrative in 1966. Colin Baker’s “The government medical service in Malawi: an 
administrative history, 1891-1974” published as an article in Medical History in 1975, 
contains only two pages on the health sector since independence. Malawi-born physician 
John Lwanda has two works (Politics, culture and medicine in Malawi (2005), and Color, 
class and culture: a preliminary communication into the creation of doctors in Malawi 
(2008)) containing helpful discussions of post-colonial medicine, but even he calls these 
works “preliminary” in recognition of the dearth of original research.21 Public health and 
medical journals contain countless studies of the AIDS epidemic, but the period between 
1964 and 1980 is rarely mentioned. 
 
																																																								
20 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, “An African Success Story.” 
21 The discrepancy between pre- and post-independence historiography may be attributable in part 
to the fact that post-colonial records in Malawi’s National Archives (which maintains a 30-year 
embargo before files can be opened) are poorly funded compared to colonial-era records. The 
European Union has provided funding to catalogue and maintain the Malawi National Archives’ 
colonial-era records. Many colonial-era documents pertaining to Nyasaland can also be found in 
the UK National Archives at Kew. The dearth of research is also partly a function of Banda’s 
effective ban on critical ethnographic and historical research in Malawi during his rule. 
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Much of the history that is written of the post-1964 period stresses continued neglect of 
government medical services for the new nation’s black population during the long reign 
of Kamuzu Banda (1964-1993). In one of the few studies of post-independence medical 
services, Eric de Winter notes that between 1964 and 1971, the Government completed 
only two new hospitals (at Rumpi and Kasungu).22 Lwanda argued that “the colonial, 
Banda, and post-Banda regimes did not…prioritise the health sector.”23 Another 
Malawian physician, Austin Mkandawire, observed that as late as 1975, the Government 
of Malawi retained the colonial-era system of segregated hospitals. In Zomba the hospital 
for whites, commonly known as “Top Hospital”  (ostensibly because of its location above 
the main city center), received better funding than the “Bottom Hospital” (lower on the 
hill) attended by black Malawians.24 In 1975, Kathryn Morton concluded “there has been 
little expansion of government health facilities since independence.”25 In his study of the 
Banda regime, Malawian theologian and author Harvey Sindima referred to the 
government health sector as an “area where attention was not as high as it should have 
been.”26 Poet and Banda-era political prisoner Jack Mapanje remarked, “Dr. Banda built 
more prisons than hospitals—rather strange for a medical doctor.”27 
 
It is quite true that during the Banda regime health was not a top priority. But together 
these authors paint a picture of abject political neglect that must be complicated in light 																																																								
22 Winter, Health Services of a District Hospital in Malawi., 85. 
23Lwanda, Colour, Class and Culture. Page 10. 
24Mkandawire, Living My Destiny. Pages 114-115. 
25 Morton, Aid and Dependence. Page 45. 
26 Malawi’s First Republic: An Economic and Political Analysis (Lanham, Md: UPA, 2002). Page 
127.  
27 John Lwanda, “Hastings Kamuzu Banda & Middot; Lambert Ulrich (‘Bertie’) Camm · 
Reginald Sydney (‘Reggie’ ) Murley,” BMJ  316, no. 7134 (March 14, 1998): 868. 
	 432	
of other facts. For instance, as Baker notes (in his uniquely sanguine appraisal of the 
health sector in this period), recurrent expenditure nearly doubled in the decade after 
independence, from £987,000 in 1964 to £1,906,000 in 1974. Spending on medical stores 
and equipment—where shortages during the Federation period were (as this chapter has 
shown) a constant source of aggravation for providers and poor outcomes for patients—
more than doubled during this decade, from £219,000 in 1964 to £505,000 in 1974.28 
Further still, since the ticky fee episode in 1964 Malawi remained one of very few 
African countries to provide government healthcare without fees at the point of care (save 
for the obstetric fees).29 
 
How do we reconcile these seemingly contradictory sets of facts? Malawi’s health sector 
expanded in the fifteen years after independence, but not nearly as much as it might have 
given the nation’s impressive growth record during this period. At the same time, neither 
Banda nor Malawi’s international donors considered healthcare a key priority in the years 
following independence. But the political backlash to the ticky fee and Banda’s need to 
retain legitimacy among the country’s impoverished rural masses did not permit him to 
ignore the sector entirely. Even while he remained devoted to weaning Malawi from 
British aid, Banda used domestic revenues and what assistance he could find abroad to 
build hospitals and recruit medical personnel. 
 
 
II. The freedom we had told the people to die for? User fees in Malawi  
a) Malawi’s brief experiment with health care user fees, 1964 																																																								
28 Baker, “The Government Medical Service in Malawi,” 308. 
29 Messac, “Moral Hazards and Moral Economies.” 
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The budgetary decision that would prove most controversial came on Malawi’s first day 
as an independent nation (July 6, 1964) when outpatients attending government hospitals 
and rural health centers began to be charged a fee. Throughout the colonial era, Africans 
had not been charged fees at the point of care at government at (segregated and inferior) 
government hospitals and rural dispensaries.30 Glyn Jones, Nyasaland’s last colonial 
governor, looked back on these fees as a wise policy aimed to restrain expenditure: “I 
regarded [Banda] as being a very honourable man in that he did his best to fulfill the 
conditions that the British Government tried to attach to the secession…you wouldn’t 
have blamed him for playing for popularity—and my God, he didn’t, he brought in 
those…charges for the health services.”31 The fees were not much publicized; the 
announcement came in a notice, authored by Secretary for Health Dr. Robert Park, 
published in the first issue of Malawi’s government gazette. Outpatients were to be 
charged three pence (3d), an amount known in much of British southern Africa as a 
“ticky” (the name for the three-pence coin).  
 
																																																								
30 Colin Baker suggests, rather vaguely, that Nyasaland’s colonial government medical services 
were “not necessarily free.” He does not explain whether he is referring to fees for non-official 
Europeans or specialty services. But other sources are clear that African inpatients and outpatients 
received care free at the point of service in segregated facilities maintained by the colonial 
government. Baker, “The Government Medical Service in Malawi.” Page 309. In 1906, Sir 
Hector Livingston Duff, who worked in the administration of British Central Africa (the name of 
Nyasaland between 1891 and 1907), wrote that the British had “erected free hospitals for the 
treatment of the sick.” HL Duff, Nyasaland under the Foreign Office (London: George Bell, 
1906). Page 361. While decrying the imposition of user fees after independence in the September 
1964 debate in Malawi’s Parliament, Paliani Gomani Chinguwo claimed that the “ordinary 
African…had been receiving free medical attention all along under the colonial government.” 
Paliani Gomani Chinguwo, in In the Parliament of Malawi, Official Report of the Proceedings, 
First Session-Second Meeting, 1964, 
http://www.kanyamachiume.com/docs/CABINETCRISIS1964.pdf. 
31 Jones et al., Colloquium on Nyasaland Finance. Pages 64-65. 
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Park’s notice stated a number of exemptions from the fee: “children at school, adult men 
enjoying tax exemption for reasons of age or debility; adult women who are old or 
otherwise enfeebled; in-patients after admittance; those who can prove they are indigent” 
[emphasis in original]. Also exempted were patients found to be suffering from 
bilharziasis [schistosomiasis], venereal disease, tuberculosis, smallpox, and leprosy.32 
Even with the exemptions, the fee marked a drastic departure from the policy, maintained 
during the colonial period (with one exception, to be mentioned below), of treatment for 
Africans at government health facilities without fees at the point of care. 
 
But the new policy did not come from thin air. For decades, a number of commentators 
and colonial administrators had called for fees. In the first edition of his African Survey, 
published in 1938, Malcolm Hailey had weighed the advantages and disadvantages of 
medical fees for African subjects in British colonies, but he did not make any firm 
recommendation either way.33 For their part, in recognition of the political significance 
of medical care, the medical directors of in most British East African colonies had 
rejected suggestions to impose fees; Dr. RR Scott, director of medical and sanitary 																																																								
32 Robert Park, “General Notice No. 3: Ministry of Health: Out-Patient and Maternity Fees,” in 
Malawi Government Gazette, vol. 1, 1, 1964. 
33 Lord Malcolm Hailey, An African Survey: a study of the problems arising in Africa South of the 
Sahara (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), 1201-1202. Hailey noted: “In the French 
colonies no payment is asked in return for medical attention save in exceptional cases where 
patients can obviously afford it.” In the Belgian Congo, he observed that “infectious diseases, 
including sleeping sickness and all epidemic and endemic diseases, are treated free,” while “in the 
case of other diseases and of accidents and most surgical cases, some payment is expected from 
patients who can afford it.” In the colonies of British Africa, on the other hand, “it is usual for 
natives to receive free attention, but in many cases those who can afford to do so are required, 
both by government and mission institutions, to make small payments for treatment or 
medicines…In support of the view that treatment should be gratuitous it is said that in many parts 
of Africa medical attention is one of the few obvious returns which the African sees for payment 
of tax...On the other hand, it is held that Africans are more likely to appreciate medical aid and 
come for treatment with greater readiness if the service is not taken entirely for granted.” 
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services of Tanganyika, explained medical services were one of the benefits Africans had 
been led to expect in return for taxes.34 
 
Late in the Federation period, calls for fees reemerged. To these observers, the existing 
system of healthcare financing was guilty either of hindering social progress or of 
advancing a revolutionary socialist agenda.35 For those who thought it halted the march 
of civilization, the system of free care perpetuated atavistic tribal laziness and colonial 
paternalism. Speaking to a branch of the British Medical Association in Northern 
Rhodesia in 1960, Federal Prime Minister Roy Welensky said it was time for an end to 
the days of “something for nothing.”36 Others thought “free” medical care was a foretaste 
of socialism, a policy that seemed too close to those concocted in the Eastern Bloc. Dr. 
Harry Gear, a consultant to the Federal Ministry of Health, worried both Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland were on path toward a “socialized medical service which in a 
relatively few years will be irreversible…It is a phenomenon,” he continued, “not entirely 
reassuring to those nervous of over-organization and excessive officialdom.”37 This 
warning may have been intended for audiences in the United States, where private sector 
																																																								
34 Beck, A History of the British Medical Administration of East Africa, 1900-1950. Page 130. 
35 “Free” healthcare was not the only social phenomenon that inspired contradictory critiques in 
colonial Nyasaland. Officials also articulated two mutually incompatible explanations for the 
seemingly high prevalence of venereal disease. To some observers these diseases were evidence 
of African’s primordial promiscuity, while to others they were a symptom of social breakdown 
with the arrival of city life and more modern sensibilities. See Vaughan, Curing Their Ills. 
36 “‘Something for Nothing Days’ over,” Nyasaland Times, November 25, 1960, MNA. 
37 Gear, “Some Problems of the Medical Services of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.” 
Page 530. 
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provision dominated, rather than in the United Kingdom, where the NHS provided health 
care without user fees.38 
 
UK Minister of Home Affairs Rab Butler, who had been tasked by Prime Minister Harold 
MacMillan with Central African affairs in March 1962, raised the issue of fees in 
negotiations with Banda over Nyasaland’s secession from the Federation. During a 
December 1962 meeting in London, Butler told Nyasaland Governor Glyn Jones that he 
had made it clear to Banda that he would have to cut the government budget and raise 
revenues to pay for education and health services.39 In a visit to Nyasaland in late 
January 1963, Butler clarified how revenues would be raised and costs cut. At some point 
“in the future,” Africans would be made to pay fees at government health facilities.40  
 
Banda would later claim to have no knowledge of the new government fees, but his own 
history indicates he had little aversion to them. In November 1960, an official in the 
Federation intelligence service in Salisbury had sought unflattering stories about Banda 
from his years as a doctor in Ghana (until 1957, the British Gold Coast) between 1953 																																																								
38 For another call for fees, this one on the basis of cost alone, see a 1961 annual report on health 
in the Federation: “It seems pretty obvious that a country whose population increases at the rate 
experienced in the Federation cannot continue to provide a completely free service to over eight 
million people and a very sub-economic paid service to the remainder, without adopting a system 
under which a larger proportion of the cost is met directly by those patients making use of the 
public service who are able to pay.” DM Blair, “Annual Report on the Public Health of the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for the Year 1961” (Salisbury: Government Printer, 
1962)., 3. There were also contrary voices in Southern Rhodesia. In the November 1963 issue of 
the Central African Medical Journal, WJ Crabb wrote in favor of a single-payer health system in 
Southern Rhodesia, and against user fees. See WJ Crabb, “Towards a State Medical Service?,” 
CAJM 9, no. 11 (November 1963): 442–45. 
39 Wood, The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Pages 
1107-1108. 
40 Ibid. Pages 1140-41. 
	 437	
and 1958. The Federation official reported hearing from a former Gold Coast officer that 
Banda had set up an unlicensed network of 22 dispensaries in a rural region of north 
Ashanti. There, the story went, Banda had his attendants—trained in a “week-end 
course”—charge patients 10 shillings 6 pence per consultation. Banda, who kept 90 
percent of the fees even as he stocked the dispensaries with government supplies and 
drugs, would earn £1,000 each month from this network for years.41 Shortly after 
independence, Ghana’s Ministry of Health suspended his medical license for six 
months.42 Biographies of Banda have noted that he maintained a private practice in 
Kumasi, and that he briefly had his license suspended, but none have yet offered a 
convincing reason for the punishment. Given that the provenance of this account was a 
Federation official, it may be exaggerated or even fabricated. But Ghanaian officers were 
unsurprised by the story; “similar practices are common among Ghanaian doctors in 
Government service.”43 Banda himself was likely no stranger to—or opponent of—fees 
for patients when Butler made his demand.  
 
The first fees, introduced before independence, were aimed at pregnant women. 
Throughout the colonial period, “non-official” Europeans and Asians were charged for 
care at European government hospitals in Lilongwe, Blantyre and Zomba.44 Then, in 
																																																								
41 “From Security Liaison Officer, Salisbury, to Special Branch, Nyasaland Police, Zomba, re: 
‘Dr. Banda’s Previous History,’” 13 November 1960, KV 2/4075, UKNA. 
42 “From AF Hewlett, Security Liaison Officer, Ghana, to SLO Central Africa,” 6 December 
1960, KV2/4075, File No 498a, UKNA. 
43 “Letter to Security Liaison Officer, Central Africa,” 5 December 1960, KV2/4075, File No 
497a, UKNA. 
44 DM Blair, “Annual Report on the Public Health of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
for the Year 1961” (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1962).; H.B. Wilson, Barrister at law, 
Bentley & Broomhall. Letter to KL Hall, Chief Secretary to the Government, Zomba, Nyasaland, 
	 438	
April 1963, seeking to save on expenditures at the close of Federation and no longer 
worried about currying favor with the general African population, the Ministry of Health 
took what the Central African Journal of Medicine—published by pro-Federation doctors 
in Salisbury—hailed as “the first step towards charging Africans for medical services.”45 
The fee, of £1 10s, would cover “ante-natal attention, the confinement and any attendant 
medical or surgical care and also post-natal attention if necessary.” It was to be charged 
only at the African hospitals in Blantyre (Queen Elizabeth), Lilongwe, and Zomba. 
Hubbard, the visiting British nurse, described the effects on the maternity ward in 
Zomba: 
Where anyone thought the women would be able to get the money from was a 
mystery. The maternity ward emptied overnight and the fear spread to other wards 
where the patients thought they would also be charged. Suddenly every patient 
had a bed as most had absconded. 46 
 
In Hubbard’s reminiscence the maternity fees were cancelled, but Park’s notice in July 
1964 stated, “The charge is at present and will remain 30s.” Park’s 1964 notice also 
instituted a 10s fee for maternity cases at Malawi’s other hospitals and rural health 
centres. 
 
The notion that maternity patients would be the first to be charged fees would have been 
unthinkable to colonial medical administrators during the interwar years, when under-
population and insufficient fertility were considered major problems and health officials 
																																																																																																																																																																					
10 March 1938, MNA. 
45 “Medical Events: Territorial Government Takes over Hospitals in Nyasaland,” CAJM, April 
1963, 159. 
46 Sally Hubbard, Nursing in Nyasaland, Expatriate experience of life and work in Nyasaland, vol 
3, page 308. 
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encouraged clinic-based births (see Chapters 1 and 3).47 But by the 1960s, the pendulum 
had swung and the concern had become overpopulation. In The Story of an African 
Famine, Megan Vaughan describes how Nyasaland officials laid the blame for a deadly 
1949 famine on neo-Malthusian claims about population growth and resulting pressure 
on land.48 The discursive shift helped move health policy away from de Boer’s late 1930s 
focus on maternal and child health and skilled attendance for all births (see Chapter 3). 
As Eric de Winter, a Dutch physician who had worked at the Nkhata Bay District 
Hospital in the late 1960s, explained, “It is often considered acceptable in developing 
countries not to let all pregnant women deliver in a hospital, but only to select high-risk 
patients.”49 
 
But if the empty maternity wards that followed the 1963 fees were disquieting to 
Hubbard and others, these sights paled in comparison to the far more dramatic effects of 
outpatient charges that came the following year. Three-pence was, at the time, considered 
a standard hourly wage for unskilled urban laborers.50 But particularly for rural 
Malawians (and that, of course, was the vast majority of the population) rarely had cash 
readily available. For them, the fee would prove a significant deterrent. In June 1964, the 
last month before the fee was instituted, 308,381 outpatients attended government 
																																																								
47 Megan Vaughan, “Maternal Mortality in Malawi: History and Moral Responsibility,” in 
Walima T. Kalusa and Megan Vaughan, Death, Belief and Politics in Central African History 
(Lusaka, Zambia: The Lembani Trust, 2013), 303. Also see Vaughan, “Health and Hegemony: 
Representation of Disease and the Creation of the Colonial Subject in Nyasaland.” Page 193. 
48 Vaughan, The Story of an African Famine. Vaughan notes that commenters who wrote about 
the deadly effects of overpopulation elided the fact that in the years before the famine, settlers 
had expropriated vast tracts of arable land 
49 Winter, Health Services of a District Hospital in Malawi. Page 122. 
50 Stevenson, “The Health Services of Malawi.” 
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facilities. In July 1964, outpatient attendance fell to 126,559 (fees were instituted on July 
6). In August 1964, the first (and as it turned out, the only) full month of the outpatient 
fee, attendances fell still further, to 122,996. Figure 9.1, a graph drawing upon a 1965 
Ministry of Health report that analyzed the effects of the fees, shows this precipitous 
decrease in attendance. 
 
Most of this decrease is attributable to the fee itself. Yet there is another factor at work: 
the seasonal variations in attendance. February, March, and April, the months following 
the onset of rains, were long known as the annual period of the most widespread illness; 
many went hungry before the harvest (which began in May), while the rains brought 
diarrheal disease and malaria. In any given year, then, one would expect to see 
attendances increase to a peak in March or April, then fall as the dry season set in and the 
harvest began in May or June. The 1964 figures do follow this pattern; monthly 
outpatient attendance peaked in 439,675 in March, and fell to a nadir in August. But the 
1964 fall in attendance was far more precipitous than the previous year’s; 295,300 
outpatients attended government facilities in July 1963, more than twice as many as in 
July 1964.51 
 
As the fees led fewer outpatients to present for treatment, fewer inpatients were admitted. 
																																																								
51A report written by the Ministry of Health in 1965 shared this analysis: “This analyses closely a 
period which shows annually little variation. It shows, in fact, a steep increase in attendances 
upon the takeover of the Ministry of Health, interrupted by a normal seasonal decline. Thereafter 
the 3d charge is anticipated in June and causes a remarkable plunge in July less than one third of 
the March total. Thereafter as the charge falls into desuetude, there is a steady recovery.” Table 
VII. Outpatient Attendances, 1954-1964, Malawi Ministry of Health, in “A Conspectus Including 
the Development Plan for 1965-69.” 
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Figure 9.1: Outpatient attendances at government facilities, 1963-64, from A Conspectus 
including the Development Plan for 1965-69, Malawi Ministry of Health.52 
 
The number of inpatient days in government facilities fell from 106,702 in June 1964 to 
84,916 in July and 84,317 in August, before rebounding to 91,727 in September and 
95,727 in October. The fall in inpatient days is less marked than the fall in outpatient 
attendances; this is predictable, as “a number of chronically ill patients remained to 
occupy their beds while fewer new patients were admitted.”53 
 
In the weeks after the fees were begun, prominent Members of Parliament heard 																																																								
52 Curiously, the 1964 outpatient attendance figures printed in the Conspectus, a Ministry of 
Health report, differ significantly from those given in the 1964 Annual Ministry of Health Report. 
In the Conspectus, the total outpatient attendance in 1964 was 3,506,851. In the 1964 annual 
report, the total outpatient attendance (including hospitals and rural health centers) was 
7,717,732. It seems likely that the monthly attendance figures in the Conspectus include only 
outpatient attendances at government hospitals (central, regional, and district). In the 1964 annual 
report, outpatient attendances at government hospitals totaled 3,481,516. Though not identical to 
the Conspectus report, this figure is far closer to it.  
53 “Table Va. Inpatient Days, 1963-65. Malawi Ministry of Health, in Ibid. 
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complaints from their constituencies. Kanyama Chiume claimed Banda (who had 
retained the Ministry of Health portfolio for himself) had instituted the fees without 
consulting his Cabinet: “All of us were pre-occupied with the independence celebrations 
at this time and so we hardly realized that this charge had been levied.” But soon enough, 
Chiume remembered, no Cabinet members could ignore the fees:  
Wherever we went, we were bombarded with questions as to whether this was the 
freedom we had told people to die for. One old man in Usisya, my home, showed 
me a wound caused by an axe which was becoming septic because he could not 
afford the new fees. ‘How do you expect us to be enthusiastic about self-help 
schemes?’ he asked me, ‘when if we hurt ourselves in the process, you ask us to 
produce money to be treated in a country where you cannot give us jobs from 
which to earn our living?’54 
 
This question invoked politically powerful obligations, namely to provide remunerative 
employment and medical care in exchange for both labor and legitimacy from the people 
(for more on these obligations, see the conclusion to this chapter).  
 
Cabinet members who opposed the fees would invoke these notions of obligation ever 
more vocally in the months to come, as the fees became one among many issues that 
alienated Banda from his erstwhile allies in the party. In September 1964, Chiume and 
other members of Banda’s Cabinet confronted the Prime Minister over the fees as well as 
low pay for civil servants and slow pace of “Africanization” of government posts, as well 
as Banda’s budding alliances with Mozambique, southern Rhodesia and South Africa, 
white-ruled regimes considered pariahs by other independent African states. After a 
conversation with Glyn Jones over whether he should resign (where Jones advised him 
not to), Banda scheduled a vote of confidence in Parliament. During the debate, Banda’s 																																																								
54 M. W. Kanyama Chiume, Kwacha: An Autobiography (East African Publishing House, 1975).  
Page 211. 
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opponents decried the fees. Henry Chipembere, a young minister who had been among 
those who invited Banda to return to Nyasaland six years earlier, said the three-pence fee 
was “a heavy burden which prevented many people from taking their fever-stricken 
children to the dispensary.” He lamented the government’s attempt to limit expenditure 
using such charges, a tactic he called “economizing at the expense of the people’s 
health.”55 At a rally near his home in Fort Johnston later that week, Chipembere said the 
fees demonstrated that “The present Malawi government is worse than Welensky’s 
Federal government.”56 
 
During the parliamentary debate, Banda’s supporters tried to justify the fees. One 
Member claimed, “People don’t complain.” After all, he noted, the three pence charge 
was less than the fees patients had long paid at mission hospitals. “You refuse to 
pay…yet expect Ngwazi Kamuzu to tell medicine manufacturers to send them millions of 
drugs without sending them a cheque, eh?” he asked. “No,” answered other supporters of 
the Prime Minister.57 
 
Banda won the vote of confidence. But for months, Banda’s hold on power remained 
uncertain. Through late 1964 and early 1965, Chipembere and a few hundred followers 
hid in the Namizimu Forest north of Fort Johnston. Banda put a price on Chipembere’s 																																																								
55 “In the Parliament of Malawi: Official Report of the Proceedings (Unrevised Edition)” (Zomba 
Malawi: Government Printer, September 9, 1964), MNA. Page 98. Also see Henry B. M. (Henry 
Blasius Masauko) Chipembere, Hero of the Nation : Chipembere of Malawi : An Autobiography 
(Blantyre [Malawi]: Christian Literature Association of Malawi, 2001). 
56 “Chipembere Addresses Rally at Fort Johnston,” The Times (of Malawi), September 15, 1964. 
Page 1. 
57 Bundaunda, in In the Parliament of Malawi, Official Report of the Proceedings, First Session-
Second Meeting, Second Day (Zomba, Malawi: Government Printer, 1964), 67. Page 67. 
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head, but either out of fear or loyalty, locals would not reveal his whereabouts. In 
February 1965 his forces briefly captured Fort Johnston, but they dispersed along the 
road to Zomba after finding that the ferry needed to cross the Shire River at Liwonde was 
tethered at the opposite bank.58 In late April 1965, Chipembere fled to the United States. 
Ironically, part of the reason for his departure was that he sought treatment for his Type II 
diabetes not available to him in Malawi. 59 Banda’s regime was saved, in part, by the 
government’s poor health system.60 
 
This entire episode, which came to be known as the Cabinet Crisis, marked the greatest 
threat to his rule until he was finally forced from power in the early 1990s. Banda did not 
change his foreign policy, or increase pay for civil servants, but he rather quickly 
distanced himself from the fee policy. A newspaper reported Banda’ speech at a rally in 
Palombe a week after the Parliamentary debate in which he claimed that his rebellious 
ministers “had bribed medical aides in the hospitals to refuse treatment to poor people so 
that there would be resentment.” The article continued: “The Prime Minister promised 
the people that no one would be refused medical treatment because he had not got a 
‘tickee.’ He said the doctors and medical assistants should have made that clear from the 
																																																								
58 C. A. (Colin A. ) Baker, Revolt of the Ministers : The Malawi Cabinet Crisis, 1964-1965 (New 
York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001). Pages 212-215. 
59 Harry Franklin, “Malawi: Dr Banda Faces the Rebels,” The Spectator, April 1, 1965. 
60 By the 1960s, Chipembere retained little direct involvement in Malawian politics. After 
studying for a PhD (though never completing one) in History at the University of California, Los 
Angeles, Chipemebere worked for some years as Assistant Professor of History at California 
State University. He died in the United States in 1975 at age 45 of complications from diabetes. 
Earl H. Phillips, “HBM Chipembere, 1930-1975, Malawi Patriot,” Ufahamu: A Journal of 
African Studies 7, no. 1 (1976): 5–18. 
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beginning.”61 Though there is no documentation of any official repeal of the fee, the 
Ministry of Health reported in 1965 that the outpatient fee “fell into desuetude.”62 The 
maternity fees, on the other hand, continued to be collected at most hospitals.63 
 
b) Reasserting legitimacy through displays of care: Banda’s symbolic health agenda, 
1964 
In addition to turning the blame for the fees back onto his rivals, Prime Minister Banda 
sought to reassert legitimacy through acts of generosity. Three days after his Palombe 
speech, Banda ordered that an earlier donation he had made to hospitals—a gift of more 
than 2000 chickens and over 250,000 eggs—was to be used “only to feed poor African 
patients.” Banda’s clarification that his gift was to go directly to the destitute sick 
demonstrated his need to respond the uproar over the fees. The need to demonstrate 
concern for the poor after the battle over fees showed that biomedicine had become a 
powerful political symbol and even a weapon capable of inflicting lasting harm.64 This 
was a lesson that Banda would not forget. 
 
																																																								
61 “Premier Addresses Rally at Palombe: Dr. Banda: ‘Man of Honour’: Repeats Charges against 
Some of the Ministers,” The Times (of Malawi), September 15, 1964, MNA. 
62 Outpatient attendances, 1963-64. In “A Conspectus Including the Development Plan for 1965-
69.” 
63 In 1967 a midwife at a government dispensary in Monkey Bay told a touring official that 
average monthly deliveries had dropped from 27 in the late Federation era to 12 because “the 
people are not anxious to pay the fee.” See “Tour of the Fort Johnston Area Commencing on 
Sunday, 25th June, 1967 at Monkey Bay.” File 195, Folder 6835 (“Monkey Bay Dispensary”), 
MNA. Also see “Annual Report on the Work of the Nyasaland/Malawi Ministry of Health for the 
Year 1964.” Page 5.  
64 “Banda Gift for Poor African Patients,” The Times (of Malawi), September 18, 1964. Before he 
donated them to hospitals, the chickens and eggs had actually been given to Banda at public 
meetings in Blantyre, Zomba, and Fort Johnston. 
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A week later the nation’s largest daily newspaper, by that point solidly pro-Banda, 
featured a number of health-related items on its front page. The first was the 
announcement of a “£100,000 leper scheme” to be funded by the Brown Memorial Trust 
and the British Leprosy Relief Association and directed by the Ministry of Health.65 The 
second item announced the arrival of 41 laboratory technicians and nurses from the 
United States to work on a tuberculosis control campaign under the auspices of the US 
Peace Corps.66 The third was a photograph of Dr. Banda, wearing a dark three-piece suit 
and tinted glasses, leaning over the bed of a female patient during a visit to the Queen 
Elizabeth Hospital (Figure 9.2). His left arm is outstretched but his hand is obscured from 
view; he appears to be examining the patient. The reminder of his career as a doctor is 
none too subtle. Sunlight streams in from a window, illuminating a soft smile on Banda’s 
lips. In the background other patients look over, seemingly waiting their turn. The article 
accompanying the photo explained that in Banda’s speech on the grounds of the hospital, 
before “several thousands,” he reminded the audience that this visit was his third to the 
hospital in his official capacity. The article also noted that he had given £5 10s of his own 
money to individual patients in the wards.67 In the midst of the greatest threat to his 
political career to date, Banda centered his publicity campaign shows of solicitude to the 
plight of the sick. 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
65 “£100,000 Leper Scheme: Malawi to Spearhead World Campaign,” The Times (of Malawi), 
September 25, 1964. Page 1. 
66 “Peace Corps to Aid TB,” The Times (of Malawi), September 25, 1964. Page 1. 
67 “Dr. Banda at Queen Elizabeth Hospital,” The Times, September 25, 1964, pages 1 and 5. 
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Figure 9.2: Prime Minister Banda at Queen Elizabeth Hospital. From The Nyasaland 
Times, September 25, 1964, page 1. 
 
b) Politics of healthcare fees in the former British Africa, 1964-1968 
 
Malawi was not the only newly independent African nation for which healthcare user 
fees became a major issue during the 1960s. Following the rise of the Rhodesian Front 
and the end of the Federation, leading settler politicians in Southern Rhodesia were far 
less concerned than their forebears about British or African opinion. Their desire to 
appear beneficent toward their African subjects had dissolved along with the Federation. 
In November 1965, Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith would issue a 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom. Without the 
fiscal subsidy it had garnered from Northern Rhodesia’s copper mines, Southern 
Rhodesia also sought to find ways to cut government spending and raise revenues. So in 
October 1964, shortly after Banda reneged on the ticky fee, Southern Rhodesia instituted 
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fees at African hospitals and dispensaries. The fees were much higher than Malawi’s 3-
pence charge. In Southern Rhodesia, the outpatient fee for men was 1 shilling 6 pence, 
and for women and children the fee was 1 shilling. For inpatients, the charges were even 
higher: £2 for men, £1 for women, and 10 shillings for children per admission at 
Bulawayo and Salisbury African Hospitals, and 10 shillings for adults and 5 shillings for 
children at general and district hospitals. Thus the end of the Federation spelled far higher 
healthcare fees for Southern Rhodesia’s Africans than it ever did for Malawians.68 
 
In other former British colonies, where independence brought majority rule, the politics 
of medical financing were similar to Malawi’s. In 1957, the colonial government of 
Kenya introduced fees for Africans for many dispensary and hospital services. The 
administration increased these fees in 1961.69 Yet the charges proved so unpopular that 
Kenya’s major nationalist party (the Kenya African National Union, or KANU) promised 
free medical care in its party platform for the 1963 elections.70 KANU won the election 
handily, securing 83 of 124 seats. In 1965, Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta honored his 
																																																								
68 Stevenson, “The Health Services of Malawi.” Page 120. Mossop, History of Western Medicine 
in Zimbabwe. 
69 Edmond H. Leavey, “The Economic Development of Kenya: Report of a Mission Organized by 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the Request of the Government of 
Kenya and the United Kingdom” (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963). Page 248. 
70 Messac, “Moral Hazards and Moral Economies.” Also see Iliffe, East African Doctors. Page 
130. 
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promise and abolished most of the fees.71 Immediately thereafter, outpatient attendances 
quadrupled.72 
 
In Uganda, popular opposition to the healthcare fees prevented the government from 
imposing them in immediate postcolonial era. Africans had been provided treatment 
without charge in all Government medical units since 1938.73 In 1956, a Colonial Office 
commission on medical and health services in Uganda chaired by Birmingham University 
Professor AC Frazer had recommended for both outpatients and inpatients in government 
facilities.74  In 1962, the same year Uganda became an independent nation, a World Bank 
Mission echoed this advice, proposing that the Ministry of Health impose outpatient fees 
of at least 1s per attendance and inpatient fees of at least 3s per admission.75 But 
																																																								
71 Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History Since Independence, Reprint edition (London; New York: 
I. B. Tauris, 2013). Page 201. 
72 Neville Rex Edwards Fendall, “Diary: Malawi,” September 1965, MSS.Afr.s990, BLOU, 
Fendall Papers. Fendall was the Director of Medical Services in Kenya’s Ministry of Health and 
Housing. He toured the health facilities of Malawi and Tanzania in 1965. 
73 AC Frazer, “Report of the Committee Appointed by His Excellency the Governor to Examine 
Medical and Health Services in Uganda” (Entebbe: Government Printer, December 1955). Page 
107. 
74 The Frazer Committee’s report said: “We consider that there is a need for some slight 
restraining factor applicable to the individual provided that it can be removed in the case of 
certain people, such as the genuinely indigent, the emergency case or for certain groups such as 
young children. A small fixed charge of, say, one shilling for entry into a peripheral medical unit 
or out-patient department would provide this effect…A similar system of charging in-patients in 
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from seeking medical aid.” AC Frazer, “Report of the Committee Appointed by His Excellency 
the Governor to Examine Medical and Health Services in Uganda” (Entebbe: Government 
Printer, December 1955). Page 107. Also see Iliffe, East African Doctors. Page 130. 
75 The mission recommended that the fees be “revised upward as the economy expands,” and 
“might be higher in the more prosperous parts of the country.” The Mission did advise “certain 
classes of exemptions, such as prenatal care, child welfare and indigent patients.” Edward S. 
Mason, The Economic Development of Uganda: Report of a Mission Organized by the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the Request of the Government of 
Uganda (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962). Pages 391-392. 
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Uganda’s postcolonial government did not heed this counsel. The state would not impose 
user fees at government health facilities until 1993.76 
 
VI. Post-ticky politics: the dueling imperatives of health and fiscal restraint 
a) Failed self-help and paltry foreign aid: forced scarcity for health in the post-
independence economic boom, 1965-1975 
Expansion of the health sector was limited during the post-independence decade. 
Malawi’s economy grew rapidly during this period, buoyed by high global prices for the 
cash crops produced by a burgeoning estate agricultural sector (see Chapters 1 and 2). 
The health sector grew as well, but it did not claim a greater share of resources (relative 
the size of the economy) than it had during the late colonial era. Total health spending 
(public and private) as a percentage of GDP barely budged between 1964 (1.5 percent) 
and 1973 (1.4 percent).77 And while recurrent expenditure for health increased, scarcely 
more than one percent of the government’s development budget went toward health 
services.78 Most of this expenditure went to “maintenance of existing facilities.”79 This 																																																								
76 GM Burnham et al., “Discontinuation of Cost Sharing in Uganda,” Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization 82, no. 3 (2004): 187–95. 
77 Morton, Aid and Dependence, 29. 
78 This level of spending was far less than was foreseen in the development plan publicized by 
The Times of Nyasaland on 2 June 1964, four days before independence. It “gave some details of 
a five year development plan for Malawi, announced by the government. £32,837,000 was to be 
spent, in the period 1964-1969, under the plan. Of this, £2,331,000 was to be spent on health, 
including an increase of hospital beds by 75% by 1969 and the opening of a nurses’ training 
school in Blantyre-Limbe to train to S.R.N level. The plan incorporates a sewerage scheme for 
Blantyre-Limbe. £75,000 was to be spent on a census, £38,000 on market surveys and £126,000 
on Blantyre airport. (Overall, 7.1% of development spending would go to health, and a further 2.9 
percent to water and sanitation)..." The Times' Independence souvenir, July 1964, gave the total 
cost of the plan as £44 million again with £2,331,000 for health." See Stevenson, “The Health 
Services of Malawi.” Page 176. 
79 Developing Malawi: Office of the President and Cabinet, Economic Planning Division 
(Zomba, Malawi: Government Press, 1971). 
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stasis occurred in a country with few facilities even compared to the rest of the generally 
impoverished southern African region.80 
 
Under Banda, the government’s response to the many requests from local leaders for new 
facilities was to require the localities to undertake construction on their own using 
voluntary “self-help.”81 Supporters of the government tended to paint an image of vibrant 
grassroots efforts involving enthusiastic villagers. A doctor writing in the Salisbury-based 
Central African Medical Journal in 1966 extolled Banda for having “inspired the rural 
population to self-help schemes. Schools, roads, hospital wards, rural medical units were 
built all over the country by voluntary efforts.”82 A 1974 Malawi government publication 
declared “a remarkable spirit of self-help has achieved magnificent results in the rural 
areas…Malawians have freely given their labour to build a better future for themselves 
and their children. Permanent school buildings, postal agencies, clinics and dispensaries, 
bridges, roads and dipping tanks are only some of the many projects tackled willingly and 
effectively by local communities.”83 
 
Unsurprisingly, the perspective from the villages was far less rosy. Local administrators 
found it exceedingly difficult to convince poor peasant farmers to contribute funds (over 																																																								
80 N. D. McGlashan, “The Distribution of Population and Medical Facilities in Malawi,” CAJM 
14, no. 11 (November 1968): 249–52.  
81 Writing of her time in the Gold Coast just before it secured independence in 1957, Joan Wicken 
said self-help programs there met with great success. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, who lived in 
Kumasi from 1953 to 1958, might have gained interest in self-help during this time. See Wicken, 
“African Contrasts.” Page 65-66. 
82 Henry Mowschenson, “Dr. H Kamuzu Banda: President of the Republic of Malawi,” CAJM, 
August 1966, 152–53. 
83 Building the Nation: Malawi, 1964-1974. Issued to Commemorate the Tenth Anniversary of 
Malawi’s Independence (Blantyre, Malawi: Department of Information, 1974). 
	 452	
and above already burdensome taxes) and time to what were often poorly coordinated 
construction projects. In 1968 the Government of Malawi secured funding from the Beit 
Trust Fund—a charitable donation using funds bequeathed by an early investor in the 
British South Africa Company—to replace a dispensary located 50 miles from Fort 
Johnston District Hospital. While the Government had used the Beit funds to build a new 
dispensary by the year’s end, officials in Zomba stipulated that the unit’s staff housing 
must be built by self-help. Two years later the new unit it had still yet to receive any 
patients because, as the Secretary for Health reported, “the spirit of self-help was not 
coming forth in order to get the staff homes constructed.”84 Ministry of Health officials 
had made a request in 1969 to the Development Division (an office in the Executive that 
held the purse-strings for all development expenditures) to use savings from other 
projects to in order to complete the staff housing, but the Division refused. One official 
suggested sending field staff “to encourage the growth of local initiative which, it would 
appear, is lacking among the people in the area.”85 By 1971 there was still no staff 
housing, and the roof of the still-unused unit had been blown off. 86 
																																																								
84 WP Junde, “Letter from Secretary for Health and Community Development to the District 
Commissioner, Fort Johnston, Re: Nankumba Health Unit - Construction of Staff Housing, 15 
July 1970,” n.d., 22-20-8F, Box 53423, No 43, MNA. 
85 WJ Kazima, “Letter from Acting Commissioner for Community Development, Zomba to 
Acting Regional Community Development Officer, Blantyre, Re: Support for Self-Help Schemes 
in Fort Johnston,” September 19, 1969, 22-20-8F, Box 53423, No 27, MNA. 
86 “Notes on Meeting Held on 25th October, 1971, to Discuss Progress on Ministry of Health and 
Community Development 1971/72 Development Projects,” n.d., 22-20-8F, Box 53423, No 61, 
MNA. Colonial officials in Nyasaland had also lamented the lack of enthusiasm of villagers for 
“self-help.” After using imprisoned tax defaulters to build a football field next to the Karonga 
District Hospital, Walter Gopsill observed that a “kindly European offered to coach them, and the 
game became very popular, but such is the African reasoning that they requested how much 
money would they be paid if they played.” But he did not consider that the request for payment, 
and the general lack of enthusiasm for additional unpaid activities at Europeans’ behest, might be 
related to Africans’ experience with forced and unpaid labor, including hut taxation, thangata, the 
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Not everyone was asked to sacrifice as much as the rural denizens made to pay for their 
own clinics. The post-colonial Ministry of Health operated “private wards” for 
outpatients and inpatients in government hospitals. These facilities promised prompt 
attention and the most expert care for paying patients. Most of these patients came from 
the few thousand “Europeans” and “Asians” who continued to dominate the commercial 
and professional classes of Malawi’s towns and cities. But the most troublesome patients 
in the private wards—according to the Ministry of Health—were “VIPs.” Members of 
Parliament, Cabinet Ministers and their families were supposed to pay for care in private 
wards, but a number of them built up substantial debts to the Ministry of Health after 
using these facilities. The Ministry’s accountants were frustrated, but impotent, when the 
officials ignored their plaintive letters asking for payment. As of March 31, 1973, 
prominent political figures with long-standing unpaid debts included: President Banda’s 
private secretary Cecilia Kadzamira; Minister of Finance Aleke K. Banda; and Reserve 
Bank of Malawi Governor John Z. Tembo.87 While other patients in private wards who 
refused to pay could eventually face legal action and wage garnishments, the Ministry of 
Health accountant was instructed that “accounts relating to prominent figures are not to 
																																																																																																																																																																					
impressment of carrier labor during the Great War. Gopsill, “A Few Notes on My Life in 
Zanzibar and Nyasaland from 1926 to 1945.” Pages 26, 35. 
87 CG Kumwembe, “V.I.P. Debtors Accounts Referred to Ministry Headquarters as at 31st 
March, 1973, from Auditor-General to Secretary for Health,” October 22, 1973, Folder C2/90, 
9.12.3F, Box 34105, MNA. As of March 31 1973, Cecelia Kadzamira owed 2 kwacha, 60 
tambala (cents); Aleke Banda owed 493 kwacha, 67 tambala; John Tembo owed 447 kwacha, 97 
tambala. (between 1964 and 1973, the kwacha was pegged to the value of one-half a British 
pound sterling.  
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be referred to the State Counsel without the prior authority of the Principal Secretary.”88 
Lessons about responsibility and self-help, it appeared, were only meant for the poor. The 
politically well-connected, on the other hand, received superior medical care without any 
obligation to pay. 
b) “When considered in light of the funds available”: overcrowded hospitals and 
drug shortages, 1965-1969 
For doctors and medical assistants in Malawi’s public sector, independence did not bring 
an end to their struggles to provide decent care. After the brief dip during the three-
month-long ticky fee period, outpatient attendance at public facilities continued to rise, 
climbing from 8.7 million in 1965 to 11.1 million in 1969.89 Decrepit facilities struggled 
to keep up with the influx of sick bodies. “Many rural health units are old, dilapidated, 
and ill equipped, even for the provision of the most rudimentary outpatient services and 
elementary medication,” wrote Maurice King, an eminence in international health who 
had been invited to write a development plan for Malawi’s health sector, in 1970.90 Even 
at the nation’s flagship hospital, Queen Elizabeth in Blantyre, staff felt overwhelmed. In 
1967 the Hospital Secretary wrote the Secretary for Health to explain that his hospital 
urgently needed an inpatient intensive care unit for critical cases, as well as a completely 
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new outpatient and casualty block. If the rate of increased attendance continued at its 
current pace, by 1975 his hospital alone would be visited by 2,000 to 3,000 outpatients 
every day.91 
 
Correspondence between physicians and administrators remained contentious. In a 1965 
letter to the Medical Superintendent of Zomba’s hospitals, Director of Medical Services 
Durrant wrote, “My impression is that your health units have been receiving excessive 
quantities—not excessive to their needs, but excessive when considered in light of the 
funds available for Zomba Hospital. I am sure that this matter will cure itself in time.”92 
But Durrant’s condescending tone did not quiet the small but vocal cadre of physicians in 
district hospitals who could not accustom themselves to the practice of medicine without 
medicines. A Dutch doctor working at Nkhata Bay District Hospital in the late 1960s 
bitterly recalled the futility of his pleading letters to the Central Medical Stores. The 
central stores, he remembered, often ran out of such basic items as “tetracycline, ferrous 
sulphate, chloroquine, penicillin, Lysol, acetyl salicylate and dressings (all sizes).”93 He 
could not intubate his surgical patients even when they were put under general anesthesia 
“because the proper tubes were not obtainable for a long time and because nobody was 
trained in this technique.”94 
 
																																																								
91 LJD Harris, Hospital Secretary, QECH to Secretary for Health Peters: “Development: Queen 
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Malawi’s facilities were not only under-equipped; most were run by a few harried staff 
with minimal training. In 1965 there were only 27 doctors in the government service; 22 
worked in the three central hospitals, and five staffed district hospitals.95 That same year 
the country had 83 nurses (graduate or state-registered); 75 worked at the central 
hospitals, and 8 at district hospitals. In the nation’s first full year of independence, 
auxiliaries (e.g. medical assistants, maternity assistants, midwives and health assistants) 
were the only staff at all 112 rural hospitals and rural health centers. These cadres 
required no more than seven years of elementary education and two to three years of 
technical training.96 Supervision was almost entirely absent; some Medical Assistants 
worked alone at rural dispensaries for years without even a visit from a doctor or nurse.97 
 
While doctors and nurses in the central hospitals complained of deficiencies at their 
facilities, the auxiliaries at rural facilities toiled in far worse conditions. In the late 1960s, 
while serving on a Rockefeller Foundation commission, US physician John Bryant 
visited a hospital in the town of Port Herald. He wrote: 
There is not a single doctor, not a single nurse…The outpatient service is jammed 
with a pressing, murmuring throng…Two medical assistants are surrounded at 
their desks. Some intangible feeling of sequence in the crowd tells each whose 
turn it is. Diagnoses are made on the basis of the first words uttered by the patient 
and are at the simplest possible level. Each takes one or two minutes. Cases that 
cannot be handled in this way may be set aside for a more thorough examination, 
and perhaps for a laboratory test (the lab is small, closetlike, with a microscope, a 																																																								
95 In those facilities fortunate enough to have a doctor, their salaries took up a large portion of the 
personnel budget. At Nkhata-Bay District Hospital, one doctor earned 20 percent of the total 
wage bill (in a hospital with 50 staff). Ibid, 111. De Winter notes that a study in Uganda found 
that 2 doctors at a hospital (with 69 staff) in Uganda together earned 20 percent of the total wage 
bill. 
96 John Bryant, Health and the Developing World, 1st Edition (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1969), 58. 
97 Ibid, 112. 
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hand-driven centrifuge, and a few bottles of stain) and consultation with one of 
the more senior medical assistants. The medical assistants see about three hundred 
patients during the morning. A baby has ‘warmth of the body.’ The blood is 
examined for malaria: positive. The treatment: chloroquine. Everyone with fever 
is assumed to have malaria. If he has a cough, pneumonia or bronchitis is 
suspected and penicillin is added…The next has abdominal pain. What do you do 
about abdominal pain in two minutes?98 
 
Bryant described this scene to illustrate a conundrum facing contemporary international 
health experts about the value of biomedical care delivered by unsupervised medical 
auxiliaries in rural Africa. Was their care worse than none at all? Bryant did not put 
himself on either side of the debate, nor did he condemn the auxiliaries or the Ministry of 
Health for the low standards. But Malawi’s public sector was to no one’s eyes a model of 
medical provision. 
c) Keeping it free: Banda’s refusal to reintroduce health care user fees 
According to Kathryn Morton, at independence Banda did not consider education and 
medicine “investments,” but rather “consumption” items. But despite the fact that Banda, 
like other modernizers, thought health and education unproductive social services, he 
believed that Malawians should reasonably expect some such services from their new 
government. Banda worked to provide, in the first few years of his rule, a district hospital 
(staffed by a medical officer) and a secondary school in every district. As of the late 
1960s, he also ensured that food was provided to inpatients free of charge in government 
hospitals.99 While he was not willing to spend much of Malawi’s development or 
recurrent budgets on health, Banda was loath to risk further unrest by attempting to 																																																								
98 Bryant, Health and the Developing World, 59-60. 
99 Eric De Winter described the budget for patients’ food at the Nkhata Bay district hospital: “For 
patients’ food the hospital paid $0.15 per person per day, for which amount they received about 
2000 calories, 65 grams protein (23 grams of animal origin) and 50 mg Vitamin C.” Winter, 
Health Services of a District Hospital in Malawi. Page 121.  
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reenact health care user fees. Throughout his long rule, Banda did not reinstitute point-of-
care user fees at public sector facilities. 
 
This insistence on free care was particularly striking because there was a general move 
early in Banda’s rule toward shifting costs of social services onto Malawi’s citizens. In its 
1961 election manifesto the Malawi Congress Party had pledged universal free primary 
education.100 But by 1963, Banda instituted fees at government primary schools in order 
to limit public expenditure. The number of primary school graduates decreased in 
Malawi’s first decade of independence.101 
 
But Banda did not forget how Chipembere used the ticky fees to foster discontent against 
him. And through the first decades of his rule, Banda saw his hold on power as 
precarious. In the first year of Malawi’s independence his public speeches were entirely 
occupied with the hunt for Chipembere.102 After Chipembere fled, Banda remained 
concerned about other ex-ministers in exile, particularly Yatuta Chisiza, elder brother of 
the late Dunduzu Chisiza and Banda’s own former bodyguard. Like Chipembere, the 
elder Chisiza had defected from Banda’s government during the 1964 Cabinet Crisis. 																																																								
100 “The Party’s ultimate aim and object is the provision of Universal Education and towards this 
end the Malawi Congress Party will take immediate steps to see that all children who go to 
Primary Schools finish their primary education without let or hindrance.” Malawi Congress Party 
Manifesto for the General Election, August 1961 (Limbe, Malawi: Malawi Congress Party, n.d.)., 
Page 7. 
101 Morton, Aid and Dependence; Lwanda, Colour, Class and Culture. 
102 In one of many speeches on Chipembere, Banda addressed “the nation” over the radio (which 
only a small share of Malawian households owned) in February 1965, less than a week after 
Chipembere’s failed attempt to reach Zomba. He assured the nation that he was in control, and 
promising that he would “crush Chipembere and anyone pinning his hope on Chipembere.” 
Hastings Kamuzu Banda, “Prime Minister’s Speech to the Nation, Transcript, Ministry of 
Information, Blantyre,” February 18, 1965, HK Banda’s Speech Collection, MNA. 
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While in exile in Tanzania, he founded the Socialist League of Malawi (LESOMA). He 
and his followers launched small guerilla incursions into Malawi until October 1967, 
when he was shot by Malawian troops during a failed invasion.103  
 
No sooner had this threat abated than another arose, this time in the form of a rumor. 
Between November 1968 and March 1970, at least 33 people died in a series of murders 
in the Blantyre suburb of Chilobwe. One of the most popular explanations for the spate of 
killings was that the government was allowing white South Africans to take Malawians’ 
blood as repayment for loans Banda had taken out to build the new capital at Lilongwe. 
These rumors had a context. Malawians had long experience repaying odious debts (see 
Chapter 1), and vampire rumors were a well-known genre used to critique exploitation in 
southern and eastern Africa. 104  
 
 
The rumors fanned unrest, particularly near estates in the South, where protesters 
attacked MCP officials. Banda tried to appease the discontents by making summary 
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California Press, 1992), pages 239-240. 
	 460	
arrests for the murders. He also ordered estates to surrender 14,000 acres of land, which 
were redistributed to the landless.105  
 
Health policy must be understood in the context of this unrest. In this uncertain political 
environment, Banda would not risk such an unpopular decision as the imposition of user 
fees. Yet to expatriate physicians and advisers, health care user fees remained a necessary 
policy. In a health sector development plan commissioned by the Ministry of Health in 
1970, Dr. Maurice King—an eminence in international health circles—acknowledged 
that fees were a “highly contentious issue” but insisted that they were “only too likely to 
be the practical option.”  His assumption was that fees would improve the quality of 
health services: “Services which have to be paid for,” he chided, “are better than no 
services at all.”106 Two years later, Dutch physician Eric de Winter marveled that “about 
30-40 per cent of the outpatients [at Nkhata Bay District Hospital] seemed to be without 
organic disease.” De Winter reckoned that auxiliaries used most of their penicillin 
injections on such patients in order to engender a placebo effect.107  Echoing economist 
Mark Pauly’s claim that point-of-care fees were a defense against a rational “moral 
hazard” among the insured, de Winter presented fees as the answer to the overcrowding 
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106 King, “Development Plan for Health Services, 1970-1985.” Page 45. 
107 An intriguing consequence of this prescribing practice (which throughout the 1960s and 
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of hospitals by patients who were not truly sick.108 “Even the raising of a minimal fee 
from each outpatient for each attendance would greatly reduce the number of unnecessary 
attendances. For political reasons,” de Winter continued, “such a measure is not likely to 
be taken by the Malawi government.”109 As of 2015, health fees had never been 
reinstituted in Malawi, in spite of the counsel of the World Bank (in the 1990s) as well as 
University of Malawi economists and prominent domestic commentators (in the 
2010s).110 
III. Fertility control vs. mortality control: the Banda-McNamara debate over 
population policy and a national health budget held hostage 
 
a) Seeking international assistance for health, 1964-1969 
A few bilateral aid programs continued to provide modest funding for health projects 
during the 1960s. Immediately after independence in 1964, with Malawi’s health sector 
almost devoid of doctors, Israel sent seven to work in the Ministry of Health; it also 
funded scholarships for nurses to train in Israel. In 1966, the West German government 
began to help plan and fund the renovation of the African Hospital in Zomba. Between 
1965 and 1967, UNICEF provided $114,000 for teaching equipment, drugs, vehicles, and 
training sessions focused on maternal and child health.111 
 
 																																																								
108 See Mark Pauly, “The economics of moral hazards: comment,” American Economic Review 
1968 58, no. 3 (1968): 531-537. 
109 Winter, Health Services of a District Hospital in Malawi. 
110 Muluzi, Mau Anga; Messac, “Moral Hazards and Moral Economies”; Handbook of Micro 
Health Insurance in Africa, 1 edition (Zurich: LIT Verlag, 2012). 
111 “Economic and Social Developments, Including Assistance Programmes Other than the 
UNDP, January-June 1966,” Quarterly Reports, United Nations Development Programme, 
(November 10, 1966), Item No. 1047167, WBGA. 
	 462	
But by the 1960s most of the largest bilateral and multilateral aid agencies counseled 
“patience in the face of poverty,” as Kapur summarizes the World Bank’s approach to 
financing (or, rather, not financing) health and education during the postwar decades. 
During the early 1950s the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) had funded malaria eradication programs and vaccination programs. Such 
funding was particularly focused on Southeast Asia, where American officials devoted 
funds toward rural health and agriculture for security purposes rather than more strictly 
economic ones; they hoped that mitigating rural poverty in this region might lessen the 
appeal of communist propaganda.112 But in the late 1950s USAID began to cut its grant 
support for malaria eradication programs, and by the mid-1960s its health programming 
was almost entirely focused on family planning.113 At the same time, UN agencies such 
as the Food and Agriculture Organization also turned their attention away disease 
control.114 Malawi may have found a few donors willing to fund small initiatives or 
provide a few personnel, but the lack of donor support for health made it nearly 
impossible for the new nation to fund improvements to its medical services with external 
loans and grants. In the seven years following independence, health spending made up 
only one percent of the government’s development (capital) budget. 
 
Between the mid-1950s and the late 1960s, then, mainstream development thought as 
well as bilateral and multilateral aid agencies gave less and less attention to health in poor 																																																								
112 Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard C. Webb, The World Bank: Its First Half Century, 
2 Volume set edition (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 1997).,Page 112 
113 Packard, “Visions of Post-War Health and Development and Their Impact on Public Health 
Interventions in the Developing World.” Pages 107-108. 
114 Ibid. pages 107-108. 
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countries. The most influential studies of development were no longer surveys conducted 
by nutritionists, anthropologists, botanists and agricultural experts, but econometric 
analyses using formal mathematical models constructed by economists. This new cadre 
of development experts saw little use for health programs; their impact was difficult to 
measure and appeared to have a long and uncertain gestation. The World Bank, USAID, 
the UK Treasury, UN agencies and other donors echoed the economists’ counsel. In this 
intellectual and financial environment, the holders of budgetary purse-strings in late-
colonial Nyasaland and post-colonial Malawi found little support for efforts to undertake 
new health interventions, or even to maintain existing programs in public health and 
curative medicine. 
b) Coolness to health at the World Bank, 1946-1968 
When Malawi’s development planners did actively seek funding for health projects from 
international aid agencies, they were rebuffed. At the October 1969 annual meeting of the 
World Bank in Washington, DC, Malawi Minister of Finance Aleke Banda [no relation to 
Kamuzu] and his team of advisers met with Abdel El-Emary, Director of the Africa 
Department. Late in the meeting, the Minister of Finance mentioned that Malawi was 
planning to approach the bank for assistance in financing health. Banda argued health 
projects “could be justified on social and economic grounds, although he was fully aware 
of the difficulty of evaluating a health project economically.” El-Emary’s response was 
not promising; he said he “could not make any positive statement on Bank interest or 
involvement in the area of health.”115  																																																								
115 “Memorandum from GE Okurume, Re: Annual Meeting Departmental Discussions Held on 
September 29, 1969,” October 17, 1969, Item No. 1860299, WBGA. This was a common 
experience for new governments seeking health funding from the World Bank. Following 
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El-Emary’s response was in keeping with the position maintained toward Malawi since it 
joined the World Bank as an independent nation in 1964. In 1967, El-Emary had written 
approvingly to the United Nations Development Programme about Malawi’s economic 
policy thus far:  
Although Government expenditure must be spread over the whole range of 
Government services, including social and security services as well as economic 
ones, the greatest emphasis is given to those projects which resulting an increase 
in the national product. Projects which result in increased exports (or a reduction 
of imports) find special favour.116 
 
The World Bank’s unwillingness to finance health care in Malawi was simply a 
recapitulation of its approach to all countries prior to the 1970s.117 The vast majority of 
World Bank lending to poor countries the first quarter-century after Bretton Woods was 
for power and transportation projects, with much of the balance going toward industry 
and telecommunications, industry, and a pittance for agriculture. None went toward 
education or health. Bank historians Mason and Asher argue this omission stemmed both 
from the difficulty of measuring the effect of education and health programs on aggregate 
production, and the concern that such financing would raise among the Wall Street 																																																																																																																																																																					
independence in 1966, Botswana’s new government sought funding from the World Bank for 
health projects. Quett Masire, Botswana’s first Minister of Finance, recalled his conversations 
with Bank officials during those years. “The World Bank didn’t want to touch social 
infrastructure, because the rule of the day was expenditure should have a rate of return…We had 
a very difficult time to justify raising money for schools, raising money for hospitals.” “Social 
infrastructure” was Masire’s favored term for government health and education spending. While 
the Bank provided loans for “physical infrastructure” (e.g. roads, bridges, power plants and 
factories), it refused to finance social infrastructure. Personal Interview with former President 
Quett Masire, Gaborone, Botswana., November 6, 2015. 
116 “AG El Emary to Mr RH Demuth, Forwarding Paper Entitled ‘UNDP Assistance to Malawi,’” 
April 7, 1967, Item No. 1047167, WBGA. Page 3. 
117 A World Bank study of Kenya’s economy in 1962 warned against increases in health 
spending. A 1961 World Bank report on Uganda demanded “vigorous action” to stem further 
expansion of the government health sector. See Iliffe, East African Doctors. Page 130. 
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financiers who held much of the Bank’s debt.118 The tone had been set as early as 1949, 
when Lauchlin Currie, a former special adviser to US President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, had tried to persuade World Bank Vice President Robert Garner to finance 
health and education programs in Colombia. Garner recoiled: “Damn it, Lauch. We can’t 
go messing around with education and health. We’re a bank!”119  
b) Malawi and the World Bank battle over population control, 1969 
When John Adelman returned to World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C. from a 
visit to Malawi in July 1969, the findings he included in his report amplified two 
arguments that were then gaining attention in development circles. The first was that 
health was not getting enough attention. “Public health,” he began, “is another area where 
I believe present thinking in Malawi may be too cautious. A growth rate of only 4% is 
being allowed for in current health expenditures, most of which are for curative purposes. 
Malaria, tuberculosis, and malnutrition are still widespread, as are intestinal parasites and 
bilharzia.”120 But this claim was tempered by the second idea rising to prominence—that 
disease control in the absence of family planning was a waste of money.  “Still,” he 
continued, “it is difficult to press for a large scale general attack on these problems, both 
because of financial limitations and also because one is reluctant to encourage a major 																																																								
118 Edward Sagendorph Mason and Robert E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods: The 
Origins, Policies, Operations, and Impact of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the Other Members of the World Bank Group: The International Finance 
Corporation, the International Development Association [and] the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (Brookings Institution Press, 1973)., p 189-190, 151-152; 
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119 Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, The World Bank., 111. A 1952 World Bank Survey Mission report 
on Nicaragua recommended “expenditures to improve sanitation, education and public health 
should, without question, be given first priority in any program to increase the long range growth 
and  
120 John A Adelman, “Back-to-Office Report, Mission to Malawi. Submitted to Mr Abdel G El 
Emary,” July 31, 1969, Item No. 1860299, WBGA. Page 15. 
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mortality control campaign prior to seeing some official receptivity to a fertility control 
campaign. The latter is definitely absent at this time.”121 These linked ideas, that health 
was worthy of additional funding, but only alongside population control, would help 
shape development experts’ writings on Malawi for the next decade. 
 
Adelman had shared these thoughts with Malawian officials prior to his departure, 
prompting a critical response from President Hastings Kamuzu Banda. At the end of his 
October 14, 1969 meeting with Abdel El-Emary in Washington (where El-Emary had 
discouraged any application for health funding), Malawi Minister of Finance Aleke 
Banda handed him a letter from President Banda. The letter, addressed to World Bank 
Group President Robert McNamara, included the following passage: 
One of the officials of the Bank who was here recently, among other things, 
mentioned the question of population explosion in this country. He said that our 
annual birth rate was too high and that we should do something about it. I 
disagreed with him. Although by African standards Malawi is relatively a small 
country, it is not true to say that our population is too big for the size of the 
country. Malawi is 45,000 square miles as against Taiwan’s 14,000 and Israel’s 
8,000 square miles as of June 1967. Yet Taiwan supports a population of 14 
million and Israel at least 2 million. I sincerely and honestly believe that properly 
developed, Malawi can support a population of even 20 million. Because although 
it is small in area, Malawi has very rich agricultural soil. As I am writing there are 
vast rich agricultural areas unoccupied…Population explosion is not a problem in 
Malawi for the next fifty years, if not a hundred years. The problem is 
development for which we need finance.122 
 
Banda could scarcely have written a passage more offensive to McNamara. An adamant 
proponent of population control as a prerequisite for prosperity in developing nations, 
McNamara believed that decreasing the fertility rate should be a central goal of Malawi’s 																																																								
121 Adelman, “Back-to-Office Report, Mission to Malawi. Submitted to Mr Abdel G El Emary.” 
Page 15. 
122 “Malawi President Hastings Kamuzu Banda to World Bank Group President Robert 
McNamara, delivered by Aleke Banda on 14 July 1969,” September 12, 1969, Item No. 1860299, 
WBGA. Page 2.  
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health policy.123 He said as much when he responded to Malawi’s President, less than a 
week after receiving the letter: “The concern I have expressed on a number of occasions 
is with a situation in which the rate of population increase, is outstripping, or threatens to 
outstrip, the rate of economic growth, with the result that economic development does not 
result in human development...I…firmly believe that family planning is important for all 
developing countries which have excessively high rates of population increase.”124 
 
This profound disagreement on population policy, born of deeply held beliefs and 
political interests on both sides, would prove a sticking point in Malawi’s discussions 
with the World Bank. The disagreement would sour personal relationships between 
Banda and many of the holders of the purse-strings of aid, and for a few years in the late 
1960s and early 1970s seemed to threaten the possibility of external aid for health 
reaching Malawi. But, as this section will explain, Banda had his own reasons for his pro-
natalist position, and eventually McNamara and the World Bank, and some other funders, 																																																								
123 As Megan Vaughan has demonstrated for Nyasaland during the 1940s, claims of population 
pressure have long been intimately tied contests over land between white settlers and Africans. 
See Vaughan, The Story of an African Famine. For a sense of how population policy fit into the 
politics of race and resources in southern Africa, compare Banda’s pro-natalist position with the 
support for controlling the African population of Southern Rhodesia, which was voiced by that 
nation’s Secretary for Health, MH Webster, in the early 1970s: “The growth of the African 
population, making ever increasing and clamorous demands on the services of this country while 
not contributing to the cost of these services in proportion, is putting an almost unbearable strain 
on the medical services and on other social services. Of course, the medical services of Rhodesia 
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annum simply cannot be sustained. It means in terms of hospital beds, for example. 550 new 
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development of the health services of Rhodesia from 1923 to the Present, Part IV, CAJM, p.50. 
124 “World Bank Group President Robert McNamara to Malawi President Hastings Kamuzu 
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moved toward more comprehensive (though still not amply funded) support for health 
programming in Malawi. 
 
c) Population control in international health, 1964-1970 
 
The idea that per-capita economic growth in poor countries was being hindered not just 
by slow aggregate production increases, but by rapid population increases, became ever 
more prominent in international development planning during the early 1960s. Less than 
three decades after the Holocaust had rendered discussions of mass sterilization suspect 
in Western political discourse, private and public sources of international aid dollars 
(particularly in the United States) opened their wallets and propounded the virtues of 
population control. At their June 1962 annual meeting, the Board of Directors of the Ford 
Foundation approved $10.7 million in funding for population projects, surpassing its 
support for such work over all years in the prior decade combined.125 In April 1963, US 
President John F Kennedy endorsed the idea of international aid for family planning in 
response to a reporters’ question (in an exchange choreographed by Planned Parenthood 
employees).126 Kennedy’s successor, President Lyndon B. Johnson, initially appeared 
averse to funding for population control policies; early in his tenure he even declined to 
meet with the (hereditarily) wealthy activists John D. Rockefeller III and William Draper 
to discuss the issue. But beginning in 1966, with support from Johnson and leading 
members of the United States Senate, USAID began receiving ever-larger appropriations 
																																																								
125 Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population 
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126 Ibid., 199. 
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to fund intrauterine device (IUD) insertion and mass sterilization campaigns in the 
developing world, with a particular focus on India.127 
 
President Johnson’s conversion from skeptic to believer on population control is another 
example of the political potency of economic projections that rely on heroic assumptions 
rather than any grounded data. The key to Johnson’s persuasion was a paper written in 
1965 by the economist Stephen Enke, then working at the RAND Corporation (Enke 
would later become deputy assistant secretary of state). Enke’s projections made use of, 
and drove to logical extremes, Arthur Lewis’ ideas about the surfeit of labor supplies in 
poor nations and the backwardness of the “traditional sector.” He assumed that children 
were unproductive consumers until age 15. Then he discounted the value of consumption 
during childhood by 15 percent per year. Using these two priors, Enke calculated that in 
the average poor country the net present value of a newborn was -$279; that is to say, for 
every child not born a nation stood to save a net $279 on unproductive consumption.128  
 
Enke admitted that this calculation of the value of a life should consider the negative net 
present value of a child’s 15 years of consumption alongside the positive net present 
value of her future production as an adult, but he did not even include a calculation the 
latter, as he assumed this discounted value was so negligible as not to merit inclusion in 																																																								
127 Ibid., 233. 
128 Ibid., 213. This view of children as an economic liability is diametrically opposed to the view 
of many African parents. As Benjamin Platt (a main character in Chapter 2) noted in 1960, only a 
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survive to take care of the parents in their old age. That is…children are an economic asset.” BS 
Platt, “The Effects of Maternal and Child Welfare Work on Problems of Population” (1960), 
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his equation. Instead, using the negative consumption figure alongside assumptions about 
fertility rates and capital/output ratios, Enke estimated that when compared to 
“investment for extra output...a birth control program would be 250 times more effective 
a means of raising per capita income per unit of resources so employed.”129  
 
The lack of evidence supporting Enke’s calculations did not prevent them from reaching 
the desks of powerful decision-makers.130 Upon reading this study in April 1965, Robert 
Komer, a staffer on the U.S. National Security Council, sent it along with a note to 
McGeorge Bundy, Johnson’s National Security Advisor. Komer wrote that the “hard 
dollar and cents argument” in the paper “might just penetrate LBJ’s defenses.” Indeed, 
Komer’s memo did pique President Johnson’s interest, and in June 1965 he publicly 
called for greater investments in population control, claiming—in a downward revision of 
Enke’s projections that might be attributed to forgetfulness—“less than five dollars 
invested in population control is worth a hundred dollars invested in economic 
growth.”131 
 
 																																																								
129 Stephen Enke, “Lower Birth Rates: Some Economic Aspects,” 12 February 1965, National 
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The focus on population control quickly migrated the few blocks from the White House 
to 1818 H Street NW, headquarters of the World Bank. By 1966, Komer had convinced 
George Woods, then the Bank’s President, to condition its aid to India (including food 
aid) on satisfactory population control policies.132 In 1967, the Bank began including 
information on population growth and population policies in borrower nations as “one 
indicator of their commitment to economic growth.”133 Woods’ successor, Robert 
McNamara, who had served as US Defense Secretary under Johnson, was an even more 
vigorous proponent of population control upon assuming the position of Bank President 
in 1968. McNamara joined the Board of Trustees of the Ford Foundation in the same 
month he began as Bank President. His speeches, including an address at the University 
of Notre Dame in 1969, echoed a finding of a World Bank-commissioned study led by 
Lester Pearson that same year, which argued that increasing fertility rates were 
overwhelming investments in development.134 His dire warnings that high fertility rates 
were a threat to the economies of poor nations also coincided with increasing popular 																																																								
132 Ibid., 213. 
133 Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, The World Bank., 249. 
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population doubles in twenty-five years, the task of development and modernization is 
compounded. It may even be impossible to attain significant improvement in living conditions 
and independence of foreign aid…There can be no serious social and economic planning unless 
the ominous implications of uncontrolled population growth are understood and acted upon.” See 
Lester B Pearson, Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International 
Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969). Pages 55-58. Pearson did not, however, go 
as far as McNamara and others would in calling for a halt to investments in “mortality control” 
until such time as fertility had been dampened. While Pearson thought that the decline in 
mortality in poor counties was “the underlying cause of the grave problem of population growth,” 
he continued to argue that “this does not detract from its value. In human terms, it has been the 
most convincing demonstration of the power of applied science. It has lifted people’s spirits and 
raised their sights in planning for the future. It has increased the capacity to work, and it has 
opened up territories for new cultivation where disease had previously been rampant.” Page 40. 
W. Arthur Lewis also served on this Commission. 
	 472	
concern in Western publics, seen most notably in the rapid sales and intense media 
coverage of Paul and Anne Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb, published in 1968.135 
McNamara had not abandoned the maximization of per capita output as a measure of 
development, but for him it was as important to keep the denominator in the measure 
(population) low even as other development lending strove to push up the numerator 
(aggregate output).  
 
McNamara’s focus on stemming rising populations was so myopic that he was unwilling 
to contemplate support for health care before achieving declines in borrower nations’ 
fertility rates. His own justifications for this requirement pitted mortality control against 
fertility control in the same way as Adelman did in his report on Malawi. In a March 
1969 response to a Bank official who had proposed financial support for preventive 
health services in Jamaica, McNamara said “he was reluctant to consider financing of 
health care unless it was very strictly related to population control, because usually health 
facilities contributed to the decline of the death rate, and thereby to the population 
explosion.”136 																																																								
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d) Population control in World Bank reports on Malawi, 1971 
In its reports on Malawi during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the World Bank made the 
new nation’s rising population a much more central concern than its dearth of healthcare 
providers and facilities. The report of a 1971 Bank mission to Malawi included no 
discrete section on health services. In fact, the only mention came in the section devoted 
to “population pressure,” which made a virtue of the country’s absence of health services. 
“The structure of population and the high fertility ratios, in addition to the pressure of 
population on land, could create a serious demographic problem, particularly if there is 
some improvement in health services on which expenditure is at present very low.”137 
The report noted per capita recurrent public expenditure on health was only about $0.85 
per year, and guessed that it “might amount to just over $1 when accounting for the 
expenditures by missionaries.” Between 1964 and 1971, yearly per capita development 
expenditure on health had declined, “and currently averages only 3 cents.” The authors 
predicted that this situation was politically untenable, as “sooner or later, there is bound 
to be increased pressure for an improvement in health.” But the authors did not look 
forward to such political pressure, as it would bring forth “a marked reduction in infant 																																																																																																																																																																					
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number of children per family would probably be only between 3 and 4.” The discrepancy 
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mortality” (from its current level of “240 deaths per 1,000 live births which makes it 
probably one of the highest in Africa”), and a subsequent rise in population. To the 
itinerant prognosticators who authored this report, astronomical rates of infant mortality 
were a rather useful check on overpopulation. 
e) Explaining pro-natalism in Banda’s Malawi, 1965-1975 
While the World Bank, USAID, the Ford Foundation and other sources of international 
aid focused on IUD insertion and sterilization campaigns in India and elsewhere, Banda 
would lend no public support to birth control measures in Malawi. He banned books on 
birth control, and deported a Dutch missionary who had delivered lectures on the subject. 
In early 1965, a Medical Officer’s request for the oral contraceptive Anovular from 
Malawi’s Medical Stores was cancelled on the grounds that “contraceptives are not 
supplied from Government Hospitals.”138 Historians of Malawi, and Banda himself, have 
offered varied reasons for his opposition to birth control in particular, and population 
control more generally. First, he saw Malawi’s rising population not as a threat, but as a 
desirable trend. In public addresses he often declared Malawi was blessed with vast 
expanses of fertile soil, which could support many millions more.139 Banda told his critics 
that he would reconsider his position on birth control only when Malawi was peopled 
enough to have every acre of its arable land under cultivation.140 Banda may have also 
relished this stand against the opinion of “so-called experts,” whose counsel ran counter 
to the tested wisdom of “the ordinary man and woman in the village.”141 																																																								
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‘Medical Supplies,’” February 3, 1965, Folder 3405, 2.1.1.F, Box 12484, MNA. 
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To some observers Banda’s position on birth control could be attributed to his puritanical 
beliefs and authoritarian dealings on matters of personal conduct. Banda did not drink or 
smoke, and promulgated laws against drunkenness within a year of Malawi’s 
independence. Most famously, beginning in the late 1960s he banned Malawian women 
from wearing mini-dresses or even trousers.142 But if in some ways Banda’s cultural 
views fit well with the contemporary Western backlash against the sexual revolution, in 
other ways his stance on population drew upon views of sexual morality that cultural 
conservatives elsewhere would have considered scandalous.143 In 1947, while working as 
a physician in North London, Banda and the Scottish missionary Cullen Young 
coauthored a preface to Our African Way of Life, a volume of essays by written by 
African students in Nyasaland. In the preface, Banda and Young wrote in defense of the 
“fertility orgy” practiced by Banda’s people, the Chewa: 
For some sixty years we have frowned upon and, indeed, opposed what we—
Government and Mission—took to be a more or less licentious ‘harvest’ or ‘fertility’ 
orgy local to the Chewa and Chipeta areas. Actually, as will be seen in these pages—
it is a central part of the educational technique, fundamental to the preparation of the 
male for adult life within the community and maintaining at the heart of the 
community itself a continuing reverence for the social ideal as Africa sees it.144 
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The logical consistency in Banda’s sexual politics lies not in its adherence to cultural 
conservatism along the lines of some Christian churches, but in what anthropologists and 
historians of Africa have called “wealth in people.” The idea that people—rather than 
money or other resources—were primary in understandings of wealth in land-rich, labor-
scarce African societies has been central to tracts on equatorial and southern Africa since 
the 1970s.145 It has been used to make sense of the rapid assimilation of the conquered 
and the destitute into new social groupings as well as inclusive definitions of kinship.146 
Even if he did not use this term, Banda’s politics could scarcely have been more focused 
on demonstrating wealth-in-people. Metaphors of abundance and of vastly extended 
kinship relations were central to his rule. Wherever Banda delivered a public address, the 
organizers of the Malawi Congress Party made sure he was greeted not only by cheering 																																																								
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have been guaranteed. They were not worked in perpetuity; eventually, widows could remarry or 
orphans could come of age. See Steven Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals : Anthropology and 
History in Tanzania (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990). Also see Miers and 
Kopytoff, Slavery in Africa; Jan Vansina, Paths in the Rainforest: Toward a History of Political 
Tradition in Equatorial Africa (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990); J Miller, 
Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism in The Angolan Slave Trade, 1730-1830 (Madison, Wis: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); Henrietta L. Moore and Megan Vaughan, Cutting down 
Trees : Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890-
1990 (Lusaka: University of Zambia Press, 1994). For a discussion of the resonances of these 
institutions in southern Africa’s present, see James Ferguson, Give a Man a Fish: Reflections on 
the New Politics of Distribution (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015). 
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thousands, but also by enthusiastic and well-rehearsed groups of praise-singing local 
women. Banda called these women his mbumba, which among the matrilineal Chewa 
refers to a group of sisters and their daughters living under the protection of a maternal 
uncle or eldest brother known as an nkhoswe. By assuming the role of nkhoswe to women 
throughout Malawi, Banda indicated he was responsible for their flourishing, and he 
would in turn be made ever more wealthy and powerful by the fruits of their wombs.147 
This political symbolism was on full display on Christmas Day, 1980, when Life 
President Banda came to the Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital to open a new maternity 
wing. The opening of the wing—which, as the Ministry of Information touted, had been 
built using personal funds donated by “His Excellency the Life President” himself—was 
a joyous celebration of this abundance, with Banda surrounded by throngs of mbumba 
clad in blue and red zitenje (cloths) bearing likenesses of his face (see Figure 9.3). State-
directed population control measures, particularly the kind of coercive sterilizations 
pursued in India at the behest of the World Bank and other international agencies during 
the 1970s, would have run directly counter to the legitimizing ideology Banda had so 
carefully constructed. 
IV. Conclusion 
 
In The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence, social anthropologist Max Gluckman argued that 
relations resembling kinship could be established through acts of material generosity. 
This materiality of obligation was especially true in relations between ruler and subject. 
A Barotse maxim held that: “The good subject is the one who is generous as a child is to  
																																																								
147 Wiseman Chijere Chirwa, Dancing towards dictatorship: political songs and popular culture in 
Malawi, Nordic Journal of African Studies 10(1): 1-27. 
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Figure 9.3: President Hastings Kamuzu Banda, surrounded by his mbumba, opening the 
Gogo Chatinkha Maternity wing at Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital, Blantyre, 
December 25, 1980. Source: Ministry of Information. 
 
a parent; the good lord is the one who is generous as a parent is to a child.”148 The 
anthropologist Meyer Fortes found much the same thing among the Tallensi in West 
Africa: “A kinsman of any degree is a person whose welfare one is interested in and 
whom one is under a moral obligation to help in difficulties, if possible.”149 
 
																																																								
148 The Ideas in Barotseland Jurisprudence (New York: Yale University Press, 1965). Page 173. 
149 Meyer Fortes, The Web of Kinship among the Tallensi (London: Oxford University Press, 
1949). Page 293. Also see Harri Englund, “Extreme Poverty and Existential Obligations: Beyond 
Morality in the Anthropology of Africa?,” Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social 
and Cultural Practice 52, no. 3 (Winter 2008): 33–50. Page 143. 
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This understanding of popular expectations of kin (and those who would claim to be kin) 
can help explain the politics of medicine in Malawi at the dawn of independence. Since 
the arrival of effective antibiotics and anti-tuberculosis agents after the Second World 
War, government hospitals and dispensaries had grown ever more popular among the 
general population. Medicine’s newfound capacity to protect the sick from suffering and 
premature death carried with it a new set of political obligations. This was particularly 
true for Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the doctor-cum-president who constantly portrayed 
himself as the benevolent nkhoswe of his people. 
 
Banda learned the potency of this obligation shortly after independence, when he sought 
to quell the popular reaction to the imposition of user fees. Banda quickly learned the 
lesson and abandoned the fees. Though he did not invest heavily in medicine in the early 
post-independence years, he did make grand displays of any new government 
developments in the health sector. His annual Christmas pilgrimages to visit patients at 
Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital and his “personal” donations to hospitals were public 
demonstrations of solicitude for the destitute ill. Banda had spent much of his life outside 
Southern Africa. In his manner and historical sensibility, he identified more with the 
London bourgeoisie among whom he had lived for so long. But, as leader of Malawi, 
there were certain social facts that he could not afford to ignore. The obligation to 
provide for the sick, or to at least appear to do so, was such a fact. Even if budget figures 
do not demonstrate Banda’s concern for health, medicine was a central component in the 
symbolism of his long rule. 
 
	 480	
Chapter 10 
Sovereignty and citizenship in an age of aid: financing health in 1970s Malawi 
 
Abstract 
 
Malawi’s health expenditures and policies during the early postcolonial period closely 
tracked perceptions of instability within the new regime. Whereas the Cabinet Crisis of 
the immediate post-independence years led Banda to abandon user fees, by the 1970s 
Banda saw few remaining threats to his rule. He turned his attention (and government 
resources) away from health, even as the rise of “human capital” in development 
discourse prompted greater tolerance for health spending among cosmopolitan economic 
experts. During the 1970s Banda did not increase the share of domestic revenues spent on 
health. Instead he relied on external donors, particularly governments facing their own 
crises of legitimacy, for health financing. Drawing upon the National Archives of Malawi 
and the World Bank Group archives this chapter demonstrates once again while changing 
fashions in economic development can at times coincide with changes in outlays for 
health, the greatest influence on health spending were political crises. This time, though, 
the crises took place outside Malawi, and were deliberately exploited by Malawi’s 
president to secure financial support for (among other aims) health facilities. 
 
Prelude: Memories of strong medicine 
 
When, during my stay in Nyanza village, people asked me to explain my research, there 
frequently ensued a moment of confusion. Ndikuphunzira mbiri ya mankhwala, I would 
say. The closest literal translation of this statement is: “I am studying the history of 
medicine.” But people often assumed, at first, that I meant “traditional” or herbal 
medicine. “History” is not an exact translation for the word mbiri, which also means 
“culture,” so mbiri ya mankhwala is ambiguous. But the confusion also stemmed from 
the widely shared memory, among Malawians in the Nyanza, that the medicine delivered 
in hospitals was of recent provenance in Malawi.  
 
In this area, my interlocutors often insisted there really were not any hospitals or clinics 
around until nthawi ya Kamuzu (“the time of Kamuzu Banda,” aka post-independence). 
One group of women, all in their seventies, had a shared response when I asked about 
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government health care during the colonial era: Panalibe! (“There were none!”).1 They 
insisted on this despite the fact that there had been a government dispensary in Sombe—
which was within two hours’ walk of Nyanza—since the 1920s.2 Nyanza was not in some 
blank space on the colonial medical map. But over his long reign, Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda had repeated so often that there were hardly any medical facilities before him, and 
that so many of those in existence were built under his rule, that these women seemed to 
have accepted it as the truth.3 
 
During the colonial era, the women explained, people found medicine “in trees.” One 
woman, Linda, showed me the scars on the inside of her lower leg below the knee where, 
as a child, she had chronic pain treated with herbs poured into cuts made with a razor. 
The treatment worked, she remembered, for the pain was soon gone, and never returned. 
Yet even though Linda had lost two children to measles, and another to AIDS, she 
maintained that mankhwala wa mzungu (“white people’s medicine”) was stronger than 
the herbs of the past.  
 
The popular narrative about mankhwala wa mzungu among the elderly in Nyanza is that 
medicines grew in potency during nthawi ya Kamuzu, but then weakened during 
																																																								
1 February 24, Nyanza interviews.  
2 “Rural Dispensaries: Sites,” 1921, File 23, S40/1/3/2, MNA. 
3 See, for instance, HK Banda’s declaration at an opening of the Dedza District Hospital in 1975: 
“This is why I wanted power—to improve the standard of living of my people. And not only the 
food and dress, no, but also education and health…When I came here in 1958, true there were 
some hospitals, there were some clinics and dispensaries, but very few. I wanted more.” Speech 
by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda at the Official Opening of 
Dedza District Hospital, December 4, 1975,” in His Excellency the Life President’s Speeches: 
Central Region Tour, December 2-15, 1975, n.d., 9–25. MNA.  
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“multiparty” (the era of multiparty democratic elections that followed the end of Banda’s 
reign in 1994). Francis’s septuagenarian mother, Anna, remembers well-stocked, well-
manned, well-maintained health facilities, especially early in Banda’s reign. Even long-
time Malawian government employees shared some version of this narrative. On a drive 
home from an outreach cervical cancer-screening clinic in the rural Neno District, a 
veteran female nurse remembered “there were many medicines in the time of Kamuzu 
Banda,” and “fewer stock-outs.” Today, the narrative goes, things are much worse. 
Mankhwala kulibe (“There are no medicines”), laments Francis’s wife Edith. She recalls 
recent instances when nearby government facilities have been stocked out of antibiotics 
like chloramphenicol, and even cheap analgesics like Panadol (acetaminophen) or aspirin.  
The staff at the hospital, she said, have only one piece of advice: “Buy them yourself!” 
(“Mugule!”). 
 
This story of rise and decline is similar to the one people in Nyanza village tell about 
agricultural production. Anna said that food was most abundant during the reign of 
Kamuzu Banda. She remembered receiving two bags of fertilizer for free every year. 
Unlike the current fertilizer subsidy program (“coupons”), these bags went to everyone. 
This program went away, she said, at the start of the multiparty era. Anna was 
remembering the large fertilizer subsidy program of the Banda era. The government had 
abolished the program in the late 1980s as a condition of its second World Bank 
	 483	
structural adjustment loan.4 Even though the subsidies were abolished in 1990, four years 
before the start of the multiparty era, in popular memory the two events are linked.5 
 
Things grew even worse in the 1990s. The “multiparty” era came to be associated in the 
popular imagination with famines, the likes of which the country had not seen since the 
late 1940s. After a weak maize harvest led the government to seek advice from the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the Malawian government began a universal (and universally 
popular) “starter pack” program, in which every household received a small packet of 
food and fertilizer. But facing pressure from donor governments, the government 
drastically scaled back the scale of the program in 2001. Smallholder maize production 
fell precipitously, from over 2 million metric tons in 2000 to less than 1.5 million metric 
tons in 2001.6 Under Banda government had often made up for such shortfalls in 
production in part by selling maize from its “strategic grain reserve.” In 1979 Malawi had 
constructed massive concrete silos at Kanengo, outside Lilongwe. The Kanengo silos, 
which housed grain bought from farmers in good harvest years to be resold at reasonable 
prices in bad ones, had for decades been trumpeted as a symbol of Banda’s protection of 
																																																								
4 Paul Mosley, “Development Economics and the Underdevelopment of Sub-Saharan Africa,” 
Journal of International Development 7, no. 5 (1995): 685–706. Mosley notes that in the 1980s, 
while the World Bank ‘s “adjustment policy” staff advocated for the elimination of fertilizer 
subsidies in Malawi (in the name of closing budget deficits), the “project staff” argued 
(unsuccessfully) for maintaining the subsidy in order to improve outputs and living standards. 
The Bank, filled as it is with thousands of staff, was never a monolith, even if it seems so in the 
accounts of its detractors. 
5 Anne Conroy et al., Poverty, AIDS and Hunger: Breaking the Poverty Trap in Malawi (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006). Page 98. 
6 Ibid. Pages 120-121. 
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his people.7 In 1990, near the end of Kamuzu Banda’s tenure, the Bank of Malawi even 
introduced a 100-kwacha note with the Life President on the front (as always) and the 
Kanengo grain silos on the reverse.8 But this symbol of dictatorial beneficence would 
soon transform, in the public eye, into an icon of democracy’s false promises. As part of 
its campaign to tear down the idols of the former regime, President Bakili Muluzi’s 
government removed the grain silo from the 100-kwacha bill in 1997.9 Far less popular 
was the action the government took in 1999 when, in fulfillment of a condition of a 
World Bank loan, Muluzi’s government privatized the grain reserve. By June 2000 all the 
grain in the silos had had been sold off, mostly to private speculators within Malawi.10 
When the next year’s harvest proved weak, the government had no stores to sell back to 
its people, while speculators could charge exorbitant prices. After a half-century without 
widespread famine, the scourge had returned.11 
 
The advent of multiparty democracy also coincided with another disaster. AIDS ravaged 
communities, including Nyanza, where most everyone mentioned a son, daughter, 
brother, sister, mother or father lost to the disease. Many would speak of the death of a 
young adult during this period without invoking AIDS (edzi), though the cause could be 
																																																								
7 The Kanengo grain silos in Malawi built by Banda in 1979, have a capacity of 130,000 metric 
tons. “Storage Facilities: Adequate Reserves for Malawi” (National Food Reserve Agency), 
accessed June 11, 2016, http://www.nframw.com/storage-facilities/5-storage-facilities. 
8 Other banknotes during Banda’s reign depicted peasant farmers in verdant fields. 
9 The grain silos reappeared on a Malawi kwacha banknote in 2011. This was part of a campaign 
by Muluzi’s successor, Bingu wa Mutharika, to refurbish the legacy of Kamuzu Banda and to 
associate himself with it.  
10 Conroy et al., Poverty, AIDS and Hunger: Breaking the Poverty Trap in Malawi. Pages 121-
123 
11 Roshni Menon, “Famine in Malawi: Causes and Consequences,” Human Development Report 
Office Occasional Paper (United Nations Development Programme, 2007), 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/menon_roshni_2007a_malawi.pdf. 
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inferred given the age of the decedent and the era. Almost no one had access to lifesaving 
antiretroviral therapy before 2005. 
 
The result of this confluence of conflagrations is a decided distrust of the present political 
system. In Nyanza, this distrust is often expressed with reference to medicines and food. 
Anna, who lost one child to AIDS in the late 1990s, explains that medicine had the 
greatest mphamvu (strength, potency) during the time of Kamuzu Banda. She also 
remembers food being most abundant during his reign (she attributes this to the fertilizer 
subsidies). Bamusa says that rains fell at the right time and in the right amount during 
nthawi atsamunda (the colonial era) and nthawi ya Kamuzu Banda. But under Muluzi, he 
says, there was too little rain, and under the then-current president, Arthur Peter 
Mutharika, there was too much. Bamusa remembers the starter pack program fondly, and 
believes the cause of the 2002 famine was the privatization of the grain reserve. For this, 
he blames former President Muluzi. 
 
Thus, Banda’s legacy was burnished not only by his ideologies of protection and 
abundance, but also by coincidence. He returned to Malawi from a near-lifelong exile in 
1958, in the midst of the marked increase in attendance at government medical facilities. 
Though the women of Nyanza insisted he had built all of Malawi’s government hospitals 
and health centers, the country had almost 100 dispensaries, and over a dozen clinics, as 
early as the mid-1930s. But until shortly before he came the medicines were “weaker,” 
even in the eyes of the colonial doctors. The doctor’s return at the same time as 
biomedicine was growing in popularity became linked in popular memory. Decades, 
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later, in 1994, as the aged Banda left office, an incurable and inevitably fatal disease 
claimed the lives of ever-more men, women and children. Though Banda had himself had 
acceded to some of the Bank’s demands for privatization and budget cuts in agriculture, 
these changes became associated in popular memory with multiparty democracy. 
Historians have noted that Banda pursued agricultural policies that exploited smallholder 
farmers. His government marketing board (ADMARC) paid maize producers far lower 
than prevailing global prices. He then funneled the profits realized by the marketing 
boards to provide aid and credit to plantations and unproductive factories, many of which 
he owned personally.12 Malawians did not forget the Malawi Congress Party cards he 
made every single Malawian purchase yearly and carry everywhere.13 
 
At tea one morning, Francis told stories of tax collection. In the time of Kamuzu Banda, 
he said everyone had to pay taxes in form of party card. Everyone had to have one. And 
this meant everyone: babies, old people, even unborn children still in the womb. Tax 
collectors would scour the country every year. If you didn’t have the money ready when 
they came, you might hide in the forest. If you were caught without money to pay, you 
would be rounded up into police vans and driven to police station in Monkey Bay. One 
tax collector in Nankwhali was infamous for beating people to death if they didn’t have 
the kwacha for the card. “He killed many people,” Francis said. Buying the card was not 
enough. You had to keep card with you at all times. If a collector or policeman asked you 
to produce it while you walked down the street and you couldn’t, you would be arrested 																																																								
12 Jonathan Kydd and Robert Christiansen, “Structural Change in Malawi since Independence: 
Consequences of a Development Strategy Based on Large-Scale Agriculture,” World 
Development 10, no. 5 (1982): 355–75.  
13 Interview with Francis, March 20, 2015. 
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and often beaten. If you went to hospital without your party card, you could be refused 
treatment. There were, Francis said, no exceptions to this system, even for the indigent 
(Look up this law). When ‘multiparty” came, people were happy at first, as they no 
longer had to buy party cards. But Muluzi’s regime was marked by hunger and disease, 
so people associate multiparty with as much bitterness as sweetness, if not more.14 
 
An elderly woman living in Nyanza named Dalitso remembered the beatings by tax 
collectors. But she did not consider the present to be a marked improvement—far from it. 
People may have lacked “peace” under Kamuzu Banda, but they did not starve. Now, 
Dalitso said, she begs her grandson for food, only to hear him respond palibe (“I have 
none.”) Her husband died a decade ago after a painful illness that she did not name. She 
is too frail to walk to the field or the clinic. She lives alone in a wattle-and-daub hut, with 
a thatch roof infested with wasps. She suffers from chronic abdominal pain, but (aside 
from our trip to Nankwhali together, see Chapter 7a prelude) she goes to a clinic no more 
than once a year. Her main sources of income are her son, who lives nearby with his large 
family, and the banana-leaf mats (nkeka) that she weaves by hand. Each one takes her 
two weeks to make, and sells for 1500 kwacha (about US$5). Today in Nyanza, the hopes 
that attended the much-vaunted “third-wave of African democratization” are a thing of 
the past.
																																																								
14 Interview with Francis, March 20, 2015. 
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I. Introduction 
 
By the early 1970s, the unrest of Malawi’s 1960s had quieted. The cabinet ministers who 
had rebelled against Banda were exiled and largely forgotten; a few of the most 
prominent were dead. Banda relished this quietude, and used the opportunity to centralize 
power. He extolled “obedience” and “unity” as two of the cardinal virtues for citizens in 
the new nation. In 1971, the Malawi Congress party named him “Life President.” The 
following year, Banda declared “everything is my business…When people think of the 
government in the village, to them it’s Kamuzu.”1 
 
Indeed, everything was his business. By the mid-1970s, Banda came to own many of the 
nation’s grandest agricultural estates. He also purchased much of the nation’s industrial 
sector. Secure in his perch, Banda felt little of the disquiet that had motivated the 
Federation government (and his own government, in its first few years) to spend on 
health as a political palliative. 
 
But Banda knew the potency of medicine as a political symbol. He also knew how to 
exploit crises elsewhere in order to garner financial resources. By publicly supporting 
foreign governments with poor reputations in Black Africa (such as apartheid South 
Africa, Portuguese Mozambique, or post-1973 Israel), Banda was able to secure aid for 
health projects. He also found aid from other international sources, including 
																																																								
1 “His Excellency the Life President’s Speeches: Opening of the Education Conference, Soche 
Hill College” (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, April 17, 1972), MNA. Page 4. 
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McNamara’s World Bank, which began to provide more financing for health activities 
outside of population control in the mid-1970s.  
 
Banda made use of this aid for personal political gain. In grand displays, he made every 
new hospital and clinic a demonstration of his personal generosity. Yet, because neither 
international donors nor Malawi’s own government were willing to significantly increase 
recurrent (as opposed to capital) spending on health, the nation’s health facilities 
remained without the staff, drugs and equipment necessary to deliver decent care. 
 
 
II. Human Capital and Foreign aid availability 
 
a) Human capital: health as wealth enters development economics theory, 1964-1972 
By the mid-1970s, the debate over population control did not so dominate discussions of 
health policy, either in transnational academic discussions of development or in Malawi. 
Instead, another paradigm was on the rise, one that would move health services beyond 
contraception, and closer to the center of development discourse. This paradigm was 
called “investment in man” or “human capital.” The idea posited that human abilities—
and not just the number of miles of road or the stock of factory equipment—might be the 
rate-limiting step in achieving aggregate economic growth. During the mid-1960s, 
economists Gary Becker and Yoram Ben-Porath had produced models in which 
individuals’ “investment” in formal schooling or on-the-job training raised their levels of 
productivity, thereby yielding higher aggregate output for the economy as a whole.2 																																																								
2 Gary Becker, Human Capital, 1964; Gary Becker, Human capital and the personal distribution 
of income: an analytical approach. WS Woytinsky Lecture no. 1. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan, 1967; Yoram Ben-Porath, “The production of human capital and the life cycle of 
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Several prominent economists, including Victor Fuchs, suggested health might be another 
form of human capital.3 Yet throughout the 1960s health remained a poor relation to 
education in the human capital literature. Only the latter was included in the formal 
mathematical models that were so prized among academic economists.  
 
This began to change in 1972, when Michael Grossman, a recently minted PhD from 
Columbia University who had worked with Victor Fuchs at the US National Bureau of 
Economic Research, published such a model in The Journal of Political Economy. In 
Grossman’s model, the main effect of increasing a person’s “stock” of health was not 
greater productivity (as was the case for a higher “stock” of education)—but rather an 
increase in the “total amount of time he can spend producing money earnings and 
commodities.”4 A person’s initial stock of health was inherited at birth and depreciated 
with age, but could be increased through investments in “medical care, diet, exercise, 
recreation, and housing,” as well as in “environmental variables” such as “the level of 
education of the producer.”5  Grossman became an influential voice in health economics; 																																																																																																																																																																					
earnings, Journal of Political Economy 75 (August 1967): 353-367. For even earlier invocations 
of education as a form of human capital, see TW Schultz, “Investment in human Capital,” The 
American Economic Review, Vol 51, No 1, March 1961, pp 1-17, and J Mincer, “Investment 
inhuman capital and personal income distribution,” Journal of Political Economy 66 (1958); 3: 
281-302.  
3 Selma Mushkin, “Health as an investment,” Journal of Political Economy 70, no 2, suppl 
(October 1962): 129-57; Victor Fuchs, “The contribution of health services to the American 
economy,” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 44 (October 21966): 65-102; Gary Becker, Human 
Capital. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.  
4 Michael Grossman, “On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health,” The 
Journal of Political Economy 80, no. 2 (1972): 223–55.  
5 Ibid. Environmental variables were, to Grossman, outside the control of the consumer, while the 
other investments were choices made by individuals themselves, p. 225. For another discussion of 
the history of human capital arguments in the economics literature, see Muhammad Jami Husain, 
“Contribution of health to economic development: a survey and overview,” Economics E-journal, 
September 2009. 
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in 1972 he was appointed head of the health economics division of the National Bureau 
of Economic Research, a post he retained as of 2016. His model complicated those that 
saw only physical capital as a productive investment.  
 
At the same time, more prominent economic thinkers called into question the hegemony 
of such formalistic model-making altogether. In a massive tome titled An Asian Drama, 
the Swedish economist, sociologist and former politician Gunnar Myrdal, lamented the 
postwar infatuation with abstracted growth models focused on physical capital: 
Models centered on the concept of a capital/output ratio have dictated the 
direction of economic planning in underdeveloped countries. One implication of 
this postwar approach is the assumption that ‘non-economic’ factors—not only 
institutions and attitudes but also levels of living, including health and educational 
facilities—can be disregarded. The primary and often exclusive importance given 
to investment in physical capital for economic development requires this 
assumption.6 
 
Myrdal believed “there can be no warrant for leaving health out of the development 
picture,” as “ill health is a very serious deterrent to a rise in labour input and efficiency in 
the underdeveloped countries of South Asia.” But Myrdal did not favor a mere expansion 
of the definition of “capital” in capital/output models to include health. Rather, he 
advised development economists to abandon these hopelessly inaccurate models. Solow 
had demonstrated in the 1950s that capital/output models could not explain historical 
patterns of growth through physical capital alone (see Chapter 7). But Myrdal believed 
adding health and education to these capital/output models was no panacea. Health, after 
all, required a large number of inputs, most notably (but not exclusively) food, clothing, 
housing and sanitary facilities. A capital/output model that included health as an input 																																																								
6 Chapter 29, “Investment in man,” in Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty 
of Nations (New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 2008). 
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would, of necessity, include every input that affected health. This would, Myrdal 
claimed, result in a model that lacked the benefits of reductionism. Such a model would 
be “virtually empty of theoretical content”—it could offer only a “vague propaganda term 
for a more rational and circumspect development planning that takes into account not 
only physical investment but all other induced changes.” Myrdal insisted he did not 
oppose formal models or quantitative social science per se but, he insisted, “Both models 
and quantitative pronouncements must be logically consistent and thoroughly grounded 
in the facts.”  
 
Myrdal’s book, published in 1968, came at a moment of profound uncertainty within 
development economics. Postwar development planning based on capital/output ratios 
and an overwhelming focus on physical capital had not resulted in disappointment. The 
implementation of five-year development plans focused on industry and agriculture in 
India yielded average annual GNP growth of only 3.5 percent during the 1950s and 
1960s.7 Schematized trajectories of Western economic growth such as Rostow’s were 
proving difficult to recapitulate in South Asia and Africa. Lester Pearson’s 1968 World 
Bank report (referenced earlier for its support of population control) documented the 
manifold disappointments of recent decades of investment.8  
 
Even the gross national product (GNP), the preeminent measure of development during 
the heyday of modernization, came under attack. In a November 1969 speech, Dudley 																																																								
7 Paul Joseph Cruickshank, “The Teleology of Care: Reinventing International Health, 1968-
1989” (PhD Dissertation, History of Science, Harvard, 2011).  
8 Pearson, Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development. 
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Seers, one of the founders of the Institute for Development Studies at the University of 
Sussex in the UK and a leading light in development thought, argued that economic 
growth and development had been conflated. He offered another definition of 
development: “Development means creating conditions for the realization of the human 
personality.” Seers argued that, by this definition, development meant a reduction in 
poverty, unemployment, and inequality. Growth was no proxy for development, as 
metrics of poverty, unemployment and inequality could all fall in the absence of 
aggregate economic growth. 9 
 
The more expansive definition of “capital” and “investment” began to displace the 
theories favored by the Lewis, Rostow and other doyens of modernization, who saw 
government spending on public health and medicine mainly as “consumption.” The 
claims in the economic literature that health was a form of “human capital,” as worthy as 
public investment as physical capital like roads and bridges and power plants, created a 
more hospitable intellectual environment for health spending in Malawi. This was 
particularly true in the development (capital) budget—made up almost entirely of 
external financing. The share of the capital budget devoted to public health and medicine 
projects increased from 1.1 percent in 1971 (since independence, it had hovered around 1 
to 2 percent) to 6.4 percent in 1974.  
 
																																																								
9 Dudley Seers, “What Are We Trying to Measure?” (World Conference of the Society for 
International Development, New Delhi, India, 1969).and Cruickshank, “The Teleology of Care: 
Reinventing International Health, 1968-1989.”Cruickshank, Teleology of Care, Pages 37-38. 
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Still, the enabling influence of human capital arguments had a relatively muted impact on 
the recurrent budget for health in Malawi, which largely came from domestic revenues. 
The share of government recurrent expenditure going toward the Ministry of Health did 
increase from 6.1 percent in 1971 to 7.6 percent in 1976, but it never approached 
Federation-era levels. Compared to the turbulent 1950s and 1960s, this was a decade of 
political quietus; the still-paltry public sector health budget was, more than anything else, 
a reflection of this fact. 
b) McNamara’s World Bank expands health beyond contraception, 1971-1973 
Much of Malawi’s newfound health funding in the 1970s came from international aid 
agencies, both bilateral and multilateral. Even though a détente between Malawi and the 
World Bank over the population issue would prove elusive for decades, the Bank and 
other external agencies did begin to provide aid for health activities other than family 
planning in Malawi by the mid-1970s. As detailed in Chapter 9, population control 
aroused great controversy not only in Malawi but also in a number of developing 
countries. This controversy only grew with revelations that the intrauterine devices 
promoted by population control advocates could cause dire adverse effects.10  
 
The inclusion of health in growth models, challenges to model-making itself, and 
concomitant efforts to redefine development beyond GNP growth all created an 
intellectual opening for international aid agencies seeking to move beyond a 
modernization paradigm focused on physical capital. In the early 1970s, McNamara 																																																								
10 Andrea Tone, Devices and Desires : A History of Contraceptives in America, 1st ed. (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 2001). Tone details how the Dalkon Shield, an IUD promoted by 
international institutions in India in the 1970s caused uterine perforation and (sometimes fatal) 
hemorrhage. 
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began to expand his focus on health beyond birth control to nutrition and, to a limited 
extent, curative health services. McNamara appointed a biochemist as his science advisor 
in 1970, and listed nutrition as one of his areas of focus. In 1972, the Bank opened a 
Nutrition Unit devoted to research and recommendations on the problems of malnutrition. 
That same year, the World Bank joined an international consortium to eradicate river 
blindness in West Africa, and began including lending for primary health care to larger 
project loans primarily aimed at improving agriculture or reducing population growth.11  
 
This change in course at the Bank moved discussions with Malawi beyond the impasse 
over population policy. In April 1971, John Malone (of the Bank’s Eastern African 
Department) reminded his boss that in an upcoming meeting Malawi’s Minister of 
Finance was “almost certain” to reiterate “the Government’s long-standing request” to 
use Bank loans to build health facilities within regions of the country already supported 
by agricultural loans, including Karonga, Lilongwe, and the Lower Shire.12 Whereas in 
1969 the Bank had declined to finance programs aimed at “mortality control” (see 
Chapter 9), Malone’s 1971 memo explained that the Eastern African Department was 
actively considering Malawi’s request and had recently hired Eric de Winter, a Dutch 
missionary doctor who had worked in Nkhata Bay during the late 1960s, as a 
consultant.13 
 																																																								
11 Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, The World Bank., 253-254. 
12 John Malone, Jr, “Letter to Mr Michael L Lejeune, Director, Eastern Africa Department, re 
‘Briefing for Your Meeting with the Malawi Minister of Finance,’” April 23, 1971, Item No 
1860300, WBGA. 
13 For more on De Winter’s 1972 book on Malawi, Health Services of a District Hospital in 
Malawi, see Chapter 4. 
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De Winter’s influence was apparent immediately. Compared to the Report of a World 
Bank Mission to Malawi in 1969, a report that had not included a health consultant and 
focused only on population pressures, De Winter’s team produced a report with a detailed 
and, for the era, ambitious plan for health services. The team evaluated a proposed “Rural 
Development Program” in Karonga District. The proposed loan would be provided on 
concessional terms to Malawi by the arm of the Bank called the International 
Development Association (IDA). This project aimed to increase agricultural yields 
through the construction of irrigation canals, feeder roads, dipping tanks for cattle, and 
the provision of extension services and farm credit. But the report also lamented the 
Malawi government’s dismally low expenditure on health (though it placed the blame 
“financial constraints” rather than deliberate neglect), and referred to recent surveys 
demonstrating that that nine percent of farmers’ labor time was being lost due to illness.14 
The report recommended the inclusion of a bilharzia control program in newly irrigated 
areas (irrigation was known to provide ideal environment for the snails that carry the 
																																																								
14 “Appraisal of Karonga Rural Development Project” (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Development Association, Agriculture Projects Department, 
December 30, 1971), WBGA Website., page 4: “The health situation in Malawi gives cause for 
concern, not because the diseases are more serious than those in surrounding countries, but 
because the expenditure Malawi could in the past afford on public health has been inadequate. 
The country spends an average US$0.94 equivalent per capita annually on health services, which 
is one of the lowest rates in Africa (Sample figures drawn from various World Health 
Organization Reports (1968-1971, converted to US$): Ghana 2.44, Kenya 1.76, Lesotho 1.21, 
Rwanda 0.32, Uganda 1.52, Zambia 9.40. Compare with Netherlands 88.31, United Kingdom 
95.16, USA 105.20 (not including expenditure on water supply, sewage, refuse disposal, etc. and 
private health expenditure). This rate is even lower in rural areas such as Karonga where, in 1970, 
expenditures for health were only about US$0.73 equivalent per capita, despite the considerable 
impact there of water-borne diseases (mainly bilharzia) in addition to the usual diseases found 
elsewhere. Health services are generally poor and understaffed. For the 1969 mission report, led 
by John A Edelman, see Harvey J Sindima, Malawi’s First Republic: An Economic and Political 
Analysis (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 2002). 
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parasites causing bilharzia), the construction and operation of five rural health outposts, 
and improvements to the Chilumba Rural Hospital and the Karonga District Hospital.15  
 
Yet these line items made up only a small part of the project’s budget. Furthermore, the 
report’s authors did not even envision that the project’s health-related spending would be 
financed by the IDA loan. Over five years, the entire project was slated to cost a total of 
$7,761,000, with slightly more than half ($4,109,000) to be financed by the IDA loan. 
The remainder ($3,652,000) would come from Malawi’s own current domestic tax 
revenues. Of the total project spending only $307,000 (4.0%) would be spent on health 
activities. Most of the health spending ($181,000) was to be funded by Malawi’s current 
revenues, while the remainder ($126,000) would be financed by the IDA loan.16 
 
Still, the Karonga project marked a departure from the Bank’s earlier position of 
wholesale opposition to health financing. Prior to De Winter’s involvement in the 1971 
report, IDA loans for Rural Development Projects in Lilongwe and the Lower Shire 
Valley had not included any health care components.17 But in Malawi and elsewhere, 																																																								
15 “Appraisal of Karonga Rural Development Project.”, i. 
16 Ibid.1971, page 7. 
17 “Staff Appraisal Report, Republic of Malawi Health Project” (World Bank, Population, Health 
and Nutrition Department, March 24, 1983), WBGA Website., page 11. The Lower Shire Project 
(IDA Credit 114-MAI) began in 1968, while the Lilongwe project (IDA Credit 244-MAI) 
commenced in 1971. When the World Bank renewed the Karonga Rural Development Project in 
1976, it planned for its second round of financing to support the “construction, staffing and 
operation of five maternity wards, seven health posts and staff houses to provide preventive and 
curative medical services, health education, maternal and child care, communicable disease 
control and environmental hygiene, and to collect health statistics.” This time health accounted 
for a greater percentage (8.9 percent) of the $9.2 million budget. Still, most (59 percent) of the 
$443,000 to be spent on health was to come directly from government coffers, while the 
remainder would be financed by an IDA loan. “Report and Recommendation of the President of 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the Executive Directors on a 
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new Bank funding for disease control and health facilities remained only a minor part of 
its development financing. The Bank did not provide “standalone” funding for preventive 
and curative health care activities (as opposed to health care components of agriculture 
project budgets) until 1979, the same year McNamara established a Health Department 
within the Bank.18 
 
III. Exploiting foreign crises and building Banda’s image as protector 
a) Health in a political economy of exploitation 
By the early 1970s, Banda had secured firm political control in Malawi. Gone were the 
rebellious ministers who sparked the Cabinet Crisis, or the widespread fear and rumor 
fanned by the Chilobwe murders (see Chapter 9). Whereas the unrest of the 1960s 
compelled Banda restrain his pursuit of his economic vision, by the 1970s political 
quietus left Banda free to pursue profoundly inegalitarian policies. A number of 
historians have noted the systematic impoverishment of smallholder agriculture under 
Banda’s rule. The state-run agricultural marketing board, ADMARC, purchased tobacco 
from smallholder farmers at prices far below prevailing global market prices, then resold 
the crop on international markets. Even when international prices rose dramatically in the 
mid-1960s, ADMARC did not increase the price it paid smallholders for their crops. 
ADMARC’s burgeoning profits were invested in elite-owned agricultural estates, largely 
tea and tobacco estates in the south. 19 Banda and other prominent members of the 																																																																																																																																																																					
Proposed Loan to the Republic of Malawi for a Karonga Rural Development Project--Phase II,” 
June 3, 1976, WBGA Website., page 10. 
18 Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, The World Bank., 265 
19 Kydd and Christiansen, “Structural Change in Malawi since Independence: Consequences of a 
Development Strategy Based on Large-Scale Agriculture.” The estates received this investment in 
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Malawi Congress Party had purchased these estates for themselves after cancelling the 
leases of European and Indian farmers so as to obtain the land at firesale prices.20 Banda 
also used state funds to build ornate homes for himself around the country. During the 
grants-in-aid period British officials criticized these “palaces” as unseemly and wasteful 
uses of public funds, but Banda argued that his people expected him to live in such 
residences.21 
 
Banda’s regime faced few existential threats, either internally or externally, during the 
1970s. The World Bank and bilateral donors thought Banda’s economic policies 
masterful.22 And without the armed rebellions that had so preoccupied him during 1960s, 																																																																																																																																																																					
the form of ADMARC the form of concessionary loans, assistance from agricultural extension 
agents, and inputs such as fertilizer. Also see Conroy et al., Poverty, AIDS and Hunger: Breaking 
the Poverty Trap in Malawi. 
20 Thomas, “Economic Developments in Malawi Since Independence.” Page 41; Geoffrey 
Traugh, “Quota-Busters and the Popular Economies of Tobacco in Malawi, 1960s-1980s,” 
Presentation to the Greater New York Area African History Workshop, Drexel University, 
Philadelphia, PA, April 8, 2016. 
21 In a 1980 discussion at Oxford University, Sir Glyn Jones (Nyasaland’s final colonial 
Governor) and Richard Kettlewell (Nyasaland’s former Director of Agriculture) recounted the 
disagreement with Banda over palaces and defense spending. Jones remembered: “Well he lives 
dangerously—there is no question about that. And he has got plenty of moral and physical 
courage that I think should be mentioned, which gave Banda’s friend’s cause for some anxiety on 
the financial side. One was his desire to erect Presidential palaces which [cost] a tremendous 
amount of money, and the other was defense. Almost from the start he insisted on increasing the 
army forces, which also is a very expensive business….so we had to get considerable financial 
support form Britain for that. But the Presidential palaces were something which he said the 
people were forcing the point. Be that as it may, they ran away with a lot of money. The money 
wasn’t entirely from public funds; a lot of private subscriptions came into it, particularly from 
some of our Asian friends, I suspect.” Kettlewell added: “ Douglas Lomax, who was up here 
recently, said that he advised Banda against these Presidential palaces. He thought that they were 
things which the people could justifiably criticize, but Banda held the view that people expected it 
of him to have this kind of residence.” Jones et al., Colloquium on Nyasaland Finance. Pages 74-
75. 
22 In a 1976 memo, Paul Meo of the World Bank’s Program Review Division extolled Banda’s 
economic management since independence: “When Malawi became independent in 1964, there 
were distinct doubts that it would ever have a viable economy. It has no mineral resources, is 
land-locked, and has one person per hectare of arable land. Since then, real output growth has 
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Banda faced, from a cynical political perspective, less of an imperative to spend on health 
as a political palliative. He could, and did, resort to other ways of dealing with discontent, 
such as jailing, exiling or killing those who challenged his rule.23  
 
Still, Banda also sought to demonstrate his concern for his people, to make good on his 
promise to be the “nkhoswe number 1.”24 Part of this came in his taxation policy. The 
colonial systems of hut taxation and thangata ended with independence. Still, rural 
Malawians were still made to buy Malawi Congress Party cards every year. And as in the 
colonial era, Malawians paid direct and indirect taxes on consumption, in the form of 
import duties and sales taxes.25  
 																																																																																																																																																																					
averaged over 7 percent yearly, domestic savings went from virtually nothing to about 12 percent 
of GDP, and investment quickly rose and is now over 20 percent of GDP (public fixed investment 
was about 11 percent during 1937-74). Exports boomed, the import elasticity to GDP was held to 
less than one, rural-urban income differentials were reduced by a tough, austere urban wage 
policy, and public sector management (and IDA disbursements) resembles more that of a 
forthcoming Bank ‘graduate’ than a ‘least developed country.’ Malawi can feed itself and is even 
exporting surpluses of its staple food crops.” Meo also justified Banda’s estate and industrial 
policies that fostered inequality: “There remains a continued concern by the Bank on ‘income 
distribution.’ This, apparently, is more related to our concern over the enrichment of a few 
cabinet ministers and private sector expatriates in the estates and industrial sector. While these 
managers and entrepreneurs may be getting rich, they have provided employment, exports and 
production almost unique in the area. We now know that more than half of smallholder income 
stems from cash payments provided from non-farming activities; much of it from jobs provided 
on the estates and industries. Could Malawi have increased smallholder output (and incomes) 
even one-third faster than occurred if this dynamic element had not been permitted?” See Paul M 
Meo, “World Bank/IFC Office Memorandum to Mr IMD Little, Adviser, Development 
Economics Department,” April 20, 1976, Item No. 1417224, WBGA. Pages 1-2. 
23 Power, Political Culture and Nationalism in Malawi. Page 206. Also see Harvey J Sindima, 
Malawi’s First Republic: An Economic and Political Analysis (Lanham, Md: University Press of 
America, 2002). Page 204. 
24 “The President Speaks: Speech Made by His Excellency the President, Ngwazi Dr. Kamuzu 
Banda at Neno, on Sunday, December 8, 1968” (Blantyre: Department of Information, n.d.), Pam 
1127, 1968, MNA. Page 3. 
25 “Recent Economic Development and Prospects of Malawi” (Washington, D.C: International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, January 14, 1975), WBGA Website. Pages 9-12. 
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Some of Banda’s most ostentatious demonstrations of beneficence came in the realm of 
health. In a December 1975 speech at the official opening of Dedza’s new District 
Hospital, Banda thanked District Chairman Juma for introducing him as “Jesus Christ for 
this country.” Banda proceeded to explain how he, personally, had improved Malawi’s 
health sector: 
That is why I wanted power—to improve the standard of living of my people. 
And not only food and dress, no, but also education and health…When I came 
here in 1958, true there were some hospitals, there were some clinics and 
dispensaries, but very few. I wanted more…Anyone who respects the truth will 
admit that there are more hospitals in the country now, more clinics and more 
dispensaries, than there were in 1958 when I came here…Take, for example, the 
hospital at Kasungu. There was a hospital there when I came but I did not like it, 
so I built another one. At Rumphi, up North, there was no hospital at all. I had to 
order the building of a hospital at Rumphi. There was a hospital here, but…I did 
not like it…That place was too small to cope with the population, far too small, 
and there were not enough facilities there. That was why I decided to build a new 
one and began to find means of financing and building the hospital.26 
 
In a 1972 article, health economist Peter Ruderman observed, “To many presidents and 
prime ministers, a hospital is a more satisfactory monument than an arch of triumph.”27 
This was certainly the case in Malawi. If this was not abundantly clear at the Dedza 
Hospital opening in 1975, it surely was two years later when the Banda named 
Lilongwe’s new central hospital (financed mainly through a loan from the Danish 
government) after himself.28 
 
																																																								
26 “Speech by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda at the Official 
Opening of Dedza District Hospital, December 4, 1975,” in His Excellency the Life President’s 
Speeches: Central Region Tour, December 2-15, 1975, n.d., 9–25. 
27 Ruderman, “General Economic Considerations.” Page 110. 
28 See PS Phiri, “Letter to the Secretary for the Treasury, Re: New Lilongwe Kamuzu Central 
Hospital Area 33, Contract No 12/73,” July 18, 1978, 20-12-3F, 52002, MNA. 
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At times Banda constructed narratives in which it was not the Malawian state, but rather 
his own personal fortune, that made improvements in the health sector possible. Officials 
publicized Banda’s “donations” to buy food for hospital inpatients. Here the parallel 
between caregiving by kin and Banda’s “gift” to the sick is striking. Among friends and 
kin, the gift of food, particularly the ndiwo (relish, or side dish) that accompanies the 
staple maize meal, is a particularly potent demonstration of generosity. LJ Chimango, 
Banda’s Minister of Health, used one of Banda’s donations to purchase “poultry 
products, bread, fruit, green maize and fresh fish.” While the government budget covered 
the cost of nsima, the basic maize staple, Banda himself contributed the ndiwo. As if the 
parallel between caregiving by kin and Banda’s role as nkhoswe was not clear enough, 
Banda’s officials arranged to have this food distributed by the League of Malawi 
Women.29  
 
Unlike Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda and other stalwarts of African socialism, Banda 
did not portray himself as a common man.30 He amassed great wealth and showed it.31 																																																								
29 “Address by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda after Inspecting 
and Approving the Site for the Kamuzu College of Nursing, Lilongwe, 8 December 1975,” in His 
Excellency the Life President’s Speeches: Central Region Tour, December 2-15, 1975, n.d., 18–
25; “Letter from LJ Chimango, Minister of Health, to Life President Hastings Kamuzu Banda, 
‘Annual Report on Gift of K160,000 to Four Hospitals,’” 1979, 9-12-1AF, MNA.  
30 Banda’s officials were often quite direct that their priority was increasing aggregate production, 
and not equalizing the distribution of wealth. In a speech on March 12, 1971, Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources AW Mwafulerwa explained: “Our 
duty here is to create wealth which our children who come later will come and dispute on its 
share. How they are going to divide that wealth. But it is no good now for us to scramble how we 
should divide the wealth here which does not exist. Therefore our main task in this country is to 
create wealth…and later our children will come and argue how to share this wealth.” Thomas, 
“Economic Developments in Malawi Since Independence.” Page 50. 
31 At the same time, he did not wish everyone to know the extent of his wealth. Glyn Jones 
remembered that part of the reason Banda opposed the Africanization of bank management at 
Malawian branches of the British-based Standard Bank. “I don’t really think that I would like any 
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He often reminded the crowds at his public addresses that he was “not poor.” 32 But, he 
continued, he used his wealth to help people. Explaining in a 1975 speech why he had 
paid out of his own pocket to construct student housing at the new College of Nursing in 
Lilongwe, Banda declared: “To me, money is of importance only for what I can do with 
it, not just for its own sake, not just for the sake of accumulating money, no—only for the 
use to which I can put it.”33 Banda justified his personal wealth and inegalitarian policies 
by the good work he did through his donations. The very modesty of his regime’s 
accomplishments in health made these grand rhetorical, symbolic, and material 
demonstrations of largesse so important.  
 
The Life President exercised a considerable measure of personal control over the health 
sector. Perhaps because he knew the esteem in which doctors were held, Banda 
personally oversaw the approval process for individual expatriate physicians, nurses, and 
laboratory technicians seeking temporary licenses to work in Malawi’s government and 
mission hospitals.34 This fear of fellow professionals may also have motivated his 
consistent refusal to build a medical school in Malawi. As late as 1979, 100 of the 130 
doctors working in Malawi (in missions and government facilities) were expatriates. A 																																																																																																																																																																					
of my chaps to be handling my account,” Banda had said, according to Jones. “Their sisters and 
their cousins and their aunts would know the next day what my balance was...An African woman 
teller—you know jolly well that her uncle will be on to her and say, ‘How much was that cheque 
deposited on behalf of Dr. Banda?’” Jones et al., Colloquium on Nyasaland Finance. Page 76. 
31 Ibid. Pages 74-75. 
32 “Speech by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda at the Official 
Opening of Dedza District Hospital, December 4, 1975.” Page 17. 
33 “Address by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda after Inspecting 
and Approving the Site for the Kamuzu College of Nursing, Lilongwe, 8 December 1975.” Page 
23. 
34 LJ Chimango, “Memorandum to His Excellency the Life President re: ‘Japanese Volunteers,’” 
January 4, 1980, 9-12-1AF, MNA. 
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few Malawian-born students were sent abroad for medical training, but this number 
averaged only five per year.35 
b) Preying on crises of legitimacy: Banda’s search for foreign aid among 
international outcasts 
Much of Banda’s time during his early years as Prime Minister (and, after 1967, as 
President) of Malawi was spent traveling the world asking foreign leaders for 
development aid. Banda sought funds from many nations, including the United States, 
Germany, Portugal, South Africa, Israel, and, of course, the UK. These pilgrimages 
dominated the schedules of many postcolonial African leaders, and even determined the 
capacities of many to remain in power.36 
 
In his requests for aid, health was not Banda’s first priority. For many years Banda 
remained intent on grand infrastructure projects, chief among them his plan to move the 
capital from Zomba to Lilongwe.37 But, as the last chapter detailed, before the mid-1970s 
even when Banda did seek funds for health projects his requests mostly fell on 
unreceptive ears. Walt Rostow and Arthur Lewis’ characterizations of spending on 
healthcare as “consumption,” inapposite to the goal of economic growth, was taken as 
gospel by the World Bank and bilateral aid agencies. 
 
																																																								
35 LJ Chimango, “Letter to His Excellency the Life President re: ‘Medical School - Feasibility 
Study,’” November 29, 1979, 9-12-1AF, MNA. A medical school finally opened in Malawi in the 
early 1990s, toward the end of Banda’s rule. See Wendland, A Heart for the Work. 
36 Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). Pages 156-157. 
37 Sindima, Malawi’s First Republic: An Economic and Political Analysis. Page 69. 
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After Malawi gained independence, the UK provided budgetary support. Though 
substantial at first, by 1972 Banda had weaned Malawi off of this support, a year earlier 
than planned. Banda saw fiscal reliance on the British—and the strings that came along 
with it—as degrading. But he did not see other kinds of aid in the same way. The search 
for aid was, to Banda a demonstration of both personal skill and national sovereignty. By 
securing support from a variety of sources, Banda could make the claim that he had not 
surrendered the nation’s independence to any outside power.38 So Banda made a grand 
show of this search, organizing large crowds to send him off at the airport and to greet 
him on his return.  
 
In his public speeches, Banda made a virtue of his skills at securing aid. Addressing a 
crowd in Neno in 1968, Banda declared, “I, your Kamuzu, have to find money 
somewhere to build more roads, more bridges, more schools, more hospitals everywhere 
in the country.”39 The following year at the Malawi Congress Party convention, Banda 
told the assembled delegates, “When you work hard…you make it easier for your 
Kamuzu to go to Britain, Germany, and the United States of America to ask for more 
money.”40 
 
																																																								
38 For a description of a similar political dynamic at work in post-colonial Lesotho, see John 
Aerni-Flessner, “Development in Lesotho, 1970-75: Authoritarianism, Aid Increases, and the 
Anti-Politics Machine.” Paper presented at Northeastern Workshop on Southern Africa, 
Burlington, VT, April 15, 2016. 
39 “The President Speaks: Speech Made by His Excellency the President, Ngwazi Dr. Kamuzu 
Banda at Neno, on Sunday, December 8, 1968.” Page 2. 
40 “The President Speaks: Malawi Congress Party Convention” (Blantyre: Department of 
Information, September 1969). Page 16. 
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As a small, impoverished nation with few mineral resources, Banda had little to offer 
foreign leaders in return for grants, concessional loans, or in-kind aid. But Malawi did 
have a seat on the UN General Assembly, and—as an African nation ruled by a black 
leader (rather than white settlers), some embattled governments sought out Malawi as an 
ally.41 Banda realized the uses to which international controversy could be put. Rather 
than siding with other southern African “frontline” states (e.g. Northern Rhodesia, 
Botswana) in opposing apartheid South Africa, Smith’s Southern Rhodesia and 
Portuguese Mozambique, Banda sought resources from these white-ruled governments in 
exchange for support in the international arena.  
 
When Banda did succeed in securing funding for new health facilities, he often secured it 
from such politically besieged regimes interested in maintaining diplomatic ties to a black 
African government. In 1965, the Beit Trust (tied to Southern Rhodesia) offered to help 
purchase a radiotherapy unit for Malawi.42 In the mid-1970s the Gulbenkian Foundation, 
a private foundation based in Portugal, and the Witswatersrand Native Labour 
Association (WENELA), a South African agency that recruited Malawians to work in 
South African’s mines, funded the construction of the new district hospital in Dedza. 
Banda explained to the crowd at the hospital’s official opening that he had obtained the 
funds by proposing diplomatic deals with both Portugal (then facing armed resistance in 
Mozambique) and apartheid South Africa:   																																																								
41 Harri Englund explains this diplomatic power in a discussion of the Republic of China 
(Taiwan), which Banda made an ally of Malawi in 1966. “Taiwan depended on countries like 
Malawi, however small and poor, in its attempt to gain recognition from the United Nations as a 
sovereign state vis-à-vis mainland China’s claims to the contrary.” Englund, “Extreme Poverty 
and Existential Obligations: Beyond Morality in the Anthropology of Africa?” Page 36. 
42 “A Conspectus Including the Development Plan for 1965-69.” 
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I happened to have known this foundation called Gulbenkian…I happened to 
know the man who was running it. So I sent word to him saying I wanted 
money…I said, ‘Tell your chairman I know your government says it wants 
friendship with us here, particularly with me. If your government wants to be 
friendly with me it must help me build a new hospital at Dedza. If it refuses then I 
will not believe it if it says it is my friend.’ I was blunt…Within two or three 
weeks I got a letter to say, ‘O, we can at least let you have K144,000’…It was 
after I had that word that I began to ask WENELA to add to what the others had 
given. I said, ‘All right, WENELA, you are recruiting my people here. That is 
what someone away from here has promised, so what have you to offer me?’...So 
they were ashamed into promising me. 43 
 
During the Cabinet Crisis Banda’s rebellious ministers had denounced his willingness to 
ally Malawi with odious colonialists like the Portuguese or the white supremacists ruling 
South Africa. But, in this address as in others, Banda defended his policies by trying to 
demonstrate how they provided direct and tangible benefits to the people of Malawi. 
 
Outside of southern Africa, Banda sought assistance from other nations who were eager 
for more allies. One of these nations was Israel. In 1964, Israel contributed five Medical 
Officers to the sorely understaffed Ministry of Health, still reeling from a raft of 
departures. In the first months of Malawi’s independence, these Israeli doctors would run 
some of the nation’s largest hospitals, including those in Lilongwe and Zomba. Also in 
1964, the Ministry of Health signed contracts to employ Israeli physicians as Medical 
Superintendent and Medical Specialist at Blantyre’s Queen Elizabeth Hospital.44 The 
																																																								
43 “Speech by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda at the Official 
Opening of Dedza District Hospital, December 4, 1975.” 
44 “Annual Report on the Work of the Nyasaland/Malawi Ministry of Health for the Year 1964.” 
Page 3. In his inaugural address at the State opening of Parliament in 1966, Banda recounted how 
he obtained support from Israel: “It is the endeavor of my Government to ensure that health 
services which it provides meet the aspirations of the people of Malawi. When we took over 
responsibility for health three years ago, the staff of the Medical Department was seriously 
depleted. In anticipation of that event I had asked the Israeli Government for a medical mission, 
which that government immediately provided…The Israeli team enabled us to preserve the health 
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majority of the more than one hundred Malawian-born nurses trained between 1964 and 
1972 were trained in Israel.45  
 
 When Israel first set up an embassy in Nyasaland in 1960, it was not yet the pariah it 
would later become among most of the majority-rule nations in Africa. A handful of 
Black African states severed diplomatic relations with Israel in the years following the 
June 1967 Six Days’ War.46 The more decisive break between Black African states and 
Israel followed the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, when the vast majority broke off 
diplomatic relations. In November 1973, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
Council of Ministers issued a resolution denouncing Israel for its annexation of Arab 
Territory, likening Israeli policies to European imperialism. In the wake of this divorce, 
Malawi was one of only four Black African countries (the others were Swaziland, 
Lesotho, and Mauritius) that maintained relations with Israel.47 Banda preferred to 
request aid, rather than changes in policy, from nations facing international crises.48 
Banda knew how to reap the dividends of disquiet.  
																																																																																																																																																																					
services, and since then the staffing position has gradually improved both by way of normal 
recruitment and by technical assistance from many countries, until there are today more doctors 
employed by the Government in this country than ever before. They are drawn from no less than 
13 countries, including Malawi itself.” See Mowschenson, “Dr. H Kamuzu Banda: President of 
the Republic of Malawi.” 
45 Colin Arthur Baker, “The Development of the Civil Service in Malawi from 1891 to 1972” 
(PhD Dissertation, University of London, 1981). Page 330. Crucially, Israel also provided 
training to Banda’s paramilitary force, the Young Pioneers. 
46 These countries were: Guinea (severed relations in June 1967), Uganda (March 1972), Chad 
(November 1972), Congo (Brazzaville) (December 1972), Niger (January 1973), Mali (January 
1973), Burundi (May 1973), and Togo (September 1973). Joel Peters, Israel and Africa: The 
Problematic Friendship (I.B.Tauris, 1992). Page 37. 
47 Ibid. Pages 37-38. 
48 This stance was similar to the one Banda had taken vis-à-vis the United States.  I In 1966 
Banda declared that his government supported President Lyndon Johnson’s policy in Vietnam 
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Not all of Malawi’s external health funding came from sources so anathema in Black 
Africa as Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and South Africa. Still, Banda entered the 
fray of international debates in such a way as to secure resources from wealthy donor 
governments. In 1965 Banda told the UN General Assembly that “history, logic, justice 
and fair play leave Malawi but with no choice but to recognize the government in Bonn 
as the legal government of Germany.” Shortly thereafter, the West German Government 
expressed its appreciation by offering a £1 million loan to replace Zomba’s General 
Hospital with a new teaching hospital.49  
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Malawi’s health sector also benefited from increased 
funding from a number of Western charities and bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. 
UNICEF continued to provide supplies of vaccines, medicines and equipment, but also 
funded programs in water and sanitation, primary health care, nutrition and primary 
education. The European Development Fund financed the replacement of two district 
hospitals. In 1971 the UK-based charity Oxfam provided a grant of £16,000 for the 
construction of new blocks at mission hospitals at Malindi and Nkope.50 During the 
1970s ten foreign governments, including Japan, The United Kingdom and the United 
States also provided support for health care projects.51 
																																																																																																																																																																					
“150 per cent.” Among other aid, the United States was, at this time, providing Peace Corps 
Volunteers and funds for tuberculosis treatment. Short, Banda. Pages 239-240. 
49 “A Conspectus Including the Development Plan for 1965-69.” Also see Short, Banda. Pages 
239-240. Also see Chitsamba, “Malawi and the Politics of Foreign Aid.” Page 104. 
50 “K32,000 Work on Mangochi Hospital Ends,” The Times (of Malawi), Republic Anniversary 
Special, July 1971, 0, MNA. 
51 “Staff Appraisal Report, Republic of Malawi Health Project.” Page 12 
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Though he consistently presented a pro-Western, pro-capitalist position after 
independence, Banda was not averse to non-Western alliances if he thought he could 
garner significant support.52 He approached the People’s Republic of China shortly after 
independence, before siding with Taiwan after learning that Mao’s regime was aiding 
some of the ministers who had rebelled against him.53 His general approach was to 
support any government that would support his own.54 
c) Re-conceptualizing health as an investment in Malawi’s Economic Planning 
Department 																																																								
52 Though he was a member of the Fabian Society in England during the 1940s, this membership 
appears to have been driven largely by his involvement in the movement to stop the formation of 
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nysaaland. There is no record of him espousing socialism as a 
philosophical or political commitment. In a speech before the Zomba Debating Society in April 
1964, Banda explained that his own preference was neither Soviet Communism nor the “rigid 
Capitalism such as is known in America,” but rather “the kind of economic and political 
life…which they have in Britain and the Scandinavian countries,” where “the State has a great 
deal of power of control over business and businessmen, but without owning all the means of 
production and distribution and without the power of conscription over capital and labour, except 
in times of war…The individual still has a great deal of freedom and liberty to do what he likes. 
But, at the same time, the state exercises a measure of control over him and his business, in the 
interest of the whole community. And this to me, is the ideal system or ideal thing, in this un-
ideal world.” See “What Is Communism? Speech by Ngwazi Dr. Kamuzu Banda, Prime Minister 
of Malawi, to Zomba Debating Society” (Ministry of Information, April 1964), Pam 1127, 
1963/64, MNA. Pages 17-18. Once in power he pursued a mix of economic planning and market-
based policy. 
53 Englund, “Extreme Poverty and Existential Obligations: Beyond Morality in the Anthropology 
of Africa?” Page 38. 
54 Banda promised as much in April 1964, when he told the Zomba Debating Society that he 
would pursue a policy of “discretional alignment.” “I will be friendly to everyone, or I will be 
friendly to every corner of the globe, East or West, as you have heard me say so many times…In 
America, I spoke at Harvard and Yale Universities in 1961…In each of the lectures and at each of 
these universities, I said that so far as I was concerned, the policy of Nyasaland when 
independent, or Malawi as it was going to be called, was going to be discretional alignment and 
non-alignment…And this is my policy now. Yes, discretional alignment and neutralism. When 
the West is doing what I think is the right thing—what is good for Malawi—I will align myself 
and this country with the West. When the East is doing the right thing—what I think is good for 
Malawi—I will align myself and this country with the East.” “What Is Communism? Speech by 
Ngwazi Dr. Kamuzu Banda, Prime Minister of Malawi, to Zomba Debating Society.” Pages 19-
20. 
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By the mid-1970s, as international aid for health became increasingly available and as 
prominent development economists challenged the “health-as-consumption” consensus, 
economists within Malawi’s own Economic Planning Department began to reframe 
health care as a productive investment. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, health was 
mentioned but briefly in the Economic Planning Division’s annual Economic Report, and 
even only to explain that health spending had been limited in order to cut the budget 
deficit.55 But the 1974 Economic Report marked a shift. “Established policy is to 
maintain existing services and concentrate improvements on those areas where the 
greatest economic return is to be expected from better health—e.g. agricultural project 
areas, where under-employment is at a minimum.”56 Though the idea that health could 
bring a substantial “economic return” was circumscribed to certain areas (and was 
articulated in order to justify the domestic revenues that would have to be spent on health 
on the World Bank agricultural projects), this language was nevertheless a departure from 
the view that health care was unproductive consumption. The 1974 report was also the 
first in which health secured its own place in the table of contents.  
 
That same year, the Ministry of Finance began to allow more rapid increases in the 
Ministry of Health budget. In the Finance Ministry’s announcement of planned annual 
																																																								
55 See the 1969 Economic Report: “Because of constraints imposed by the need to reduce the 
budgetary deficit, it is not possible to undertake any significant expansion of health services and 
attention is therefore being concentrated on finding means of making the best possible use of 
existing facilities and personnel.” “Economic Report 1969, Prepared by the Office of the 
President and Cabinet, Economic Planning Division and the Ministry of Finance” (Zomba, 
Malawi: Government Printer, 1970), Box 3, No 4, SoMA. Page 72 
56 “Economic Report 1974, Office of the President and Cabinet, Economic Planning Division” 
(Zomba, Malawi: Government Printer, 1975), Centre for African Studies Pamphlets, Malawi Box 
16, UoELA. Page 55. 
	 512	
“ceilings” on increases in recurrent expenditure in the coming three-year period, the 
Ministries of Works and Agriculture were each allotted a 10 percent increase, while the 
Ministries of Education and Health were allowed to increase spending by 7.5 percent. 
Other departments secured less: the University of Malawi, once such a priority of 
President Banda, was allowed only a 5 percent annual increase; and most other Ministries 
and Departments were given a ceiling of 4 percent.57  
 
As external funding became more available in the coming years, the authors of 
subsequent reports indicated a commitment to health for the general population (and not 
just those working in specified “agricultural project areas”). While reiterating the general 
principle that health spending should be focused where “the greatest economic return is 
to be expected,” the 1976 Report added: “But the inheritance at independence by the 
Malawi Government of a health system which was inadequate and contained many ill-
equipped and outdated hospitals has meant that a considerable part of the development 
budget must be spent on maintaining and improving existing facilities.”58 Whereas in the 
1960s health was not included among Banda’s budgetary priorities (which included a 
new capital at Lilongwe, new roads and railways, and the University of Malawi), the 
Ministry of Health came, by the mid-1970s, to occupy a more privileged place in 
budgetary discussions.  
 																																																								
57 “Recent Economic Development and Prospects of Malawi” (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association, Eastern Africa 
Region, January 14, 1975), WBGA Website., page 11. 
58 “Economic Report 1976, Office of the President and Cabinet Economic Planning Division” 
(Zomba Malawi: Government Printer, 1977), Centre for African Studies Pamphlets, Malawi Box 
16, UoELA. Page 56 
	 513	
Still, these shifts in the priority accorded to health were relatively minor. Ministry of 
Health expenditure (including recurrent and capital expenditures) rose 25 percent in real 
terms between fiscal years 1975/76 and 1980/81, but did not keep pace with the rise in 
overall government spending.59 During the fiscal years 1976/77 through 1980/81, the 
Ministry of Health claimed an average of only 6.8 percent of the Malawi government’s 
recurrent budget and 1.8 percent of the development budget.60 Memos flew back and 
forth within the Bank’s East Africa Department debating whether its reports should 
attribute Malawi’s low level of government health spending to “neglect” or to “the 
paucity of funds available” to fill the “bottomless pits” of need.61 Despite suggestions 
from some Bank officials and other agencies that the government might spend more on 
health, health as a share of government expenditure remained far below the Federation-
era peak.  
d) Health in the political ideology of Banda’s rule, 1975-1977 
Banda recognized the political significance of access to biomedicine. The numbers of 
patients in hospitals and clinics continued to rise after independence, though at a slower 
rate than during the Federation era. Between 1966 and 1974, outpatient attendances at 
government facilities increased by 26 percent.62  
 
																																																								
59 “Staff Appraisal Report, Republic of Malawi Health Project.” 
60 “Malawi Growth and Structural Change: A Basic Economic Report” (World Bank, East Africa 
Regional Office, February 8, 1982), WBGA Website. Page 183 
61 “JR Peberdy, Acting Chief, EAPSA, to Ms Kasuko Hashimoto, EA1DB, Re: First Draft Issues 
Paper for Malawi Basic Economic Report,” July 26, 1978, Item No. 1417224, WBGA; “Peter 
Hansen, Economist, East Africa Region, to Mr AA Upindi, Secretary to the Treasury, Ministry of 
Finance,” June 23, 1978, Item No. 1417224, WBGA. 
62 Baker, “The Development of the Civil Service in Malawi from 1891 to 1972.” Page 332. 
	 514	
In his public addresses and in his administration’s propaganda, Banda stressed his 
dedication to improving health care. The Times faithfully covered Banda’s annual 
pilgrimages to Queen Elizabeth Hospital to visit the sick on Christmas Day. The first 
stanza of Malawi’s national anthem, Mlungu dalitsani Malawi (“God bless Malawi”), 
adopted in 1964, made the fight against disease one of the primary goals for the new 
nation: 
  Mlungu dalitsani Malawi, (O God bless our land of Malawi) 
  Mumsunge m’mtendere. (Keep it a land of peace.) 
  Gonjetsani adani onse, (Put down each and every enemy,) 
  Njala, ntenda, nsanje, (Hunger, disease, envy,) 
  Lunzitsani mitima yathu (Join together all our hearts as one,) 
  Kuti tisaope (That we be free from fear.) 
  Mdalitse Mtsogoleri nafe (Bless our leader, each and every one,) 
Ndi Mayi Malawi (And Mother Malawi.) 
 
In speeches, Banda declared his commitment to improving access to medicine. During his 
inaugural address as President [following a change in Malawi’s constitution] in 1966, 
Banda said, “It is the endeavor of my Government to ensure that health services which it 
provides meet the aspirations of the people of Malawi.” He pointed to his recruitment of 
staff from Israel and other countries as evidence of his commitment. He also pointed to 
the National School of Nursing, opened in 1965. He touted a 400-bed hospital to be built 
in Zomba with the £1 million loan from West Germany.  
 
Banda was not deterred by slow progress. In 1971, speaking once more before 
Parliament, he acknowledged the modesty of his government’s achievements in the 
health sector: “Of course…we have not achieved everything we want to achieve, but 
everyone must admit that we have achieved far more than anyone ever hoped or expected 
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us to achieve.” New hospitals at Rumpi and Kasungu had been completed, though many 
of the planned renovations to existing hospitals had not been carried out yet.63  
 
By 1974 the tone was more confident. A Government-issued booklet that surveyed the 
“expanding health services” since 1964 claimed: 3 new hospitals and 21 new dispensaries 
had been built; visits at under-5 clinics (including government and mission facilities) 
surpassed one million per year; government health assistants had improved access to safe 
water in rural areas; smallpox and leprosy eradication programs had been launched; a 
major new hospital in Lilongwe—with a new training school for medical auxiliaries—
was scheduled to be opened in 1975; and 20 Malawian doctors (trained abroad) practiced 
in the country.64  
 
Banda also touted his own status as a biomedical doctor, while simultaneous claiming 
powers as an indigenous healer. At most every event, Banda carried a flywhisk, a gift 
from Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta. Among the Kikuyu, the flywhisk was said to 
confer defense against witchcraft. Many groups in Malawi, including the Yao, had 
similar ritual objects.65 Banda had built a popular reputation for immense healing powers 
during the first few months after his return from exile. A top-secret January 1959 report 
by an analyst in the UK’s Special Branch explained, “Banda’s personal reputation 
																																																								
63 President Hastings Kamuzu Banda, His Excellency the President’s Speeches: State Opening of 
Parliament, 2 July 1971, n.d. Page 20. 
64 Building the Nation: Malawi, 1964-1974. Issued to Commemorate the Tenth Anniversary of 
Malawi’s Independence. Page 32. 
65 John Lwanda explains that the “the flywhisk symbolized Banda’s potent kukhwima [skill in 
magic]…Banda’s unambiguous nod to traditional culture was clear…Banda was held to be both a 
western and African doctor.” Lwanda, Colour, Class and Culture, 32. 
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amongst the illiterate masses has been enhanced by a belief, now becoming evident in the 
urban areas of the southern province, that he has powers of faith healing, as even the most 
sickly patients walk out of his surgery claiming to have been completely cured after five 
minutes.”66 Even Banda was initially surprised by the power of his medical persona. A 
few weeks after his release from Gwelo in April 1960, Banda expressed his surprise in a 
letter to friends in London: “Poor patients! I do not know what to do about them…the 
size of the crowd of patients is growing each day.”67 
 
But after independence, the Life President’s most potent symbols of power were the 
throngs of women who surrounded him. At the opening of Dedza District Hospital in 
1975, Banda’s mbumba sang songs and danced during Banda’s speech. The songs, often 
written by the women, were particularly important, as they were delivered in Chichewa. 
Banda, on the other hand always delivered his speeches in English (even Banda’s closest 
confidants admitted that after decades abroad he didn’t have much facility with Chichewa 
or any other indigenous language). At the Dedza rally the mbumba’s first song was as 
follows: 
 Ife ndife amayi (We are mothers) 
 Ochokera ku Dedza (The poor of Dedza) 
 Tangomvani mawu a Ngwazi (We are here to hear the words of our Hero) 
 Chitukuko m’Malawi (On the development of Malawi)68 
 
																																																								
66 “Banda, Dr. Hastings Walter Kamuzu,” January 7, 1959, KV2/4075, File 498a, UKNA. 
67 “From Dr H Kamuzu Banda to the Micklems,” 9 May 1960, KV2/4075, File 453a, UKNA. 
68 “Speech by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda at the Official 
Opening of Dedza District Hospital, December 4, 1975.”, page 12. For more on these singers, see 
Wiseman C. Chirwa, “Dancing Towards Dictatorship: Political Songs and Popular Culture in 
Malawi,” Nordic Journal of African Studies 10, no. 1 (2001): 1–27; Lisa Gilman, The Dance of 
Politics: Gender, Performance, and Democratization in Malawi (Temple University Press, 2009). 
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After Banda, speaking from the dais, thanked them for their “sense of gratitude,” the 
women continued: 
Taomboledwa a Malawi, (We are the redeemed of Malawi) 
Taomboledwa mu ukapolo, (We are the redeemed from slavery) 
Kubwera kwake kwa Ngwazi Kamuzu, (The coming of our Hero Kamuzu) 
Nyimbo Zinamveka m’mwambam’mwamba, (The sounds of loud music could be 
heard) 
Oyitanidwa kudaona Kamuzu (When those who came to see Kamuzu) 
Anasonkhana pa Chileka (Gathered at Chileka)69 
 
“Chileka” is a reference to the airport outside Blantyre where Banda landed in Malawi in 
1958 when he returned, to great fanfare, for the first time after decades living outside the 
country. The women’s final song made clear that they were thanking Banda personally 
for the new hospital. He was not a representative of the state, but rather its 
personification: 
 Ife ndife amayi (“We are mothers”) 
 Tinyadira chipatala (“We are proud of the hospital”) 
Tangoona a Ngwazi amangitsa chipatala. (“We see that our Hero has built a 
hospital”) 
 
The centrality of women to Banda’s political symbolism (also discussed in Chapter 9) 
had been demonstrated early in his tenure. A prime example is an article from the Malawi 
News, the mouthpiece of the Malawi Congress Party, which in January 1961 reported on 
Banda’s speech to a crowd in Limbe with the headline: “Kamuzu Speaks to his Amazon 
Army.” The article consistently referred to the women in the crowd as “his women.”70 
This attribution of all women to Banda persisted well into his reign as Life President, and 
motivated much of the imagery surrounding his appearances at hospitals and clinics. The 																																																								
69 Speech by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr H Kamuzu Banda at the official 
opening of Dedza District Hospital, 4 December 1975, page 13. 
70 “Kamuzu Speaks to His Amazon Army, by Our Staff Reporter,” Malawi News: The Voice of 
the Congress Party, January 21, 1961, MNA. 
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presence of so many singing women was evidence of Banda’s greatest source of 
wealth—his wealth in people. 
 
IV. Counterintuitive, once more: health spending at the dawn of the neoliberal era 
a) Limits of human capital and basic needs rhetoric at the World Bank 
 
The brief opening for international aid for health services ended quite rapidly at the start 
of the 1980s. Though McNamara had tried to champion new approaches to development 
financing during his tenure at the Bank, he did not fundamentally change the institution’s 
lending practices. In 1976, McNamara called for the Bank to focus not only on increasing 
GDP growth, but to aim its attention and resources toward the universal provision of 
“basic needs,” which to his mind included nutrition, health, clothing, and shelter. 
McNamara insisted that there existed no tradeoff between equity and efficiency; the focus 
on growth could continue alongside concern for basic needs. But his ambitions ran 
aground against skeptical economists making everyday lending decisions and writing the 
reports that shaped understandings of economic reality. Skeptics of health financing 
maintained that no one could muster sufficient evidence to convince them that spending 
on “basic needs” would yield as much growth as the earlier focus on physical capital such 
as roads, telephone wiring and power plants. Critical observers (including the Bank’s 
own staff) pilloried the “basic needs” approach as “a mistake,” a “superfluous new idea,” 
a “slogan,” and a “populist” program that obscured the unavoidable trade-off between 
consumption and investment.71 
 																																																								
71 Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, The World Bank., 267. 
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By the early 1980s, profound global economic shifts made budget cuts for health appear, 
to many in Ministries of Finance and international development agencies, a necessity. 
Around the world rising oil prices increased the cost of imports, while poor harvests (due, 
in part, to El Niño) depressed primary-product export revenue. At the same time, interest 
rates on sovereign debt increased markedly. Following the elections of Margaret Thatcher 
(1979) and Ronald Reagan (1980), economic thought in the US and UK shifted away 
from the Keynesian consensus. When McNamara departed from the Bank in 1981, 
Reagan named as his replacement the former Bank of America CEO Alden Clausen. 
Clausen and his Chief Economist, Anne Krueger, scrapped the rhetoric of basic needs. 
The Bank’s 1981 World Development Report, authored by Elliot Berg, proposed on 
stabilization of inflation through cuts in public expenditure, the liberalization of financial 
markets, and the privatization of government services. Following Mexico’s default on its 
sovereign debt in 1982, the Bank insisted on the prompt repayment of loans by other 
nations. In this new environment of austerity, health spending was deemed contrary to the 
central aim—the timely servicing of rising debt burdens. 
 
b) Health spending in Malawi at the dawn of the neoliberal era, 1980-1983  
But, once more, international development discourse and even economic crisis proved 
insufficient to predict all of Malawi’s health policies during the dawn of neoliberalism. 
Malawi’s health budgets did fall precipitously during this period. While the Ministry of 
Health claimed 7.2 percent of total expenditure on the revenue account in 1980, it secured 
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only 4.6 percent in 1982/1983.72 In absolute terms, this was a decline (in current 
Malawian Kwacha) from 14.98 million to 12.64 million. The 1982/1983 figure marked 
the smallest share of the revenue account that the Ministry of Health had claimed since 
the Second World War (see Figure 0.2). Still, in the face of constant advice from Bank 
staffers that Malawi should stop providing free food at hospitals and institute user fees, 
public sector health facilities remained free at the point of care (with the notable 
exception of obstetric services) and patients were fed at hospitals.73 Chakakala Chaziya, 
Malawi’s Minister of Finance, wrote to McNamara on May 22, 1981 (during his final 
week as World Bank President) to explain that due to the nation’s interest-rate-fueled 
debt burden and falling export revenues, “low priority items” would be dropped from the 
development budget. Yet there were, Chaziya continued, “key sectors” that would remain 
priorities: agriculture, transport, education and health.74 The inclusion of investments in 
human capital, as well as physical capital, on this list ran counter to contemporary trends 
in development thinking. Banda sought to avoid a reenactment of the popular discontent 
that had followed the ticky fees and budget cuts of 1964. 
 
V.  Conclusion: politically important but sparse on the ground, health under 
Banda’s reign 
Through the first two decades of Banda’s iron rule medicine was not a central priority, 
but nor was it entirely forgotten. In the colonial era, officials in London had used 
medicine to try to tamp down labor unrest. During the Federation years, officials in 																																																								
72 “Staff Appraisal Report, Republic of Malawi Health Project.” Page 73. 
73 Ibid. page 11. 
74 L Chakakala Chaziya, “Letter to Robert McNamara, Re :‘Letter of Development Policies,’” 
May 22, 1981, Item No 1158183, WBGA. Page 3. 
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Salisbury had increased medical spending to try to demonstrate the beneficence of 
Federation rule. After independence, Banda used government medical services much as 
he used his ubiquitous flywhisk—to ward off the bad omens threatening his own regime.  
 
Yet in the midst of all Banda’s grand displays of concern, Malawians continued to suffer 
for want of decent curative and preventive health services. Measles vaccination, for 
instance, was fairly universal in children in the United States by the mid-1950s. But in 
1979, measles remained the leading cause of inpatient pediatric deaths in Malawi’s 
government hospitals.75 The other two leading causes of pediatric inpatient deaths, 
pneumonia and malaria, were readily treatable conditions.76 And, for all his talk of 
protecting women, Banda’s ban on birth control and poor funding for antenatal and 
perinatal care helped Malawi secure one of the world’s highest maternal mortality rates.77 
Banda’s rhetoric about health may have helped to secure his regime, but the lack of 
																																																								
75 Until the late 1970s Malawi’s government received external financial support for smallpox, 
measles and DPT (diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus) vaccines. Still, by 1978, BCG coverage stood at 
65 percent, and only 30 percent of children had received their 3rd dose of DPT. Prior to 1978, the 
government had to purchase polio and measles vaccine using its own domestic revenues, and 
these were often out of stock. In 1978, with funding from the UNFPA and WHO, the Ministry 
undertook its first nationwide measles vaccination campaign. In the following years, UNICEF 
also provided funding for measles vaccination campaigns. In 1980, the Ministry also received 
support from Save the Children UK for a polio vaccination campaign, as well as refrigerators to 
store cold chain vaccines. See WJ Chikakuda, “The Expanded Programme on Immunization in 
Malawi,” Malawi Epidemiological Quarterly 2 (April 1983): 3–12. 
76 “Malawi Growth and Structural Change: A Basic Economic Report.” Page 180. 
77 According to the World Bank, in 1994, the final year of HK Banda’s long tenure in office, the 
maternal mortality ratio stood at 956 deaths per 100,000 live births. This was 164th out of 183 
countries for which the World Bank collected statistics. See “Maternal Mortality Ratio (Modeled 
Estimate, per 100,000 Live Births),” World Bank Data, accessed June 10, 2016, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT?order=wbapi_data_value_1994+wbapi_data
_value&sort=asc&page=4. For a critical analysis of the methodology by which maternal 
mortality is estimated, see Claire Wendland, “Estimating Death: A Close Reading of Maternal 
Mortality Metrics in Malawi,” in Metrics: What Counts in Global Health (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2016), 57–81. 
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attention to health in his budgets helped Malawi maintain its position toward the bottom 
of international health indices. 
 
Nevertheless, many Malawians today remember Banda as a protector who successfully 
brought a modicum of material security to most Malawians. In the three decades that 
followed 1980, an era marked by AIDS, famine, and chronic want, government health 
facilities again became a focal point of popular politics. The idealization of this less-than-
ideal past is the focus of the conclusion. 
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Conclusion 
I. Conflict as the Bridge Between High and Low Politics 
During the summer of 2006, I was a congressional intern in Washington, D.C., working 
in the office of a Democratic representative with a liberal voting record and an interest in 
global health. His most senior legislative aide, “Susan,” was a woman in her early 50s. 
She had the seen-it-all, done-it-all grizzled habitus shared by many long-time staffers on 
Capitol Hill. Whenever I became too excited about a new piece of proposed legislation, 
or a seeming breakthrough in budget negotiations, Susan would laugh a bit and warn me 
not to get my hopes up.  
 
One day, Susan explained the hierarchy of policy areas in congressional deliberations. 
Health policy was, she explained, a “chick issue.” As health was part of her portfolio in 
the congressman’s office, I thought at first this might be a declaration of feminist pride. 
After all, the preparations for the next push for universal health insurance were one of the 
few topics Democratic staffers would discuss without a hint of cynicism. Yet I could not 
help but notice that Susan spoke of “chick issues” in a tone of bitterness. She went on to 
explain that health and other “caring” issues (such as children’s policy and old-age 
policy) were often delegated to female staffers because they were commonly viewed as 
both more feminine and less important than economic policy and defense. Health was, 
she explained, an afterthought in the halls of power, one that the male-dominated 
legislative body felt comfortable relegating to a second tier. 
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Susan was not alone in noticing this hierarchy. One need look no further than the field of 
international relations, which draws a distinction between “high politics”—those issues, 
namely defense, that are vital to the survival of the state, and “low politics”—issues that 
are not so essential. But in this dissertation I have argued that this distinction between 
high and low politics obscures a more complex history. Health policy has long been a 
tool wielded by regimes seeking to maintain power. In Malawian history, the political 
ideology of health was often gendered (see Chapters 7 and 8), but neither Banda nor the 
(almost entirely male) British officials of the colonial era saw health as an issue that they 
could simply ignore. 
 
The unrest to which colonial and postcolonial officials felt compelled to respond with 
health spending was not “health activism.” The labor militants of East and West Africa of 
the 1930s and 1940s did not demand health spending, but rather higher wages and better 
working conditions. Still, the UK Government responded with the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act of 1940, as it sought to answer concerns that the “colonial question” was 
hurting its international standing. The Malawi Congress Party of the 1950s did not call 
for hospitals and clinics, but rather for the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland. The one exception to this was the “ticky fee” in 1964 and the ensuing Cabinet 
Crisis, in which access to care was an explicitly stated concern of agents of unrest. Yet, 
for the most part, officials offered health care to restive publics demanding more 
fundamental social changes.  
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Africanists have long recognized the lack of a separation between what Aristotle termed 
the oikos (the home) and the polis (the public sphere).1 Indeed, in Malawi there is no 
clear distinction between these two spheres. Insofar as two spheres can be said to exist at 
all, it must be recognized that the oikos shapes the polis. The logic of judgments about 
local moral worlds informs those that citizens and subjects make about distant politicians 
and institutions. They are not divided spheres with separate logics. In both, the ability to 
subsist and the continuation of social solidarity are central concerns. The fluidity between 
these two spheres—divided in Western self-understandings—is evident in the work of 
“public healers,” as Steven Feierman has demonstrated.2 Dunduza Chisiza, the foremost 
economic thinker in Malawi’s nationalist vanguard, recognized the influence of domestic 
life on national politics when he argued that while “charity begins at home,” obligations 
to the vulnerable extended beyond the family to “the clan, the tribe, the nation, and to 
humanity as a whole.”3 
 
The blurring of oikos and polis in European welfare states has long concerned social 
theorists. Jürgen Habermas argues that a citizenry beholden to public benefits is no longer 
well-placed to engage in “rational-critical” debate about the proper extent of state action.4  
With the rise of the welfare state, particularly in postwar Europe, Habermas sees a state 
																																																								
1 For a discussion of the separation of these spheres in classical philosophy, see Georgio 
Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 
1998). Page 4. 
2 Steven Feierman, “Colonizers, Scholars and the Creation of Invisible Histories,” in Beyond the 
Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture (Berkeley, Calif.: University 
of California Press, 1999). Pages 186-187. 
3 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor, 2000). p 11. Also see Chapter 5. 
4 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1991). p. 232. 
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no longer opposed by a critical public sphere. Instead, he laments that the public sphere, 
“once invested in the institutions of the bourgeois constitutional state,” has become “an 
element in the political realm.” Once defined by negative rights guaranteeing certain 
liberties to propertied bourgeois citizens, the public sphere has been transformed with the 
rise of positive social rights. The state is now called upon to interfere constantly in realms 
previously off limits. 
 
In Malawian history, political leaders have indeed sought to use spending on social 
services to maintain power and consolidate support.  The white settlers who ran the 
Federation Government from Salisbury touted health spending as a demonstration of 
concern for Africans and proof of its mantra of “partnership.” President Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda fostered the connection between oikos and polis whenever he spoke of 
“his mbumba” or when he called himself “nkhoswe no. 1” at openings of new 
government hospital wings. This practice endures. In 2012, President Joyce Banda (no 
relation to Hastings Kamuzu Banda) had her likeness emblazoned on sacks of corn 
purchased with USAID funds and distributed to drought victims.5 With such a 
personalized, intimate discourse of political legitimacy, it is unsurprising that health 
spending would be a central tool of leaders in times of imperiled legitimacy. 
 
While Habermas might interpret these acts as nefarious attempts to foreclose critical 
debate, many Africanists believe that postcolonial citizenries would benefit from more 
robust state involvement in the lives of citizens. Achille Mbembe has argued that 																																																								
5 Personal communication with Anna West, July 13, 2013. 
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postcolonial African states have only rarely concerned themselves with the productive 
capacities of their citizenries. By contrast, it was a continuation of colonial sovereignty, 
which was “the exact opposite of the liberal model of debate and discussion.” Colonial 
sovereignty did not fit Foucault’s description of biopolitics.6 Rather, like Foucault’s 
classical sovereignty, it rested on violence, much of it “designed to ensure this authority’s 
maintenance, spread and permanence” through numerous banal acts “falling well short of 
what is properly called war.”7  
 
When compared to such violence (seen in Malawi in the form of forced labor, hut 
taxation, and coercive and ineffective public health campaigns), spending on voluntary 
medical care seems more benign than Habermas’ dystopian portrayal. Anthropologist 
Jean Comaroff echoes this point in her discussion of South African AIDS activists, who 
have forged a “moral politics” that “insists on making death sacrificial once more.”8 
These activists make productive use of the “salience of health in the reciprocal 
engagement of rulers and subjects across the world.”9 There is, in this telling, life-saving 
potential in the welfarist response to civil (and uncivil) disobedience. 
 
The idea that social spending is a product of agitation is not entirely new. It has been 
more than three decades since the economist Amartya Sen argued that famine is rarely 
																																																								
6 P. Wenzel Geissler, Richard Rottenburg, and Julia Zenker, “21st Century African Biopolitics: 
Fuzzy Fringes, Cracks and Undersides, Neglected Backwaters, and Returning Politics,” in 
Rethinking Biomedicine and Governance in Africa: Contributions from Anthropology (Bielefeld, 
Germany: Transcript, 2012), 7–22. p. 11. 
7 Mbembé, On the Postcolony. P. 25.  
8 Comaroff, “Beyond Bare Life.” Page 207. 
9 Ibid. Page 210. 
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the result of a decline in available food, but always occurs in the setting of an unequal 
distribution of “entitlements.”10 The distribution of entitlements—the means by which 
people acquire food, through cash wages or food distribution programs or any other 
means—is an outcome, Sen argues, of political decisions. Scarcity is a political 
construction used to justify a distribution of resources that leaves some with an 
abundance of food while others starve and die. Sen places great faith in the ability of 
democratic political discourse to prevent famines. He has gone so far as to argue “there 
has never been a famine in a functioning multiparty democracy.”11 
 
The importance of politics to social protection is evident in Malawian history as well. By 
the 1960s, Chisiza would argue that ignoring popular expectations of social protection 
“would be a dangerous political omission for the ruling parties.”12 Later politicians 
heeded this counsel. In the years leading up to Malawi’s 2004 general election, President 
Bakili Muluzi presided over an increase in public expenditure on health, which rose from 
2.9 percent of GDP in 2002 to 5.7 percent in 2004. Muluzi’s handpicked successor, 
Bingu wa Mutharika, won the election and maintained this level of health spending as a 
percentage of GDP even as Malawi entered a period of rapid economic growth.13 
 
But during the period covered by this dissertation, Malawi’s 1961 election was its only 
one with multiple parties and a large African franchise. What kinds of political action 																																																								
10 Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1983). 
11 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor, 2000). p 178. Emphasis added. 
12 Chisiza, Realities of African Independence. p 17. 
13 “World Development Indicators: Health Expenditure, Total (% of GDP)” (World Bank), 
accessed May 25, 2016. 
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could shift the distribution of entitlements colonial Nyasaland, or Malawi under Banda’s 
one-party rule? Neither British colonial officials nor Banda’s censors allowed for the 
flourishing of critical discourse so valued by Sen. Colonialism and dictatorship 
foreclosed to the populace certain options for registering discontent. Instead of strongly 
worded newspaper editorials and orderly demonstrations, subject peoples had to resort to 
other tactics. As the political scientist James Scott has argued, “Much of the politics that 
has historically mattered has taken the form of unruly defiance.” Particularly in places 
where a vocal civil society is outlawed (but even, as Scott argues, where it is allowed) 
profound structural change usually only occurs after “massive, non-institutionalized 
disruption in the form of riots, attacks, on property, unruly demonstrations, theft, arson, 
and open defiance threatens established institutions.”14 
 
Throughout the era covered in this dissertation, Malawi was not a place where votes 
mattered.15 But even here, the demands of a marginalized African populace could not be 
entirely ignored. Particularly after the antibiotic revolution, colonial and postcolonial 
regimes could not miss the popularity of government health services. Even without 
opinion polling or free elections, the long queues at outpatient departments made it 
impossible to ignore the demand for government medical facilities. Rulers thought it wise 
to oblige African publics with some measure of health spending, even if health spending 
was not thought to contribute to economic growth. Cosmopolitan technical experts and 																																																								
14 Scott, Two Cheers for Anarchism: Six Easy Pieces on Autonomy, Dignity, and Meaningful 
Work and Play. P. xvii. 
15 The only election that approached openness and fairness during this era came in 1961. Not 
coincidentally, the Malawi Congress Party, which won that election handily, promised free 
education and healthcare for the populace in their party platform. See Chapter 6.  
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repressive rulers did have to make some concessions to local demands if they were to 
remain in power.  
 
This line of inquiry reveals new insights about postcolonial global health. International 
aid has been a crucial part of the recent response to AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, maternal 
mortality and other major health problems in Africa. While the nature of this assistance 
differs in many ways from colonial development funding, there are similarities. The 
Colonial Development Act was, in part, a response to a political crisis of unemployment. 
So, too, was the US President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a 5-year, 
$15 billion contribution to the international AIDS response. US President George W. 
Bush announced this plan—which he called “a work of mercy” in his 2003 State of the 
Union. In this same speech, the President issued an ultimatum to Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein, threatening that if he did not “fully disarm” (of his alleged weapons of mass 
destruction), “we will lead a coalition to disarm him.” In juxtaposing the threat of war 
with AIDS relief, Bush seemed to try to soften his image.16 There were, of course, many 
other motivations behind President Bush’s PEPFAR proposal—particularly the pleas of 
powerful members of the evangelical Christian Right. I have written about these 
motivations elsewhere.17 I mention the Iraq War connection only to show that the 
confluence of crisis politics and health spending persists. 
 
																																																								
16 Greg Behrman, The Invisible People: How the U.S. Has Slept Through the Global AIDS 
Pandemic, the Greatest Humanitarian Catastrophe of Our Time (New York: Free Press, 2004); 
Messac and Prabhu, “Redefining the Possible: The Global AIDS Response.” 
17 Messac and Prabhu, “Redefining the Possible: The Global AIDS Response.” 
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More recently, health activists have used the power of what Martin Luther King Jr. called 
“productive tension” to awaken politicians to the urgency of their demands. In 2000, 
activists in the United States persisted in disrupting the campaign rallies of Vice 
President Al Gore until the Clinton Administration stopped threatening Mandela’s 
government in South Africa with trade embargoes for importing low-cost generic AIDS 
drugs.18 Three years later, activist Zackie Achmat’s refusal to take antiretrovirals to treat 
his own infection until low-income citizens were guaranteed access to the same drugs 
helped compel the South African government to declare the right of universal access.19  
During Bingu wa Mutharika’s presidency, protestors held marches and rallies to draw 
attention to stock-outs of drugs and supplies in public hospitals.20  
 
These actions are much more consciously directed toward the health sector than, say, the 
Copperbelt strikes of the 1930s, or the anti-Federation protests of the 1950s. But this 
recent activism, which makes claims upon what Adriana Petryna has called “biological 
citizenship,” aims to recreate the same atmospheric of political tension that has often 
impelled officials to direct public resources toward the needs of the masses.21 Indeed, the 
share of government spending devoted to health reached its historical zenith after the 
anti-stock-out protests, rising briefly to 21 percent in 2009.22 Health activism itself can 
																																																								
18 Messac and Prabhu, “Redefining the Possible: The Global AIDS Response.” 
19 Comaroff, “Beyond Bare Life.”  p.210. 
20 “Missing Medicines in Malawi: Campaigning against ‘Stock-Outs’ of Essential Drugs,” Oxford 
Programme Insights (Oxfam, 2011), file:///Users/lukemessac/Downloads/pi-local-governance-
malawi-25052012-en.pdf. p 1. 
21 Adriana Petryna, Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl, With a New introduction 
by the author edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
22 “Missing Medicines in Malawi: Campaigning against ‘Stock-Outs’ of Essential Drugs.” p 7. 
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then, in certain circumstances, open the purse-strings of government budgets just as 
effectively as widespread social unrest. 
 
II. Does health spending matter? 
To advocates of a certain strain of social medicine, the kind of politically driven health 
spending—largely on curative medicine—this dissertation has chronicled does little to 
improve the public’s health. The architects of the 1978 Alma-Ata Declaration promoted 
the concept of “appropriate technology,” which sought to prioritize scientifically proven 
and financially feasible interventions over expensive and sophisticated technological 
interventions, which would, in the words of historian Marcos Cueto, draw away a 
“substantial share of scarce funds and manpower.”23 The following year, Julia Walsh and 
Kenneth Warren’s proposal for “selective primary health care” helped convince many of 
the largest international health agencies to focus on small menu of simple health 
interventions in order to achieve the maximum benefits for public health. Over the next 
two decades, UNICEF, the World Bank, USAID and the Rockefeller Foundation 
promoted and funded a set of interventions known by the acronym GOBI-FFF: Growth 
monitoring, Oral rehydration therapy, Breastfeeding, Immunization, Family planning, 
Female education, and Food supplementation.24 
 
Proponents of “appropriate technology” and “selective primary health care” were 
especially critical of the high shares of health budgets going toward urban hospitals. Such 																																																								
23 Marcos Cueto, “The Origins of Primary Health Care and Selective Primary Health Care,” 
American Journal of Public Health 94, no. 11 (November 2004): 1864–74. 
24 Kelley Lee, The World Health Organization (New York: Routledge, 2009). p. 80-81. 
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hospitals were, they said, costly distractions from the high-impact interventions in 
nutrition, water and sanitation, maternal and child health care, immunization, and 
essential drugs.25 Such hospitals rarely benefited the poor, and only served to bolster the 
egos of out-of-touch politicians. As the economist Peter Ruderman had observed in a 
1972 article, “To many presidents and prime ministers, a hospital is a more satisfactory 
monument than an arch of triumph.”26 According to these critics, such monuments were 
not an appropriate use of limited resources if the intent was to provide the greatest benefit 
for the greatest number. 
 
This strand of criticism also tended to criticize the focus in poor countries on curative 
chemotherapeutic interventions. Steeped in 1970s debate about the “medicalization” of 
U.S. and Western European societies, some cosmopolitan international health experts 
viewed budgets as zero-sum contests between individual-level measures such as drugs 
and surgeries and more upstream preventive interventions like clean water. Ivan Illich, 
the most prominent proponent of the “medicalization” thesis, went so far as to argue that 
medical provision was so harmful that “less access to the present health system would, 
contrary to popular rhetoric, benefit the poor.”27 In a 1979 book, British political 
economist Lesley Doyal used less strident language, but remained critical of the trend in 
which postcolonial governments continued to spend on “individual curative” measures 
instead of focusing on “fundamental social and environmental” transformations. She 
explained, “While the application of western medical treatment under third world 																																																								
25 Ibid. p. 76-80. 
26 Ruderman, “General Economic Considerations.” p 110. 
27 Ivan Illich, Medical Nemesis : The Expropriation of Health (London: Calder & Boyars, 1975). 
p. 73. Emphasis added. 
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conditions may have extremely beneficial short-term consequences for the individual 
patient, it cannot reduce the high incidence of disease, or raise the general level of 
health.”28 
 
Since the 1990s, similar critiques have often been couched in the language of cost-
effectiveness. Health economists, ethicists, and policymakers have argued against 
spending “limited” international aid and domestic health resources in poor countries on 
“high-tech” interventions such as antiretroviral AIDS treatment,29 multi-drug resistant 
tuberculosis treatment,30 and cancer chemotherapy.31 These analyses tended to assume 
costs were fixed, though as the steep fall in the prices of AIDS drugs would demonstrate 
they are anything but.32 Many of these studies also made assumptions about efficacy of 
preventive measures such as educational campaigns focused on behavior change that 
lacked evidence. Still, cost-benefit analyses have been highly influential in shaping the 
priorities of international agencies and national health ministries.33 
 
																																																								
28 Lesley Doyal, The Political Economy of Health (London: Pluto Press Limited, 1979). p. 256. 
29 Andrew Creese et al., “Cost-Effectiveness of HIV/AIDS Interventions in Africa: A Systematic 
Review of the Evidence,” Lancet 359, no. 9318 (2002): 1635–42; Elliot Marseille, Paul B. 
Hofmann, and James G. Kahn, “HIV Prevention before HAART in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Lancet 
359, no. 9320 (2002): 1851–56. 
30 John Donnelly, “Emanuel on TB: ‘The Challenge in Enormous,’” Science Speaks: Global ID 
News, October 28, 2010. 
31 I Magrath and J Litvak, “Cancer in Developing Countries: Opportunity and Challenge,” 
Journal of the National Cancer Institute 85, no. 11 (1993): 863; TA Ngoma, “World Health 
Organization Cancer Priorities in Developing Countries,” Annals of Oncology 17, no. suppl 8 
(July 2006): viii9-viii14. 
32 Messac and Prabhu, “Redefining the Possible: The Global AIDS Response.” 
33 Paul Farmer, Infections and Inequalities: The Modern Plagues (University of California Press, 
2001). 
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This line of argumentation contains many important truths. For instance, the lack of 
access to health services in rural areas is a well-documented problem with deadly 
consequences.34 Yet this perspective also elides other realities. First, pace Doyal, 
individual-level medical care can “reduce the high incidence of disease” and “improve 
the general level of health.” The most notable recent demonstration of this is a 
randomized-controlled trial, published in 2011, which demonstrated that early initiation 
of combined antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS not only improves the health of the 
person taking the medicines, but also reduces the risk of transmitting the virus to 
uninfected sexual partners by 96 percent.35 Thus, while the value of many preventive 
interventions, such as behavior change campaigns, remains relatively unproven, treating 
an individual patient is one of the most effective ways to prevent new infections and stem 
the tide of the AIDS pandemic. The global scale-up in antiretroviral treatment helped 
effect a 42 percent decline in global deaths from AIDS between 2004 and 2014. It also 
contributed to the 35 percent decline in new infections between 2000 and 2015.36 There 
exists, then, no bright line between individual-level treatment interventions and 
population-level prevention measures. 
 
There is also growing evidence that, at least since the antibiotic revolution of the mid-
twentieth century, individual-level medical care has been an important part of many 
																																																								
34 Stephen C. Joseph, “The Case for Clinical Services” (Good Health at Low Cost, Bellagio, Italy: 
Rockefeller Foundation, 1985), 221–27. 
35 Myron S Cohen, Ying Q Chen, and Marybeth McCauley, “Prevention of HIV-1 Infection with 
Early Antietroviral Therapy,” New England Journal of Medicine 365, no. 6 (July 18, 2011): 493–
505. 
36 “The Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic,” Global Health Policy Fact Sheet (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, November 30, 2015). 
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population-level mortality declines. For instance, demographer Olukunle Adegbola 
argued that the deployment of biomedicine in Nigeria helped increase life expectancy by 
fourteen years between 1963 and 1980.37 In a presentation before the famous conference 
sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation on “Good Health at Low Cost” in 1985, 
Stephen Joseph of UNICEF also presented a case for the population-level mortality 
benefits of clinical services. He joked that in making this argument, he represented a 
school of whose members “are usually in these circles referred to as ‘the bad guys.’” 
Joseph contended that in each of the four case studies being considered at the conference 
(Kerala, Costa Rica, China and Sri Lanka), a sizable portion of steep drops in mortality 
could reasonably be linked to rising government expenditures on personal-encounter 
medical care: “All the societies under consideration expended significant portions of their 
government budgets for health, and much of that was and remains in the clinical or health 
services sector.” Joseph did not argue against preventive services such as mass 
vaccination campaigns, but contended instead that the two were complementary—
experience with clinical services “may well serve as a motivator and incentive for people 
to utilize/accept preventive and public health services.”38 The key lesson in these case 																																																								
37 Olukunle Adegbola, “The Impact of Urbanization and Industrialization on Health Conditions: 
The Case of Nigeria,” World Health Statistics Quarterly 40 (1987): 74–83. This literature is not 
without its own immodest claims. In 1975, Orubuloye and Caldwell published a study arguing 
that statistically significant differences in under-five mortality between two otherwise very 
similar areas of rural Nigeria could be attributed almost entirely to the presence of a hospital in 
only one of the towns. But anthropologist Steven Feierman has pointed out that the authors 
“ignored several possible explanatory factors,” including higher rates of male migration and of 
well water contaminated with feces in the town without the hospital. See Steven Feierman, 
“Struggles for Control: The Social Roots of Health and Healing in Modern Africa,” African 
Studies Review 28, no. 2–3 (1985): 73–147. 
38 Joseph, “The Case for Clinical Services.” For more on the role of trust in public acceptance of 
public health interventions such as vaccines, see Robert Aronowitz, Risky Medicine: Our Quest to 
Cure Fear and Uncertainty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). Page 214. Also see 
Julie Livingston, Keith Wailoo, and Barbara M. Cooper, “Vaccination as Governance: HPV 
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studies, Joseph maintained, was not the need to prioritize population-level prevention 
over personal-encounter medical care. None of the governments had so shifted their 
health budgets. Instead, these case studies revealed two much more salient factors: first, 
the importance of the overall size of government health budgets, for both “medical” 
services and “public health” interventions; and second, the need for equitable access to 
such services in areas rich and poor, urban and rural.39 
 
Scholars seeking to determine the causes of mortality decline face the challenge of 
collinearity; investments in health infrastructure often occur alongside broader social and 
economic changes. Yet there is now a sizable literature demonstrating that biomedicine 
has made a discrete and measurable contribution to population-level mortality decline.40 
A review of this literature by Harvard economist Michael Kremer in 2002 concluded that 
the weight of evidence favored the view that “the role of pharmaceuticals and medical 
technology in improving health in developing countries stands in contrast to the historical 
experience of the developed countries…Modern medical technologies allow tremendous 
improvements in health even at low income levels.”41 Medical care, then, is more than 
just a neo-colonialist drain on limited resources.  																																																																																																																																																																					
Skepticism in the United States and Africa, and the North-South Divide,” in Three Shots at 
Prevention: The HPV Vaccine and the Politics of Medicine’s Simple Solutions (Baltimore, Md.: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 231–53. 
39 Joseph, “The Case for Clinical Services.”  
40 For a review of this literature, see Farmer, Paul, Matthew Basilico, and Luke Messac. “After 
McKeown: The Changing Roles of Biomedicine, Public Health and Economic Growth in 
Mortality Declines.” In Therapeutic Revolutions: Pharmaceuticals and Social Change in the 
Twentieth Century, Eds. Jeremy Greene, Flurin Condrau, Elizabeth Watkins. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2016. Also see Robert Aronowitz, Risky Medicine: Our Quest to Cure Fear 
and Uncertainty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).  
41 Michael Kremer, “Pharmaceuticals and the Developing World,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 2002, 67–90. 
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Furthermore, as this dissertation has demonstrated, after the Second World War what has 
been called “personal-encounter” medical care—that is, care delivered by individual 
medical professionals and paraprofessionals to individual patients—has increasingly been 
in demand among the Malawian public. During the 1950s and 1960s, Nyasaland’s 
Africans presented in rapidly growing numbers at government hospitals and health 
centers. When, in 1964, the popular hero of the anti-Federation movement, Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda, presided over the imposition of an outpatient user fee, he quickly 
encountered armed resistance. This popular demand for medicine was not false 
consciousness. As shown in Chapter 7, patients sought preventive and curative 
interventions for those conditions with proven efficacy at relieving symptoms. Patients 
with tuberculosis avoided palliative long-term hospitalization and surgical ablation of the 
phrenic nerve for tuberculosis, but flocked for treatment once streptomycin and isoniazid 
reached clinic shelves. Communities shunned ineffective smallpox vaccination 
campaigns for decades, but accepted them willingly following the use of effective 
vaccine and cold-chain storage. Care-seeking behavior in Malawi was highly specific and 
empirical. Patients appeared when there was something on offer that worked. 
 
III. Scarcity discourse 
The most troubling consequence of pitting personal-encounter medical care against 
population-level prevention is that it concedes the argument to those who argue that 
health budgets in poor countries are fated to their current low levels. This concession 
appears early in a 2008 commentary in the Journal of the American Medical Association 
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authored by Colleen Denny and Ezekiel Emanuel, published just before Emanuel began 
serving as a global health advisor to U.S. President Barack Obama. “International aid is 
inherently limited,” the authors argued. “Consequently, it is extremely important to 
consider how this finite aid is distributed.”42 The authors’ assumption that the size of the 
budget for global health is inherently limited (to its current levels) automatically limits 
the discussion to how existing resources should be divided amongst competing priorities. 
Inevitably, this calculus leaves some to die: should money go to immunize children 
against pertussis, or to treat adults with AIDS? But those who make this assumption 
discard the many possibilities that arise from the question: where are more resources to 
be found? Only if we accept the allocation of societal resources as given will we make 
expanded AIDS treatment the enemy of higher immunization rates, as Denny and 
Emanuel do in their commentary.  
 
In one sense, this focus on apportioning limited resources in surprising, for it comes from 
many of the same people who argue for the importance of upstream, environmental 
factors. Yet when they discuss the political process, their temporal perspective is very 
limited. They take health budgets as given, rather than considering how to influence 
decisions about their size.  
 
Rural Malawians, on the other hand do not accept this zero-sum formulation. Scarcity 
may have a hold on the elite moral imaginary, but this thrall does not cross class lines. I 																																																								
42 Colleen C Denny and Ezekiel J. Emanuel, “US Health Aid Beyond PEPFAR: The Mother & 
Child Campaign,” Journal of the American Medical Association 300, no. 17 (November 5, 2008): 
2048–51. 
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learned this rather quickly during my time in Nyanza. There I frequently had my clothes 
repaired by a paraplegic man who had survived polio. He used a hand-powered sewing 
machine; his young nephew aided him by turning the wheel. About a kilometer away 
lived a blind man who had lost his sight in the late 1970s to measles. Neither of these 
men would likely link their debility to the man in their village who had regained his sight 
following cataract surgery in Zomba’s Central Hospital. The cataract surgery was more 
expensive than a polio or measles vaccine, but none of the men saw a necessary trade-off 
between immunization and ophthalmologic surgery. They did not believe resources were 
so scarce as to demand such a choice. 
 
People in Nyanza knew the benefits of immunization, of better housing and more 
adequate food. They desperately sought each of these goods for themselves and their 
families. But none saw decreasing budgets for drugs and staff at hospitals as the 
preferable way to increase spending on these other priorities. When asked where 
additional funds for such programs might come from, many Malawians looked to 
government officials who stole from government coffers, or wealthy Malawians in the 
larger cities and towns, or foreign governments with historic ties to Malawi. Looking far 
and wide, they could see that there was plenty of money available; it just wasn’t available 
to them. In the words of Amartya Sen, they recognized the unequal “distribution of 
entitlements.” 
 
Understanding where health budgets actually come from demands that we see claims of 
scarcity for what they usually are: an excuse. Even in Malawi, once an “imperial slum” 
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and in the twenty-first century still one of the world’s poorest countries, scarcity is a 
construction that obscures unequal wealth and exploitative extraction, and by so 
obscuring aims to free the powerful from social obligations. During the First World War, 
colonial police conducted night raids to kidnap villagers and force them into the carrier 
service. At the same time, colonial officials claimed to lack the resources to provide 
better care for the thousands of African carriers who toiled and died (Chapter 1). During 
the 1920s, the claim of scarce resources was the preferred excuse of the UK Treasury as 
officials demanded repayment for the TZR loan while refusing to improve African 
hospitals (Chapters 2-3). During the 1940s, the Labour Party used claims of scarce 
resources and the myth of comprehensive “traditional social security” to place 
geographical bounds on its plans for social protection (Chapters 4-6). The Federation 
government resorted to such claims as they spent far more per-capita on health services 
for Europeans than they did for Africans (Chapter 8). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
Life President Banda and World Bank administrators constantly claimed Malawi’s dismal 
health services were actually quite impressive “in light of funds available,” even while 
Banda built personal palaces with state funds (Chapters 9-10). 
 
The impoverishment of Nyasaland’s medical department by 1919 TZR loan guarantee 
also has postcolonial parallels. Multilateral and bilateral aid agencies have consistently 
favored large, capital-intensive projects over community health and education (see 
Chapters 7 and 8). Muckraking exposés and confessional memoirs have presented loans 
from the World Bank, USAID and other agencies to build dams, roads, and railways in 
poor countries as ploys to profit European, American and (more recently) Chinese 
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manufacturers and financiers, prop up puppet dictators, and entrap poor countries in 
debt.43 The moral obligations invoked by advocates in the international debt relief 
(“Jubilee”) movement of the 1990s and 2000s find echoes in the pleas of Colonial Office 
officials to the Treasury to lessen the crushing burden of the TZR loan guarantee on 
Nyasaland’s population. Neither accepts the geographical boundaries that underpin the 
claims of scarcity. 
 
While historians of colonial, postcolonial, or international health have tended (with 
notable exceptions) to accept claims of scarcity at face value, other scholars have begun 
to contest them. The clearest example of this is in studies of water and food allocation. 
Inspired by Sen’s studies of famine, the Institute of Development Studies at the 
University of Sussex convened a meeting in 2005 on “the limits of scarcity.” Their 
collective statement, signed by economists and sociologists specializing in the politics of 
food and other “scarce” resources, expresses many of the themes I have explored in a 
dissertation on health budgets. It is worth quoting at some length here: 
Scarcity is considered to be the ubiquitous feature of the modern condition and is 
widely used as an explanation for social organization…Scarcity is made out to be 
an all-pervasive fact of our lives…We, however, believe that scarcity is not a 
natural condition. It is not something that is inherently in the nature of 
things…Detailed sociological and political attention to what is actually happening 
on the ground has almost always located the causes of pressing social problems 
such as hunger or water shortage not in an absolute scarcity but in socially 
generated scarcity arising from imbalances of power that deny people access to 
food or water…Moreover, the ‘scare’ of scarcity has led to scarcity emerging as a 
political strategy for powerful groups…It is also used to provide simplistic 
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solutions rather than focusing on the social and political reasons that cause 
inaccessibility and perpetrate exclusions.44 
 
In order to understand that money for government health services is rarely so scarce as 
officials claim, and to see when and how these claims of scarcity have been overcome (if 
momentarily), scholars must look beyond the normal confines of global health discourse. 
They must look to international labor history, the history of economic thought, and to the 
idiosyncratic details of the political histories of particular countries. In doing so, it 
becomes apparent that even in one of the world’s most impoverished nations, health 
budgets have been determined not by the absolute amount of money available, but by the 
extent of unrest.  
 
This is not an automatic cause-and-effect relationship. The episodes of unrest that led to 
increases in health spending in Malawi were not always—or even often—in Malawi 
proper. And though governmental responses to unrest often involved the provision of 
health care, the unrest itself was only seldom impelled by an explicit demand for health 
care. In this dissertation, health spending came in response to varied and unrelated 
movements, including strikes over pay and labor conditions (see the strikes of the 1930s 
and 1940s in the Copperbelt and the West Indies), a movement to stop an inegalitarian 
political system (see the anti-Federation protests of the 1950s), and rumors about foreign 
creditors (see the vampire rumors about South Africa in the 1960s). Furthermore, as 
James Scott has noted, sometimes unrest leads not to progressive social and political 
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transformation, but to repression.45 Even unrest that accomplishes the aims of protestors 
can lead to great suffering. The people of Masasa have not been displaced from their 
homes, but Nicotine is dead and Innocent has only one leg (Chapters 3 and 4). It is 
difficult to predict the dividends of disquiet. 
 
And, of course, there are limits to health spending, particularly spending coming from the 
domestic coffers of poor countries. Such nations cannot spend at will on anything and 
everything. Governments do have competing priorities. A number of these—education, 
agricultural supports, and social insurance—are essential for human flourishing. And 
government spending requires revenue, which must be raised by collecting taxes, issuing 
debt, or printing money. Each of these can have undesirable economic consequences, 
such as inflation, particularly when taken to extremes. Yet low-income countries have 
seldom found themselves imperiled by runaway government health spending. In a cross-
country analysis of 80 nations between 1973 and 1990, Song Han and Casey Mulligan 
concluded that inflation was spurred by most often by wartime military expenditures 
rather than by expansions in social spending.46 
 
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, experts in development economics have 
reached a consensus that poor countries generally underinvest in health, education, and 
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46 Song Han and Casey B. Mulligan, “Inflation and the Size of Government,” Federal Reserve 
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social insurance.47 This consensus had affected Malawi’s health spending. In recent years 
the International Monetary Fund has warned Malawi that it must pursue “tighter fiscal 
and monetary policies geared toward placing inflation on a declining trend.” Malawi’s 
refusal to follow this advice could leave it without the IMF’s seal of approval, a demerit 
that often leads other international agencies to deny poor nations access to concessional 
loans and grants. But even while it counsels cuts to farm input subsidies and certain parts 
of the civil service, the IMF has insisted that Malawi’s finance ministry should 
“safeguard social spending,” especially health, education, and cash transfers.48 So even 
the foremost institutional guardian of fiscal austerity on the planet has decided that health 
budgets need not be subjected to the same regimes of scarcity as other public spending. 
 
IV. Lessons  
In a series of lectures first published in 1961, British historian EH Carr objected to two 
kinds of historical writing. The first is the kind of writing that maintains pretensions to 
scientistic impartiality. These are chronicles of dates and events so thorough and without 
analysis as to numb the mind. The second form of meaninglessness is the history of 																																																								
47 Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict Clements, and Gabriela Inchauste, Helping Countries Develop: The 
Role of Fiscal Policy (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2004). See Chapters 8 and 
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development aid. But even the critics of aid, such as Angus Deaton, generally consider health aid 
as more beneficial than other forms of international assistance. For anti-aid perspectives, see 
Angus Deaton, The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2013); Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How 
There Is a Better Way for Africa (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010); William 
Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so Much Ill 
and so Little Good (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006). For a pro-aid perspective, 
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Director for Malawi,” IMF Country Report (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 
December 2015), p. 13 and 15. 
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accidents, which rests all historical turning points on great or evil men or unforeseeable 
calamities. While Carr believed that great historical shifts had multiple causes, he also 
believed historians can speak of causation and not just pure contingency. Only from those 
histories that explore relationships between actions and reactions can lessons be derived. 
History does not repeat itself, nor prescribe immutable laws of causation. But, as Carr 
suggested, it is not the historian’s aim merely to produce either naively “objective” or 
meaningless narratives, but to glean lessons relevant to the present.49 In this spirit, I, too, 
will suggest that this history has lessons for the present.  
 
After rapid increases in international aid for health in southern Africa during the 2000s 
and 2010s, funding has plateaued in recent years. International development assistance 
flattened at a level far below of the target of 0.7 percent of GDP agreed to by the leaders 
of wealthy nations at the G8 summit in Gleneagles in 2005. Aid levels failed to rise even 
as Western economies emerged from recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis. 
Politicians in rich nations have justified the persistently low levels of aid by invoking 
familiar claims of scarcity. At the same time, wealthy nations have done little to stem the 
tide of illicit financial flows leaving poor nations. By some credible estimates, the 
amount of money leaving Africa through illicit financial flows equals the amount 
entering through aid.50 Meanwhile, Malawi’s recent governments have in recent years 
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floated the idea of making the rural poor pay for user fees at government clinics. The 
Ministry of Health has claimed that the government can no longer afford to treat patients 
free at the point of care.51 
 
These claims lack evidence and imagination; they are also tired. What Paul Farmer has 
called “the house of No” was built long ago; officials in Britain’s Colonial Office and 
Southern Rhodesia’s Federal Ministry of Health justified paltry health budgets with 
similar claims, until forced by circumstances to shift course. Claims of scarcity are a 
smokescreen, a simulacrum; they apply only in periods of political quiet. Health funding 
is not an automatic function of economic growth. Government purses have been pried 
open before, and they will be again. All it takes is a crisis of legitimacy. The health of the 
poor has mattered most to those in power when their own political fortunes hang in the 
balance. 
 
If we acknowledge the role of unrest in determining health budgets, and the importance 
of health budgets in determining health outcomes, what are we to do? Foment uprisings? 
This seems a dangerous strategy, given the often-disastrous consequences of political 
instability, particularly in central and southern Africa. Some Malawians have seen fit to 
protest the dreadful state of government health services.52 Their protests could surely 
																																																																																																																																																																					
out against licit, but still quite deleterious, avoidance of taxes by corporate actors in Malawi. The 
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benefit from international support. But thus far, they have not secured sustained 
improvements in the government health system. In fact, a popular rumor holds that when 
78-year-old President Bingu wa Mutharika’s was rushed to Kamuzu Central Hospital 
with a heart attack in April 2012, the hospital did not have any epinephrine to administer 
to him.53 Though the government never confirmed the rumor, and it is not at all certain 
that epinephrine would have saved the president’s life, this drug is a standard component 
of cardiac resuscitation protocols around the world. Bingu’s purported death-by-stock-out 
became a subject of derision among Malawians, no longer surprised by a health system 
so poorly funded and managed it killed even the president. 
 
For the citizens of the wealthy nations of the Global North, different lessons emerge from 
the history recounted in the preceding chapters. There is an urgent need to challenge the 
ubiquitous claims of scarcity. Even colonial-era doctors such as John Owen Shircore and 
Henry De Boer realized that health budgets in Nyasaland need not be so low, and 
presented plans to increase them. During the Federation Era, doctors like John Goodall 
insisted that they did not have the tools they need to practice decent medicine in 
Nyasaland’s African hospitals. At times their protests helped to garner greater resources, 
as when the Colonial Development Fund approved the majority of the proposals in 
Shircore’s 1930 report. Yet during the last two decades of the twentieth century, with the 
World Bank and IMF insisting on cuts to social spending in debtor nations, practitioners 
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and policymakers in international health became “socialized for scarcity.”54 So pervasive 
was the habitus of defeatism in international health in 2004 that an executive at the 
Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative told me he generally did not hire people with 
NGO experience because they had grown “too used to taking no for an answer.”55 
 
Through all of this, though, there remains a need to cultivate a “willingness to be 
surprised,” to question totalizing narratives with inductive histories.56 Twenty-first 
century global health does not share all the sins of colonial medicine.57 Nor were colonial 
doctors and officials simply handmaidens of economic exploitation. Even this study of 
colonial medicine, which is informed (though not dictated) by a materialist understanding 
of history, there are still colonial administrators who exhibit deeply held moral 
commitments and have made significant impacts on access to medicine and care. John 
Owen Shircore, Shenton Thomas, and Lord Eustace Percy are such individuals. Working 
within a discriminatory social and economic system, the efforts of these sons of privilege 
helped to funnel resources down steep gradients of inequality to ensure some modicum of 
medical care reached subject African populations.  
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It may seem regressive to look to colonial doctors as role models, but in this case there is 
something worth emulating. Global health practitioners and policymakers should be at 
least as skeptical about claims of scarcity in our time as Shircore and De Boer were in 
theirs. Just as De Boer suggested that tax revenues from mining might be used to benefit 
Nyasaland, advocates of the present should insist on greater creativity in securing the 
finances necessary to improve the health of poor people in poor countries.58 Such 
creativity is evident in the creation, in 2006, of the UNITAID airline tax by a number of 
European and Latin American nations. The revenues of this tax, which reached $2.4 
billion between 2006 and 2014, have been used to finance AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria diagnosis and treatment activities around the globe.59 More recently advocates 
have agitated for a financial transactions tax (on sales of bonds and shares) and a tax on 
arms sales to fund health programs in poor nations.60 
 
V. What it takes 
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Malawi markets itself as the “warm heart of Africa,” trading on its international 
reputation as a friendly, peaceful oasis in the midst of a region long mired in violence and 
turmoil.61 As this dissertation has shown, this land is not so placid as its reputation 
indicates. Early in the nineteenth century it received migrants from the south fleeing the 
mfecane. By the mid-nineteenth century, its people were constantly subjected to slave 
raids from armed traders seeking riches in the Indian Ocean trade. The colonial era 
brought wars of conquest, two world wars, anti-witchcraft movements and Christian 
millenarianism. Mass arrests and strikes attended the anti-Federation movement of the 
1950s and early 1960s. After independence, the leadership of the new nation fell into a 
bitter and bloody internecine battle. Popular demonstrations and labor actions heralded 
the end of Banda’s long reign in the 1990s. Even today, as evidenced by the Masasa 
incident in 2015, political violence remains a feature of life and death in Malawi. 
 
Still, it is true that Malawi has presented few of the profound threats to foreign capital 
that have led, in other places, to significant increases in social spending. Nyasaland 
benefitted relatively little from the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act, while 
centers of labor agitation in the West Indies and West Africa received far more aid. 
Malawi’s dearth of mineral resources and its geopolitical insignificance have afforded it 
few opportunities to enter the realpolitik calculus of more powerful nations. The few 
exceptions to this trend, such as the increase in health spending that followed the 
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agitation of the Federation era, only prove the rule. There are dividends to disquiet, but 
Malawian history has usually demonstrated, conversely, the perils of peace. 
 
Just as Malawi’s health services have derived relatively paltry benefits from unrest, they 
also have been unable to garner much funding from arguments about the economic 
benefits of health spending. The interwar focus on nutrition petered out without any great 
investments in either agriculture or medical services, while the human capital arguments 
of the 1970s did not spur vast new health spending by international aid agencies or by 
Banda’s government. Those holding the purse strings of colonial and postcolonial 
treasuries have proven to be little moved by trends in economic thought. 
 
The greatest recent boon to Malawi’s health sector came neither from unrest nor from 
economic logics, but from a human rights movement for health at the dawn of the twenty-
first century. Activists, humanitarians, and politicians of vastly different ideologies from 
the Global North and South propelled successful campaigns for debt relief and increased 
international aid for global health. These campaigns made it possible for Malawi’s 
government, and those in other poor countries, to expand access to AIDS treatment while 
improving staffing in clinics and hospitals around the country.62  
 
In 2004 an estimated 900,000 citizens had HIV.63 The next year, 98,000 Malawians 
became newly infected.64 For every 10 new nurses graduating from Malawi’s training 																																																								
62 Messac and Prabhu, “Redefining the Possible: The Global AIDS Response.” 
63 Katharina Kober and Wilm Van Damme, “Scaling up Access to Antiretroviral Treatment in 
Southern Africa: Who Will Do the Job?,” Lancet 364, no. 9428 (July 3, 2004): 103–7. p 2.  
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institutions, four existing nurses succumbed to AIDS.65 Only nine facilities in the public 
sector offered antiretroviral therapy (ART); these treated a total of 3,000 patients.66 That 
year, using funding from a successful application from the first round of the Global Fund 
for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, Malawi began providing free antiretroviral therapy 
to adult patients.67 Within a few years, with funding from UNITAID, Malawi also began 
to provide pediatric patients access to ART free of charge. By March 2011, 433 clinics in 
Malawi treated over 264,000 patients with ART.68 A recurring survey in Karonga 
District, in the north of Malawi, found that all-cause adult mortality decreased by 32 
percent between 2002 and 2008.69  
 
During this period, Malawi also received assistance to address its dire shortage of 
healthcare workers. Low pay and desperate working conditions had long impelled many 
of Malawi’s health workers to leave the public sector. The Global Fund and the UK 
Department for International Development inaugurated 6-year, $272 million Emergency 
Human Resources Programme (EHRP) in 2005. This program provided a 52 percent 
salary increase for all health workers, expanded pre-service training, and recruited 
expatriate volunteer doctors and nurses. The EHRP also included incentives to attract 																																																																																																																																																																					
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healthcare workers to underserved areas.70 Analyses found that the salary “top-ups” 
helped stem the flow of healthcare workers out of the public sector, while expanded pre-
service training led to a more robust cadres of healthcare workers.71 The number of 
health professionals trained annually increased from 400 in 2004 to over 1000 by 2008.72  
 
Between 2002 and 2008, donor countries’ contributions to global AIDS programs 
increased by a factor of six. For millions, these investments transformed HIV from a 
death sentence to a manageable chronic disease. Yet in the wake of the financial crisis, 
the annual increases in aid stopped.73 As of 2016, global health spending levels by 
bilateral and multilateral donors remained largely unchanged.74 In a July 2011 interview 
Dorothy Ngoma, Executive Director of Malawi’s National Organization of Nurses and 
Midwives, expressed despair over the state of Malawi’s health sector: 
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Don’t let anyone convince you that [past efforts] have relieved the emergency. 
While we can see improvements in pockets, we are still in a crisis. Without 
money on the table, we can’t make progress…Where are our partners?...Why are 
babies still dying? In a nation with only one-quarter of the nurses necessary to 
meet WHO-recommended minimums, why does tuition still cost $2000 per 
student? Why are there so many people dying for want of basic needs? Why are 
there so many hospitals without labs?75 
 
While unrest and economic arguments may help put drugs on shelves and nurses in wards 
of public hospitals, ultimately Sen is correct. Incredibly, scholars and policymakers still 
need to be reminded of “the intrinsic importance we attach—and have reason to attach—
to living.” Campaigns built on moral claims have, in recent years, proved capable of 
spurring rapid changes. Still, the provision of medical care and public health to Malawi’s 
people remains woefully inadequate. 
 
What is an acceptable standard of care for poor people in poor countries? How much 
untimely and avoidable death is morally permissible? How much action is politically 
possible? This dissertation has chronicled the (generally disappointing) answers that 
actors of the past have given to these questions in their own time. Now, we must answer 
them in our own.  
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